1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
818 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
819 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
820 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
821 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
822 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
823 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
824 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
825 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
828 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
829 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
830 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
831 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
832 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
833 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
834 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
835 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
836 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
837 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
838 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
839 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
840 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
841 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
842 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
844 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
845 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
846 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
847 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
849 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
850 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
851 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
852 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
854 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
855 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
856 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
857 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
858 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
860 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
861 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
862 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
863 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
865 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
866 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
867 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
869 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
870 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
871 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
872 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
873 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
875 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
876 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
879 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
880 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
882 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
883 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
884 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
885 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
887 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
888 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
890 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
891 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
894 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
895 (0, update, required),
898 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
899 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
900 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
901 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
902 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
906 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
907 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
908 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
910 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
912 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
918 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
920 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
928 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
929 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
930 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
931 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
933 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
934 /// in a timely manner.
935 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
938 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
939 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
940 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
942 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
943 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
944 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
945 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
949 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
950 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
951 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
953 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
954 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
955 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
956 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
958 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
962 /// The current channel ID.
963 channel_id: ChannelId,
964 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
965 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
966 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
967 channel_state: ChannelState,
969 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
970 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
972 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
973 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
974 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
976 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
977 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
978 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
979 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
981 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
982 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
984 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
986 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
987 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
988 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
990 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
991 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
992 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
994 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
995 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
996 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
997 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
998 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
999 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1001 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1002 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1003 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1004 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1005 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1006 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1008 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1010 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1011 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1012 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1014 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1015 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1016 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1017 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1018 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1019 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1020 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1022 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1023 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1024 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1026 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1027 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1028 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1029 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1030 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1031 /// outbound or inbound.
1032 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1034 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1036 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1037 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1038 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1039 // HTLCs with similar state.
1040 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1041 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1042 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1043 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1044 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1045 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1046 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1049 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1051 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1052 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1053 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1055 update_time_counter: u32,
1057 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1058 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1059 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1060 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1061 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1062 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1064 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1065 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1067 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1068 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1069 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1070 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1072 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1073 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1075 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1077 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1079 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1080 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1081 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1082 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1083 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1085 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1086 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1088 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1089 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1090 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1092 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1093 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1094 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1095 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1096 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1097 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1098 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1099 channel_creation_height: u32,
1101 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1104 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1106 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1111 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1114 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1118 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1122 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1124 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1126 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1127 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1129 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1131 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1132 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1133 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1135 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1137 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1138 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1139 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1141 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1142 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1143 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1145 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1147 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1149 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1150 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1151 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1152 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1154 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1155 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1156 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1158 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1159 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1160 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1162 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1163 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1164 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1165 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1166 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1167 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1168 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1169 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1171 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1172 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1173 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1174 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1175 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1177 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1178 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1180 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1181 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1182 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1183 /// unblock the state machine.
1185 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1186 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1187 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1189 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1190 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1191 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1194 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1195 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1196 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1197 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1198 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1199 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1200 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1202 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1203 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1205 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1206 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1207 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1209 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1210 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1211 // associated channel mapping.
1213 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1214 // to store all of them.
1215 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1217 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1218 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1219 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1220 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1221 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1223 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1224 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1226 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1227 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1229 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1230 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1231 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1233 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1234 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1235 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1238 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1239 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1240 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1241 self.update_time_counter
1244 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1245 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1248 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1249 self.config.announced_channel
1252 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1253 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1256 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1257 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1258 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1259 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1262 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1263 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1264 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1267 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1268 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1269 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1270 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1271 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1272 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1273 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1276 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1277 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1278 match self.channel_state {
1279 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1280 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1281 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1282 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1283 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1284 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1285 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1287 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1289 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1290 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1294 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1295 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1296 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1297 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1298 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1299 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1302 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1303 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1304 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1308 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1309 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1310 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1311 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1312 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1315 // Public utilities:
1317 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1321 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1323 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1324 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1325 self.temporary_channel_id
1328 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1332 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1333 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1334 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1338 /// Gets the channel's type
1339 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1343 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1345 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1346 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1347 self.short_channel_id
1350 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1351 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1357 self.outbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1362 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1363 return &self.holder_signer
1366 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1367 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1368 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1369 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1370 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1371 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1374 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1375 /// get_funding_created.
1376 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1380 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1381 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1382 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1383 if conf_height > 0 {
1390 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1391 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1392 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1395 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1397 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1398 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1402 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1405 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1406 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1409 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1410 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1413 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1414 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1415 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1418 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1419 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1423 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1424 self.counterparty_node_id
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1429 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1434 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1438 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1440 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1441 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1442 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1443 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1445 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1449 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1450 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1451 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1459 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1460 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1461 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1463 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1464 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1469 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1470 self.channel_value_satoshis
1473 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1474 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1477 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1478 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1481 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1482 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1483 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1485 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1486 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1487 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1488 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1489 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1495 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1496 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1497 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1500 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1501 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1502 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1505 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1507 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1515 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1517 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1520 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1522 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1525 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1526 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1527 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1528 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1529 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1532 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1534 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1535 self.prev_config = None;
1539 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1540 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1544 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1545 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1546 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1547 let did_channel_update =
1548 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1549 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1550 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1551 if did_channel_update {
1552 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1553 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1554 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1555 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1557 self.config.options = *config;
1561 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1562 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1563 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1564 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1565 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1568 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1569 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1570 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1571 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1572 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1574 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1575 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1576 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1577 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1578 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1579 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1580 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1582 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1583 where L::Target: Logger
1585 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1586 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1587 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1589 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1590 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1591 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1592 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1594 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1595 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1596 if match update_state {
1597 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1598 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1599 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1600 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1601 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1603 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1607 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1608 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1609 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1611 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1613 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1614 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1615 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1617 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1618 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1619 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1620 transaction_output_index: None
1625 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1626 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1627 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1628 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1629 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1632 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1634 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1635 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1636 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1638 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1639 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1642 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1643 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1646 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1648 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1649 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1650 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1652 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1653 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1659 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1661 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1663 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1664 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1665 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1666 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1667 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1671 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1672 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1676 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1677 if generated_by_local {
1678 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1679 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1680 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1690 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1692 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1693 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1694 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1695 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1696 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1697 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1698 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1701 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1702 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1704 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1709 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1713 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1714 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1718 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1719 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1721 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1722 if !generated_by_local {
1723 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1731 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1732 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1733 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1734 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1735 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1736 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1737 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1738 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1740 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1742 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1743 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1744 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1745 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1747 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1749 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1750 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1751 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1752 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1755 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1756 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1757 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1758 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1760 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1763 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1764 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1765 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1766 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1768 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1771 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1772 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1777 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1778 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1783 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1785 let channel_parameters =
1786 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1787 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1788 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1795 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1798 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1799 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1800 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1801 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1803 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1804 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1805 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1813 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1814 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1815 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1816 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1821 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1822 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1823 /// our counterparty!)
1824 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1825 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1826 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1827 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1828 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1829 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1830 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1832 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1836 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1837 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1838 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1839 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1840 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1841 //may see payments to it!
1842 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1843 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1844 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1846 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1849 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1850 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1851 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1852 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1853 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1856 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1857 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1860 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1864 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1865 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1866 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1867 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1868 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1869 // which are near the dust limit.
1870 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1871 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1872 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1873 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1874 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1876 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1877 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1879 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1882 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1883 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1884 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1887 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1888 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1890 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1891 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1892 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1895 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1896 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1902 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1909 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1914 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1920 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1921 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1929 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1932 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1935 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1936 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1937 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1939 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1941 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1944 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1947 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1952 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1953 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1954 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1955 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1956 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1959 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1969 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1970 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1971 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1972 /// corner case properly.
1973 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1974 -> AvailableBalances
1975 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1977 let context = &self;
1978 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1979 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1980 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1982 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1985 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1990 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1991 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1993 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1995 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1997 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1998 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2002 if context.is_outbound() {
2003 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2004 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2006 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2007 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2009 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2010 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2011 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2012 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2015 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2016 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2017 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2018 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2020 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2021 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2028 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2029 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2030 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2031 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2033 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2034 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2036 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2039 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2040 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2041 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2042 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2043 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2046 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2047 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2049 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2050 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2051 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2053 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2054 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2055 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2056 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2060 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2062 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2063 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2064 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2065 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2066 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2067 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2070 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2073 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2074 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2075 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2077 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2078 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2079 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2080 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2081 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2084 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2085 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2087 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2088 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2089 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2092 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2093 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2096 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2100 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2101 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2103 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2104 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2108 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2109 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2110 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2111 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2113 outbound_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2115 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2120 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2121 let context = &self;
2122 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2125 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2126 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2128 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2129 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2131 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2132 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2134 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 let context = &self;
2137 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2139 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2142 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2143 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2145 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2146 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2148 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2149 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2151 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2156 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2164 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2169 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2170 included_htlcs += 1;
2173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2178 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2181 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2182 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2183 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2188 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2191 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2197 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2201 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2202 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2207 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2209 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2210 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2211 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2213 total_pending_htlcs,
2214 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2218 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2219 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2220 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2222 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2224 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2229 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2230 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2232 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2233 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2235 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2236 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2238 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2239 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2240 let context = &self;
2241 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2243 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2246 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2247 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2249 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2253 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2255 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2260 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2267 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2268 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2269 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2270 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2271 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2272 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2275 included_htlcs += 1;
2278 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2282 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2283 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2285 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2293 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2298 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2300 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2301 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2303 total_pending_htlcs,
2304 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2308 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2310 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2312 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2314 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2319 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2320 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2321 match self.channel_state {
2322 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2323 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) {
2332 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2334 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2335 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2338 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2340 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2341 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2342 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2346 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2347 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2348 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2351 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2353 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2354 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2357 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2358 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2359 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2360 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2361 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2362 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2363 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2364 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2365 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2366 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2367 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2369 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2370 // return them to fail the payment.
2371 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2372 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2373 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2375 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2376 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2381 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2382 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2383 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2384 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2385 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2386 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2387 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2388 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2389 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2390 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2393 if generate_monitor_update {
2394 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2395 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2396 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2397 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2398 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2402 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2404 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2405 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2408 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2409 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2410 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2411 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2415 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2416 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2417 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2418 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2420 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2421 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2422 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2423 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2425 match &self.holder_signer {
2426 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2427 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2428 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2429 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2430 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2433 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2437 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2438 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2439 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2441 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2442 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2443 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2445 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2446 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2447 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2450 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2451 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2453 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2460 // Internal utility functions for channels
2462 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2463 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2464 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2466 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2468 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2469 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2470 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2472 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2475 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2477 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2480 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2481 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2482 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2484 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2486 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2487 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2488 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2489 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2490 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2493 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2494 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2495 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2496 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2497 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2498 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2499 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2502 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2503 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2505 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2506 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2509 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2510 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2511 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2512 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2513 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2514 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2517 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2518 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2519 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2520 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2523 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2524 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2526 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2527 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2528 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2532 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2533 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2534 trait FailHTLCContents {
2535 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2536 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2537 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2538 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2540 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2541 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2542 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2543 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2545 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2546 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2548 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2549 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2552 impl FailHTLCContents for (u16, [u8; 32]) {
2553 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC; // (failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
2554 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2555 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2558 failure_code: self.0,
2559 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2562 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2563 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(
2564 InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((self.1, self.0))
2567 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2568 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2570 failure_code: self.0,
2571 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2576 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2577 fn name() -> &'static str;
2579 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2580 fn name() -> &'static str {
2584 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2585 fn name() -> &'static str {
2586 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2590 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2591 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2592 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2594 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2595 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2596 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2597 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2599 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2600 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2602 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2604 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2605 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2606 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2607 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2609 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2610 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2620 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2621 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2622 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2623 // outside of those situations will fail.
2624 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2628 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2633 1 + // script length (0)
2637 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2638 2 + // witness marker and flag
2639 1 + // witness element count
2640 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2641 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2642 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2643 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2644 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2645 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2647 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2648 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2649 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2655 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2656 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2657 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2658 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2660 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2661 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2662 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2664 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2665 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2666 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2667 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2668 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2669 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2672 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2673 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2676 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2677 value_to_holder = 0;
2680 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2681 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2682 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2683 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2685 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2686 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2689 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2690 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2693 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2696 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2697 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2699 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2701 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2702 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2703 where L::Target: Logger {
2704 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2705 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2706 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2707 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2708 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2709 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2710 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2711 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2715 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2716 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2717 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2718 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2720 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2721 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2724 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2725 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2726 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2728 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2729 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2730 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2731 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2732 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2733 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2734 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2736 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2737 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2738 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2740 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2741 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2743 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2746 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2747 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2751 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2755 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2756 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2757 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2758 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2759 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2760 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2763 // Now update local state:
2765 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2766 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2767 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2768 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2769 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2770 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2771 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2772 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2776 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2777 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2778 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2779 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2780 // do not not get into this branch.
2781 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2782 match pending_update {
2783 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2784 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2785 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2786 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2787 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2788 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2789 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2792 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2793 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2795 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2796 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2797 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2798 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2799 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2800 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2806 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2807 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2808 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2810 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2811 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2812 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2814 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2815 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2818 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2819 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2821 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2822 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2824 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2825 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2828 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2831 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2832 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2833 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2834 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2839 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2840 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2841 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2842 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2843 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2844 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2845 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2846 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2847 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2848 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2849 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2850 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2851 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2852 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2853 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2855 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2856 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2857 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2858 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2859 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2862 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2863 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2864 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2870 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2871 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2873 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2877 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2878 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2879 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2880 /// before we fail backwards.
2882 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2883 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2884 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2885 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2886 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2887 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2888 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2891 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2892 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2894 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2895 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2896 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2897 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2898 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), true, logger)
2899 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2902 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2903 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2904 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2905 /// before we fail backwards.
2907 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2908 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2909 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2910 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2911 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2913 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2914 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2915 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2918 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2919 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2920 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2922 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2923 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2924 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2926 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2927 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2928 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2930 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2935 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2942 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2944 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2945 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2946 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2950 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2951 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2952 force_holding_cell = true;
2955 // Now update local state:
2956 if force_holding_cell {
2957 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2958 match pending_update {
2959 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2960 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2961 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2962 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2966 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2967 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2969 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2970 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2971 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2977 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2978 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_packet.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2982 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2983 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2985 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2986 htlc.state = err_packet.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2989 Ok(Some(err_packet.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
2992 // Message handlers:
2993 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2994 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2995 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2996 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2997 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2998 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2999 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3002 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3004 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3006 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3007 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3008 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3009 debug_assert!(matches!(
3010 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3012 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3013 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3016 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3017 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3019 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3020 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3021 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3022 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3024 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3027 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3028 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3032 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3033 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3034 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3035 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3036 // when routing outbound payments.
3037 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3041 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3042 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3043 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3044 match &self.context.channel_state {
3045 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3046 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3047 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3048 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3049 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3050 check_reconnection = true;
3051 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3052 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3053 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3054 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3055 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3057 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3058 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3061 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3062 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3063 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3065 if check_reconnection {
3066 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3067 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3068 let expected_point =
3069 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3070 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3072 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3073 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3074 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3075 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3076 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3077 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3079 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3080 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3081 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3082 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3083 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3085 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3091 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3092 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3094 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3096 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3099 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3100 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3101 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3102 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3103 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3104 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3106 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3107 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3109 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3110 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3111 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3113 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3114 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3117 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3120 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3123 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3126 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3130 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3131 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3132 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3135 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3139 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3140 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3141 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3142 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3143 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3144 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3145 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3146 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3147 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3148 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3149 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3151 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3152 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3153 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3154 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3155 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3156 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3160 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3161 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3164 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3165 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3166 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3168 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3169 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3170 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3171 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3172 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3173 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3174 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3178 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3179 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3180 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3181 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3182 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3183 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3184 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3188 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3189 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3190 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3191 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3192 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3196 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3197 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3199 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3200 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3201 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3203 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3204 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3208 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3211 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3216 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3217 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3221 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3222 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3223 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3224 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3225 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3226 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3227 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3228 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3229 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3231 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3232 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3233 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3234 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3235 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3238 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3239 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3240 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3241 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3245 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3248 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3252 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3253 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3254 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3258 // Now update local state:
3259 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3260 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3261 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3262 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3263 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3264 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3265 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3270 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3272 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3273 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3274 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3275 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3276 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3277 None => fail_reason.into(),
3278 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3279 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3280 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3283 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3289 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3290 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3292 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3298 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3301 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3302 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3305 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3309 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3312 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3313 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3314 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3316 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3320 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3324 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3325 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3328 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3332 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3336 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3337 where L::Target: Logger
3339 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3342 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3345 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3349 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3351 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3353 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3354 let commitment_txid = {
3355 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3356 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3357 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3359 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3360 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3361 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3362 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3363 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3368 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3370 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3371 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3372 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3373 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3376 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3377 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3378 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3382 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3384 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3385 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3386 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3387 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3388 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3389 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3390 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3391 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3392 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3393 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3394 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3400 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3404 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3405 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3406 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3407 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3408 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3409 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3410 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3411 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3412 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3413 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3414 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3415 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3416 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3419 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3420 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3421 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3422 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3423 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3424 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3425 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3427 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3428 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3429 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3430 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3431 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3432 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3433 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3436 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3437 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3440 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3442 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3443 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3444 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3447 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3450 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3451 commitment_stats.tx,
3453 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3454 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3455 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3458 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3459 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3461 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3462 let mut need_commitment = false;
3463 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3464 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3465 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3466 need_commitment = true;
3470 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3471 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3472 Some(forward_info.clone())
3474 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3475 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3476 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3477 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3478 need_commitment = true;
3481 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3482 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3483 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3484 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3485 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3486 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3487 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3488 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3489 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3490 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3491 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3492 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3493 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3494 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3496 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3498 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3499 need_commitment = true;
3503 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3504 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3505 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3506 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3507 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3508 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3509 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3511 nondust_htlc_sources,
3515 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3516 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3517 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3518 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3519 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3521 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3522 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3523 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3524 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3525 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3526 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3527 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3528 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3529 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3530 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3531 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3532 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3533 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3534 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3536 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3537 &self.context.channel_id);
3538 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3541 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3542 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3543 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3544 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3545 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3546 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3547 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3548 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3549 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3553 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3554 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3555 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3556 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3559 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3560 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3561 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3562 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3563 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3564 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3565 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3567 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3568 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3569 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3572 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3573 /// for our counterparty.
3574 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3575 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3576 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3577 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3579 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3580 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3581 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3582 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3584 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3585 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3586 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3587 updates: Vec::new(),
3590 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3591 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3592 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3593 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3594 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3595 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3596 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3597 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3598 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3599 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3600 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3601 // to rebalance channels.
3602 match &htlc_update {
3603 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3604 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3605 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3607 match self.send_htlc(
3608 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3609 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3611 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3614 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3615 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3616 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3617 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3618 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3619 // into the holding cell without ever being
3620 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3621 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3622 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3625 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3631 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3632 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3633 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3634 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3635 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3636 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3637 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3638 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3639 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3640 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3641 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3642 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3644 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3645 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3646 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3647 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3648 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3649 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3650 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3651 // for a full revocation before failing.
3652 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3653 update_fail_count += 1;
3656 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3658 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3663 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3664 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), false, logger) {
3665 Ok(update_fail_malformed_opt) => {
3666 debug_assert!(update_fail_malformed_opt.is_some()); // See above comment
3667 update_fail_count += 1;
3670 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3672 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3679 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3680 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3682 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3683 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3688 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3689 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3690 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3691 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3692 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3694 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3695 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3696 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3698 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3699 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3705 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3706 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3707 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3708 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3709 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3710 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3711 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3712 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3713 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3715 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3718 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3721 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3725 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3727 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3728 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3733 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3734 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3735 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3736 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3737 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3738 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3739 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3740 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3746 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3747 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3750 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3751 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3752 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3753 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3755 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3757 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3762 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3763 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3764 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3765 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3766 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3767 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3768 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3769 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3770 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3774 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3775 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3776 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3777 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3778 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3779 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3780 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3781 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3782 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3784 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3785 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3788 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3789 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3790 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3791 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3792 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3793 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3794 let mut require_commitment = false;
3795 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3798 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3799 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3800 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3801 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3803 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3804 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3805 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3806 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3807 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3808 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3810 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3814 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3815 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3816 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3817 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3818 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3820 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3821 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3822 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3827 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3828 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3830 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3834 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3835 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3837 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3839 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3840 require_commitment = true;
3841 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3842 match forward_info {
3843 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3844 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3845 require_commitment = true;
3847 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3848 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3849 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3851 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3852 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3853 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3857 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3858 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3859 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3860 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3866 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3867 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3868 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3869 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3870 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3872 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3873 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3874 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3875 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3876 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3877 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3878 require_commitment = true;
3882 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3884 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3885 match update_state {
3886 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3887 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3888 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3889 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3890 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3891 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3893 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3894 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3895 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3896 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3897 require_commitment = true;
3898 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3899 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3904 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3905 let release_state_str =
3906 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3907 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3908 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3909 if !release_monitor {
3910 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3911 update: monitor_update,
3913 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3915 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3920 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3921 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3922 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3923 if require_commitment {
3924 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3925 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3926 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3927 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3929 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3930 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3931 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3932 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3933 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3935 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3936 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3937 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3938 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3939 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3942 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3943 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3944 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3945 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3946 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3947 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3949 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3950 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3952 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3953 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3955 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3956 if require_commitment {
3957 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3959 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3960 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3961 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3962 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3964 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3965 &self.context.channel_id(),
3966 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3969 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3970 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3972 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3973 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3975 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3976 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3982 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3983 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3984 /// commitment update.
3985 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3986 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3987 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3989 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3990 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3993 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3994 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3995 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3996 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3998 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3999 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4000 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4001 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4002 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4003 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4004 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4006 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4007 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4009 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4010 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4012 if !self.context.is_live() {
4013 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4016 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4017 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4018 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4019 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4020 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4021 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4022 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4023 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4024 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4025 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4029 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4030 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4031 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4032 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4033 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4034 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4037 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4038 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4042 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4043 force_holding_cell = true;
4046 if force_holding_cell {
4047 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4051 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4052 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4054 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4055 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4060 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4061 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4063 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4065 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4066 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4067 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4068 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4072 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4073 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4074 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4078 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4079 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4082 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4083 // will be retransmitted.
4084 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4085 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4086 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4088 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4089 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4091 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4092 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4093 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4094 // this HTLC accordingly
4095 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4098 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4099 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4100 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4101 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4104 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4105 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4106 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4107 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4108 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4109 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4114 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4116 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4117 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4118 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4119 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4123 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4124 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4125 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4126 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4127 // the update upon reconnection.
4128 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4132 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4134 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4135 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4139 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4140 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4141 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4142 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4143 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4144 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4145 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4147 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4148 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4149 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4150 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4151 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4152 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4153 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4155 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4156 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4157 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4158 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4159 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4160 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4161 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4164 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4165 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4166 /// to the remote side.
4167 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4168 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4169 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4170 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4173 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4175 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4176 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4178 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4179 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4180 // first received the funding_signed.
4181 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4182 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4183 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4184 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4186 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4188 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4189 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4190 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4191 funding_broadcastable = None;
4194 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4195 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4196 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4197 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4198 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4199 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4200 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4201 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4202 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4203 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4204 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4205 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4206 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4207 next_per_commitment_point,
4208 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4212 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4214 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4215 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4216 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4217 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4218 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4219 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4221 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4222 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4223 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4224 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4225 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4226 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4230 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4231 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4233 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4234 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4236 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4237 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4240 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4241 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4242 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4243 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4244 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4245 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4246 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4247 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4248 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4252 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4253 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4255 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4258 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4261 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4263 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4264 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4265 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4266 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4267 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4268 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4269 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4270 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4271 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4272 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4274 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4276 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4278 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4284 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4286 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4287 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4288 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4289 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4291 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4292 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4294 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4295 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4298 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4299 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4300 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4301 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4303 SignerResumeUpdates {
4310 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4311 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4312 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4313 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4315 per_commitment_secret,
4316 next_per_commitment_point,
4318 next_local_nonce: None,
4322 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4323 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4324 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4325 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4326 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4327 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4329 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4330 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4331 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4332 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4333 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4334 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4335 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4336 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4337 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4338 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4339 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4344 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4345 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4347 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4348 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4349 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4350 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4351 reason: err_packet.clone()
4354 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4355 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4356 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4357 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4358 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4359 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4362 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4363 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4364 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4365 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4366 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4373 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4374 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4375 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4376 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4380 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4381 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4382 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4383 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4384 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4385 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4386 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4390 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4391 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4393 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4394 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4395 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4396 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4401 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4402 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4407 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4408 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4409 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4410 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4411 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4412 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4413 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4418 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4419 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4421 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4422 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4423 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4424 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4425 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4426 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4427 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4428 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4431 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4433 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4434 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4435 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4436 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4440 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4441 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4445 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4446 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4447 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4448 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4449 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4450 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4453 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4454 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4455 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4456 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4457 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4460 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4461 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4462 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4463 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4464 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4465 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4466 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4467 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4471 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4472 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4473 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4474 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4475 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4476 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4477 our_commitment_transaction
4481 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4482 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4483 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4484 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4486 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4488 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4490 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4491 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4492 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4493 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4494 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4497 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4498 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4499 channel_ready: None,
4500 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4501 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4502 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4506 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4507 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4508 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4509 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4510 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4511 next_per_commitment_point,
4512 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4514 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4515 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4516 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4520 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4521 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4522 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4524 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4525 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4526 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4529 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4532 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4534 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4535 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4536 our_commitment_transaction
4540 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4541 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4542 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4543 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4544 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4545 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4546 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4548 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4550 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4551 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4552 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4553 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4554 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4555 next_per_commitment_point,
4556 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4560 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4561 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4562 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4564 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4567 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4568 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4569 raa: required_revoke,
4570 commitment_update: None,
4571 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4573 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4574 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4575 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4577 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4580 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4581 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4582 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4583 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4584 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4585 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4588 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4589 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4590 raa: required_revoke,
4591 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4592 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4595 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4596 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4597 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4598 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4599 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4602 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4603 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4604 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4605 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4610 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4611 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4612 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4613 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4615 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4617 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4619 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4620 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4621 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4622 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4623 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4624 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4625 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4626 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4628 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4629 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4630 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4631 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4632 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4634 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4635 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4636 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4637 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4640 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4641 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4642 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4643 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4644 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4645 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4646 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4647 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4648 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4649 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4650 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4651 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4652 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4653 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4654 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4656 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4659 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4660 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4663 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4664 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4665 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4666 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4667 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4668 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4671 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4672 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4673 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4674 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4675 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4676 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4679 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4685 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4686 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4687 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4688 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4690 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4691 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4692 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4693 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4694 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4695 return Ok((None, None, None));
4698 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4699 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4700 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4702 return Ok((None, None, None));
4705 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4706 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4707 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4708 return Ok((None, None, None));
4711 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4713 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4714 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4715 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4716 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4718 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4719 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4721 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4722 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4724 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4725 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4726 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4727 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4729 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4730 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4731 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4735 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4741 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4742 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4744 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4745 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4748 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4749 /// within our expected timeframe.
4751 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4752 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4753 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4756 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4759 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4760 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4764 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4765 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4767 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4770 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4771 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4772 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4773 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4776 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4777 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4781 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4783 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4784 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4787 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4788 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4789 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4792 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4795 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4796 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4797 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4798 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4800 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4803 assert!(send_shutdown);
4804 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4805 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4806 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4808 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4811 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4816 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4818 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4819 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4821 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4822 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4823 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4824 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4825 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4826 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4827 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4830 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4831 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4833 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4834 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4835 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4836 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4840 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4841 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4842 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4843 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4844 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4845 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4847 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4848 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4855 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4856 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4858 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4861 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4862 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4864 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4866 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4867 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4868 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4869 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4870 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4871 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4872 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4873 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4874 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4876 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4877 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4880 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4884 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4885 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4886 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4887 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4889 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4892 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4893 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4895 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4898 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4902 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4906 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4907 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4908 return Ok((None, None, None));
4911 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4912 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4913 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4914 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4916 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4918 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4921 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4922 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4923 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4924 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4925 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4929 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4930 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4935 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4936 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4937 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4938 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4939 monitor_update: None,
4940 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4941 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4942 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4943 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4945 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4946 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4947 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4948 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4952 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4954 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4955 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4956 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4957 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4959 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4962 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4963 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4965 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4966 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4967 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4968 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4969 monitor_update: None,
4970 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4971 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4972 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4973 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4975 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4976 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4977 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4978 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4983 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4984 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4985 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4986 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4988 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4989 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4990 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4992 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4994 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5001 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5002 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5005 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5006 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5008 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5009 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5012 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5013 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5014 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5015 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5016 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5018 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5020 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5022 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5023 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5026 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5027 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5028 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5029 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5030 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5031 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5032 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5033 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5038 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5039 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5040 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5041 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5047 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5048 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5049 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5050 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5052 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5058 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5059 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5060 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5061 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5062 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5063 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5064 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5066 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5067 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5070 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5072 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5073 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5079 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5080 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5081 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5082 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5083 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5084 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5085 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5087 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5088 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5095 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5096 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5099 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5100 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5103 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5104 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5108 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5109 &self.context.holder_signer
5113 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5115 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5116 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5117 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5118 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5119 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5120 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5122 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5124 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5132 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5133 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5137 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5139 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5140 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5143 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5144 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5145 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5146 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5149 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5150 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5151 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5152 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5153 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5154 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5157 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5158 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5159 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5160 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5161 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5162 if !release_monitor {
5163 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5172 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5173 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5176 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5177 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5178 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5180 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5181 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5183 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5184 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5186 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5187 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5188 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5191 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5192 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5193 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5194 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5195 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5196 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5198 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5199 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5200 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5202 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5203 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5204 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5205 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5206 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5207 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5213 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5214 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5215 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5216 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5219 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5220 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5221 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5224 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5225 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5226 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5229 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5230 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5231 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5232 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5233 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5236 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5237 self.context.channel_update_status
5240 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5241 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5242 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5245 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5247 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5248 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5249 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5253 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5254 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5255 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5258 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5262 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5263 // channel_ready yet.
5264 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5268 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5269 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5270 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5271 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5273 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5274 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5275 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5277 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5278 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5281 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5282 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5284 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5285 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5286 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5287 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5288 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5289 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5290 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5291 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5293 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5297 if need_commitment_update {
5298 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5299 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5300 let next_per_commitment_point =
5301 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5302 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5303 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5304 next_per_commitment_point,
5305 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5309 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5315 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5316 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5317 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5318 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5319 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5320 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5321 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5323 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5326 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5327 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5328 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5329 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5330 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5331 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5332 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5333 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5334 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5335 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5336 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5337 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5338 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5339 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5340 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5341 // channel and move on.
5342 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5343 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5345 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5346 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5347 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5349 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5350 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5351 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5352 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5353 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5354 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5355 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5356 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5361 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5362 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5363 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5364 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5365 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5368 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5369 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5370 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5371 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5372 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5373 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5376 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5377 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5378 // may have already happened for this block).
5379 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5380 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5381 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5382 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5385 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5386 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5387 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5388 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5396 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5397 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5398 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5399 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5401 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5402 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5405 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5407 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5408 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5409 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5410 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5412 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5415 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5418 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5419 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5420 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5421 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5423 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5426 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5427 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5428 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5430 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5431 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5433 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5434 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5435 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5443 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5445 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5446 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5447 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5449 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5450 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5453 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5454 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5455 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5456 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5457 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5458 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5459 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5460 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5463 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5464 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5465 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5466 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5468 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5469 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5470 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5472 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5473 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5474 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5475 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5477 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5478 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5479 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5480 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5481 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5482 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5483 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5486 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5487 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5489 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5492 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5493 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5494 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5495 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5496 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5497 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5498 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5499 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5500 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5501 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5502 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5503 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5504 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5505 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5506 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5507 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5508 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5514 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5519 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5520 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5522 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5523 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5524 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5525 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5527 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5530 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5532 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5533 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5534 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5535 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5536 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5537 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5539 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5540 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5543 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5544 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5545 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5546 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5547 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5548 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5550 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5551 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5554 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5555 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5556 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5557 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5558 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5564 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5565 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5566 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5567 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5569 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5572 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5576 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5580 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5581 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5585 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5589 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5590 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5593 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5597 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5599 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5604 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5605 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5606 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5608 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5613 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5615 None => return None,
5618 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5620 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5621 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5623 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5624 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5627 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5633 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5635 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5636 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5637 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5638 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5639 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5640 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5641 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5643 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5644 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5645 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5646 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5647 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5648 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5649 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5650 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5651 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5652 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5653 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5654 contents: announcement,
5657 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5662 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5666 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5667 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5668 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5669 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5670 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5671 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5672 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5673 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5675 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5677 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5679 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5680 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5682 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5683 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5684 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5685 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5688 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5689 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5690 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5691 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5694 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5697 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5698 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5699 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5700 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5701 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5702 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5705 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5707 Err(_) => return None,
5709 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5710 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5715 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5716 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5717 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5718 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5719 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5720 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5721 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5722 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5723 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5724 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5725 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5726 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5727 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5728 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5729 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5730 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5733 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5736 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5737 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5738 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5739 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5740 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5741 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5742 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5743 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5744 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5746 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5747 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5748 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5749 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5750 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5751 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5752 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5753 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5754 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5756 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5757 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5758 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5759 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5760 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5761 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5762 next_funding_txid: None,
5767 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5769 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5770 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5771 /// commitment update.
5773 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5774 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5775 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5776 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5777 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5778 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5779 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5782 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5783 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5784 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5786 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5787 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5792 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5793 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5795 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5797 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5798 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5800 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5801 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5802 /// regenerate them.
5804 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5805 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5807 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5808 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5809 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5810 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5811 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5812 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5813 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5814 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5816 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5817 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5818 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5820 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5822 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5823 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5827 if amount_msat == 0 {
5828 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5831 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5832 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5833 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5834 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5837 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5838 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5839 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5842 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5843 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5844 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5845 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5846 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5847 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5848 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5849 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5852 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5853 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5854 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5855 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5856 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5857 else { "to peer" });
5859 if need_holding_cell {
5860 force_holding_cell = true;
5863 // Now update local state:
5864 if force_holding_cell {
5865 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5870 onion_routing_packet,
5877 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5878 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5880 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5882 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5888 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5889 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5890 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5894 onion_routing_packet,
5898 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5903 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5904 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5905 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5906 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5908 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5909 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5910 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5912 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5913 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5917 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5918 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5919 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5920 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5921 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5922 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5923 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5926 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5927 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5928 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5929 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5930 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5931 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5934 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5936 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5937 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5938 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5939 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5940 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5942 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5943 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5946 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5947 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5948 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5949 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5950 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5951 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5952 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5953 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5954 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5955 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5956 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5957 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5960 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5964 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5965 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5966 where L::Target: Logger
5968 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5969 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5970 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5972 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5974 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5975 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5976 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5977 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5978 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5979 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5980 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5981 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5982 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5983 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5984 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5990 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5993 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5994 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5995 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5996 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5997 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5998 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6000 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6001 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6002 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6004 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6005 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6006 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6009 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6010 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6014 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6015 &commitment_stats.tx,
6016 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6017 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6018 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6019 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6021 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6023 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6024 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6025 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6026 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6028 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6029 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6030 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6031 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6032 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6033 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6037 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6038 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6042 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6043 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6045 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6051 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6052 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6054 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6055 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6056 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6057 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6058 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6059 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6060 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6061 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6063 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6064 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6065 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6068 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6069 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6070 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6076 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6078 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6079 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6080 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6081 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6082 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6084 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6086 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6092 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6093 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6094 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6095 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6096 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6098 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6099 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6100 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6103 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6104 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6106 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6107 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6109 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6110 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6112 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6113 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6114 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6117 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6120 // use override shutdown script if provided
6121 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6122 Some(script) => script,
6124 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6125 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6126 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6127 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6131 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6132 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6134 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6139 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6140 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6141 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6142 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6144 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6145 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6146 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6147 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6148 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6149 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6150 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6153 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6154 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6156 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6157 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6158 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6161 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6162 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6163 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6164 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6165 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6167 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6168 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6175 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6176 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6178 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6181 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6182 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6183 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6185 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6186 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6190 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6194 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6195 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6196 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6197 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6200 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6201 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6202 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6203 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6204 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6205 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6206 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6207 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6209 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6210 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6211 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6212 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6214 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6215 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6217 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6218 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6220 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6221 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6222 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6224 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6225 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6227 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6228 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6229 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6230 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6231 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6234 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6235 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6237 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6238 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6240 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6242 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6244 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6245 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6246 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6247 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6250 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6251 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6253 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6254 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6255 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6256 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6260 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6261 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6262 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6266 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6267 Ok(script) => script,
6268 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6271 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6274 context: ChannelContext {
6277 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6278 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6279 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6280 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6285 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6287 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6288 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6289 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6290 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6292 channel_value_satoshis,
6294 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6296 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6297 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6300 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6301 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6304 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6305 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6306 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6307 pending_update_fee: None,
6308 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6309 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6310 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6311 update_time_counter: 1,
6313 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6315 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6316 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6317 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6318 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6319 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6320 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6322 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6323 signer_pending_funding: false,
6325 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6326 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6327 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6328 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6330 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6331 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6332 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6333 closing_fee_limits: None,
6334 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6336 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6337 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6338 short_channel_id: None,
6339 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6341 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6342 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6343 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6344 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6345 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6346 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6347 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6348 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6349 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6350 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6351 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6352 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6354 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6356 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6357 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6358 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6359 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6360 counterparty_parameters: None,
6361 funding_outpoint: None,
6362 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6364 funding_transaction: None,
6365 is_batch_funding: None,
6367 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6368 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6369 counterparty_node_id,
6371 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6373 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6375 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6376 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6378 announcement_sigs: None,
6380 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6381 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6382 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6383 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6385 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6386 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6388 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6389 outbound_scid_alias,
6391 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6392 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6394 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6395 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6400 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6402 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6406 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6407 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6408 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6409 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6410 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6411 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6412 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6413 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6414 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6416 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6421 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6422 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6423 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6426 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6427 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6428 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6429 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6432 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6434 next_local_nonce: None,
6438 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6439 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6440 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6441 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6442 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6443 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6444 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6445 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6446 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6447 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6448 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6451 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6452 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6454 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6456 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6457 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6458 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6459 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6462 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6463 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6465 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6467 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6468 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6470 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6471 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6472 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6473 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6474 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6475 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6478 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6479 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6481 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6482 if funding_created.is_none() {
6483 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6484 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6486 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6487 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6488 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6489 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6497 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6498 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6499 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6500 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6501 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6502 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6503 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6504 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6505 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6506 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6509 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6510 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6511 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6512 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6513 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6514 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6520 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6521 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6522 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6523 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6524 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6525 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6527 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6529 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6531 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6532 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6537 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6538 // We've exhausted our options
6541 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6542 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6545 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6546 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6547 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6548 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6550 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6551 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6552 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6553 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6554 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6555 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6557 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6559 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6560 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6563 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6564 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6565 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6567 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6568 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6571 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6572 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6575 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6576 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6580 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6581 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6582 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6583 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6584 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6585 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6586 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6587 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6588 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6589 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6590 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6591 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6592 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6593 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6594 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6595 first_per_commitment_point,
6596 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6597 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6598 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6599 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6601 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6606 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6607 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6609 // Check sanity of message fields:
6610 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6613 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6616 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6619 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6622 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6625 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6627 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6629 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6630 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6631 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6633 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6634 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6635 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6637 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6640 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6641 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6644 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6645 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6646 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6648 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6649 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6651 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6652 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6654 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6657 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6660 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6663 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6667 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6668 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6669 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6671 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6672 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6674 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6675 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6678 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6679 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6682 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6683 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6684 &Some(ref script) => {
6685 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6686 if script.len() == 0 {
6689 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6690 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6692 Some(script.clone())
6695 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6697 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6702 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6703 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6704 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6705 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6706 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6708 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6709 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6711 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6714 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6715 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6716 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6717 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6718 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6719 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6722 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6723 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6724 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6727 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6728 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6730 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6731 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6733 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6738 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6739 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6740 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6741 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6742 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6746 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6747 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6749 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6750 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6752 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6753 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6754 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6755 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6758 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6760 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6761 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6762 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6763 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6765 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6766 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6768 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6769 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6771 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6772 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6773 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6774 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6775 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6776 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6780 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6781 initial_commitment_tx,
6784 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6785 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6789 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6790 if validated.is_err() {
6791 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6794 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6795 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6796 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6797 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6798 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6799 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6800 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6801 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6802 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6803 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6804 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6805 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6807 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6808 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6809 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6810 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6811 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6812 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6813 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6814 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6816 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6817 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6818 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6820 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6822 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6823 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6825 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6827 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6829 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6830 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6831 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6834 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6836 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6837 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6838 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6839 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6840 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6845 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6846 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6847 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6848 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6851 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6852 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6853 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6854 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6855 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6856 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6857 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6858 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6859 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6860 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6861 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6864 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6865 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6867 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6868 // support this channel type.
6869 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6870 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6874 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6875 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6876 // `static_remote_key`.
6877 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6880 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6881 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6884 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6887 channel_type.clone()
6889 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6890 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6896 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6897 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6898 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6899 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6900 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6901 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6902 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6903 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6904 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6907 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6908 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6911 // Check sanity of message fields:
6912 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6915 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6916 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6918 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6921 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6922 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6925 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6926 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6928 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6929 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6931 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6933 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6934 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6937 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6940 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6941 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6944 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6945 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6948 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6951 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6952 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6954 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6957 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6960 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6963 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6967 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6969 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6970 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6975 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6976 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6977 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6978 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6979 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6981 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6984 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6985 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6986 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6988 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6992 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6993 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6994 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6995 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6999 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7000 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7001 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7005 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7006 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7007 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7008 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7009 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7012 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7013 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7014 &Some(ref script) => {
7015 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7016 if script.len() == 0 {
7019 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7022 Some(script.clone())
7025 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7027 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7032 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7033 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7034 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7035 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7039 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7040 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7045 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7046 Ok(script) => script,
7047 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7050 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7051 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7053 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7056 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7060 context: ChannelContext {
7063 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7064 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7066 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7071 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7073 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7074 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7075 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7076 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7078 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7081 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7083 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7084 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7087 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7088 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7089 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7091 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7092 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7093 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7094 pending_update_fee: None,
7095 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7096 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7097 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7098 update_time_counter: 1,
7100 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7102 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7103 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7104 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7105 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7106 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7107 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7109 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7110 signer_pending_funding: false,
7112 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7113 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7114 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7115 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7117 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7118 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7119 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7120 closing_fee_limits: None,
7121 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7123 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7124 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7125 short_channel_id: None,
7126 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7128 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7129 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7130 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7131 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7132 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7133 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7134 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7135 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7136 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7137 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7138 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7139 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7142 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7144 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7145 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7146 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7147 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7148 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7149 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7150 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7152 funding_outpoint: None,
7153 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7155 funding_transaction: None,
7156 is_batch_funding: None,
7158 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7159 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7160 counterparty_node_id,
7162 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7164 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7166 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7167 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7169 announcement_sigs: None,
7171 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7172 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7173 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7174 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7176 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7177 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7179 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7180 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7182 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7183 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7185 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7186 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7191 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7193 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7199 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7200 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7202 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7203 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7204 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7205 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7208 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7209 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7211 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7213 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7214 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7217 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7220 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7221 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7222 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7224 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7225 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7226 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7227 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7229 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7230 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7231 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7232 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7233 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7234 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7235 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7236 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7237 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7238 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7239 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7240 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7241 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7242 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7243 first_per_commitment_point,
7244 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7245 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7246 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7248 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7250 next_local_nonce: None,
7254 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7255 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7257 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7259 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7260 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7263 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7264 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7266 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7267 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7268 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7269 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7270 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7271 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7272 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7273 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7274 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7275 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7276 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7278 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7281 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7282 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7283 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7287 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7288 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7291 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7292 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7294 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7295 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7297 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7299 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7300 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7301 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7302 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7305 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7306 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7307 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7308 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7309 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7311 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7313 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7314 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7315 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7318 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7319 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7320 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7324 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7325 initial_commitment_tx,
7328 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7329 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7332 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7333 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7336 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7338 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7339 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7340 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7341 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7343 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7345 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7346 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7347 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7348 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7349 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7350 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7351 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7352 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7353 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7354 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7355 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7357 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7358 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7359 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7360 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7361 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7362 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7363 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7365 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7366 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7368 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7369 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7370 let mut channel = Channel {
7371 context: self.context,
7373 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7374 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7376 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7380 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7381 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7383 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7389 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7390 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7391 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7392 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7393 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7395 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7396 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7397 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7398 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7404 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7405 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7406 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7407 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7408 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7409 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7414 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7415 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7416 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7417 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7419 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7420 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7421 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7422 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7427 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7428 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7429 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7430 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7431 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7432 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7437 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7439 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7442 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7444 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7445 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7446 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7447 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7448 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7450 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7451 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7452 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7453 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7455 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7457 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7458 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7459 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7461 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7463 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7465 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7467 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7468 // deserialized from that format.
7469 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7470 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7471 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7473 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7475 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7476 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7477 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7479 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7480 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7481 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7482 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7485 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7486 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7487 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7490 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7491 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7492 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7493 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7495 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7496 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7498 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7500 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7502 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7504 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7507 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7509 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7514 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7515 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7516 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7518 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7519 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7520 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7521 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7522 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7523 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7524 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7526 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7528 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7530 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7533 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7534 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7535 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7538 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7540 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7541 preimages.push(preimage);
7543 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7544 reason.write(writer)?;
7546 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7548 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7549 preimages.push(preimage);
7551 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7552 reason.write(writer)?;
7555 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7556 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7559 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7560 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7561 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7562 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7563 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7564 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7566 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7567 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7568 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7571 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7572 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7573 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7574 source.write(writer)?;
7575 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7577 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7578 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7580 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7582 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7583 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7585 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7587 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7588 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7590 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7591 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7593 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7594 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7595 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7597 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7599 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7600 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7605 match self.context.resend_order {
7606 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7607 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7610 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7611 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7612 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7614 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7615 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7616 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7617 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7620 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7621 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7622 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7623 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7624 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7627 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7628 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7629 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7630 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7632 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7633 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7634 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7636 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7638 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7639 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7640 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7641 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7643 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7644 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7645 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7646 // consider the stale state on reload.
7649 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7650 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7651 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7653 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7654 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7655 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7657 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7658 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7660 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7661 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7662 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7664 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7665 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7667 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7670 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7671 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7672 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7674 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7677 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7678 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7680 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7681 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7682 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7684 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7686 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7688 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7690 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7691 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7692 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7693 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7694 htlc.write(writer)?;
7697 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7698 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7699 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7701 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7702 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7704 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7705 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7706 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7707 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7708 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7709 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7710 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7712 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7713 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7714 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7715 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7716 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7718 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7719 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7721 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7722 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7723 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7724 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7726 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7728 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7729 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7730 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7731 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7732 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7733 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7734 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7736 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7737 (2, chan_type, option),
7738 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7739 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7740 (5, self.context.config, required),
7741 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7742 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7743 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7744 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7745 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7746 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7747 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7748 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7749 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7750 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7751 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7752 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7753 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7754 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7755 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7756 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7757 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7758 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7759 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7760 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7761 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7762 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7769 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7770 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7772 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7773 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7775 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7776 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7777 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7779 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7780 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7781 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7782 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7784 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7786 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7787 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7788 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7789 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7790 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7792 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7793 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7796 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7797 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7798 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7800 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7802 let mut keys_data = None;
7804 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7805 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7806 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7807 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7808 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7809 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7810 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7811 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7812 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7813 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7817 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7818 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7819 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7822 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7824 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7825 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7826 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7828 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7830 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7831 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7832 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7833 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7834 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7835 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7836 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7837 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7838 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7839 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7840 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7841 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7842 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7847 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7848 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7849 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7850 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7851 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7852 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7853 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7854 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7855 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7856 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7857 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7858 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7860 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7861 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7864 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7865 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7868 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7869 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7871 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7873 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7874 blinding_point: None,
7878 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7879 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7880 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7881 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7882 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7883 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7884 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7885 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7886 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7887 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7888 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7889 blinding_point: None,
7891 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7892 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7893 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7895 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7896 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7897 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7899 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7903 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7904 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7905 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7906 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7909 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7910 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7911 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7913 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7914 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7915 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7916 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7919 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7920 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7921 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7922 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7925 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7927 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7929 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7930 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7931 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7932 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7935 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7936 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7937 // consider the stale state on reload.
7938 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7941 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7942 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7943 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7945 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7948 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7949 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7950 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7952 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7953 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7955 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7957 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7958 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7960 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7961 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7963 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7964 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7965 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7967 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7969 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7970 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7972 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7973 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7976 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7978 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7979 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7980 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7981 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7983 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7986 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7987 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7989 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7991 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7992 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7994 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7995 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7997 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7999 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8000 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8001 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8003 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8004 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8005 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8009 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8010 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8011 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8013 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8019 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8020 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8021 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8022 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8023 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8024 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8025 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8026 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8027 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8028 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8030 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8031 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8032 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8033 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8034 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8035 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8036 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8038 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8039 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8040 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8041 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8043 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8045 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8046 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8048 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8050 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8051 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8053 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8055 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8056 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8057 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8058 (2, channel_type, option),
8059 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8060 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8061 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8062 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8063 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8064 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8065 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8066 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8067 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8068 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8069 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8070 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8071 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8072 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8073 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8074 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8075 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8076 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8077 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8078 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8079 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8080 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8081 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8082 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8083 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8086 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8087 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8088 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8089 // required channel parameters.
8090 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8091 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8093 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8095 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8096 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8097 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8098 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8101 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8102 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8103 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8105 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8106 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8108 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8109 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8114 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8115 if iter.next().is_some() {
8116 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8120 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8121 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8122 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8123 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8124 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8127 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8128 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8129 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8131 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8132 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8134 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8135 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8136 // separate u64 values.
8137 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8139 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8141 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8142 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8143 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8144 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8146 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8147 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8149 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8150 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8151 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8152 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8153 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8156 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8157 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8159 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8160 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8161 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8162 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8164 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8165 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8167 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8168 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8169 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8170 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8171 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8174 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8175 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8178 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8179 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8180 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8181 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8182 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8183 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8186 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8187 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8188 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8190 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8195 context: ChannelContext {
8198 config: config.unwrap(),
8202 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8203 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8204 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8207 temporary_channel_id,
8209 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8211 channel_value_satoshis,
8213 latest_monitor_update_id,
8215 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8216 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8219 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8220 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8223 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8224 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8225 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8226 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8230 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8231 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8232 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8233 monitor_pending_forwards,
8234 monitor_pending_failures,
8235 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8237 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8238 signer_pending_funding: false,
8241 holding_cell_update_fee,
8242 next_holder_htlc_id,
8243 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8244 update_time_counter,
8247 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8248 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8249 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8250 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8252 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8253 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8254 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8255 closing_fee_limits: None,
8256 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8258 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8259 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8261 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8263 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8264 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8265 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8266 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8267 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8268 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8269 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8270 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8271 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8274 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8276 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8277 funding_transaction,
8280 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8281 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8282 counterparty_node_id,
8284 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8288 channel_update_status,
8289 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8293 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8294 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8295 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8296 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8298 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8299 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8301 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8302 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8303 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8305 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8306 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8308 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8309 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8311 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8314 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8323 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8324 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8325 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8326 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8327 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8328 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8329 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8330 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8331 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8332 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8333 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8334 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8335 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8336 use crate::ln::msgs;
8337 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8338 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8339 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8340 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8341 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8342 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8343 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8344 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8345 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8346 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8347 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8348 use crate::util::test_utils;
8349 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8350 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8351 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8352 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8353 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8354 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8355 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8356 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8357 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8358 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8359 use crate::prelude::*;
8361 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8364 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8365 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8371 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8372 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8373 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8374 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8378 signer: InMemorySigner,
8381 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8382 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8385 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8386 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8388 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8390 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8391 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8394 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8398 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8400 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8401 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8402 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8403 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8404 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8407 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8408 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8409 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8410 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8414 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8415 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8416 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8420 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8421 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8422 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8423 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8426 let seed = [42; 32];
8427 let network = Network::Testnet;
8428 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8429 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8430 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8433 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8434 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8435 let config = UserConfig::default();
8436 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8437 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8438 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8440 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8441 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8445 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8446 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8448 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8449 let original_fee = 253;
8450 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8451 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8452 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8453 let seed = [42; 32];
8454 let network = Network::Testnet;
8455 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8457 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8458 let config = UserConfig::default();
8459 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8461 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8462 // same as the old fee.
8463 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8464 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8465 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8469 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8470 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8471 // dust limits are used.
8472 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8473 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8474 let seed = [42; 32];
8475 let network = Network::Testnet;
8476 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8477 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8478 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8480 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8481 // they have different dust limits.
8483 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8484 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8485 let config = UserConfig::default();
8486 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8488 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8489 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8490 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8491 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8492 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8494 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8495 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8496 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8497 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8498 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8500 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8501 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8502 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8503 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8505 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8506 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8507 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8509 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8510 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8511 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8513 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8514 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8515 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8517 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8518 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8519 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8520 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8523 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8525 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8526 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8527 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8528 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8529 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8530 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8531 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8532 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8533 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8535 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8536 blinding_point: None,
8539 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8540 // the dust limit check.
8541 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8542 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8543 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8544 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8546 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8547 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8548 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8549 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8550 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8551 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8552 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8556 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8557 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8558 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8559 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8560 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8561 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8562 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8563 let seed = [42; 32];
8564 let network = Network::Testnet;
8565 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8567 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8568 let config = UserConfig::default();
8569 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8571 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8572 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8574 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8575 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8576 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8577 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8578 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8579 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8581 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8582 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8583 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8584 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8585 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8587 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8589 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8590 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8591 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8592 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8593 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8595 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8596 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8597 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8598 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8599 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8603 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8604 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8605 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8606 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8607 let seed = [42; 32];
8608 let network = Network::Testnet;
8609 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8610 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8611 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8613 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8615 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8616 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8617 let config = UserConfig::default();
8618 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8620 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8621 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8622 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8623 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8625 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8626 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8627 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8629 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8630 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8631 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8632 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8634 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8635 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8636 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8638 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8639 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8640 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8642 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8643 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8644 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8645 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8646 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8647 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8648 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8650 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8652 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8653 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8654 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8655 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8656 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8660 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8661 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8662 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8663 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8664 let seed = [42; 32];
8665 let network = Network::Testnet;
8666 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8667 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8668 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8670 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8671 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8672 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8673 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8674 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8675 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8676 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8677 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8679 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8680 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8681 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8682 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8683 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8684 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8686 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8687 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8688 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8689 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8691 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8693 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8694 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8695 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8696 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8697 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8698 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8700 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8701 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8702 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8703 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8705 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8706 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8707 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8708 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8709 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8711 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8712 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8714 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8715 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8716 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8718 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8719 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8720 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8721 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8722 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8724 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8725 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8727 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8728 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8729 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8733 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8735 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8736 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8737 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8739 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8740 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8741 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8742 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8744 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8745 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8746 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8748 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8750 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8751 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8754 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8755 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8756 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8757 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8758 let seed = [42; 32];
8759 let network = Network::Testnet;
8760 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8761 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8762 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8765 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8766 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8767 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8769 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8770 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8772 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8773 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8774 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8776 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8777 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8779 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8781 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8782 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8784 // Channel Negotiations failed
8785 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8786 assert!(result.is_err());
8791 fn channel_update() {
8792 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8793 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8794 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8795 let seed = [42; 32];
8796 let network = Network::Testnet;
8797 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8798 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8799 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8801 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8802 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8803 let config = UserConfig::default();
8804 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8806 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8807 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8808 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8809 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8810 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8812 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8813 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8814 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8815 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8816 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8818 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8819 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8820 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8821 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8823 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8824 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8825 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8827 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8828 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8829 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8831 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8832 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8833 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8835 short_channel_id: 0,
8838 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8839 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8840 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8842 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8843 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8845 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8847 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8849 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8850 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8851 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8852 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8854 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8855 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8856 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8858 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8861 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8865 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8866 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8868 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8869 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8870 let seed = [42; 32];
8871 let network = Network::Testnet;
8872 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8874 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8875 let config = UserConfig::default();
8876 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8877 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8878 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8880 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8882 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8883 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8884 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8885 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8889 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8890 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8891 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8893 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8896 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8898 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8899 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8900 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8901 blinding_point: None,
8903 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8904 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8906 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8909 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8912 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8914 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8917 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8918 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8919 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8921 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8922 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8925 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8926 blinding_point: None,
8928 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8929 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8932 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8933 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
8935 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8936 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
8938 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
8941 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8942 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
8943 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8944 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
8945 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8946 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8947 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8948 } = &mut dummy_add {
8949 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8950 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8952 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8953 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
8954 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
8956 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
8959 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8961 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8962 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8963 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8964 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8965 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8966 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8967 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8968 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8971 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8973 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8974 use bitcoin::sighash;
8975 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8976 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8977 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8978 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8979 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8980 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8981 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8982 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8983 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8984 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8985 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8986 use crate::sync::Arc;
8987 use core::str::FromStr;
8988 use hex::DisplayHex;
8990 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8991 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8992 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8993 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8995 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8997 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8998 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8999 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9000 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9001 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9003 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9004 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9010 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9011 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9012 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9014 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9015 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9016 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9017 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9018 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9019 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9021 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9023 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9024 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9025 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9026 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9027 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9028 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9030 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9031 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9032 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9033 selected_contest_delay: 144
9035 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9036 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9038 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9039 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9041 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9042 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9044 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9045 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9047 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9048 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9049 // build_commitment_transaction.
9050 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9051 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9052 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9053 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9054 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9056 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9057 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9058 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9059 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9063 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9064 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9065 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9066 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9070 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9071 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9072 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9074 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9075 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9077 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9078 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9080 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9082 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9083 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9084 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9085 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9086 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9087 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9088 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9090 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9091 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9092 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9093 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9095 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9096 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9097 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9099 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9101 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9102 commitment_tx.clone(),
9103 counterparty_signature,
9104 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9105 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9106 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9108 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9109 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9111 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9112 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9113 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9115 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9116 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9119 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9120 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9122 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9123 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9124 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9125 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9126 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9127 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9128 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9129 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9131 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9134 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9135 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9136 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9140 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9143 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9144 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9145 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9146 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9147 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9148 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9150 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9151 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9152 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9153 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9155 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9156 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9157 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9158 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9159 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9161 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9162 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9163 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9164 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9165 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9166 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9168 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9172 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9173 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9174 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9175 "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", {});
9177 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9178 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9180 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9181 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9182 "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", {});
9184 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9185 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9186 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9187 "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", {});
9189 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9190 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9192 amount_msat: 1000000,
9194 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9195 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9197 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9200 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9201 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9203 amount_msat: 2000000,
9205 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9206 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9208 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9211 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9212 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9214 amount_msat: 2000000,
9216 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9217 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9218 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9219 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9220 blinding_point: None,
9222 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9225 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9226 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9228 amount_msat: 3000000,
9230 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9231 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9232 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9233 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9234 blinding_point: None,
9236 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9239 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9240 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9242 amount_msat: 4000000,
9244 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9245 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9247 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9251 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9252 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9253 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9255 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9256 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9257 "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", {
9260 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9261 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9262 "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" },
9265 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9266 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9267 "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" },
9270 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9271 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9272 "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" },
9275 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9276 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9277 "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" },
9280 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9281 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9282 "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" }
9285 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9286 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9287 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9289 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9290 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9291 "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", {
9294 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9295 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9296 "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" },
9299 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9300 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9301 "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" },
9304 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9305 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9306 "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" },
9309 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9310 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9311 "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" },
9314 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9315 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9316 "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" }
9319 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9320 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9321 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9323 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9324 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9325 "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", {
9328 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9329 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9330 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9333 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9334 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9335 "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" },
9338 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9339 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9340 "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" },
9343 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9344 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9345 "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" }
9348 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9349 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9350 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9351 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9353 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9354 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9355 "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", {
9358 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9359 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9360 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
9363 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9364 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9365 "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" },
9368 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9369 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9370 "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" },
9373 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9374 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9375 "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" }
9378 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9379 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9380 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9381 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9383 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9384 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9385 "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", {
9388 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9389 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9390 "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" },
9393 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9394 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9395 "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" },
9398 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9399 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9400 "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" },
9403 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9404 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9405 "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" }
9408 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9409 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9410 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9412 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9413 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9414 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9417 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9418 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9419 "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" },
9422 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9423 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9424 "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" },
9427 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9428 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9429 "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" }
9432 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9433 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9434 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9436 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9437 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9438 "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", {
9441 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9442 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9443 "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" },
9446 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9447 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9448 "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" },
9451 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9452 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9453 "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" }
9456 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9457 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9458 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9460 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9461 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9462 "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", {
9465 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9466 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9467 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9470 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9471 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9472 "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" }
9475 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9476 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9477 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9478 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9479 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9480 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9482 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9483 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9484 "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", {
9487 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9488 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9489 "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" },
9492 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9493 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9494 "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" }
9497 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9498 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9499 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9500 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9501 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9503 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9504 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9505 "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", {
9508 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9509 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9510 "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" },
9513 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9514 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9515 "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" }
9518 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9519 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9520 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9522 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9523 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9524 "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", {
9527 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9528 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9529 "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" }
9532 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9533 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9534 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9535 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9536 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9538 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9539 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9540 "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", {
9543 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9544 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9545 "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" }
9548 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9549 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9550 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9551 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9552 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9554 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9555 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9556 "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", {
9559 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9560 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9561 "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" }
9564 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9565 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9566 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9567 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9569 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9570 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9571 "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", {});
9573 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9574 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9575 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9576 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9577 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9579 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9580 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9581 "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", {});
9583 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9584 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9585 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9586 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9587 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9589 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9590 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9591 "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", {});
9593 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9594 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9595 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9597 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9598 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9599 "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", {});
9601 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9602 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9603 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9604 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9605 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9607 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9608 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9609 "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", {});
9611 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9612 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9613 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9614 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9615 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9617 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9618 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9619 "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", {});
9621 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9622 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9623 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9624 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9625 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9626 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9628 amount_msat: 2000000,
9630 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9631 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9633 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9636 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9637 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9638 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9640 amount_msat: 5000001,
9642 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9643 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9644 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9645 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9646 blinding_point: None,
9648 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9651 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9652 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9654 amount_msat: 5000000,
9656 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9657 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9658 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9659 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9660 blinding_point: None,
9662 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9666 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9667 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9668 "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", {
9671 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9672 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9673 "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" },
9675 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9676 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9677 "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" },
9679 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9680 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9681 "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" }
9684 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9685 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9686 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9687 "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", {
9690 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9691 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9692 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
9694 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9695 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9696 "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" },
9698 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9699 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9700 "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" }
9705 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9706 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9708 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9709 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9710 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9711 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9713 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9714 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9715 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9717 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9718 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9720 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9721 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9723 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9724 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9725 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9729 fn test_key_derivation() {
9730 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9731 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9733 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9734 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9736 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9737 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9739 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9740 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9742 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9743 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9745 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9746 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9748 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9749 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9753 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9754 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9755 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9756 let seed = [42; 32];
9757 let network = Network::Testnet;
9758 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9759 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9761 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9762 let config = UserConfig::default();
9763 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9764 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9766 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9767 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9769 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9770 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9771 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9772 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9773 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9774 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9775 assert!(res.is_ok());
9779 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9780 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9781 // resulting `channel_type`.
9782 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9783 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9784 let network = Network::Testnet;
9785 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9786 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9788 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9789 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9791 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9792 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9794 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9795 // need to signal it.
9796 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9797 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9798 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9799 &config, 0, 42, None
9801 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9803 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9804 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9805 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9807 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9808 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9809 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9813 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9814 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9815 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9816 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9817 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9820 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9821 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9825 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9826 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9827 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9828 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9829 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9830 let network = Network::Testnet;
9831 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9832 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9834 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9835 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9837 let config = UserConfig::default();
9839 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9840 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9841 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9842 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9843 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9845 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9846 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9847 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9851 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9852 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9853 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9855 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9856 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9857 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9858 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9859 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9860 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9862 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9866 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9867 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9869 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9870 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9871 let network = Network::Testnet;
9872 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9873 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9875 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9876 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9878 let config = UserConfig::default();
9880 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9881 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9882 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9883 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9884 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9885 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9886 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9887 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9889 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9890 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9891 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9892 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9893 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9894 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9898 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9899 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9901 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9902 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9903 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9904 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9906 assert!(res.is_err());
9908 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9909 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9910 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9912 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9913 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9914 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9917 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9919 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9920 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9921 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9922 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9925 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9926 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9928 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9929 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9931 assert!(res.is_err());
9935 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9936 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9937 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9938 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9939 let seed = [42; 32];
9940 let network = Network::Testnet;
9941 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9942 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9943 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9945 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9946 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9947 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9948 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9950 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9951 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9952 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9957 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9967 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9968 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9969 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9974 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9975 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9981 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9984 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9985 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9986 &accept_channel_msg,
9987 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9988 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9991 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9992 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9993 let tx = Transaction {
9995 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9999 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10002 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10005 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10006 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10007 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10008 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10009 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10010 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10014 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10015 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10023 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10024 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10025 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10026 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10028 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10029 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10036 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10037 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10038 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10039 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10040 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10042 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10043 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10044 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10052 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10053 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10056 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10057 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10058 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10059 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());