_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  16
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  26 use ln::msgs;
  27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  28 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  29 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  30 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
  31 use ln::chan_utils;
  32 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  33 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  34 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
  35 use util::transaction_utils;
  36 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
  37 use util::logger::Logger;
  38 use util::errors::APIError;
  39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::default::Default;
  43 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  44 use std::ops::Deref;
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  46
  47 #[cfg(test)]
  48 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  49         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  50         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  51         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  52         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  53         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  54         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  55         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  56         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  57 }
  58
  59 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  60         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  61         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  62         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  63 }
  64
  65 enum InboundHTLCState {
  66         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  67         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  68         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  69         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  70         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  71         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  72         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  73         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  74         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  75         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  76         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  77         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  78         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  79         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  80         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  81         ///
  82         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  83         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  84         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  85         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  86         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  87         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  88         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  89         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  90         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  91         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  92         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  93         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  94         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  95         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  96         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
  97         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
  98         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
  99         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 100         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 101         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 102         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 103         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 104         Committed,
 105         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 106         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 107         /// we'll drop it.
 108         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 109         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 110         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 111         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 112         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 113         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 114         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
 115         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 116 }
 117
 118 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 119         htlc_id: u64,
 120         amount_msat: u64,
 121         cltv_expiry: u32,
 122         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 123         state: InboundHTLCState,
 124 }
 125
 126 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 127         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 128         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 129         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 130         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 131         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 132         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 133         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 134         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 135         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 136         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 137         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 138         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 139         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 140         Committed,
 141         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 142         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 143         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 144         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 145         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 146         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 147         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 148         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 149         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 150         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 151         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 152         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 153         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 154         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 155         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 156 }
 157
 158 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 159         htlc_id: u64,
 160         amount_msat: u64,
 161         cltv_expiry: u32,
 162         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 163         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 164         source: HTLCSource,
 165 }
 166
 167 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 168 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 169         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 170                 // always outbound
 171                 amount_msat: u64,
 172                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 173                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 174                 source: HTLCSource,
 175                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 176         },
 177         ClaimHTLC {
 178                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 179                 htlc_id: u64,
 180         },
 181         FailHTLC {
 182                 htlc_id: u64,
 183                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 184         },
 185 }
 186
 187 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 188 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 189 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 190 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 191 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 192 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 193 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 194 enum ChannelState {
 195         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 196         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 197         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 198         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 199         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 200         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 201         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 202         FundingCreated = 4,
 203         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 204         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 205         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 206         FundingSent = 8,
 207         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 208         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 209         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 210         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 211         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 212         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 213         ChannelFunded = 64,
 214         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 215         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 216         /// dance.
 217         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 218         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 219         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 220         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 221         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 222         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 223         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 224         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 225         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 226         /// later.
 227         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 228         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 229         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 230         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 231         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 232         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 233         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 234         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 235         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 236         /// us their shutdown.
 237         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 238         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 239         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 240         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 241 }
 242 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 243 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 244
 245 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 246
 247 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 248 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 249 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 250 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 251 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 252 enum UpdateStatus {
 253         /// Status has been gossiped.
 254         Fresh,
 255         /// Status has been changed.
 256         DisabledMarked,
 257         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 258         DisabledStaged,
 259 }
 260
 261 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 262 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 263 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 264 // inbound channel.
 265 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
 266         config: ChannelConfig,
 267
 268         user_id: u64,
 269
 270         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 271         channel_state: u32,
 272         channel_outbound: bool,
 273         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 274         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 275
 276         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 277
 278         #[cfg(not(test))]
 279         holder_keys: ChanSigner,
 280         #[cfg(test)]
 281         pub(super) holder_keys: ChanSigner,
 282         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 283         destination_script: Script,
 284
 285         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 286         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 287         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 288
 289         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 290         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 291         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 292         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 293         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 294         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 295
 296         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 297         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 298         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 299         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 300         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 301         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 302         /// send it first.
 303         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 304
 305         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 306         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 307         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 308         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 309         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 310
 311         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 312         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 313         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 314         //
 315         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 316         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 317         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 318         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 319         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 320         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 321         // commitment_signed.
 322         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 323         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 324         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 325         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 326         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 327         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 328         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 329         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 330         update_time_counter: u32,
 331         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 332
 333         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 334         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 335         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 336         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 337         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 338         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 339
 340         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 341
 342         funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
 343
 344         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
 345         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
 346         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 347         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
 348         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 349         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 350         /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
 351         /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
 352         pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
 353         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 354
 355         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 356         #[cfg(test)]
 357         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 358         #[cfg(not(test))]
 359         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 360         #[cfg(test)]
 361         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 362         #[cfg(not(test))]
 363         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 364         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 365         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 366         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 367         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 368         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 369         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 370         counterparty_to_self_delay: u16,
 371         to_self_delay: u16,
 372         #[cfg(test)]
 373         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 374         #[cfg(not(test))]
 375         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 376         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 377         minimum_depth: u32,
 378
 379         counterparty_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
 380
 381         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 382
 383         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 384         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 385
 386         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 387
 388         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 389
 390         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 391 }
 392
 393 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 394 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 395 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 396 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
 397 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 398 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 399 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 400
 401 #[cfg(not(test))]
 402 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 403 #[cfg(test)]
 404 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 405 #[cfg(not(test))]
 406 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 407 #[cfg(test)]
 408 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 409
 410 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 411 /// it's 2^24.
 412 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 413
 414 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 415 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 416 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 417 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 418         Ignore(String),
 419         Close(String),
 420         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 421 }
 422
 423 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 424         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 425                 match self {
 426                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 427                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 428                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 429                 }
 430         }
 431 }
 432
 433 macro_rules! secp_check {
 434         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 435                 match $res {
 436                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 437                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 438                 }
 439         };
 440 }
 441
 442 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
 443         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 444         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 445                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 446         }
 447
 448         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 449         /// required by us.
 450         ///
 451         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 452         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 453                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 454                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 455         }
 456
 457         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 458                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 459         }
 460
 461         // Constructors:
 462         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
 463         where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
 464               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 465         {
 466                 let to_self_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 467                 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 468
 469                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 470                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 471                 }
 472                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 473                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 474                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 475                 }
 476                 if to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 477                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", to_self_delay)});
 478                 }
 479                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 480                 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 481                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 482                 }
 483
 484                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 485
 486                 Ok(Channel {
 487                         user_id: user_id,
 488                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 489
 490                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 491                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 492                         channel_outbound: true,
 493                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 494                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
 495
 496                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 497
 498                         holder_keys: chan_keys,
 499                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 500                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 501
 502                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 503                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 504                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 505
 506                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 507                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 508                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 509                         pending_update_fee: None,
 510                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 511                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 512                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 513                         update_time_counter: 1,
 514
 515                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 516
 517                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 518                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 519                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 520                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 521                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 522
 523                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 524                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 525                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 526                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 527
 528                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 529
 530                         funding_txo: None,
 531                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 532                         short_channel_id: None,
 533                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 534                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 535
 536                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 537                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 538                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 539                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 540                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 541                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 542                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 543                         counterparty_to_self_delay: 0,
 544                         to_self_delay,
 545                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 546                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 547
 548                         counterparty_pubkeys: None,
 549                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 550
 551                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 552                         counterparty_node_id,
 553
 554                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 555
 556                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 557
 558                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 559                 })
 560         }
 561
 562         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 563                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 564         {
 565                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 566                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 567                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 568                 }
 569                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 570                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 571                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 572                 }
 573                 Ok(())
 574         }
 575
 576         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 577         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 578         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
 579                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
 580           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 581         {
 582                 let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 583                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 584                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 585                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 586                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 587                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 588                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 589                 };
 590                 chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay);
 591                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 592
 593                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 594                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 595                 }
 596
 597                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 598                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 599                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 600                 }
 601                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 602                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 603                 }
 604                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 605                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 606                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 607                 }
 608                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 609                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 610                 }
 611                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 612                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 613                 }
 614                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 615                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 616                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 617                 }
 618                 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 619
 620                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 621                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 622                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 623                 }
 624                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 625                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 626                 }
 627                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
 628                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
 629                 }
 630
 631                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 632                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 633                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 634                 }
 635                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 636                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 637                 }
 638                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 639                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 640                 }
 641                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 642                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 643                 }
 644                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 645                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 646                 }
 647                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 648                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 649                 }
 650                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 651                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 652                 }
 653
 654                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 655
 656                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 657                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 658                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 659                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 660                         }
 661                 }
 662                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 663                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 664
 665                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 666
 667                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 668                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 669                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 670                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 671                 }
 672                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 673                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 674                 }
 675                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 676                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 677                 }
 678
 679                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 680                 // for full fee payment
 681                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 682                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 683                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 684                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 685                 }
 686
 687                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 688                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 689                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 690                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 691                 }
 692
 693                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 694                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 695                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 696                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
 697                                         if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 698                                                 Some(script.clone())
 699                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 700                                         } else if script.len() == 0 {
 701                                                 None
 702                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 703                                         } else {
 704                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 705                                         }
 706                                 },
 707                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 708                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 709                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 710                                 }
 711                         }
 712                 } else { None };
 713
 714                 let chan = Channel {
 715                         user_id: user_id,
 716                         config: local_config,
 717
 718                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 719                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 720                         channel_outbound: false,
 721                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 722
 723                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 724
 725                         holder_keys: chan_keys,
 726                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 727                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 728
 729                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 730                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 731                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 732
 733                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 734                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 735                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 736                         pending_update_fee: None,
 737                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 738                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 739                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 740                         update_time_counter: 1,
 741
 742                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 743
 744                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 745                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 746                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 747                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 748                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 749
 750                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 751                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 752                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 753                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 754
 755                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 756
 757                         funding_txo: None,
 758                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 759                         short_channel_id: None,
 760                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 761                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 762
 763                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 764                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 765                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 766                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 767                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 768                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 769                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 770                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 771                         counterparty_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 772                         to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 773                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 774                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 775
 776                         counterparty_pubkeys: Some(counterparty_pubkeys),
 777                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 778
 779                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 780                         counterparty_node_id,
 781
 782                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 783
 784                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 785
 786                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 787                 };
 788
 789                 Ok(chan)
 790         }
 791
 792         // Utilities to build transactions:
 793
 794         fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
 795                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 796
 797                 let counterparty_payment_point = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point.serialize();
 798                 if self.channel_outbound {
 799                         sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 800                         sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
 801                 } else {
 802                         sha.input(counterparty_payment_point);
 803                         sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 804                 }
 805                 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 806
 807                 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
 808                 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
 809                 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
 810                 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
 811                 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
 812                 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
 813         }
 814
 815         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 816         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 817         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 818         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 819         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 820         /// an HTLC to a).
 821         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 822         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 823         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 824         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 825         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 826         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 827         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 828         /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 829         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 830         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 831         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 832         #[inline]
 833         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 834                 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
 835
 836                 let txins = {
 837                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 838                         ins.push(TxIn {
 839                                 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
 840                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 841                                 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
 842                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 843                         });
 844                         ins
 845                 };
 846
 847                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
 848                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 849
 850                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 851                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 852                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 853                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 854
 855                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 856
 857                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 858                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 859                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 860                                         offered: $offered,
 861                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 862                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 863                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 864                                         transaction_output_index: None
 865                                 }
 866                         }
 867                 }
 868
 869                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 870                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 871                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 872                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 873                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 874                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 875                                                 txouts.push((TxOut {
 876                                                         script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 877                                                         value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
 878                                                 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
 879                                         } else {
 880                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 881                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 882                                         }
 883                                 } else {
 884                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 885                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 886                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 887                                                 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
 888                                                         script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 889                                                         value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
 890                                                 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
 891                                         } else {
 892                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 893                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 894                                         }
 895                                 }
 896                         }
 897                 }
 898
 899                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 900                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 901                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 902                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 903                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 904                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 905                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 906                         };
 907
 908                         if include {
 909                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 910                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 911                         } else {
 912                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 913                                 match &htlc.state {
 914                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 915                                                 if generated_by_local {
 916                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 917                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 918                                                         }
 919                                                 }
 920                                         },
 921                                         _ => {},
 922                                 }
 923                         }
 924                 }
 925
 926                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 927                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 928                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 929                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 930                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 931                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 932                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 933                         };
 934
 935                         if include {
 936                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 937                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 938                         } else {
 939                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 940                                 match htlc.state {
 941                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 942                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 943                                         },
 944                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 945                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 946                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 947                                                 }
 948                                         },
 949                                         _ => {},
 950                                 }
 951                         }
 952                 }
 953
 954                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 955                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 956                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 957                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 958                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 959                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 960                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 961                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 962
 963                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 964                 {
 965                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 966                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 967                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 968                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 969                         } else {
 970                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 971                         };
 972                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
 973                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
 974                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
 975                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
 976                 }
 977
 978                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 979                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
 980                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
 981                 } else {
 982                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
 983                 };
 984
 985                 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
 986                 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
 987
 988                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
 989                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
 990                         txouts.push((TxOut {
 991                                 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
 992                                                                                        if local { self.counterparty_to_self_delay } else { self.to_self_delay },
 993                                                                                        &keys.delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 994                                 value: value_to_a as u64
 995                         }, None));
 996                 }
 997
 998                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
 999                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1000                         let static_payment_pk = if local {
1001                                 self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point
1002                         } else {
1003                                 self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1004                         }.serialize();
1005                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1006                                 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1007                                                              .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&static_payment_pk)[..])
1008                                                              .into_script(),
1009                                 value: value_to_b as u64
1010                         }, None));
1011                 }
1012
1013                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1014                         if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
1015                                 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
1016                                         a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
1017                                                 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1018                                                 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1019                                                 // may fail)!
1020                                                 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
1021                                 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1022                                 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1023                                 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1024                         } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1025                 });
1026
1027                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1028                 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
1029                 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1030                         outputs.push(out.0);
1031                         if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
1032                                 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1033                                 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
1034                         }
1035                 }
1036                 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
1037                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1038
1039                 (Transaction {
1040                         version: 2,
1041                         lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1042                         input: txins,
1043                         output: outputs,
1044                 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
1045         }
1046
1047         #[inline]
1048         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1049                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1050                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1051         }
1052
1053         #[inline]
1054         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
1055                 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1056         }
1057
1058         #[inline]
1059         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1060                 let txins = {
1061                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1062                         ins.push(TxIn {
1063                                 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1064                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1065                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1066                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1067                         });
1068                         ins
1069                 };
1070
1071                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1072                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1073                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1074
1075                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1076                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1077                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1078
1079                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1080                         assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1081                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1082                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1083                         assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1084                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1085                 }
1086
1087                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1088                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1089                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1090                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1091                         }, ()));
1092                 }
1093
1094                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1095                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1096                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1097                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1098                         }, ()));
1099                 }
1100
1101                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1102
1103                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1104                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1105                         outputs.push(out.0);
1106                 }
1107
1108                 (Transaction {
1109                         version: 2,
1110                         lock_time: 0,
1111                         input: txins,
1112                         output: outputs,
1113                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1114         }
1115
1116         #[inline]
1117         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1118         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1119         /// our counterparty!)
1120         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1121         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1122         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1123                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1124                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1125                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1126                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1127
1128                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1129         }
1130
1131         #[inline]
1132         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1133         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1134         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1135         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1136                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1137                 //may see payments to it!
1138                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1139                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1140                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1141
1142                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1143         }
1144
1145         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1146         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1147         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1148         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1149                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1150         }
1151
1152         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1153         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1154         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1155         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1156                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.counterparty_to_self_delay } else { self.to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1157         }
1158
1159         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1160         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1161         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1162         ///
1163         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1164         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1165         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1166                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1167                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1168                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1169                 // either.
1170                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1171                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1172                 }
1173                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1174
1175                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1176
1177                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1178                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1179                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1180
1181                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1182                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1183                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1184                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1185                                 match htlc.state {
1186                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1187                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1188                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1189                                                 } else {
1190                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1191                                                 }
1192                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1193                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1194                                         },
1195                                         _ => {
1196                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1197                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1198                                         }
1199                                 }
1200                                 pending_idx = idx;
1201                                 break;
1202                         }
1203                 }
1204                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1205                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1206                 }
1207
1208                 // Now update local state:
1209                 //
1210                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1211                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1212                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1213                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1214                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1215                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1216                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1217                         }],
1218                 };
1219
1220                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1221                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1222                                 match pending_update {
1223                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1224                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1225                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1226                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1227                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1228                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1229                                                 }
1230                                         },
1231                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1232                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1233                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1234                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1235                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1236                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1237                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1238                                                 }
1239                                         },
1240                                         _ => {}
1241                                 }
1242                         }
1243                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1244                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1245                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1246                         });
1247                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1248                 }
1249
1250                 {
1251                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1252                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1253                         } else {
1254                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1255                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1256                         }
1257                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1258                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1259                 }
1260
1261                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1262                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1263                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1264                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1265                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1266         }
1267
1268         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1269                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1270                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1271                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1272                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1273                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1274                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1275                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1276                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1277                         },
1278                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1279                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1280                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1281                         },
1282                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1283                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1284                 }
1285         }
1286
1287         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1288         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1289         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1290         ///
1291         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1292         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1293         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1294                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1295                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1296                 }
1297                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1298
1299                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1300                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1301                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1302
1303                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1304                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1305                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1306                                 match htlc.state {
1307                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1308                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1309                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1310                                                 return Ok(None);
1311                                         },
1312                                         _ => {
1313                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1314                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1315                                         }
1316                                 }
1317                                 pending_idx = idx;
1318                         }
1319                 }
1320                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1321                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1322                 }
1323
1324                 // Now update local state:
1325                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1326                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1327                                 match pending_update {
1328                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1329                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1330                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1331                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1332                                                 }
1333                                         },
1334                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1335                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1336                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1337                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1338                                                 }
1339                                         },
1340                                         _ => {}
1341                                 }
1342                         }
1343                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1344                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1345                                 err_packet,
1346                         });
1347                         return Ok(None);
1348                 }
1349
1350                 {
1351                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1352                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1353                 }
1354
1355                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1356                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1357                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1358                         reason: err_packet
1359                 }))
1360         }
1361
1362         // Message handlers:
1363
1364         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1365                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1366                 if !self.channel_outbound {
1367                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1368                 }
1369                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1370                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1371                 }
1372                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1373                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1374                 }
1375                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1376                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1377                 }
1378                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1379                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1380                 }
1381                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1382                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1383                 }
1384                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1385                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1386                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1387                 }
1388                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1389                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1390                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1391                 }
1392                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1393                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1394                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1395                 }
1396                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1397                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1398                 }
1399                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1400                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs)));
1401                 }
1402
1403                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1404                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1405                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1406                 }
1407                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1408                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1409                 }
1410                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1411                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1412                 }
1413                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1414                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1415                 }
1416                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1417                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1418                 }
1419                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1420                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1421                 }
1422                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1423                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1424                 }
1425
1426                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1427                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1428                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1429                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1430                                         if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1431                                                 Some(script.clone())
1432                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1433                                         } else if script.len() == 0 {
1434                                                 None
1435                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1436                                         } else {
1437                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. scriptpubkey: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1438                                         }
1439                                 },
1440                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1441                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1442                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1443                                 }
1444                         }
1445                 } else { None };
1446
1447                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1448                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1449                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1450                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1451                 self.counterparty_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1452                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1453                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1454
1455                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1456                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1457                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1458                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1459                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1460                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1461                 };
1462
1463                 self.holder_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, self.to_self_delay);
1464                 self.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys);
1465
1466                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1467                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1468
1469                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1470
1471                 Ok(())
1472         }
1473
1474         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1475                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1476
1477                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1478                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1479                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1480
1481                 // They sign the "our" commitment transaction...
1482                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_tx), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1483                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1484
1485                 let tx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(initial_commitment_tx, sig.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1486
1487                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1488                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1489                 let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
1490                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
1491                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1492
1493                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1494                 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, tx, counterparty_signature))
1495         }
1496
1497         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1498                 &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
1499         }
1500
1501         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1502                 if self.channel_outbound {
1503                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1504                 }
1505                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1506                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1507                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1508                         // channel.
1509                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1510                 }
1511                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1512                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1513                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1514                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1515                 }
1516
1517                 let funding_txo = OutPoint{ txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1518                 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
1519
1520                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1521                         Ok(res) => res,
1522                         Err(e) => {
1523                                 self.funding_txo = None;
1524                                 return Err(e);
1525                         }
1526                 };
1527
1528                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1529
1530                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1531                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1532                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1533                 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1534                         () => { {
1535                                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
1536                                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.to_self_delay,
1537                                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1538                                                                               &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1539                                                                               self.counterparty_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1540                                                                               self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1541                                                                               initial_commitment_tx.clone());
1542
1543                                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1544                                 channel_monitor
1545                         } }
1546                 }
1547
1548                 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1549
1550                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1551                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1552                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1553                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1554
1555                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1556                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1557                         signature: signature
1558                 }, channel_monitor))
1559         }
1560
1561         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1562         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1563         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1564                 if !self.channel_outbound {
1565                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1566                 }
1567                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1568                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1569                 }
1570                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1571                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1572                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1573                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1574                 }
1575
1576                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1577
1578                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1579                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1580
1581                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1582                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1583                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1584
1585                 let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1586
1587                 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1588                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) {
1589                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1590                 }
1591
1592                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1593                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1594                 let funding_txo = self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap();
1595                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1596                 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1597                         () => { {
1598                                 let commitment_tx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(initial_commitment_tx.clone(), msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, counterparty_funding_pubkey, keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1599                                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
1600                                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.to_self_delay,
1601                                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo.clone(), funding_txo_script.clone()),
1602                                                                               &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1603                                                                               self.counterparty_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1604                                                                               self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1605                                                                               commitment_tx);
1606
1607                                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1608
1609                                 channel_monitor
1610                         } }
1611                 }
1612
1613                 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1614
1615                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1616                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1617                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1618                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1619
1620                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1621         }
1622
1623         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1624                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1625                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1626                 }
1627
1628                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1629
1630                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1631                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1632                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1633                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1634                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1635                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1636                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1637                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1638                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1639                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1640                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1641                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1642                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1643                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1644                         }
1645                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1646                         return Ok(());
1647                 } else {
1648                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1649                 }
1650
1651                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1652                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1653                 Ok(())
1654         }
1655
1656         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1657         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1658                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1659                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1660                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1661                 }
1662                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1663         }
1664
1665         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1666         /// holding cell.
1667         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1668                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1669                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1670                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1671                 }
1672
1673                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1674                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1675                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1676                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1677                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1678                         }
1679                 }
1680
1681                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1682         }
1683
1684         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1685         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1686         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1687         /// corner case properly.
1688         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1689                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1690                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1691                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1692         }
1693
1694         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1695         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1696         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1697                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1698                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1699                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1700         }
1701
1702         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local (i.e our) next commitment transaction
1703         // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next
1704         // commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
1705         // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust
1706         // HTLCs are excluded.
1707         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1708                 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1709
1710                 let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
1711                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1712                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1713                                 continue
1714                         }
1715                         match htlc.state {
1716                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1717                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1718                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1719                                 _ => {},
1720                         }
1721                 }
1722
1723                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1724                         match htlc {
1725                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1726                                 _ => {},
1727                         }
1728                 }
1729
1730                 self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
1731         }
1732
1733         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction
1734         // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their
1735         // next commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
1736         // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust HTLCs
1737         // are excluded.
1738         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1739                 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1740
1741                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next
1742                 // commitment_signed, all inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be
1743                 // included) and only committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1744                 let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
1745                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1746                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis {
1747                                 continue
1748                         }
1749                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next
1750                         // commitment_signed, i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1751                         match htlc.state {
1752                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1753                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1754                                 _ => {},
1755                         }
1756                 }
1757
1758                 self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
1759         }
1760
1761         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1762         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1763                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1764                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1765                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1766                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1767                 }
1768                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1769                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1770                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1771                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1772                 }
1773                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1774                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1775                 }
1776                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1777                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1778                 }
1779                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1780                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1781                 }
1782                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1783                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1784                 }
1785
1786                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1787                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1788                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1789                 }
1790                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1791                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1792                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1793                 }
1794                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1795                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1796                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1797                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1798                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1799                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1800                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1801                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1802                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1803                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1804                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1805                 // transaction).
1806                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1807                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1808                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1809                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1810                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1811                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1812                         }
1813                 }
1814
1815                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1816                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1817                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1818                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1819                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1820                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1821                 }
1822
1823                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1824                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1825                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else {
1826                         // +1 for this HTLC.
1827                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1)
1828                 };
1829                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1830                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1831                 };
1832
1833                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1834                         Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1835                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1836                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1837                 }
1838
1839                 if !self.channel_outbound {
1840                         // `+1` for this HTLC, `2 *` and `+1` fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from the
1841                         // spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's side,
1842                         // only on the sender's.
1843                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output fees,
1844                         // we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep the extra +1
1845                         // as we should still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of
1846                         // being sensitive to fee spikes.
1847                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1);
1848                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1849                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1850                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
1851                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
1852                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
1853                         }
1854                 } else {
1855                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
1856
1857                         // +1 for this HTLC.
1858                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
1859                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1860                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
1861                         }
1862                 }
1863                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1864                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
1865                 }
1866                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1867                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
1868                 }
1869
1870                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1871                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
1872                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1873                         }
1874                 }
1875
1876                 // Now update local state:
1877                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
1878                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1879                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1880                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1881                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1882                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1883                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
1884                 });
1885                 Ok(())
1886         }
1887
1888         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1889         #[inline]
1890         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1891                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1892                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1893                                 match check_preimage {
1894                                         None => {},
1895                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
1896                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1897                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
1898                                                 }
1899                                 };
1900                                 match htlc.state {
1901                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1902                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
1903                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1904                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1905                                         },
1906                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1907                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
1908                                 }
1909                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1910                         }
1911                 }
1912                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
1913         }
1914
1915         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1916                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1917                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1918                 }
1919                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1920                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1921                 }
1922
1923                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1924                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1925         }
1926
1927         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1928                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1929                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1930                 }
1931                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1932                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1933                 }
1934
1935                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1936                 Ok(())
1937         }
1938
1939         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1940                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1941                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1942                 }
1943                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1944                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1945                 }
1946
1947                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1948                 Ok(())
1949         }
1950
1951         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
1952         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1953                                 L::Target: Logger
1954         {
1955                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1956                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
1957                 }
1958                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1959                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
1960                 }
1961                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1962                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
1963                 }
1964
1965                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1966
1967                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1968
1969                 let mut update_fee = false;
1970                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1971                         update_fee = true;
1972                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1973                 } else {
1974                         self.feerate_per_kw
1975                 };
1976
1977                 let mut commitment_tx = {
1978                         let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
1979                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1980                         (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1981                 };
1982                 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.0.txid();
1983                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&commitment_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1984                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_tx.0), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1985                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
1986                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
1987                 }
1988
1989                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1990                 if update_fee {
1991                         let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.1;
1992                         let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1993
1994                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1995                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
1996                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
1997                         }
1998                 }
1999
2000                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_tx.1 {
2001                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_tx.1))));
2002                 }
2003
2004                 // TODO: Merge these two, sadly they are currently both required to be passed separately to
2005                 // ChannelMonitor:
2006                 let mut htlcs_without_source = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len());
2007                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len());
2008                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
2009                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2010                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2011                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2012                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2013                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2014                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2015                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2016                                 }
2017                                 htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx])));
2018                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2019                         } else {
2020                                 htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), None));
2021                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2022                         }
2023                 }
2024
2025                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2026                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2027
2028                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2029                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2030                 if !self.channel_outbound {
2031                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2032                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2033                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2034                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2035                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2036                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2037                                         need_commitment = true;
2038                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2039                                 }
2040                         }
2041                 }
2042
2043                 let counterparty_funding_pubkey = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
2044
2045                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2046                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2047                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2048                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
2049                                 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(commitment_tx.0, msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &counterparty_funding_pubkey, keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_without_source),
2050                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2051                         }]
2052                 };
2053
2054                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2055                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2056                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2057                         } else { None };
2058                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2059                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2060                                 need_commitment = true;
2061                         }
2062                 }
2063                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2064                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2065                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2066                         } else { None } {
2067                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2068                                 need_commitment = true;
2069                         }
2070                 }
2071
2072                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2073                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2074                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2075                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2076
2077                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2078                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2079                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2080                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2081                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2082                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2083                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2084                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2085                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2086                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2087                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2088                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2089                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2090                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2091                         }
2092                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2093                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2094                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2095                 }
2096
2097                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2098                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2099                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2100                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2101                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2102                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2103                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2104                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2105                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2106                         (Some(msg), None)
2107                 } else if !need_commitment {
2108                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2109                 } else { (None, None) };
2110
2111                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2112                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2113                         per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
2114                         next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2115                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2116         }
2117
2118         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2119         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2120         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2121                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2122                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2123                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2124
2125                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2126                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2127                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2128                         };
2129
2130                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2131                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2132                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2133                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2134                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2135                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2136                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2137                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2138                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2139                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2140                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2141                                 // to rebalance channels.
2142                                 match &htlc_update {
2143                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2144                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2145                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2146                                                         Err(e) => {
2147                                                                 match e {
2148                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2149                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2150                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2151                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2152                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2153                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2154                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2155                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2156                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2157                                                                         },
2158                                                                         _ => {
2159                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2160                                                                         },
2161                                                                 }
2162                                                         }
2163                                                 }
2164                                         },
2165                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2166                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2167                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2168                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2169                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2170                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2171                                                                 }
2172                                                         },
2173                                                         Err(e) => {
2174                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2175                                                                 else {
2176                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2177                                                                 }
2178                                                         }
2179                                                 }
2180                                         },
2181                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2182                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2183                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2184                                                         Err(e) => {
2185                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2186                                                                 else {
2187                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2188                                                                 }
2189                                                         }
2190                                                 }
2191                                         },
2192                                 }
2193                         }
2194                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2195                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2196                         }
2197                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2198                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2199                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2200                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2201                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2202                                 })
2203                         } else {
2204                                 None
2205                         };
2206
2207                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2208                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2209                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2210                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2211                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2212
2213                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2214                                 update_add_htlcs,
2215                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2216                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2217                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2218                                 update_fee: update_fee,
2219                                 commitment_signed,
2220                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2221                 } else {
2222                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2223                 }
2224         }
2225
2226         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2227         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2228         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2229         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2230         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2231         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2232                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2233                                         L::Target: Logger,
2234         {
2235                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2236                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2237                 }
2238                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2239                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2240                 }
2241                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2242                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2243                 }
2244
2245                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2246                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2247                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2248                         }
2249                 }
2250
2251                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2252                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2253                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2254                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2255                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2256                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2257                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2258                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2259                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2260                 }
2261
2262                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2263                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2264                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2265                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2266                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2267                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2268                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2269                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2270                         }],
2271                 };
2272
2273                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2274                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2275                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2276                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2277                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2278                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2279                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2280                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2281
2282                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2283                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2284                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2285                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2286                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2287                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2288                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2289
2290                 {
2291                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2292                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2293                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2294
2295                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2296                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2297                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2298                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2299                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2300                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2301                                         }
2302                                         false
2303                                 } else { true }
2304                         });
2305                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2306                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2307                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2308                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2309                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2310                                         } else {
2311                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2312                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2313                                         }
2314                                         false
2315                                 } else { true }
2316                         });
2317                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2318                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2319                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2320                                         true
2321                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2322                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2323                                         true
2324                                 } else { false };
2325                                 if swap {
2326                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2327                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2328
2329                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2330                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2331                                                 require_commitment = true;
2332                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2333                                                 match forward_info {
2334                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2335                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2336                                                                 match fail_msg {
2337                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2338                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2339                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2340                                                                         },
2341                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2342                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2343                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2344                                                                         },
2345                                                                 }
2346                                                         },
2347                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2348                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2349                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2350                                                         }
2351                                                 }
2352                                         }
2353                                 }
2354                         }
2355                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2356                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2357                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2358                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2359                                 }
2360                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2361                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2362                                 } else { None } {
2363                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2364                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2365                                         require_commitment = true;
2366                                 }
2367                         }
2368                 }
2369                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2370
2371                 if self.channel_outbound {
2372                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2373                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2374                         }
2375                 } else {
2376                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2377                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2378                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2379                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2380                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2381                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2382                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2383                                         require_commitment = true;
2384                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2385                                 }
2386                         }
2387                 }
2388
2389                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2390                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2391                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2392                         if require_commitment {
2393                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2394                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2395                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2396                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2397                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2398                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2399                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2400                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2401                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2402                         }
2403                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2404                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2405                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2406                 }
2407
2408                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2409                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2410                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2411                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2412                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2413                                 }
2414                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2415                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2416                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2417                                 }
2418
2419                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2420                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2421                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2422                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2423
2424                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2425                         },
2426                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2427                                 if require_commitment {
2428                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2429
2430                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2431                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2432                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2433                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2434
2435                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2436                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2437                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2438                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2439                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2440                                                 update_fee: None,
2441                                                 commitment_signed
2442                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2443                                 } else {
2444                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2445                                 }
2446                         }
2447                 }
2448
2449         }
2450
2451         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2452         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2453         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2454         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2455                 if !self.channel_outbound {
2456                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2457                 }
2458                 if !self.is_usable() {
2459                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2460                 }
2461                 if !self.is_live() {
2462                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2463                 }
2464
2465                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2466                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2467                         return None;
2468                 }
2469
2470                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2471                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2472
2473                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2474                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2475                         feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw,
2476                 })
2477         }
2478
2479         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2480                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2481                         Some(update_fee) => {
2482                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2483                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2484                         },
2485                         None => Ok(None)
2486                 }
2487         }
2488
2489         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2490         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2491         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2492         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2493         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2494         /// completed.
2495         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2496                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2497
2498                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2499                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2500                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2501                         return outbound_drops;
2502                 }
2503                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2504                 // will be retransmitted.
2505                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2506
2507                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2508                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2509                         match htlc.state {
2510                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2511                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2512                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2513                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2514                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2515                                         false
2516                                 },
2517                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2518                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2519                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2520                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2521                                         true
2522                                 },
2523                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2524                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2525                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2526                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2527                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2528                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2529                                         true
2530                                 },
2531                         }
2532                 });
2533                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2534
2535                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2536                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2537                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2538                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2539                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2540                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2541                         }
2542                 }
2543
2544                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2545                         match htlc_update {
2546                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2547                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2548                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2549                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2550                                 // logic.
2551                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2552                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2553                                         false
2554                                 },
2555                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2556                         }
2557                 });
2558                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2559                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2560                 outbound_drops
2561         }
2562
2563         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2564         /// updates are partially paused.
2565         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2566         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2567         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2568         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2569         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2570                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2571                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2572                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2573                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2574                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2575                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2576                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2577                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2578         }
2579
2580         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2581         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2582         /// to the remote side.
2583         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2584                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2585                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2586
2587                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2588
2589                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2590                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2591                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2592                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2593                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2594                 // monitor was persisted.
2595                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2596                         assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2597                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2598                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2599                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2600                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2601                                 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2602                         })
2603                 } else { None };
2604
2605                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2606                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2607                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2608                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2609
2610                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2611                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2612                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2613                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2614                 }
2615
2616                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2617                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2618                 } else { None };
2619                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2620                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2621                 } else { None };
2622
2623                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2624                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2625                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2626                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2627                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2628                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2629                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2630                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2631                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2632         }
2633
2634         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2635                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2636         {
2637                 if self.channel_outbound {
2638                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2639                 }
2640                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2641                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2642                 }
2643                 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2644                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2645                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2646                 Ok(())
2647         }
2648
2649         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2650                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2651                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2652                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2653                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2654                         per_commitment_secret,
2655                         next_per_commitment_point,
2656                 }
2657         }
2658
2659         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2660                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2661                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2662                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2663                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2664
2665                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2666                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2667                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2668                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2669                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2670                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2671                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2672                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2673                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2674                                 });
2675                         }
2676                 }
2677
2678                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2679                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2680                                 match reason {
2681                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2682                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2683                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2684                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2685                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2686                                                 });
2687                                         },
2688                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2689                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2690                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2691                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2692                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2693                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2694                                                 });
2695                                         },
2696                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2697                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2698                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2699                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2700                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2701                                                 });
2702                                         },
2703                                 }
2704                         }
2705                 }
2706
2707                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2708                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2709                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2710                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2711                         update_fee: None,
2712                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2713                 }
2714         }
2715
2716         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2717         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2718         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2719                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2720                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2721                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2722                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2723                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2724                 }
2725
2726                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2727                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2728                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2729                 }
2730
2731                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2732                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2733                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2734                                         let expected_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2735                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2736                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2737                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2738                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2739                                         }
2740                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2741                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2742                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2743                                                 ));
2744                                         }
2745                                 },
2746                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2747                         }
2748                 }
2749
2750                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2751                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2752                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2753
2754                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2755                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2756                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2757                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2758                         })
2759                 } else { None };
2760
2761                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2762                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2763                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2764                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2765                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2766                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2767                                 }
2768                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2769                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2770                         }
2771
2772                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2773                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2774                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2775                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2776                                 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2777                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2778                 }
2779
2780                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2781                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2782                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2783                         None
2784                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2785                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2786                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2787                                 None
2788                         } else {
2789                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2790                         }
2791                 } else {
2792                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2793                 };
2794
2795                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2796                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2797                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2798                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2799                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2800
2801                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2802                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2803                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2804                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2805                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2806                                 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2807                         })
2808                 } else { None };
2809
2810                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2811                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2812                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2813                         } else {
2814                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2815                         }
2816
2817                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2818                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2819                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2820                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2821                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2822                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
2823                                         }
2824                                 }
2825
2826                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2827                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2828                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2829                                 // now!
2830                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
2831                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2832                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2833                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
2834                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2835                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2836                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
2837                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2838                                         },
2839                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
2840                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2841                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2842                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
2843                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2844                                         },
2845                                 }
2846                         } else {
2847                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2848                         }
2849                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
2850                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2851                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2852                         } else {
2853                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2854                         }
2855
2856                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2857                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2858                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2859                         }
2860
2861                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2862                 } else {
2863                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2864                 }
2865         }
2866
2867         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
2868                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2869         {
2870                 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2871                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2872                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2873                         return None;
2874                 }
2875
2876                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2877                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2878                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2879                 }
2880                 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2881                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
2882
2883                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2884                 let sig = self.holder_keys
2885                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2886                         .ok();
2887                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
2888
2889                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
2890                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2891                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2892                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2893                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
2894                 })
2895         }
2896
2897         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2898                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2899         {
2900                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2901                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2902                 }
2903                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2904                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2905                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2906                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2907                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
2908                 }
2909                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2910                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2911                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
2912                         }
2913                 }
2914                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2915
2916                 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2917                 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2918                 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2919                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got counterparty shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2920                 }
2921
2922                 //Check counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2923                 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2924                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2925                 }
2926
2927                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2928                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2929                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2930                         }
2931                 } else {
2932                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2933                 }
2934
2935                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2936
2937                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2938                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2939
2940                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2941                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2942                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2943                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2944                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2945                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2946                         match htlc_update {
2947                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2948                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2949                                         false
2950                                 },
2951                                 _ => true
2952                         }
2953                 });
2954                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2955                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2956                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2957
2958                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2959                         None
2960                 } else {
2961                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2962                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2963                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2964                         })
2965                 };
2966
2967                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2968                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2969
2970                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2971         }
2972
2973         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
2974                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2975                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2976                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2977
2978                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2979
2980                 let funding_key = self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
2981                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2982                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
2983                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2984                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2985                 } else {
2986                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2987                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2988                 }
2989                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2990                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2991
2992                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
2993         }
2994
2995         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
2996                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2997         {
2998                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2999                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3000                 }
3001                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3002                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3003                 }
3004                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3005                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3006                 }
3007                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3008                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3009                 }
3010
3011                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3012                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3013                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3014                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3015                 }
3016                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3017
3018                 let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
3019
3020                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) {
3021                         Ok(_) => {},
3022                         Err(_e) => {
3023                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3024                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3025                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3026                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3027                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3028                         },
3029                 };
3030
3031                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3032                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3033                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3034                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3035                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3036                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3037                         }
3038                 }
3039
3040                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3041                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3042                                 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
3043                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
3044                                 let sig = self.holder_keys
3045                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3046                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3047                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3048                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3049                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3050                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3051                                         signature: sig,
3052                                 }), None))
3053                         }
3054                 }
3055
3056                 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis  * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
3057                 if self.channel_outbound {
3058                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3059                         if (proposed_sat_per_kw as u32) > max_feerate {
3060                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3061                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3062                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3063                                         }
3064                                 }
3065                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3066                         }
3067                 } else {
3068                         let min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3069                         if (proposed_sat_per_kw as u32) < min_feerate {
3070                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3071                                         if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3072                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3073                                         }
3074                                 }
3075                                 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3076                         }
3077                 }
3078
3079                 let sig = self.holder_keys
3080                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3081                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3082                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3083
3084                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3085                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3086
3087                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3088                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3089                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3090                         signature: sig,
3091                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3092         }
3093
3094         // Public utilities:
3095
3096         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3097                 self.channel_id
3098         }
3099
3100         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3101         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3102         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3103                 self.user_id
3104         }
3105
3106         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3107         /// is_usable() returns true).
3108         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3109         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3110                 self.short_channel_id
3111         }
3112
3113         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3114         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3115         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3116                 self.funding_txo
3117         }
3118
3119         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3120         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3121                 self.counterparty_node_id
3122         }
3123
3124         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3125         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3126                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3127         }
3128
3129         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3130         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3131                 return cmp::min(
3132                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3133                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3134                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3135                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
3136
3137                         Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3138                 );
3139         }
3140
3141         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3142         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3143                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3144         }
3145
3146         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3147                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3148         }
3149
3150         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3151                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3152         }
3153
3154         #[cfg(test)]
3155         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3156                 self.feerate_per_kw
3157         }
3158
3159         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3160                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3161         }
3162
3163         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3164                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3165         }
3166
3167         pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3168                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3169         }
3170
3171         #[cfg(test)]
3172         pub fn get_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
3173                 &self.holder_keys
3174         }
3175
3176         #[cfg(test)]
3177         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3178                 ChannelValueStat {
3179                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3180                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3181                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3182                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3183                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3184                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3185                                 let mut res = 0;
3186                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3187                                         match h {
3188                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3189                                                         res += amount_msat;
3190                                                 }
3191                                                 _ => {}
3192                                         }
3193                                 }
3194                                 res
3195                         },
3196                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3197                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3198                 }
3199         }
3200
3201         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3202         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3203                 self.update_time_counter
3204         }
3205
3206         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3207                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3208         }
3209
3210         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3211                 self.config.announced_channel
3212         }
3213
3214         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3215                 self.channel_outbound
3216         }
3217
3218         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3219         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3220         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3221                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3222         {
3223                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3224                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3225
3226                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3227                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3228
3229                 if self.channel_outbound {
3230                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3231                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3232                 }
3233
3234                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3235                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3236
3237                 res as u32
3238         }
3239
3240         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3241         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3242                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3243         }
3244
3245         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3246         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3247         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3248                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3249                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3250         }
3251
3252         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3253         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3254         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3255         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3256                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3257         }
3258
3259         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3260         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3261         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3262                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3263         }
3264
3265         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3266         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3267                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3268         }
3269
3270         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3271         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3272         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3273         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3274                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3275                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3276                         true
3277                 } else { false }
3278         }
3279
3280         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3281                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3282         }
3283
3284         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3285                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3286         }
3287
3288         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3289                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3290         }
3291
3292         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3293                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3294         }
3295
3296         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3297                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3298         }
3299
3300         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3301         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3302         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3303         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3304         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3305         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3306         ///
3307         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3308         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3309         /// post-shutdown.
3310         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3311         ///
3312         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3313         /// back.
3314         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3315                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3316                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3317                         match htlc_update {
3318                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3319                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3320                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3321                                                 false
3322                                         } else { true }
3323                                 },
3324                                 _ => true
3325                         }
3326                 });
3327                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3328                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3329                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3330                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3331                         }
3332                 }
3333                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3334                         for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
3335                                 if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
3336                                         let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
3337                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3338                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3339                                                 if self.channel_outbound {
3340                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3341                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3342                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3343                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3344                                                         // channel and move on.
3345                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3346                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3347                                                 }
3348                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3349                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3350                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3351                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3352                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3353                                                 });
3354                                         } else {
3355                                                 if self.channel_outbound {
3356                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3357                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3358                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3359                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3360                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3361                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3362                                                                 }
3363                                                         }
3364                                                 }
3365                                                 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (*index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3366                                                         panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3367                                                 }
3368                                                 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3369                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3370                                                 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)          << (5*8)) |
3371                                                                              ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3372                                                                              ((txo_idx as u64)         << (0*8)));
3373                                         }
3374                                 }
3375                         }
3376                 }
3377                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3378                         self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3379                         self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3380                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3381                                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3382                                         let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3383                                                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3384                                                 true
3385                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3386                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3387                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3388                                                 true
3389                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3390                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3391                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3392                                                 false
3393                                         } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3394                                                 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3395                                         } else {
3396                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3397                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3398                                                 false
3399                                         };
3400                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3401
3402                                         //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3403                                         //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3404                                         //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3405                                         //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3406                                         if need_commitment_update {
3407                                                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3408                                                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3409                                                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3410                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3411                                                                 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
3412                                                         }), timed_out_htlcs));
3413                                                 } else {
3414                                                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3415                                                         return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3416                                                 }
3417                                         }
3418                                 }
3419                         }
3420                 }
3421                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3422         }
3423
3424         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3425         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3426         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3427         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3428                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3429                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3430                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3431                                 return true;
3432                         }
3433                 }
3434                 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3435                 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3436                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3437                 }
3438                 false
3439         }
3440
3441         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3442         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3443
3444         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3445                 if !self.channel_outbound {
3446                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3447                 }
3448                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3449                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3450                 }
3451
3452                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3453                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3454                 }
3455
3456                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3457                 let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys();
3458
3459                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3460                         chain_hash: chain_hash,
3461                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3462                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3463                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3464                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3465                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3466                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3467                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3468                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3469                         to_self_delay: self.to_self_delay,
3470                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3471                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3472                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3473                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3474                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3475                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3476                         first_per_commitment_point,
3477                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3478                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3479                 }
3480         }
3481
3482         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3483                 if self.channel_outbound {
3484                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3485                 }
3486                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3487                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3488                 }
3489                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3490                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3491                 }
3492
3493                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3494                 let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys();
3495
3496                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3497                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3498                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3499                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3500                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3501                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3502                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3503                         to_self_delay: self.to_self_delay,
3504                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3505                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3506                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3507                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3508                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3509                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3510                         first_per_commitment_point,
3511                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3512                 }
3513         }
3514
3515         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3516         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3517                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3518                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3519                 let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
3520                 Ok(self.holder_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3521                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3522         }
3523
3524         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3525         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3526         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3527         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3528         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3529         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3530         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3531         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3532                 if !self.channel_outbound {
3533                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3534                 }
3535                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3536                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3537                 }
3538                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3539                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3540                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3541                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3542                 }
3543
3544                 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
3545                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3546                         Ok(res) => res,
3547                         Err(e) => {
3548                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3549                                 self.funding_txo = None;
3550                                 return Err(e);
3551                         }
3552                 };
3553
3554                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3555
3556                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3557
3558                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3559                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3560
3561                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3562                         temporary_channel_id,
3563                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3564                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3565                         signature: signature
3566                 })
3567         }
3568
3569         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3570         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3571         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3572         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3573         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3574         /// closing).
3575         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3576         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3577         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3578                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3579                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3580                 }
3581                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3582                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3583                 }
3584                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3585                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3586                 }
3587
3588                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3589
3590                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3591                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3592                         chain_hash: chain_hash,
3593                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3594                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3595                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3596                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3597                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3598                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3599                 };
3600
3601                 let sig = self.holder_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3602                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3603
3604                 Ok((msg, sig))
3605         }
3606
3607         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3608         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3609         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3610                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3611                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3612                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3613                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3614                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3615                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3616                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3617                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3618                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3619                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3620                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3621                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3622                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3623                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3624                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3625                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3626                         })
3627                 } else {
3628                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3629                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3630                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3631                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3632                         })
3633                 };
3634                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3635                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3636                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3637                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3638                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3639                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3640                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3641                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3642
3643                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3644                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3645                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3646                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3647                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3648                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3649                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3650                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3651                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3652                         // overflow here.
3653                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3654                         data_loss_protect,
3655                 }
3656         }
3657
3658
3659         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3660
3661         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3662         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3663         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3664         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3665         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3666         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3667         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3668         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3669                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3670                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3671                 }
3672                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3673                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3674                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3675                 }
3676
3677                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3678                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3679                 }
3680
3681                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3682                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3683                 }
3684
3685                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3686                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3687                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3688                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3689                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3690                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3691                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3692                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3693                 }
3694
3695                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3696                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3697                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3698                 }
3699                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3700                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3701                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3702                 }
3703
3704                 if !self.channel_outbound {
3705                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3706
3707                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3708                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3709                         // 1 additional HTLC corresponding to this HTLC.
3710                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
3711                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3712                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3713                         }
3714                 }
3715
3716                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3717                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3718                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3719                 }
3720
3721                 // The `+1` is for the HTLC currently being added to the commitment tx and
3722                 // the `2 *` and `+1` are for the fee spike buffer.
3723                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound {
3724                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1)
3725                 } else { 0 };
3726                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3727                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3728                 }
3729
3730                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3731                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3732                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3733                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3734                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3735                 }
3736
3737                 // Now update local state:
3738                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3739                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3740                                 amount_msat,
3741                                 payment_hash,
3742                                 cltv_expiry,
3743                                 source,
3744                                 onion_routing_packet,
3745                         });
3746                         return Ok(None);
3747                 }
3748
3749                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3750                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3751                         amount_msat,
3752                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3753                         cltv_expiry,
3754                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3755                         source,
3756                 });
3757
3758                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3759                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3760                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3761                         amount_msat,
3762                         payment_hash,
3763                         cltv_expiry,
3764                         onion_routing_packet,
3765                 };
3766                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3767
3768                 Ok(Some(res))
3769         }
3770
3771         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3772         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3773         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3774         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3775         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3776                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3777                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3778                 }
3779                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3780                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3781                 }
3782                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3783                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3784                 }
3785                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3786                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3787                 }
3788                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3789                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3790                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3791                                 have_updates = true;
3792                         }
3793                         if have_updates { break; }
3794                 }
3795                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3796                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3797                                 have_updates = true;
3798                         }
3799                         if have_updates { break; }
3800                 }
3801                 if !have_updates {
3802                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3803                 }
3804                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3805         }
3806         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3807         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3808                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3809                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3810                 // is acceptable.
3811                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3812                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3813                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3814                         } else { None };
3815                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
3816                                 htlc.state = state;
3817                         }
3818                 }
3819                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3820                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3821                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
3822                         } else { None } {
3823                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3824                         }
3825                 }
3826                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3827
3828                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
3829                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3830                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3831                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3832                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3833                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3834                         },
3835                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
3836                 };
3837
3838                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3839                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3840                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3841                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
3842                                 unsigned_commitment_tx: counterparty_commitment_tx.clone(),
3843                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3844                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
3845                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3846                         }]
3847                 };
3848                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3849                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3850         }
3851
3852         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3853         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3854         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3855                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3856                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3857                         if self.channel_outbound {
3858                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3859                         }
3860                 }
3861
3862                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3863                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
3864                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3865
3866                 {
3867                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
3868                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3869                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
3870                         }
3871
3872                         let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys);
3873                         let res = self.holder_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &pre_remote_keys, &htlcs, &self.secp_ctx)
3874                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
3875                         signature = res.0;
3876                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
3877                         let counterparty_keys = pre_remote_keys.trust_key_derivation();
3878
3879                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3880                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0),
3881                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3882                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3883
3884                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3885                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3886                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.to_self_delay, htlc, &counterparty_keys.delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
3887                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, counterparty_keys)),
3888                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
3889                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3890                         }
3891                 }
3892
3893                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3894                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3895                         signature,
3896                         htlc_signatures,
3897                 }, (counterparty_commitment_tx.0, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
3898         }
3899
3900         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3901         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3902         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3903         /// more info.
3904         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3905                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3906                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3907                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3908                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3909                         },
3910                         None => Ok(None)
3911                 }
3912         }
3913
3914         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3915         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3916         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3917                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3918                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3919                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
3920                         }
3921                 }
3922                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3923                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3924                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
3925                         }
3926                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3927                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
3928                         }
3929                 }
3930                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3931                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3932                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
3933                 }
3934
3935                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3936
3937                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3938                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3939                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3940                 } else {
3941                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3942                 }
3943                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3944
3945                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3946                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3947                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3948                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3949                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3950                         match htlc_update {
3951                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3952                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3953                                         false
3954                                 },
3955                                 _ => true
3956                         }
3957                 });
3958
3959                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3960                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3961                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
3962                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3963         }
3964
3965         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3966         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3967         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3968         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3969         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3970         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3971                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3972
3973                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3974                 // return them to fail the payment.
3975                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3976                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3977                         match htlc_update {
3978                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3979                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3980                                 },
3981                                 _ => {}
3982                         }
3983                 }
3984
3985                 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3986                         //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3987                         //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3988                         //which correspond)
3989                 }
3990
3991                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3992                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3993                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3994                 (self.funding_txo.clone(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3995                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3996                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3997                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3998         }
3999 }
4000
4001 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4002 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4003
4004 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4005         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4006                 match self {
4007                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4008                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4009                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4010                         },
4011                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4012                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4013                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4014                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4015                         },
4016                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4017                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4018                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4019                         },
4020                 }
4021                 Ok(())
4022         }
4023 }
4024
4025 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4026         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4027                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4028                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4029                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4030                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4031                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4032                 })
4033         }
4034 }
4035
4036 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4037         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4038                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4039                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4040
4041                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4042                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4043
4044                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4045                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4046
4047                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4048                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4049                 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
4050                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4051
4052                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4053
4054                 self.holder_keys.write(writer)?;
4055                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4056                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4057
4058                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4059                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4060                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4061
4062                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4063                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4064                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4065                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4066                         }
4067                 }
4068                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4069                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4070                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4071                                 continue; // Drop
4072                         }
4073                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4074                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4075                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4076                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4077                         match &htlc.state {
4078                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4079                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4080                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4081                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4082                                 },
4083                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4084                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4085                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4086                                 },
4087                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4088                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4089                                 },
4090                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4091                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4092                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4093                                 },
4094                         }
4095                 }
4096
4097                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4098                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4099                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4100                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4101                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4102                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4103                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4104                         match &htlc.state {
4105                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4106                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4107                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4108                                 },
4109                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4110                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4111                                 },
4112                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4113                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4114                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4115                                 },
4116                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4117                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4118                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4119                                 },
4120                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4121                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4122                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4123                                 },
4124                         }
4125                 }
4126
4127                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4128                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4129                         match update {
4130                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4131                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4132                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4133                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4134                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4135                                         source.write(writer)?;
4136                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4137                                 },
4138                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4139                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4140                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4141                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4142                                 },
4143                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4144                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4145                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4146                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4147                                 }
4148                         }
4149                 }
4150
4151                 match self.resend_order {
4152                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4153                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4154                 }
4155
4156                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4157                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4158                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4159
4160                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4161                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4162                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4163                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4164                 }
4165
4166                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4167                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4168                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4169                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4170                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4171                 }
4172
4173                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4174                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4175
4176                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4177                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4178                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4179                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4180
4181                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4182                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4183                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4184                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4185                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4186                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4187                         },
4188                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4189                 }
4190
4191                 self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4192                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4193                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4194
4195                 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4196                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4197
4198                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4199                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4200                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4201                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4202                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4203                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4204                 self.counterparty_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
4205                 self.to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
4206                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4207                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4208
4209                 self.counterparty_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
4210                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4211
4212                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4213                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4214
4215                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4216
4217                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4218                 Ok(())
4219         }
4220 }
4221
4222 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4223         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4224                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4225                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4226                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4227                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4228                 }
4229
4230                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4231                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4232
4233                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4234                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4235                 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
4236                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4237
4238                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4239
4240                 let holder_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4241                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4242                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4243
4244                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4245                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4246                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4247
4248                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4249                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4250                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4251                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4252                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4253                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4254                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4255                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4256                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4257                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4258                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4259                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4260                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4261                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4262                                 },
4263                         });
4264                 }
4265
4266                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4267                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4268                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4269                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4270                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4271                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4272                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4273                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4274                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4275                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4276                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4277                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4278                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4279                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4280                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4281                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4282                                 },
4283                         });
4284                 }
4285
4286                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4287                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4288                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4289                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4290                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4291                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4292                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4293                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4294                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4295                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4296                                 },
4297                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4298                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4299                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4300                                 },
4301                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4302                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4303                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4304                                 },
4305                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4306                         });
4307                 }
4308
4309                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4310                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4311                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4312                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4313                 };
4314
4315                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4316                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4317                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4318
4319                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4320                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4321                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4322                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4323                 }
4324
4325                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4326                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4327                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4328                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4329                 }
4330
4331                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4332                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4333
4334                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4335                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4336                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4337                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4338
4339                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4340                         0 => None,
4341                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4342                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4343                 };
4344
4345                 let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
4346                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4347                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4348
4349                 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4350                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4351
4352                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4353                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4354                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4355                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4356                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4357                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4358                 let counterparty_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4359                 let to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4360                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4361                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4362
4363                 let counterparty_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4364                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4365
4366                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4367                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4368
4369                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4370                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4371
4372                 Ok(Channel {
4373                         user_id,
4374
4375                         config,
4376                         channel_id,
4377                         channel_state,
4378                         channel_outbound,
4379                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4380                         channel_value_satoshis,
4381
4382                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4383
4384                         holder_keys,
4385                         shutdown_pubkey,
4386                         destination_script,
4387
4388                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4389                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4390                         value_to_self_msat,
4391
4392                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4393                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4394                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4395
4396                         resend_order,
4397
4398                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4399                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4400                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4401                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4402                         monitor_pending_failures,
4403
4404                         pending_update_fee,
4405                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4406                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4407                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4408                         update_time_counter,
4409                         feerate_per_kw,
4410
4411                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4412                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4413                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4414                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4415
4416                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4417
4418                         funding_txo,
4419                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4420                         short_channel_id,
4421                         last_block_connected,
4422                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4423
4424                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4425                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4426                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4427                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4428                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4429                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4430                         counterparty_to_self_delay,
4431                         to_self_delay,
4432                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4433                         minimum_depth,
4434
4435                         counterparty_pubkeys,
4436                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4437
4438                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4439                         counterparty_node_id,
4440
4441                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4442
4443                         commitment_secrets,
4444
4445                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4446                 })
4447         }
4448 }
4449
4450 #[cfg(test)]
4451 mod tests {
4452         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4453         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4454         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4455         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4456         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4457         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4458         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4459         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4460         use hex;
4461         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4462         use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4463         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4464         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4465         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
4466         use ln::chan_utils;
4467         use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
4468         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4469         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4470         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4471         use util::config::UserConfig;
4472         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
4473         use util::test_utils;
4474         use util::logger::Logger;
4475         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4476         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4477         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4478         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4479         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4480         use std::sync::Arc;
4481
4482         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4483                 fee_est: u32
4484         }
4485         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4486                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4487                         self.fee_est
4488                 }
4489         }
4490
4491         #[test]
4492         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4493                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4494                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4495         }
4496
4497         struct Keys {
4498                 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4499         }
4500         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4501                 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4502
4503                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4504                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4505                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4506                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4507                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4508                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4509                 }
4510
4511                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4512                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4513                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4514                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4515                 }
4516
4517                 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4518                         self.chan_keys.clone()
4519                 }
4520                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4521         }
4522
4523         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4524                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4525         }
4526
4527         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4528         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4529         #[test]
4530         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4531                 let original_fee = 253;
4532                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4533                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4534                 let seed = [42; 32];
4535                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4536                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4537
4538                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4539                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4540                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4541
4542                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4543                 // same as the old fee.
4544                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4545                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4546                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4547         }
4548
4549         #[test]
4550         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4551                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4552                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4553                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4554                 let seed = [42; 32];
4555                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4556                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4557
4558                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4559
4560                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4561                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4562                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4563                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4564
4565                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4566                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4567                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4568                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4569
4570                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4571                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4572                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4573
4574                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4575                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4576                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4577                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4578                 }]};
4579                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4580                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4581                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4582
4583                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4584                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4585
4586                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4587                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4588                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4589                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4590                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4591                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4592                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4593                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4594                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4595                         },
4596                         _ => panic!()
4597                 }
4598
4599                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4600                 // is sane.
4601                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4602                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4603                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4604                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4605                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4606                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4607                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4608                         },
4609                         _ => panic!()
4610                 }
4611         }
4612
4613         #[test]
4614         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4615                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4616                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4617                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4618                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4619
4620                 let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4621                         &secp_ctx,
4622                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4623                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4624                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4625                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4626                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4627
4628                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4629                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4630                         10_000_000,
4631                         (0, 0)
4632                 );
4633
4634                 assert_eq!(chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4635                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4636                 let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
4637
4638                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4639                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4640                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4641                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4642                 chan.counterparty_to_self_delay = 144;
4643                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4644
4645                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
4646                 chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
4647
4648                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4649                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4650                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4651                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4652                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4653                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4654                 };
4655                 chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, chan.counterparty_to_self_delay, chan.to_self_delay);
4656
4657                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
4658                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4659
4660                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4661                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4662
4663                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4664                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4665
4666                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4667                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4668                 // build_commitment_transaction.
4669                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
4670                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4671                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4672                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
4673                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4674
4675                 chan.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys);
4676
4677                 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4678
4679                 let mut localtx;
4680                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4681                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
4682                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
4683                         } ) => { {
4684                                 unsigned_tx = {
4685                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
4686                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4687                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4688                                                 .collect();
4689                                         (res.0, htlcs)
4690                                 };
4691                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4692                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4693                                 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&unsigned_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
4694                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4695
4696                                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::new();
4697                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
4698                                 $({
4699                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4700                                         per_htlc.push((unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
4701                                 })*
4702                                 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), per_htlc.len());
4703
4704                                 localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), counterparty_signature.clone(), &chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc);
4705                                 let local_sig = chan_keys.sign_local_commitment(&localtx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4706                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), local_sig);
4707
4708                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.add_local_sig(&redeemscript, local_sig))[..],
4709                                                 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4710
4711                                 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(&localtx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4712                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = localtx.per_htlc.iter().zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
4713
4714                                 $({
4715                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4716
4717                                         let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4718                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4719                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4720                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
4721                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
4722
4723                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4724                                         if !htlc.offered {
4725                                                 for i in 0..5 {
4726                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4727                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4728                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4729                                                         }
4730                                                 }
4731
4732                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4733                                         }
4734
4735                                         let mut htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
4736                                         while (htlc_sig.1).1.is_none() { htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); }
4737                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx));
4738
4739                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4740                                         assert_eq!(Some(signature), *(htlc_sig.1).1);
4741                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.get_signed_htlc_tx((htlc_sig.1).0, &(htlc_sig.1).1.unwrap(), &preimage, chan.counterparty_to_self_delay))[..],
4742                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4743                                 })*
4744                                 loop {
4745                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next();
4746                                         if htlc_sig.is_none() { break; }
4747                                         assert!((htlc_sig.unwrap().1).1.is_none());
4748                                 }
4749                         } }
4750                 }
4751
4752                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4753                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4754
4755                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
4756                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
4757                                                  "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", {});
4758
4759                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4760                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4761                                 htlc_id: 0,
4762                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
4763                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
4764                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4765                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4766                         };
4767                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4768                         out
4769                 });
4770                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4771                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4772                                 htlc_id: 1,
4773                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
4774                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
4775                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4776                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4777                         };
4778                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4779                         out
4780                 });
4781                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4782                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4783                                 htlc_id: 2,
4784                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
4785                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
4786                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4787                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4788                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4789                         };
4790                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4791                         out
4792                 });
4793                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4794                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4795                                 htlc_id: 3,
4796                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
4797                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
4798                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4799                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4800                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4801                         };
4802                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4803                         out
4804                 });
4805                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4806                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4807                                 htlc_id: 4,
4808                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
4809                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
4810                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4811                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4812                         };
4813                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4814                         out
4815                 });
4816
4817                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4818                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4819                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4820
4821                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
4822                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
4823                                  "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", {
4824
4825                                   { 0,
4826                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
4827                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
4828                                   "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" },
4829
4830                                   { 1,
4831                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
4832                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
4833                                   "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" },
4834
4835                                   { 2,
4836                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
4837                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
4838                                   "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" },
4839
4840                                   { 3,
4841                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
4842                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
4843                                   "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" },
4844
4845                                   { 4,
4846                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
4847                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
4848                                   "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" }
4849                 } );
4850
4851                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4852                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4853                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4854
4855                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
4856                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
4857                                  "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", {
4858
4859                                   { 0,
4860                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
4861                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
4862                                   "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" },
4863
4864                                   { 1,
4865                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
4866                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
4867                                   "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" },
4868
4869                                   { 2,
4870                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
4871                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
4872                                   "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" },
4873
4874                                   { 3,
4875                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
4876                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
4877                                   "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" },
4878
4879                                   { 4,
4880                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
4881                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
4882                                   "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" }
4883                 } );
4884
4885                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4886                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4887                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4888
4889                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
4890                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
4891                                  "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", {
4892
4893                                   { 0,
4894                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
4895                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
4896                                   "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" },
4897
4898                                   { 1,
4899                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
4900                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
4901                                   "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" },
4902
4903                                   { 2,
4904                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
4905                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
4906                                   "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" },
4907
4908                                   { 3,
4909                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
4910                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
4911                                   "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" }
4912                 } );
4913
4914                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4915                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4916                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4917
4918                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
4919                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
4920                                  "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", {
4921
4922                                   { 0,
4923                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
4924                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
4925                                   "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" },
4926
4927                                   { 1,
4928                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
4929                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
4930                                   "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
4931
4932                                   { 2,
4933                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
4934                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
4935                                   "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" },
4936
4937                                   { 3,
4938                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
4939                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
4940                                   "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" }
4941                 } );
4942
4943                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4944                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4945                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4946
4947                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
4948                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
4949                                  "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", {
4950
4951                                   { 0,
4952                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
4953                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
4954                                   "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" },
4955
4956                                   { 1,
4957                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
4958                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
4959                                   "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" },
4960
4961                                   { 2,
4962                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
4963                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
4964                                   "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" }
4965                 } );
4966
4967                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4968                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4969                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4970
4971                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
4972                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
4973                                  "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", {
4974
4975                                   { 0,
4976                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
4977                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
4978                                   "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" },
4979
4980                                   { 1,
4981                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
4982                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
4983                                   "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" },
4984
4985                                   { 2,
4986                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
4987                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
4988                                   "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
4989                 } );
4990
4991                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4992                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4993                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4994
4995                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
4996                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
4997                                  "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", {
4998
4999                                   { 0,
5000                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5001                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5002                                   "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" },
5003
5004                                   { 1,
5005                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5006                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5007                                   "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" }
5008                 } );
5009
5010                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5011                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5012                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5013
5014                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5015                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5016                                  "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", {
5017
5018                                   { 0,
5019                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5020                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5021                                   "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" },
5022
5023                                   { 1,
5024                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5025                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5026                                   "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" }
5027                 } );
5028
5029                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5030                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5031                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5032
5033                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5034                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5035                                  "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", {
5036
5037                                   { 0,
5038                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5039                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5040                                   "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" }
5041                 } );
5042
5043                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5044                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5045                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5046
5047                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5048                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5049                                  "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", {
5050
5051                                   { 0,
5052                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5053                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5054                                   "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" }
5055                 } );
5056
5057                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5058                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5059                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5060
5061                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5062                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5063                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5064
5065                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5066                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5067                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5068
5069                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5070                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5071                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5072
5073                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5074                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5075                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5076
5077                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5078                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5079                                  "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", {});
5080
5081                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5082                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5083                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5084
5085                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5086                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5087                                  "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", {});
5088         }
5089
5090         #[test]
5091         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5092                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5093
5094                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5095                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5096                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5097                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5098
5099                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5100                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5101                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5102
5103                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5104                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5105
5106                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5107                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5108
5109                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5110                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5111                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5112         }
5113
5114         #[test]
5115         fn test_key_derivation() {
5116                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5117                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5118
5119                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5120                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5121
5122                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5123                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5124
5125                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5126                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5127
5128                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5129                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5130
5131                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5132                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5133
5134                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5135                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5136
5137                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5138                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5139         }
5140 }