1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
196 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
199 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
202 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
203 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
208 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
209 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
217 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
221 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
222 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
227 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
228 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
232 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
247 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
248 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
249 /// move on to ChannelReady.
250 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
251 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
252 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
254 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
255 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
256 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
257 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
258 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
259 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
260 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
262 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
263 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
264 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
266 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
267 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
268 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
273 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
274 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
276 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
277 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
278 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
279 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
280 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
281 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
282 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
283 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
284 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
286 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
287 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
288 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
289 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
290 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
291 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
292 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
293 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
294 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
295 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
296 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
297 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
299 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
300 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
302 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
304 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
305 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
306 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
307 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
308 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
309 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
311 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
313 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
315 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
317 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
321 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
323 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
324 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
325 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
327 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
328 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
330 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
331 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
332 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
333 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
334 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
336 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
337 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
341 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
347 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
350 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
351 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 holding_cell_msat: u64,
354 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
357 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
358 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
359 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
360 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
361 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
362 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
363 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
364 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
369 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
370 struct HTLCCandidate {
372 origin: HTLCInitiator,
376 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
384 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
386 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
388 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
389 htlc_value_msat: u64,
390 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
395 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
396 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
397 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
398 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
399 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
401 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
402 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
403 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
404 htlc_value_msat: u64,
406 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
407 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
411 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
412 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
413 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
414 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
415 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
420 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
421 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
424 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
425 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
426 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
427 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
428 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
429 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
430 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
431 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
434 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
435 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
436 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
437 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
438 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
439 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
440 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
441 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
442 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
443 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
444 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
445 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
446 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
447 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
448 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
450 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
451 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
452 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
453 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
455 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
456 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
457 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
458 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
460 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
461 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
462 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
463 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
464 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
466 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
467 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
468 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
469 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
471 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
472 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
473 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
475 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
476 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
477 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
478 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
479 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
481 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
482 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
483 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
486 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
487 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
488 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
489 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
491 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
492 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
493 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
494 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
496 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
500 channel_id: [u8; 32],
503 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
504 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
506 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
507 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
508 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
510 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
511 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
512 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
513 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
515 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
516 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
518 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
520 holder_signer: Signer,
521 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
522 destination_script: Script,
524 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
525 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
526 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
528 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
529 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
530 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
531 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
532 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
533 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
535 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
536 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
537 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
538 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
539 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
540 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
542 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
544 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
545 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
546 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
548 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
549 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
550 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
551 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
552 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
553 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
554 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
556 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
558 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
559 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
560 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
561 // HTLCs with similar state.
562 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
563 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
564 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
565 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
566 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
567 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
568 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
569 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
570 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
573 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
574 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
575 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
577 update_time_counter: u32,
579 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
580 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
581 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
582 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
583 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
584 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
586 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
587 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
589 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
590 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
591 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
592 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
594 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
595 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
597 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
599 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
601 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
602 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
603 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
604 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
605 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
606 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
608 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
609 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
610 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
611 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
612 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
614 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
615 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
616 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
617 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
618 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
619 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
620 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
621 channel_creation_height: u32,
623 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
626 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
628 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
631 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
633 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
636 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
638 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
641 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
644 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
646 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
649 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
651 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
653 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
657 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
659 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
660 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
662 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
663 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
664 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
666 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
668 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
670 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
671 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
672 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
673 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
675 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
676 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
677 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
679 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
680 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
681 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
683 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
684 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
685 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
686 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
688 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
690 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
692 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
693 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
694 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
695 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
696 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
698 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
699 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
702 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
703 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
704 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
705 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
706 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
707 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
708 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
710 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
711 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
713 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
714 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
715 // the channel's funding UTXO.
717 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
718 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
719 // associated channel mapping.
721 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
722 // to store all of them.
723 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
725 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
726 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
727 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
728 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
729 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
731 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
732 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
734 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
735 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
736 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
738 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
739 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
740 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
741 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
742 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
746 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
748 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
749 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
750 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
754 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
756 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
757 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
759 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
763 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
765 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
769 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
770 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
771 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
772 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
773 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
775 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
776 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
778 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
780 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
781 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
783 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
784 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
785 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
786 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
787 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
788 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
790 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
791 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
793 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
794 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
795 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
796 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
797 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
799 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
800 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
802 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
803 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
805 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
806 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
807 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
808 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
814 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
815 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
817 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
818 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
824 macro_rules! secp_check {
825 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
828 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
833 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
834 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
835 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
836 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
838 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
840 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
841 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
842 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
844 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
847 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
849 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
852 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
853 /// required by us according to the configured or default
854 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
856 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
858 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
859 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
860 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
861 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
862 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
865 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
866 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
867 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
868 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
869 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
870 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
871 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
874 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
875 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
878 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
879 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
880 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
881 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
882 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
883 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
884 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
885 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
886 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
890 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
891 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
892 // `only_static_remotekey`.
894 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
895 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
896 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
897 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
904 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
905 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
906 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
907 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
908 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
909 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
910 // We've exhausted our options
913 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
914 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
917 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
918 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
919 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
920 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
922 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
923 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
924 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
925 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
926 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
927 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
929 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
931 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
935 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
936 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
937 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
938 outbound_scid_alias: u64
939 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
940 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
941 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
944 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
945 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
946 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
947 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
949 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
952 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
953 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
955 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
956 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
959 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
962 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
963 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
964 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
965 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
969 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
970 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
972 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
974 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
975 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
976 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
980 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
981 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
983 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
984 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
987 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
988 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
989 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
996 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
997 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
998 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
999 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1004 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1006 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1007 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1008 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1010 channel_value_satoshis,
1012 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1015 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1016 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1018 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1019 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1022 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1023 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1025 pending_update_fee: None,
1026 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1027 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1028 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1029 update_time_counter: 1,
1031 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1033 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1034 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1035 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1036 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1037 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1038 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1040 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1041 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1042 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1043 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1045 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1046 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1047 closing_fee_limits: None,
1048 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1050 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1052 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1053 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1054 short_channel_id: None,
1055 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1057 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1058 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1059 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1060 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1061 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1062 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1063 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1064 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1065 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1066 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1067 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1069 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1071 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1072 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1073 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1074 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1075 counterparty_parameters: None,
1076 funding_outpoint: None,
1077 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1078 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1080 funding_transaction: None,
1082 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1083 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1084 counterparty_node_id,
1086 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1088 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1090 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1091 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1093 announcement_sigs: None,
1095 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1096 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1098 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1100 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1102 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1103 outbound_scid_alias,
1105 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1107 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1108 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1113 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1117 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1118 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1119 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1121 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1122 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1123 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1124 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1125 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1126 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1127 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1130 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1131 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1132 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1133 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1134 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1135 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1136 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1137 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1139 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1140 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1149 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1150 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1151 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1152 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1153 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1154 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1155 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1156 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1157 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1158 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1162 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1164 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1165 // support this channel type.
1166 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1167 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1171 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1172 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1173 // `static_remote_key`.
1174 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1177 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1178 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1181 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1184 channel_type.clone()
1186 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1187 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1192 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1194 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1195 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1196 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1197 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1198 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1199 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1200 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1201 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1202 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1205 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1209 // Check sanity of message fields:
1210 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1213 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1216 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1219 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1220 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1226 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1229 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1231 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1232 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1235 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1238 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1242 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1249 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1252 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1258 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1261 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1265 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1267 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1268 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1273 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1274 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1275 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1276 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1279 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1282 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1283 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1284 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1286 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1290 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1291 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1292 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1293 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1294 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1298 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1299 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1300 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1301 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1305 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1306 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1307 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1308 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1309 if script.len() == 0 {
1312 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1315 Some(script.clone())
1318 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1319 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1325 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1326 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1329 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1330 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1335 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1336 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1338 let chan = Channel {
1341 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1342 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1344 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1349 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1351 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1352 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1353 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1356 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1359 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1360 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1362 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1363 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1366 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1369 pending_update_fee: None,
1370 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1371 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1372 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1373 update_time_counter: 1,
1375 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1377 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1378 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1379 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1380 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1381 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1384 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1385 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1386 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1387 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1389 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1390 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1391 closing_fee_limits: None,
1392 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1394 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1396 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1397 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1398 short_channel_id: None,
1399 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1401 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1402 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1403 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1404 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1405 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1406 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1407 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1408 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1409 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1410 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1411 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1412 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1414 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1416 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1417 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1418 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1419 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1420 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1421 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1422 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1424 funding_outpoint: None,
1425 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1426 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1428 funding_transaction: None,
1430 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1431 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1432 counterparty_node_id,
1434 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1436 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1438 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1439 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1441 announcement_sigs: None,
1443 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1444 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1446 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1448 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1450 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1451 outbound_scid_alias,
1453 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1461 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1467 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1468 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1469 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1470 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1471 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1473 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1474 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1475 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1476 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1477 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1478 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1479 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1481 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1482 where L::Target: Logger
1484 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1485 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1486 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1488 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1489 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1490 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1491 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1493 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1494 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1495 if match update_state {
1496 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1497 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1498 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1499 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1500 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1502 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1506 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1507 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1508 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1509 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1511 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1512 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1513 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1515 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1516 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1517 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1518 transaction_output_index: None
1523 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1524 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1525 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1526 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1527 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1530 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1532 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1533 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1534 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1536 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1537 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1540 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1541 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1544 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1546 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1547 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1548 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1550 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1551 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1557 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1558 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1559 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1560 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1563 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1567 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1568 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1572 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1573 if generated_by_local {
1574 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1575 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1584 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1586 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1587 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1588 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1589 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1592 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1595 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1596 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1597 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1602 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1603 preimages.push(preimage);
1607 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1608 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1610 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1612 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1613 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1615 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1616 if !generated_by_local {
1617 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1625 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1626 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1627 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1628 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1629 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1630 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1631 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1632 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1634 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1636 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1637 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1638 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1639 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1641 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1643 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1644 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1645 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1646 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1649 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1650 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1651 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1652 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1654 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1657 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1658 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1659 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1660 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1662 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1665 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1666 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1671 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1672 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1677 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1679 let channel_parameters =
1680 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1681 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1682 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1685 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1690 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1693 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1694 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1695 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1696 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1698 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1699 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1700 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1708 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1709 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1715 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1716 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1717 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1718 // outside of those situations will fail.
1719 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1723 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1728 1 + // script length (0)
1732 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1733 2 + // witness marker and flag
1734 1 + // witness element count
1735 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1736 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1737 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1738 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1739 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1740 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1742 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1743 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1744 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1750 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1751 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1752 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1753 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1755 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1756 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1757 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1759 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1760 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1761 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1762 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1763 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1764 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1767 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1768 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1771 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1772 value_to_holder = 0;
1775 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1776 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1777 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1778 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1780 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1781 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1784 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1785 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1789 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1790 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1791 /// our counterparty!)
1792 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1793 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1794 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1795 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1796 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1797 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1798 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1800 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1804 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1805 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1806 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1807 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1808 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1809 //may see payments to it!
1810 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1811 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1812 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1814 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1817 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1818 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1819 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1820 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1821 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1824 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1827 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1828 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1830 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1832 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1833 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1834 where L::Target: Logger {
1835 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1836 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1837 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1838 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1839 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1840 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1841 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1842 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1846 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1847 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1848 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1849 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1851 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1852 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1854 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1856 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1858 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1859 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1860 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1862 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1863 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1864 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1865 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1866 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1868 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1869 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1870 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1872 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1873 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1875 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1878 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1879 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1883 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1887 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1889 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1890 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1891 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1892 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1895 // Now update local state:
1897 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1898 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1899 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1900 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1901 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1902 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1903 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1907 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1908 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1909 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1910 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1911 // do not not get into this branch.
1912 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1913 match pending_update {
1914 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1915 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1916 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1917 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1918 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1919 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1920 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1923 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1924 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1925 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1926 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1927 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1928 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1929 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1935 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1936 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1937 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1939 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1940 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1941 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1944 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1947 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1948 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1950 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1951 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1953 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1954 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1957 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1960 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1961 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1962 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1963 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1968 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1969 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1970 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1971 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1972 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1973 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1974 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1975 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1976 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1977 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1978 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1979 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1983 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1984 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1985 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1986 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1987 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1991 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
1995 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1996 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1997 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1998 /// before we fail backwards.
2000 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2001 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2002 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2003 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2004 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2005 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2006 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2009 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2010 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2011 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2012 /// before we fail backwards.
2014 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2015 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2016 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2017 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2018 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2019 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2020 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2022 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2024 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2025 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2026 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2028 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2029 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2030 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2032 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2033 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2034 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2036 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2041 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2042 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2048 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2049 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2050 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2051 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2052 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2056 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2057 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2058 force_holding_cell = true;
2061 // Now update local state:
2062 if force_holding_cell {
2063 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2064 match pending_update {
2065 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2066 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2068 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2072 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2073 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2074 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2081 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2082 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2083 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2089 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2091 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2092 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2095 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2096 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2097 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2102 // Message handlers:
2104 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2105 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2107 // Check sanity of message fields:
2108 if !self.is_outbound() {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2111 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2114 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2117 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2120 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2123 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2125 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2127 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2128 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2131 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2132 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2135 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2138 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2142 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2143 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2146 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2149 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2152 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2155 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2158 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2161 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2165 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2166 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2169 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2170 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2172 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2173 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2176 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2179 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2180 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2181 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2182 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2183 if script.len() == 0 {
2186 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2189 Some(script.clone())
2192 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2193 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2199 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2200 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2201 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2202 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2203 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2205 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2206 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2208 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2211 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2212 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2213 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2214 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2215 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2216 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2219 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2220 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2221 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2224 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2225 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2227 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2228 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2233 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2234 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2236 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2237 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2239 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2240 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2241 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2242 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2243 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2244 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2245 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2247 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2250 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2251 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2253 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2254 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2255 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2256 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2258 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2259 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2261 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2262 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2265 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2266 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2269 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2270 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2271 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2273 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2276 if self.is_outbound() {
2277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2279 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2280 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2281 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2285 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2288 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2289 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2290 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2291 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2294 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2295 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2296 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2297 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2298 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2300 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2302 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2303 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2307 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2308 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2309 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2313 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2314 initial_commitment_tx,
2317 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2318 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2321 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2322 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2324 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2326 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2327 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2328 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2329 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2330 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2331 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2332 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2333 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2334 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2335 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2336 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2338 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2340 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2342 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2343 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2344 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2345 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2347 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2349 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2350 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2352 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2355 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2356 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2357 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2358 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2359 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2361 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2364 if !self.is_outbound() {
2365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2367 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2370 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2371 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2372 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2373 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2376 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2378 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2379 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2380 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2381 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2383 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2384 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2386 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2387 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2389 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2390 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2391 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2392 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2393 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2398 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2399 initial_commitment_tx,
2402 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2403 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2406 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2407 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2410 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2411 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2412 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2413 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2414 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2415 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2416 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2417 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2418 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2419 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2420 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2421 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2423 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2425 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2427 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2428 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2429 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2430 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2432 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2434 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2435 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2439 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2440 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2442 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2443 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2444 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2445 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2447 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2450 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2451 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2452 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2455 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2456 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2457 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2458 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2459 // when routing outbound payments.
2460 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2464 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2466 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2467 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2468 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2469 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2470 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2471 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2472 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2473 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2474 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2476 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2477 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2478 let expected_point =
2479 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2480 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2482 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2484 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2485 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2486 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2487 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2488 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2490 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2491 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2498 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2499 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2501 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2503 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2506 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2507 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2508 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2509 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2515 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2516 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2517 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2518 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2519 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2520 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2521 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2522 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2523 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2526 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2529 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2530 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2531 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2533 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2534 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2535 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2536 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2537 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2538 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2540 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2541 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2547 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2548 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2549 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2550 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2551 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2552 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2553 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2554 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2555 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2558 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2561 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2562 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2563 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2565 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2566 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2567 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2568 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2569 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2570 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2572 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2573 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2577 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2578 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2579 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2580 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2581 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2582 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2583 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2585 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2586 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2588 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2595 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2596 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2597 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2598 /// corner case properly.
2599 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2600 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2601 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2603 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2604 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2605 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2606 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2609 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2611 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2612 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2613 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2616 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2617 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2618 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2619 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2621 outbound_capacity_msat,
2622 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2623 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2624 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2630 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2631 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2634 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2635 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2636 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2637 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2638 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2639 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2642 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2643 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2645 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2646 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2649 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2650 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2651 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2653 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2654 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2656 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2659 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2660 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2662 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2663 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2665 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2666 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2668 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2669 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2673 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2674 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2680 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2681 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2682 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2685 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2686 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2687 included_htlcs += 1;
2690 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2691 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2695 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2696 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2697 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2698 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2699 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2700 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2705 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2707 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2708 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2713 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2714 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2718 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2719 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2723 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2724 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2726 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2727 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2728 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2730 total_pending_htlcs,
2731 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2732 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2733 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2735 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2736 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2737 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2739 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2741 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2746 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2747 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2748 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2750 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2751 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2753 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2756 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2757 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2759 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2760 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2762 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2763 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2765 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2766 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2770 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2771 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2777 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2778 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2779 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2780 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2781 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2782 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2785 included_htlcs += 1;
2788 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2789 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2792 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2793 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2795 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2796 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2797 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2802 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2803 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2807 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2808 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2810 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2811 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2813 total_pending_htlcs,
2814 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2815 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2816 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2818 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2822 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2824 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2829 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2830 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2831 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2832 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2833 if local_sent_shutdown {
2834 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2836 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2837 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2838 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2841 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2844 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2847 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2850 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2854 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2855 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2856 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2859 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2862 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2863 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2864 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2865 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2866 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2867 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2868 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2869 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2870 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2871 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2872 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2874 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2875 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2876 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2877 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2878 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2879 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2883 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2886 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2887 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2888 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2890 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2891 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2892 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2893 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2894 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2895 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2896 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2900 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2901 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2902 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2903 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2904 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2905 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2906 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2910 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2911 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2912 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2913 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2914 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2918 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2919 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2920 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2921 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2922 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2924 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2928 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2932 if !self.is_outbound() {
2933 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2934 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2935 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2936 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2937 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2938 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2939 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2940 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2941 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2942 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2943 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2944 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2945 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2946 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2947 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2950 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2951 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2952 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2953 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2957 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2960 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2964 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2965 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2966 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2970 // Now update local state:
2971 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2972 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2973 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2974 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2975 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2976 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2977 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2982 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2984 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2985 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2986 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2987 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2988 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2989 None => fail_reason.into(),
2990 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2991 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2992 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2995 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2999 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3001 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3002 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3004 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3010 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3013 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3014 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3015 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3017 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3018 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3021 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3024 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3025 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3028 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3032 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3036 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3037 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3040 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3044 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3048 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3049 where L::Target: Logger
3051 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3054 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3057 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3061 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3063 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3065 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3066 let commitment_txid = {
3067 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3068 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3069 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3071 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3072 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3073 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3074 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3075 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3080 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3082 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3083 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3084 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3085 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3088 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3089 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3090 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3094 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3096 if self.is_outbound() {
3097 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3098 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3099 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3100 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3101 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3102 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3103 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3104 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3105 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3106 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3112 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3116 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3117 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3118 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3119 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3120 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3121 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3122 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3124 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3125 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3126 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3127 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3128 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3129 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3130 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3133 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3135 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3139 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3140 commitment_stats.tx,
3142 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3143 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3144 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3147 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3148 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3150 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3151 let mut need_commitment = false;
3152 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3153 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3154 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3155 need_commitment = true;
3159 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3160 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3161 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3162 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3163 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3164 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3168 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3169 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3170 Some(forward_info.clone())
3172 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3173 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3174 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3175 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3176 need_commitment = true;
3179 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3180 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3181 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3182 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3183 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3184 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3185 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3186 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3187 need_commitment = true;
3191 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3192 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3193 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3194 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3196 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3197 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3198 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3199 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3200 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3201 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3202 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3203 // includes the right HTLCs.
3204 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3205 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3206 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3207 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3208 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3209 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3211 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3212 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3213 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3214 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3217 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3218 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3219 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3220 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3221 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3222 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3223 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3224 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3225 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3229 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3230 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3231 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3232 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3233 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3236 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3237 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3238 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3239 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3240 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3241 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3242 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3243 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3246 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3247 /// for our counterparty.
3248 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3249 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3250 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3251 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3252 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3254 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3255 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3256 updates: Vec::new(),
3259 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3260 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3261 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3262 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3263 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3264 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3265 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3266 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3267 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3268 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3269 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3270 // to rebalance channels.
3271 match &htlc_update {
3272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3273 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3274 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3277 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3278 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3279 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3280 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3281 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3282 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3283 // into the holding cell without ever being
3284 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3285 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3286 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3289 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3295 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3296 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3297 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3298 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3299 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3300 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3301 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3302 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3303 (msg, monitor_update)
3304 } else { unreachable!() };
3305 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3306 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3308 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3309 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3310 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3311 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3312 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3313 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3314 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3315 // for a full revocation before failing.
3316 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3319 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3321 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3328 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3329 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3331 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3332 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3337 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3338 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3339 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3340 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3341 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3343 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3344 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3345 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3347 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3348 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3349 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3355 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3356 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3357 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3358 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3359 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3360 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3361 where L::Target: Logger,
3363 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3366 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3369 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3373 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3375 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3376 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3381 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3382 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3383 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3384 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3385 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3386 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3387 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3388 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3392 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3394 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3395 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3398 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3399 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3401 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3403 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3404 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3405 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3406 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3407 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3408 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3409 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3410 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3414 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3415 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3416 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3417 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3418 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3419 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3420 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3421 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3423 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3424 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3427 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3428 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3429 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3430 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3431 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3432 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3433 let mut require_commitment = false;
3434 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3437 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3438 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3439 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3441 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3442 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3443 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3444 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3445 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3446 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3451 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3452 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3453 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3454 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3455 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3457 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3458 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3459 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3464 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3465 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3467 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3471 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3472 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3474 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3475 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3476 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3477 require_commitment = true;
3478 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3479 match forward_info {
3480 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3481 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3482 require_commitment = true;
3484 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3485 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3486 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3488 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3489 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3490 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3494 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3495 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3496 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3497 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3503 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3504 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3505 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3506 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3508 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3509 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3510 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3511 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3512 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3513 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3514 require_commitment = true;
3518 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3520 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3521 match update_state {
3522 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3523 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3524 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3525 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3526 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3528 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3529 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3530 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3531 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3532 require_commitment = true;
3533 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3534 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3539 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3540 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3541 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3542 if require_commitment {
3543 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3544 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3545 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3546 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3547 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3548 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3549 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3550 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3551 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3553 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3554 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3555 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3556 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3557 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3558 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3561 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3562 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3563 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3564 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3565 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3566 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3567 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3569 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3570 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3571 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3573 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3574 if require_commitment {
3575 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3577 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3578 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3579 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3580 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3582 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3583 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3584 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3585 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3586 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3588 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3589 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3590 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3591 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3597 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3598 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3599 /// commitment update.
3600 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3601 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3602 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3605 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3606 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3607 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3608 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3610 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3611 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3612 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3613 if !self.is_outbound() {
3614 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3616 if !self.is_usable() {
3617 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3619 if !self.is_live() {
3620 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3623 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3624 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3625 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3626 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3627 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3628 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3629 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3630 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3631 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3632 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3636 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3637 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3638 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3639 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3640 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3643 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3644 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3648 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3649 force_holding_cell = true;
3652 if force_holding_cell {
3653 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3657 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3658 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3660 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3661 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3666 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3667 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3669 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3671 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3672 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3673 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3674 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3678 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3679 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3680 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3684 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3685 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3688 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3689 // will be retransmitted.
3690 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3691 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3692 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3694 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3695 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3697 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3698 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3699 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3700 // this HTLC accordingly
3701 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3704 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3705 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3706 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3707 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3710 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3711 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3712 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3713 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3714 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3715 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3720 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3722 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3723 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3724 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3725 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3729 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3730 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3731 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3732 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3733 // the update upon reconnection.
3734 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3738 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3739 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3742 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3743 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3744 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3745 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3746 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3747 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3749 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3750 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3751 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3752 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3753 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3754 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3756 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3757 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3758 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3759 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3760 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3761 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3762 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3765 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3766 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3767 /// to the remote side.
3768 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3769 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3770 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3771 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3774 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3776 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3777 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3778 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3780 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3781 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3782 // first received the funding_signed.
3783 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3784 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3785 self.funding_transaction.take()
3787 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3788 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3789 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3790 funding_broadcastable = None;
3793 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3794 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3795 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3796 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3797 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3798 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3799 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3800 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3801 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3802 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3803 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3804 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3805 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3806 next_per_commitment_point,
3807 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3811 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3813 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3814 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3815 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3816 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3817 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3818 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3820 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3821 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3822 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3823 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3824 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3825 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3829 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3830 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3832 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3833 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3836 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3837 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3838 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3839 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3840 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3841 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3842 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3843 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3844 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3848 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3849 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3851 if self.is_outbound() {
3852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3854 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3857 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3858 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3860 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3861 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3862 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3863 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3864 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3865 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3866 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3867 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3868 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3869 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3870 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3871 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3872 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3874 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3875 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3876 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3882 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3883 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3884 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3885 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3886 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3887 per_commitment_secret,
3888 next_per_commitment_point,
3892 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3893 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3894 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3895 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3896 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3898 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3899 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3900 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3901 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3902 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3903 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3904 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3905 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3906 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3911 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3912 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3914 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3915 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3916 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3917 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3918 reason: err_packet.clone()
3921 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3922 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3923 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3924 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3925 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3926 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3929 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3930 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3931 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3932 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3933 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3940 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3941 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3942 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3943 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3947 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3948 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3949 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3950 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3951 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3952 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3956 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3957 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3959 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3960 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3961 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3962 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3963 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3964 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3965 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3966 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3969 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3971 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3972 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3973 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3974 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3975 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3978 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3979 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3983 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3984 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3985 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3986 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3987 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3988 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3989 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3992 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3993 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3994 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3995 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3996 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3999 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4000 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4001 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4002 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4003 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4004 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4005 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4006 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4009 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4013 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4014 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4015 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4016 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4018 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4022 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4023 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4024 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4026 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4027 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4028 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4029 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4030 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4034 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4036 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4037 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4038 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4039 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4040 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4043 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4044 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4045 channel_ready: None,
4046 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4047 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4048 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4052 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4053 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4054 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4055 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4056 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4057 next_per_commitment_point,
4058 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4060 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4061 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4062 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4066 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4067 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4068 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4070 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4071 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4072 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4075 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4081 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4082 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4083 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4084 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4085 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4087 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4088 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4089 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4090 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4091 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4092 next_per_commitment_point,
4093 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4097 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4098 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4099 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4101 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4104 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4105 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4106 raa: required_revoke,
4107 commitment_update: None,
4108 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4110 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4111 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4112 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4114 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4117 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4118 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4119 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4120 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4121 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4122 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4125 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4126 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4127 raa: required_revoke,
4128 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4129 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4133 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4137 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4138 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4139 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4140 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4142 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4144 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4146 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4147 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4148 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4149 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4150 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4151 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4153 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4154 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4155 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4156 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4157 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4159 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4160 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4161 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4162 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4165 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4166 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4167 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4168 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4169 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4170 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4171 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4172 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4173 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4174 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4175 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4176 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4177 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4178 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4179 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4181 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4184 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4185 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4188 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4189 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4190 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4191 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4192 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4193 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4194 self.channel_state &
4195 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4196 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4197 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4198 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4201 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4202 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4203 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4204 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4205 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4206 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4209 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4215 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4216 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4217 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4218 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4220 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4221 return Ok((None, None));
4224 if !self.is_outbound() {
4225 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4226 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4228 return Ok((None, None));
4231 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4233 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4234 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4235 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4236 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4238 let sig = self.holder_signer
4239 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4240 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4242 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4243 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4244 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4245 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4247 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4248 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4249 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4254 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4255 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4256 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4257 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4259 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4260 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4262 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4263 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4264 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4265 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4268 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4269 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4273 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4275 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4276 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4279 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4280 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4281 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4284 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4287 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4288 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4289 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4290 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4292 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4295 assert!(send_shutdown);
4296 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4297 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4300 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4305 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4307 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4308 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4310 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4311 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4312 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4313 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4314 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4315 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4318 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4319 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4320 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4322 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4323 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4324 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4325 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4329 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4330 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4331 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4332 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4333 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4334 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4336 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4337 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4344 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4345 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4347 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4350 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4351 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4353 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4355 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4356 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4357 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4358 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4359 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4360 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4361 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4362 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4363 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4365 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4366 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4369 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4373 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4374 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4375 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4376 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4378 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4381 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4384 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4387 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4391 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4395 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4396 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4397 return Ok((None, None));
4400 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4401 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4402 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4403 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4405 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4407 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4410 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4411 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4412 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4413 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4414 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4418 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4419 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4424 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4425 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4426 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4427 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4428 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4429 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4430 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4434 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4436 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4437 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4438 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4439 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4441 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4444 let sig = self.holder_signer
4445 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4446 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4448 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4449 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4450 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4451 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4455 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4456 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4457 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4458 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4460 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4461 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4462 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4468 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4469 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4472 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4473 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4475 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4479 if !self.is_outbound() {
4480 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4481 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4482 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4483 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4485 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4486 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4487 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4489 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4490 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4493 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4494 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4495 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4496 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4497 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4498 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4499 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4500 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4502 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4505 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4506 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4507 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4508 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4514 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4515 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4516 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4517 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4519 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4525 // Public utilities:
4527 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4531 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4535 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4536 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4537 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4541 /// Gets the channel's type
4542 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4546 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4547 /// is_usable() returns true).
4548 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4549 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4550 self.short_channel_id
4553 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4554 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4555 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4558 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4559 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4560 self.outbound_scid_alias
4562 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4563 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4564 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4565 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4566 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4569 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4570 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4571 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4572 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4575 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4576 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4577 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4580 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4581 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4582 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4583 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4587 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4590 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4591 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4594 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4595 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4598 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4599 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4600 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4603 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4604 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4607 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4608 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4609 self.counterparty_node_id
4612 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4613 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4614 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4617 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4618 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4619 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4622 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4623 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4625 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4626 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4627 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4628 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4630 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4634 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4635 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4636 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4639 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4640 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4641 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4644 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4645 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4646 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4648 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4649 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4654 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4655 self.channel_value_satoshis
4658 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4659 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4662 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4663 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4666 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4667 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4670 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4671 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4672 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4675 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4676 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4677 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4680 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4681 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4682 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4685 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4686 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4687 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4688 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4689 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4692 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4694 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4695 self.prev_config = None;
4699 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4700 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4704 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4705 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4706 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4707 let did_channel_update =
4708 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4709 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4710 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4711 if did_channel_update {
4712 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4713 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4714 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4715 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4717 self.config.options = *config;
4721 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4722 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4723 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4724 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4725 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4726 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4727 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4729 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4730 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4733 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4735 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4736 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4742 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4743 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4744 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4745 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4746 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4747 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4748 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4750 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4751 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4758 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4762 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4763 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4764 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4765 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4766 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4767 // which are near the dust limit.
4768 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4769 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4770 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4771 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4772 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4774 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4775 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4777 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4780 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4781 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4784 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4785 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4788 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4789 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4793 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4798 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4800 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4801 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4802 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4803 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4804 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4805 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4807 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4809 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4817 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4818 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4822 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4823 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4824 self.update_time_counter
4827 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4828 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4831 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4832 self.config.announced_channel
4835 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4836 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4839 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4840 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4841 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4842 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4845 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4846 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4847 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4850 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4851 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4852 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4853 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4854 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4857 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4858 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4859 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4860 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4861 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4864 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4865 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4866 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4867 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4870 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4871 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4874 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4875 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4876 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4879 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4880 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4881 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4883 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4884 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4885 if self.channel_state &
4886 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4887 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4888 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4889 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4890 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4893 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4894 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4895 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4896 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4897 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4898 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4900 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4901 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4902 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4904 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4905 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4906 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4907 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4908 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4909 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4915 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4916 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4917 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4920 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4921 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4922 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4925 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4926 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4927 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4930 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4931 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4932 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4933 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4934 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4935 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4940 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4941 self.channel_update_status
4944 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4945 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4946 self.channel_update_status = status;
4949 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4951 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4952 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4953 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4957 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4958 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4959 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4962 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4966 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4967 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4968 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4970 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4971 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4972 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4974 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4975 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4978 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4979 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4980 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4981 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4982 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4983 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4984 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4985 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4986 self.channel_state);
4988 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4992 if need_commitment_update {
4993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4994 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4995 let next_per_commitment_point =
4996 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4997 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4998 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4999 next_per_commitment_point,
5000 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5004 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5010 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5011 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5012 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5013 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5014 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5015 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5016 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5018 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5021 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5022 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5023 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5024 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5025 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5026 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5027 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5028 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5029 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5030 if self.is_outbound() {
5031 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5032 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5033 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5034 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5035 // channel and move on.
5036 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5037 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5039 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5040 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5041 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5043 if self.is_outbound() {
5044 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5045 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5046 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5047 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5048 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5049 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5053 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5054 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5055 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5056 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5057 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5061 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5062 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5063 // may have already happened for this block).
5064 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5065 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5066 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5067 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5070 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5071 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5072 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5073 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5081 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5082 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5083 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5084 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5086 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5087 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5090 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5092 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5093 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5094 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5095 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5097 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5100 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5103 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5104 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5105 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5106 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5111 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5112 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5113 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5115 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5116 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5118 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5119 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5120 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5128 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5130 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5131 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5132 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5134 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5135 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5138 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5139 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5140 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5141 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5142 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5143 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5144 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5145 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5146 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5149 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5150 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5151 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5152 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5154 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5155 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5156 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5158 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5159 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5160 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5161 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5163 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5164 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5165 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5166 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5167 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5168 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5169 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5172 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5173 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5175 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5178 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5179 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5180 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5181 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5182 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5183 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5184 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5185 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5186 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5187 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5188 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5189 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5190 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5191 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5192 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5193 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5194 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5200 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5205 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5206 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5208 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5209 if !self.is_outbound() {
5210 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5212 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5213 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5216 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5217 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5220 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5221 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5225 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5226 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5227 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5228 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5229 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5230 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5231 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5232 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5233 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5234 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5235 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5236 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5237 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5238 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5239 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5240 first_per_commitment_point,
5241 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5242 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5243 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5244 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5246 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5250 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5251 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5254 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5255 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5256 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5257 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5260 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5261 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5263 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5264 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5265 if self.is_outbound() {
5266 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5268 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5269 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5271 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5272 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5274 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5275 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5278 self.user_id = user_id;
5279 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5281 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5284 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5285 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5286 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5288 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5289 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5290 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5291 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5293 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5294 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5295 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5296 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5297 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5298 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5299 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5300 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5301 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5302 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5303 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5304 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5305 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5306 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5307 first_per_commitment_point,
5308 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5309 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5310 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5312 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5316 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5317 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5319 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5321 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5322 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5325 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5326 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5327 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5328 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5329 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5330 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5333 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5334 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5335 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5336 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5337 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5338 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5339 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5340 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5341 if !self.is_outbound() {
5342 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5344 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5345 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5347 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5348 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5349 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5350 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5353 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5354 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5356 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5359 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5360 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5365 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5367 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5369 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5370 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5371 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5373 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5374 temporary_channel_id,
5375 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5376 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5381 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5382 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5383 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5384 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5386 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5389 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5390 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5391 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5392 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5393 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5394 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5396 if !self.is_usable() {
5397 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5400 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5401 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5402 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5403 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5405 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5406 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5408 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5409 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5410 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5411 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5412 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5413 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5419 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5420 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5421 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5422 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5424 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5427 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5431 if !self.is_usable() {
5435 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5436 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5440 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5444 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5445 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5448 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5452 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5454 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5459 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5461 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5466 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5468 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5469 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5470 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5471 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5472 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5476 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5478 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5479 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5480 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5481 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5482 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5483 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5484 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5486 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5487 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5488 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5489 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5490 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5491 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5492 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5493 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5494 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5495 contents: announcement,
5498 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5502 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5503 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5504 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5505 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5506 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5507 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5508 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5509 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5511 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5513 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5514 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5515 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5516 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5518 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5519 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5520 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5521 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5524 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5525 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5526 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5527 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5530 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5533 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5534 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5535 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5536 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5537 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5538 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5541 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5543 Err(_) => return None,
5545 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5546 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5551 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5552 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5553 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5554 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5555 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5556 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5557 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5558 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5559 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5560 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5561 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5562 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5563 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5564 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5565 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5566 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5567 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5568 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5569 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5572 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5573 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5574 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5575 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5578 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5579 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5580 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5581 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5582 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5583 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5584 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5585 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5587 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5588 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5589 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5590 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5591 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5592 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5593 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5594 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5595 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5597 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5603 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5605 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5606 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5607 /// commitment update.
5609 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5610 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5611 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5612 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5614 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5615 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5617 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5618 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5623 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5624 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5626 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5628 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5629 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5631 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5632 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5633 /// regenerate them.
5635 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5636 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5638 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5639 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5640 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5641 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5642 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5643 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5645 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5646 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5647 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5650 if amount_msat == 0 {
5651 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5654 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5655 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5658 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5659 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5660 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5661 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5662 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5663 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5664 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5665 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5668 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5669 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5670 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5671 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5673 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5674 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5675 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5678 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5679 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5680 if !self.is_outbound() {
5681 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5682 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5683 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5684 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5685 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5686 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5690 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5693 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5694 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5695 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5697 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5698 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5699 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5700 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5701 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5702 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5706 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5707 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5708 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5709 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5710 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5711 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5715 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5716 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5717 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5720 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5721 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5722 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5723 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5725 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5726 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5729 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5730 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5731 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5732 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5733 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5736 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5737 force_holding_cell = true;
5740 // Now update local state:
5741 if force_holding_cell {
5742 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5747 onion_routing_packet,
5752 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5753 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5755 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5757 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5761 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5762 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5763 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5767 onion_routing_packet,
5769 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5774 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5775 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5776 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5777 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5779 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5780 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5781 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5783 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5784 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5788 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5789 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5790 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5791 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5792 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5793 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5794 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5797 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5798 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5799 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5800 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5801 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5802 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5805 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5807 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5808 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5809 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5811 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5812 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5815 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5816 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5817 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5818 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5819 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5820 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5821 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5822 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5825 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5829 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5830 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5831 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5832 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5836 if !self.is_outbound() {
5837 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5838 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5839 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5840 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5841 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5842 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5843 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5844 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5845 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5846 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5852 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5855 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5856 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5857 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5858 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5860 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5862 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5863 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5864 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5865 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5868 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5869 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5873 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5874 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5876 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5878 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5879 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5880 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5881 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5883 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5884 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5885 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5886 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5887 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5888 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5892 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5893 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5896 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5899 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5900 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5902 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5903 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5904 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5905 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5906 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5909 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5910 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5911 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5912 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5918 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5919 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5920 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5923 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5924 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5927 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5928 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5929 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5930 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5936 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5937 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5939 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5940 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5941 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5942 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5943 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5944 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5945 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5946 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5950 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5951 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5954 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5955 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5958 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5960 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5963 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5966 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5967 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5968 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5970 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5975 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5976 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5977 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5978 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5980 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5982 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5984 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5985 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5986 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5987 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5988 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5989 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5992 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5993 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5994 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
5996 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5997 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5998 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6001 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6002 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6003 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6004 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6005 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6007 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6008 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6015 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6016 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6018 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6021 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6022 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6023 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6024 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6025 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6026 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6027 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6028 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6029 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6030 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6031 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6033 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6034 // return them to fail the payment.
6035 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6036 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6037 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6039 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6040 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6045 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6046 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6047 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6048 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6049 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6050 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6051 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6052 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6053 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6054 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6055 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6056 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6057 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6062 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6063 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6064 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6067 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6068 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6069 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6071 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6072 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6076 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6080 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6081 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6083 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6089 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6090 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6091 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6092 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6093 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6095 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6096 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6097 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6098 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6104 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6105 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6106 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6107 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6108 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6109 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6114 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6115 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6116 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6117 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6119 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6120 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6121 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6122 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6127 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6128 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6129 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6130 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6131 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6132 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6137 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6138 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6139 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6142 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6144 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6145 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6146 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6147 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6148 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6150 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6151 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6152 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6153 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6155 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6156 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6157 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6159 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6161 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6162 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6163 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6164 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6165 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6166 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6168 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6169 // deserialized from that format.
6170 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6171 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6172 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6174 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6176 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6177 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6178 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6180 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6181 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6182 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6183 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6186 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6187 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6188 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6191 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6192 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6193 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6194 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6196 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6197 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6199 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6201 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6203 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6205 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6208 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6210 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6215 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6217 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6218 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6219 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6220 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6221 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6222 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6223 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6225 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6227 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6229 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6232 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6233 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6234 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6237 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6239 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6240 preimages.push(preimage);
6242 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6243 reason.write(writer)?;
6245 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6247 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6248 preimages.push(preimage);
6250 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6251 reason.write(writer)?;
6256 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6257 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6259 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6261 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6262 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6263 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6264 source.write(writer)?;
6265 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6267 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6269 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6270 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6274 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6275 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6280 match self.resend_order {
6281 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6282 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6285 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6286 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6287 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6289 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6290 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6291 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6292 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6295 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6296 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6297 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6298 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6299 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6302 if self.is_outbound() {
6303 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6304 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6305 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6307 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6308 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6309 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6311 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6313 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6314 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6315 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6316 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6318 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6319 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6320 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6321 // consider the stale state on reload.
6324 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6325 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6326 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6328 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6329 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6330 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6332 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6333 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6335 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6336 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6337 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6339 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6340 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6342 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6345 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6346 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6347 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6349 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6352 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6353 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6355 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6356 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6357 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6359 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6361 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6363 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6365 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6366 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6367 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6368 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6369 htlc.write(writer)?;
6372 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6373 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6374 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6376 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6377 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6379 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6380 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6381 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6382 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6383 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6384 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6385 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6387 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6388 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6389 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6390 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6391 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6393 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6395 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6396 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6397 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6398 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6400 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6401 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6402 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6403 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6404 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6405 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6406 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6408 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6409 (2, chan_type, option),
6410 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6411 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6412 (5, self.config, required),
6413 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6414 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6415 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6416 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6417 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6418 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6419 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6420 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6421 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6422 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6423 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6424 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6431 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6432 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6434 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6435 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6437 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6438 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6439 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6441 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6442 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6443 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6444 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6448 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6449 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6452 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6454 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6455 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6462 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let mut keys_data = None;
6466 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6467 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6468 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6470 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6471 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6472 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6473 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6474 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6475 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6479 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6480 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6481 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6484 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6492 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6493 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6494 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6495 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6496 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6497 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6498 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6499 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6500 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6501 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6502 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6503 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6508 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6509 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6510 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6511 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6512 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6513 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6514 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6515 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6516 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6517 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6518 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6519 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6521 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6525 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6526 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6529 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6530 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6532 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6537 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6538 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6539 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6540 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6541 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6542 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6543 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6544 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6545 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6546 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6548 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6549 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6550 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6552 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6553 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6554 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6556 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6560 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6561 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6562 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6563 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6566 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6567 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6570 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6571 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6572 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6573 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6576 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6577 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6578 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6579 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6582 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6584 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6586 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6588 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6589 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6591 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6592 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6593 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6594 // consider the stale state on reload.
6595 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6598 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6600 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6602 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6605 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6607 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6611 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6612 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6614 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6615 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6617 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6618 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6624 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6626 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6627 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6629 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6630 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6635 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6636 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6637 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6638 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6640 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6643 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6646 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6648 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6652 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6656 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6657 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6658 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6660 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6661 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6662 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6666 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6667 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6668 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6670 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6676 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6677 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6678 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6679 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6680 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6681 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6682 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6683 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6684 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6685 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6687 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6688 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6689 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6690 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6691 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6692 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6694 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6695 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6697 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6698 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6699 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6700 (2, channel_type, option),
6701 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6702 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6703 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6704 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6705 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6706 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6707 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6708 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6709 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6710 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6711 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6712 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6713 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6714 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6715 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6718 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6719 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6720 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6721 // required channel parameters.
6722 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6723 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6724 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6726 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6728 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6729 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6730 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6731 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6734 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6735 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6736 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6738 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6739 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6741 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6742 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6747 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6748 if iter.next().is_some() {
6749 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6753 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6754 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6755 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6756 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6757 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6760 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6761 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6763 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6764 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6765 // separate u64 values.
6766 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6771 config: config.unwrap(),
6775 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6776 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6777 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6781 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6783 channel_value_satoshis,
6785 latest_monitor_update_id,
6788 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6791 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6792 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6795 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6796 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6797 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6801 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6802 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6803 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6804 monitor_pending_forwards,
6805 monitor_pending_failures,
6806 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6809 holding_cell_update_fee,
6810 next_holder_htlc_id,
6811 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6812 update_time_counter,
6815 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6816 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6817 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6818 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6820 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6821 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6822 closing_fee_limits: None,
6823 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6825 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6827 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6828 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6830 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6832 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6833 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6834 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6835 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6836 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6837 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6838 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6839 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6840 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6843 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6845 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6846 funding_transaction,
6848 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6849 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6850 counterparty_node_id,
6852 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6856 channel_update_status,
6857 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6861 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6862 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6863 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6864 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6866 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6868 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6869 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6870 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6872 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6875 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6877 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6880 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6888 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6889 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6890 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6891 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6892 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6894 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6895 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6897 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6898 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6899 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6900 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6901 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6902 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6903 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6904 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6905 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6906 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6907 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6908 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6909 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6910 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6911 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6912 use crate::util::test_utils;
6913 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6914 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6915 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6916 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6917 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6918 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6919 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6920 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6921 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6922 use crate::prelude::*;
6924 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6927 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6928 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6934 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6935 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6936 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6937 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6941 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6942 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6943 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6944 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6945 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6946 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6947 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6951 signer: InMemorySigner,
6954 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6955 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6958 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6959 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6961 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6962 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6965 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6969 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6971 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6972 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6973 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6974 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6975 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6978 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6980 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6981 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6985 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6986 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6987 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6991 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6992 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6993 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6994 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6996 let seed = [42; 32];
6997 let network = Network::Testnet;
6998 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6999 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7000 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7003 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7004 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7005 let config = UserConfig::default();
7006 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7007 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7008 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7010 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7011 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7015 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7016 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7018 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7019 let original_fee = 253;
7020 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7021 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7022 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7023 let seed = [42; 32];
7024 let network = Network::Testnet;
7025 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7027 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7028 let config = UserConfig::default();
7029 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7031 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7032 // same as the old fee.
7033 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7034 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7035 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7039 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7040 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7041 // dust limits are used.
7042 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7043 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7044 let seed = [42; 32];
7045 let network = Network::Testnet;
7046 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7047 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7049 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7050 // they have different dust limits.
7052 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7053 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7054 let config = UserConfig::default();
7055 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7057 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7058 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7059 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7060 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7061 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7063 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7064 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7065 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7066 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7067 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7069 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7070 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7071 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7073 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7074 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7075 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7076 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7079 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7081 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7082 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7083 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7084 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7085 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7087 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7088 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7089 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7090 payment_secret: None,
7091 payment_params: None,
7095 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7096 // the dust limit check.
7097 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7098 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7099 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7100 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7102 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7103 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7104 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7105 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7106 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7107 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7108 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7112 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7113 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7114 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7115 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7116 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7117 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7118 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7119 let seed = [42; 32];
7120 let network = Network::Testnet;
7121 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7123 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7124 let config = UserConfig::default();
7125 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7127 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7128 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7130 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7131 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7132 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7133 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7134 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7135 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7137 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7138 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7139 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7140 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7141 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7143 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7145 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7146 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7147 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7148 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7149 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7151 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7152 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7153 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7154 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7155 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7159 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7160 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7161 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7162 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7163 let seed = [42; 32];
7164 let network = Network::Testnet;
7165 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7166 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7167 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7169 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7171 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7172 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7173 let config = UserConfig::default();
7174 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7176 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7177 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7178 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7179 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7181 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7182 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7183 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7185 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7186 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7187 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7188 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7190 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7191 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7192 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7194 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7195 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7197 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7198 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7199 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7200 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7201 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7202 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7203 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7204 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7205 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7210 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7212 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7213 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7214 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7215 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7216 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7217 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7218 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7225 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7226 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7227 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7228 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7229 let seed = [42; 32];
7230 let network = Network::Testnet;
7231 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7232 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7233 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7235 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7236 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7237 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7238 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7239 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7240 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7241 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7242 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7244 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7245 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7246 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7247 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7248 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7249 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7251 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7252 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7253 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7254 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7256 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7258 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7259 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7260 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7261 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7262 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7263 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7265 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7266 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7267 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7268 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7270 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7271 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7272 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7273 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7274 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7276 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7277 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7279 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7280 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7281 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7283 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7284 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7285 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7286 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7287 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7289 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7290 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7292 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7293 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7294 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7298 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7300 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7301 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7302 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7304 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7305 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7306 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7307 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7309 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7310 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7311 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7313 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7315 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7316 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7319 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7320 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7321 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7322 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7323 let seed = [42; 32];
7324 let network = Network::Testnet;
7325 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7326 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7327 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7330 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7331 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7332 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7334 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7335 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7337 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7338 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7339 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7341 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7342 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7344 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7346 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7347 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7349 // Channel Negotiations failed
7350 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7351 assert!(result.is_err());
7356 fn channel_update() {
7357 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7358 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7359 let seed = [42; 32];
7360 let network = Network::Testnet;
7361 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7362 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7364 // Create a channel.
7365 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7366 let config = UserConfig::default();
7367 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7368 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7369 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7370 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7372 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7373 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7374 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7376 short_channel_id: 0,
7379 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7380 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7381 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7383 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7384 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7386 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7388 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7390 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7391 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7392 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7393 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7395 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7396 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7397 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7399 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7403 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7405 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7406 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7407 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7408 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7409 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7410 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7411 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7412 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7413 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7414 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7415 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7416 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7417 use crate::sync::Arc;
7419 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7420 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7421 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7422 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7424 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7426 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7427 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7428 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7429 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7430 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7432 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7433 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7438 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7439 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7440 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7442 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7443 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7444 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7445 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7446 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7447 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7449 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7451 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7452 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7453 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7454 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7455 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7456 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7458 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7459 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7460 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7461 selected_contest_delay: 144
7463 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7464 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7466 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7467 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7469 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7470 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7472 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7473 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7475 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7476 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7477 // build_commitment_transaction.
7478 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7479 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7480 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7481 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7482 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7484 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7485 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7486 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7487 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7491 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7492 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7493 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7494 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7498 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7499 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7500 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7502 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7503 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7505 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7506 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7508 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7510 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7511 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7512 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7513 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7514 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7515 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7516 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7518 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7519 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7520 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7521 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7523 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7524 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7525 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7527 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7529 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7530 commitment_tx.clone(),
7531 counterparty_signature,
7532 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7533 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7534 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7536 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7537 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7539 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7540 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7541 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7543 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7544 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7547 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7548 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7550 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7551 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7552 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7553 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7554 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7555 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7556 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7557 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7559 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7562 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7563 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7564 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7568 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7571 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7572 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7573 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7575 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7576 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7577 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7578 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7579 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7580 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7581 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7582 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7584 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7588 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7589 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7591 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7592 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7593 "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", {});
7595 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7596 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7597 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7598 "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", {});
7600 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7601 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7603 amount_msat: 1000000,
7605 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7606 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7608 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7611 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7612 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7614 amount_msat: 2000000,
7616 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7617 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7619 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7622 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7623 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7625 amount_msat: 2000000,
7627 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7628 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7629 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7631 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7634 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7635 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7637 amount_msat: 3000000,
7639 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7640 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7641 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7643 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7646 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7647 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7649 amount_msat: 4000000,
7651 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7652 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7654 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7658 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7659 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7660 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7662 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7663 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7664 "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", {
7667 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7668 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7669 "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" },
7672 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7673 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7674 "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" },
7677 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7678 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7679 "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" },
7682 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7683 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7684 "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" },
7687 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7688 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7689 "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" }
7692 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7693 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7694 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7696 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7697 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7698 "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", {
7701 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7702 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7703 "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" },
7706 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7707 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7708 "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" },
7711 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7712 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7713 "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" },
7716 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7717 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7718 "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" },
7721 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7722 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7723 "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" }
7726 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7727 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7728 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7730 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7731 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7732 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7735 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7736 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7737 "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" },
7740 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7741 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7742 "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" },
7745 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7746 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7747 "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" },
7750 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7751 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7752 "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" }
7755 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7756 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7757 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7758 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7760 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7761 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7762 "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", {
7765 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7766 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7767 "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" },
7770 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7771 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7772 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7775 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7776 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7777 "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" },
7780 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7781 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7782 "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" }
7785 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7786 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7787 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7788 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7790 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7791 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7792 "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", {
7795 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7796 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7797 "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" },
7800 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7801 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7802 "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" },
7805 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7806 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7807 "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" },
7810 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7811 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7812 "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" }
7815 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7816 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7817 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7819 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7820 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7821 "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", {
7824 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7825 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7826 "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" },
7829 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7830 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7831 "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" },
7834 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7835 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7836 "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" }
7839 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7840 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7841 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7843 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7844 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7845 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7848 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7849 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7850 "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" },
7853 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7854 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7855 "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" },
7858 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7859 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7860 "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" }
7863 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7864 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7865 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7867 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7868 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7869 "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", {
7872 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7873 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7874 "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" },
7877 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7878 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7879 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7882 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7883 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7884 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7885 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7887 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7888 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7889 "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", {
7892 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7893 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7894 "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" },
7897 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7898 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7899 "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" }
7902 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7903 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7904 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7905 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7907 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7908 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7909 "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", {
7912 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7913 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7914 "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" },
7917 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7918 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7919 "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" }
7922 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7923 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7924 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7926 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7927 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7928 "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", {
7931 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7932 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7933 "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" }
7936 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7937 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7938 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7939 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7941 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7942 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7943 "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", {
7946 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7947 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7948 "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" }
7951 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7952 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7953 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7954 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7956 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7957 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7958 "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", {
7961 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7962 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7963 "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" }
7966 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7967 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7968 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7969 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7971 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7972 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7973 "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", {});
7975 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7976 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7977 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7978 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7980 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7981 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7982 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7984 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7985 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7986 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7987 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7989 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7990 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7991 "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", {});
7993 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7994 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7995 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7997 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7998 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7999 "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", {});
8001 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8002 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8003 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8004 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8006 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8007 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8008 "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", {});
8010 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8011 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8012 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8013 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8015 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8016 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8017 "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", {});
8019 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8020 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8021 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8022 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8023 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8024 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8026 amount_msat: 2000000,
8028 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8029 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8031 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8034 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8035 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8036 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8038 amount_msat: 5000000,
8040 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8041 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8042 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8044 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8047 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8048 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8050 amount_msat: 5000000,
8052 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8053 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8054 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8056 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8060 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8061 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8062 "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", {
8065 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8066 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8067 "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" },
8069 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8070 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8071 "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" },
8073 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8074 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8075 "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" }
8078 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8079 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8080 "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", {
8083 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8084 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8085 "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" },
8087 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8088 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8089 "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" },
8091 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8092 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8093 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe290400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e83473044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced401008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8098 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8099 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8101 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8102 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8103 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8104 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8106 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8107 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8108 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8110 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8111 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8113 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8114 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8116 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8117 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8118 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8122 fn test_key_derivation() {
8123 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8124 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8126 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8127 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8129 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8130 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8132 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8133 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8135 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8136 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8138 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8139 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8141 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8142 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8144 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8145 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8149 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8150 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8151 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8152 let seed = [42; 32];
8153 let network = Network::Testnet;
8154 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8155 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8157 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8158 let config = UserConfig::default();
8159 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8160 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8162 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8163 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8165 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8166 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8167 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8168 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8169 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8170 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8171 assert!(res.is_ok());
8176 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8177 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8178 // resulting `channel_type`.
8179 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8180 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8181 let network = Network::Testnet;
8182 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8183 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8185 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8186 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8188 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8189 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8191 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8192 // need to signal it.
8193 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8194 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8195 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8198 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8200 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8201 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8202 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8204 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8205 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8206 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8209 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8210 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8211 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8212 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8213 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8216 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8217 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8222 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8223 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8224 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8225 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8226 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8227 let network = Network::Testnet;
8228 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8229 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8231 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8232 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8234 let config = UserConfig::default();
8236 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8237 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8238 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8239 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8240 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8242 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8243 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8244 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8247 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8248 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8249 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8251 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8252 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8253 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8254 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8255 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8256 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8258 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8263 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8264 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8267 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8268 let network = Network::Testnet;
8269 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8270 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8272 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8273 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8275 let config = UserConfig::default();
8277 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8278 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8279 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8280 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8281 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8282 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8283 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8284 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8286 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8287 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8288 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8289 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8290 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8291 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8294 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8295 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8297 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8298 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8299 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8300 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8302 assert!(res.is_err());
8304 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8305 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8306 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8308 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8309 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8310 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8313 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8315 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8316 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8317 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8318 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8321 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8322 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8324 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8325 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8327 assert!(res.is_err());