1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::transaction_utils;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
67 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
68 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
69 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
72 enum InboundHTLCState {
73 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
74 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
75 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
76 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
77 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
78 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
79 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
80 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
81 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
82 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
83 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
84 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
85 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
86 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
87 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
89 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
90 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
91 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
92 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
93 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
94 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
95 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
96 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
97 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
98 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
99 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
100 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
101 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
102 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
104 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
105 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
106 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
107 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
108 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
109 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
110 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
111 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
113 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
114 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
116 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
117 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
118 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
119 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
120 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
121 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
122 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
123 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
126 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
130 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
131 state: InboundHTLCState,
134 enum OutboundHTLCState {
135 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
136 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
137 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
138 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
139 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
140 /// money back (though we won't), and,
141 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
142 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
143 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
144 /// we'll never get out of sync).
145 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
146 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
147 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
149 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
150 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
151 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
152 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
153 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
154 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
155 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
156 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
157 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
158 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
159 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
160 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
161 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
162 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
163 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
166 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
170 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
171 state: OutboundHTLCState,
175 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
176 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
177 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
181 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
183 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
186 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
191 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
195 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
196 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
197 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
198 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
199 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
200 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
201 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
203 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
204 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
205 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
206 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
207 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
208 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
209 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
211 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
212 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
213 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
215 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
216 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
217 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
218 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
219 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
220 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
222 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
223 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
225 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
226 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
227 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
228 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
229 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
230 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
231 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
232 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
233 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
235 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
236 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
237 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
238 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
239 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
240 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
241 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
242 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
243 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
244 /// us their shutdown.
245 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
246 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
247 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
248 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
250 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
251 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
253 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
255 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
256 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
257 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
258 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
259 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
260 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
261 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
262 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
264 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
266 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
268 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
272 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
278 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
279 struct HTLCCandidate {
281 origin: HTLCInitiator,
285 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
293 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
294 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
295 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
296 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
297 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
298 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
299 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
300 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
301 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
302 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
303 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
306 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
308 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
310 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
311 htlc_value_msat: u64,
312 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
317 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
318 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
319 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
320 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
321 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
323 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
324 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
325 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
326 htlc_value_msat: u64,
327 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
328 /// in the holding cell).
329 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
331 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
332 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
336 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
337 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
338 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
341 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
342 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
343 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
344 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
345 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
346 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
347 config: ChannelConfig,
351 channel_id: [u8; 32],
353 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
354 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
356 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
358 holder_signer: Signer,
359 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
360 destination_script: Script,
362 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
363 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
364 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
366 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
367 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
368 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
369 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
370 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
371 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
373 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
374 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
375 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
376 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
377 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
378 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
380 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
382 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
383 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
384 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
385 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
386 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
388 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
389 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
390 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
392 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
393 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
394 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
395 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
396 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
397 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
398 // commitment_signed.
399 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
400 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
401 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
402 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
403 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
404 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
405 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
406 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
407 update_time_counter: u32,
410 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
411 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
412 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
413 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
414 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
415 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
417 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
419 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
420 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
421 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
422 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
424 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
426 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
428 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
430 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
432 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
433 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
434 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
435 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
436 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
437 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
438 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
440 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
442 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
443 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
444 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
446 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
448 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
449 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
451 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
452 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
453 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
455 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
457 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
459 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
461 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
462 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
463 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
465 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
466 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
467 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
468 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
469 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
470 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
471 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
472 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
474 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
475 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
476 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
477 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
478 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
480 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
481 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
483 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
484 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
485 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
486 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
487 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
488 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
489 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
490 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
493 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
494 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
496 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
497 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
498 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
502 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
505 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
507 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
509 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
511 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
513 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
515 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
517 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
518 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
519 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
520 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
521 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
522 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
523 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
524 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
525 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
527 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
528 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
529 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
530 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
531 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
533 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
534 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
535 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
536 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
539 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
542 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
543 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
545 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
546 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
547 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
552 macro_rules! secp_check {
553 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
556 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
561 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
562 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
563 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
564 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
567 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
570 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
571 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
572 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
573 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
577 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
578 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
579 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
581 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
582 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
583 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
585 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
588 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
589 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
592 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
595 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
596 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
597 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
600 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
602 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
603 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
605 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
606 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
609 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
610 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
611 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer. script: ({})", shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().into_inner().to_bytes().to_hex()) });
617 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
619 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
620 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
622 channel_value_satoshis,
624 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
627 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
628 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
630 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
631 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
632 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
634 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
635 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
636 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
637 pending_update_fee: None,
638 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
639 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
640 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
641 update_time_counter: 1,
643 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
645 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
646 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
647 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
648 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
649 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
651 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
652 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
653 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
654 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
656 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
658 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
659 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
660 short_channel_id: None,
662 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
663 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
664 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
665 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
666 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
667 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
668 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
669 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
670 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
672 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
674 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
675 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
676 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
677 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
678 counterparty_parameters: None,
679 funding_outpoint: None
681 funding_transaction: None,
683 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
684 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
685 counterparty_node_id,
687 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
689 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
691 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
693 announcement_sigs: None,
695 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
697 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
700 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
702 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
703 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
707 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
708 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
710 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
711 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
712 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
714 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
715 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
716 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
721 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
722 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
723 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
724 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
725 F::Target: FeeEstimator
727 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
728 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
729 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
730 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
731 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
732 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
733 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
734 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
736 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
738 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
742 // Check sanity of message fields:
743 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
744 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
746 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
747 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
749 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
750 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
753 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
756 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
757 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
759 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
760 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
761 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
763 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
765 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
766 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
767 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
769 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
770 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
772 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
773 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
776 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
777 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
780 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
781 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
783 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
784 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
786 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
787 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
789 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
792 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
793 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
795 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
796 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
799 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
801 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
802 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
803 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
807 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
808 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
810 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
812 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
813 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
816 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
819 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
823 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
824 // for full fee payment
825 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
826 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
827 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
828 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
831 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
832 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
833 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
837 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
838 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
839 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
840 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
841 if script.len() == 0 {
844 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), &their_features)) {
845 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
846 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
850 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
851 &OptionalField::Absent => {
852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
857 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
858 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
861 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
862 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer. script: ({})", shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().into_inner().to_bytes().to_hex())));
867 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
868 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
872 config: local_config,
874 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
875 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
878 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
881 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
882 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
884 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
885 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
886 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
888 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
889 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
890 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
891 pending_update_fee: None,
892 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
893 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
894 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
895 update_time_counter: 1,
897 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
899 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
900 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
901 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
902 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
903 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
905 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
906 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
907 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
908 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
910 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
912 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
913 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
914 short_channel_id: None,
916 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
917 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
918 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
919 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
920 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
921 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
922 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
923 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
924 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
925 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
927 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
929 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
930 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
931 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
932 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
933 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
934 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
935 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
937 funding_outpoint: None
939 funding_transaction: None,
941 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
942 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
943 counterparty_node_id,
945 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
947 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
949 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
951 announcement_sigs: None,
953 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
954 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
955 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
956 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
958 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
960 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
961 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
967 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
968 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
969 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
970 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
971 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
973 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
974 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
975 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
976 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
977 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
978 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
979 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
980 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
981 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
982 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
983 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
985 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
986 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
987 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
988 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
990 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
991 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
992 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
993 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
995 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
996 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
997 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
998 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1000 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1001 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1002 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1004 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1005 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1006 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1007 transaction_output_index: None
1012 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1013 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1014 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1015 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1016 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1017 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1018 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1020 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1021 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1024 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1025 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1026 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1027 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1029 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1030 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1036 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1037 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1038 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1039 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1040 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1041 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1042 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1046 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1047 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1049 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1051 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1052 if generated_by_local {
1053 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1054 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1063 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1064 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1065 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1066 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1067 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1068 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1069 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1073 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1074 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1076 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1078 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1079 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1081 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1082 if !generated_by_local {
1083 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1091 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1092 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1093 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1094 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1095 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1096 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1097 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1098 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1100 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1102 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1103 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1104 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1105 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1107 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1109 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1110 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1111 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1112 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1115 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1116 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1117 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1119 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1122 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1123 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1125 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1126 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1131 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1132 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1137 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1139 let channel_parameters =
1140 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1141 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1142 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1147 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1150 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1151 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1152 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1153 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1155 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1159 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1160 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1161 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1162 // outside of those situations will fail.
1163 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1167 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1172 1 + // script length (0)
1176 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1177 2 + // witness marker and flag
1178 1 + // witness element count
1179 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1180 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1181 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1182 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1183 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1184 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1186 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1187 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1188 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1194 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1196 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1198 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1199 script_sig: Script::new(),
1200 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1201 witness: Vec::new(),
1206 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1207 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1208 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1210 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1211 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1212 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1214 if value_to_self < 0 {
1215 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1216 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1217 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1218 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1219 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1222 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1223 txouts.push((TxOut {
1224 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1225 value: value_to_remote as u64
1229 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1230 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1231 txouts.push((TxOut {
1232 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1233 value: value_to_self as u64
1237 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1239 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1240 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1241 outputs.push(out.0);
1249 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1252 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1253 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1257 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1258 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1259 /// our counterparty!)
1260 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1261 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1262 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1263 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1264 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1265 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1266 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1268 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1272 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1273 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1274 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1275 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1276 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1277 //may see payments to it!
1278 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1279 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1280 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1282 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1285 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1286 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1287 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1288 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1289 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1292 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1293 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1294 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1295 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1297 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1298 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1300 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1302 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1304 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1305 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1306 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1308 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1309 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1310 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1311 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1312 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1314 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1315 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1316 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1318 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1319 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1321 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1324 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1325 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1329 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1333 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1334 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1335 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1336 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1337 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1338 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1341 // Now update local state:
1343 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1344 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1345 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1346 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1347 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1348 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1349 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1353 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1354 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1355 match pending_update {
1356 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1357 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1358 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1359 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1360 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1361 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1362 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1365 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1366 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1367 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1368 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1369 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1370 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1371 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1377 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1378 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1379 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1381 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1382 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1383 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1385 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1386 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1389 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1390 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1392 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1393 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1395 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1396 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1399 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1402 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1403 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1404 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1405 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1410 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1411 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1412 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1413 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1414 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1417 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1418 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1419 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1420 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1421 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1423 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1424 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1425 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1429 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1430 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1431 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1432 /// before we fail backwards.
1433 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1434 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1435 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1436 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1437 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1439 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1441 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1442 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1443 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1445 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1446 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1447 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1449 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1450 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1451 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1453 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1458 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1459 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1465 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1466 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1467 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1468 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1469 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1473 // Now update local state:
1474 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1475 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1476 match pending_update {
1477 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1478 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1479 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1480 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1484 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1485 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1486 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1487 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1493 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1494 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1495 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1501 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1503 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1504 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1507 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1508 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1509 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1514 // Message handlers:
1516 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1517 // Check sanity of message fields:
1518 if !self.is_outbound() {
1519 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1521 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1522 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1524 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1525 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1527 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1528 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1530 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1531 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1533 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1534 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1535 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1537 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1538 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1541 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1542 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1543 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1545 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1548 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1549 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1552 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1553 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1554 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1556 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1557 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1559 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1560 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1562 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1563 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1565 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1566 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1568 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1569 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1571 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1572 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1574 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1575 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1576 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1581 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1582 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1583 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1584 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1585 if script.len() == 0 {
1588 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), &their_features)) {
1589 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1590 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
1594 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1595 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1601 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1602 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1603 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1604 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1605 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1606 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1608 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1609 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1610 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1611 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1612 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1613 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1616 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1617 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1618 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1621 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1622 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1624 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1629 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1630 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1632 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1633 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1635 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1636 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1637 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1638 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1639 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1640 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1641 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1642 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1643 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1646 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1647 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1649 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1650 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1651 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1652 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1654 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1655 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1657 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1658 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1661 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1662 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1665 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1666 if self.is_outbound() {
1667 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1669 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1670 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1671 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1675 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1676 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1677 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1678 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1681 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1682 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1683 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1684 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1685 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1687 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1689 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1690 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1694 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1695 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1696 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1700 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1701 initial_commitment_tx,
1704 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1705 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1708 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1710 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1711 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1712 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1713 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1714 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1715 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1716 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1717 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1718 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1720 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1722 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1724 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1725 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1726 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1727 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1729 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1731 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1732 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1734 }, channel_monitor))
1737 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1738 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1739 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1740 if !self.is_outbound() {
1741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1743 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1746 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1747 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1748 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1749 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1752 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1754 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1755 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1756 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1757 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1759 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1760 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1762 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1763 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1765 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1766 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1767 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1768 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1769 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1770 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1774 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1775 initial_commitment_tx,
1778 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1779 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1783 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1784 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1785 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1786 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1787 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1788 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1789 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1790 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1791 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1792 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1794 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1796 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1798 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1799 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1800 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1801 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1803 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1805 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1808 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1809 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1810 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1811 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1814 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1816 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1817 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1818 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1819 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1820 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1821 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1822 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1823 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1824 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1825 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1826 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1827 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1828 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1831 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1837 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1838 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1840 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1845 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1846 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1847 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1848 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1849 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1851 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1854 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1856 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1857 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1858 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1859 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1862 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1863 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1864 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1865 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1866 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1870 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1873 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1874 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1875 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1876 /// corner case properly.
1877 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1878 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1880 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1881 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1882 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64
1883 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1885 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1886 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64
1887 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1892 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1893 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1894 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1897 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1898 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1899 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1900 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1901 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1902 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1905 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1906 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1907 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1909 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1910 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1912 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1913 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1915 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1916 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1918 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1919 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1923 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1924 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1930 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1931 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1932 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1935 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1936 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1937 included_htlcs += 1;
1940 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1941 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1945 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1946 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1947 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1948 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1949 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1950 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1955 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1957 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1958 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1963 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1964 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1968 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1969 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1970 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1973 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1974 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1976 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1977 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1978 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1980 total_pending_htlcs,
1981 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1982 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1983 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1985 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1986 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1987 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1989 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1991 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1996 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1997 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1998 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2000 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2001 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2003 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2004 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2006 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2007 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2009 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2010 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2014 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2015 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2021 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2022 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2023 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2024 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2025 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2026 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2029 included_htlcs += 1;
2032 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2033 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2036 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2037 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2039 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2040 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2041 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2046 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2047 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2048 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2051 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2052 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2054 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2055 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2057 total_pending_htlcs,
2058 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2059 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2060 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2062 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2063 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2064 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2066 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2068 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2073 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2074 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2075 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2076 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2077 if local_sent_shutdown {
2078 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2080 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2081 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2082 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2085 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2088 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2091 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2094 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2098 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2099 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2102 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2103 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2106 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2107 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2108 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2109 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2110 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2111 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2112 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2113 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2114 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2115 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2116 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2118 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2119 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2120 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2121 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2122 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2123 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2127 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2128 self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2129 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2130 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2131 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2135 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2136 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2137 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2138 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2139 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2141 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2145 let chan_reserve_msat =
2146 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2147 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2151 if !self.is_outbound() {
2152 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2153 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2154 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2155 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2156 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2157 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2158 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2159 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2160 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2161 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2162 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2163 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2164 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2165 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2166 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2169 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2170 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2171 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2172 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2176 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2179 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2183 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2184 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2185 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2189 // Now update local state:
2190 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2191 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2192 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2193 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2194 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2195 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2196 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2201 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2203 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2204 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2205 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2206 match check_preimage {
2208 Some(payment_hash) =>
2209 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2214 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2216 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2217 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2219 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2225 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2228 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2229 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2232 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2236 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2237 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2240 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2241 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2244 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2248 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2252 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2253 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2256 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2260 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2264 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2265 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2268 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2269 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2271 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2272 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2274 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2275 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2278 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2280 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2282 let mut update_fee = false;
2283 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2285 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2290 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2291 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2292 let commitment_txid = {
2293 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2294 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2295 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2297 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2298 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2299 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2300 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2301 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2302 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2306 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2307 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2310 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2311 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2313 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2314 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2315 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2318 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2320 if self.is_outbound() {
2321 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2322 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2323 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2324 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2325 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2326 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2327 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2328 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2329 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2330 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2336 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2337 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2340 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2341 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2342 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2343 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2344 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2345 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2346 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2348 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2349 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2350 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2351 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2352 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2353 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2354 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2356 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2358 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2362 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2365 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2366 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2367 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2370 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2371 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2373 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2374 let mut need_commitment = false;
2375 if !self.is_outbound() {
2376 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2377 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2378 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2379 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2380 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2381 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2382 need_commitment = true;
2383 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2388 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2389 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2390 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2391 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2392 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2393 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2397 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2398 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2399 Some(forward_info.clone())
2401 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2402 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2403 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2404 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2405 need_commitment = true;
2408 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2409 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2410 Some(fail_reason.take())
2412 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2413 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2414 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2415 need_commitment = true;
2419 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2420 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2421 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2422 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2424 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2425 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2426 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2427 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2428 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2429 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2430 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2431 // includes the right HTLCs.
2432 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2433 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2434 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2435 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2436 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2437 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2439 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2440 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2441 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2442 // re-send the message on restoration)
2443 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2446 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2447 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2448 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2449 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2450 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2451 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2452 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2453 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2454 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2456 } else if !need_commitment {
2457 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2458 } else { (None, None) };
2460 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2461 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2463 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2464 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2465 per_commitment_secret,
2466 next_per_commitment_point,
2467 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2470 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2471 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2472 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2473 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2474 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2475 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2476 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2477 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2480 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2481 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2482 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2483 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2484 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2485 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2486 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2488 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2489 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2490 updates: Vec::new(),
2493 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2494 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2495 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2496 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2497 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2498 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2499 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2500 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2501 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2502 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2503 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2504 // to rebalance channels.
2505 match &htlc_update {
2506 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2507 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2508 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2511 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2512 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2513 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2514 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2515 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2516 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2517 // into the holding cell without ever being
2518 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2519 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2520 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2523 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2529 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2530 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2531 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2532 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2533 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2534 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2535 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2536 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2537 (msg, monitor_update)
2538 } else { unreachable!() };
2539 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2540 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2543 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2544 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2545 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2546 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2547 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2548 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2549 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2550 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2553 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2555 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2562 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2563 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2565 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2566 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2567 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2568 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2569 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2575 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2576 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2577 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2578 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2579 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2581 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2582 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2583 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2585 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2587 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2589 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2592 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2594 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2598 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2599 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2600 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2601 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2602 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2603 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2604 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2607 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2610 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2613 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2617 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2618 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2623 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2624 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2625 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2626 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2627 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2628 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2629 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2630 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2631 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2634 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2636 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2637 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2640 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2641 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2642 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2643 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2644 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2645 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2646 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2647 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2651 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2652 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2653 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2654 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2655 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2656 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2657 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2658 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2660 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2661 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2662 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2663 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2664 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2665 let mut require_commitment = false;
2666 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2669 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2670 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2671 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2673 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2674 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2675 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2676 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2677 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2678 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2683 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2684 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2685 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2686 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2687 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2689 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2690 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2695 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2696 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2698 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2702 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2703 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2705 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2706 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2707 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2708 require_commitment = true;
2709 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2710 match forward_info {
2711 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2712 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2713 require_commitment = true;
2715 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2716 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2717 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2719 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2720 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2721 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2725 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2726 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2727 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2728 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2734 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2735 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2736 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2737 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2739 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2740 Some(fail_reason.take())
2742 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2743 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2744 require_commitment = true;
2748 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2750 if self.is_outbound() {
2751 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2752 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2755 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2756 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2757 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2758 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2759 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2760 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2761 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2762 require_commitment = true;
2763 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2768 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2769 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2770 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2771 if require_commitment {
2772 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2773 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2774 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2775 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2776 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2777 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2778 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2779 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2780 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2782 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2783 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2784 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2785 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2788 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2789 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2790 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2791 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2792 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2794 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2795 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2796 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2799 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2800 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2801 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2802 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2804 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2806 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2807 if require_commitment {
2808 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2810 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2811 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2812 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2813 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2815 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2816 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2817 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2818 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2819 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2821 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2824 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2826 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2827 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2834 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2835 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2836 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2837 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2838 if !self.is_outbound() {
2839 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2841 if !self.is_usable() {
2842 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2844 if !self.is_live() {
2845 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2848 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2849 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2853 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2854 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2856 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2857 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2862 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2863 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2864 Some(update_fee) => {
2865 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2866 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2872 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2873 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2875 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2877 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2878 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2879 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2880 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2883 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2884 // will be retransmitted.
2885 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2887 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2888 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2890 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2891 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2892 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2893 // this HTLC accordingly
2894 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2897 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2898 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2899 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2900 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2903 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2904 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2905 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2906 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2907 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2908 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2913 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2915 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2916 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2917 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2918 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2919 // the update upon reconnection.
2920 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2924 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2925 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2928 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2929 /// updates are partially paused.
2930 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2931 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2932 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2933 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2934 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2935 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2936 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2937 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2938 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2939 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2940 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2941 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2942 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2945 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2946 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2947 /// to the remote side.
2948 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2949 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2950 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2952 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2953 self.funding_transaction.take()
2956 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2957 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2958 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2959 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2960 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2961 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2962 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2963 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2964 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2965 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2966 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2967 next_per_commitment_point,
2971 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2972 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2973 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2974 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2976 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2977 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2978 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2979 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2982 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2983 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2985 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2986 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2989 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2990 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2991 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2992 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2993 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2994 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2995 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2996 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2999 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3000 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3002 if self.is_outbound() {
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3008 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3009 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
3010 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3014 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3015 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3016 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3017 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3018 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3019 per_commitment_secret,
3020 next_per_commitment_point,
3024 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3025 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3026 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3027 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3028 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3030 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3031 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3032 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3033 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3034 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3035 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3036 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3037 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3038 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3043 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3044 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3046 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3047 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3048 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3049 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3050 reason: err_packet.clone()
3053 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3054 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3055 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3056 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3057 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3058 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3061 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3062 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3063 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3064 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3065 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3072 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3073 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3074 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3075 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3077 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3081 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3082 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3083 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3084 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3085 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3086 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3087 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3091 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3092 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3096 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3097 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3098 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3099 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3100 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3101 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3102 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3105 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3106 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3107 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3111 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3115 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3116 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3117 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3119 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3120 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3121 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3122 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3123 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3127 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3128 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3129 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3130 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3131 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3134 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3135 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3138 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3139 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3140 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3141 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3142 next_per_commitment_point,
3143 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3146 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3147 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3148 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3150 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3151 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3152 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3155 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3161 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3162 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3163 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3164 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3165 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3167 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3168 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3169 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3170 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3171 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3172 next_per_commitment_point,
3176 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3177 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3178 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3180 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3183 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3184 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3185 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3186 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3188 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3189 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3190 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3191 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3192 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3194 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3195 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3199 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3201 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3202 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3203 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3205 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3208 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3209 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3210 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3213 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3219 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3220 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3222 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3223 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3224 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3228 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3229 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3230 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3232 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3233 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3234 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3236 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3237 let sig = self.holder_signer
3238 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3240 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3241 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3243 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3244 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3245 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3246 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3247 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3251 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref, K: Deref>(
3252 &mut self, fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3253 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3255 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3256 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3258 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3261 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3262 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3263 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3264 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3267 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3268 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3272 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3274 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3275 Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3276 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3279 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3280 if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3284 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3287 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3288 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3289 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3290 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3292 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3295 assert!(send_shutdown);
3296 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3297 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer. script: ({})", shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().into_inner().to_bytes().to_hex())));
3300 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3305 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3307 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3308 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3310 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3311 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3312 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3313 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3314 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3315 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3319 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3320 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3321 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3322 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3326 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3327 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3328 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3329 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3330 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3331 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3333 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3334 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3341 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3342 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3344 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3347 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3348 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3349 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3350 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3352 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3354 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3355 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3356 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3357 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3358 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3360 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3361 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3363 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3364 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3366 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3369 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3370 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3372 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3375 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3378 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3381 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3385 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3386 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3387 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3388 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3390 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3392 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3395 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3396 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3397 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3398 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3399 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3403 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3404 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3405 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3406 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3407 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3408 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3409 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3410 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3411 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3412 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3413 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3417 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3418 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3419 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3420 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3421 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3422 let sig = self.holder_signer
3423 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3424 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3425 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3426 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3427 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3428 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3429 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3435 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3436 if self.is_outbound() {
3437 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3438 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3439 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3440 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3441 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3444 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3447 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3449 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3450 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3451 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3452 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3455 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3458 let sig = self.holder_signer
3459 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3460 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3461 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3462 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3463 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3465 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3466 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3468 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3469 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3470 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3472 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3475 // Public utilities:
3477 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3481 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3485 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3486 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3487 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3491 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3492 /// is_usable() returns true).
3493 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3494 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3495 self.short_channel_id
3498 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3499 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3500 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3501 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3504 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3505 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3508 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3509 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3512 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3513 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3514 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3517 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3518 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3521 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3522 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3523 self.counterparty_node_id
3526 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3528 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3529 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3532 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3533 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3535 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3536 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3537 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3538 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3540 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3544 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3545 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3546 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3549 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3550 self.channel_value_satoshis
3553 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3554 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3557 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3558 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3562 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3566 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3567 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3570 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3571 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3574 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3575 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3579 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3584 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3586 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3587 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3588 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3589 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3590 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3591 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3593 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3595 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3603 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3604 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3608 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3609 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3610 self.update_time_counter
3613 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3614 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3617 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3618 self.config.announced_channel
3621 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3622 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3625 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3626 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3627 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3628 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3631 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3632 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3633 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3636 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3637 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3638 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3639 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3640 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3643 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3644 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3645 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3646 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3647 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3650 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3651 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3652 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3653 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3656 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3657 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3658 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3661 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3662 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3663 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3664 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3665 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3666 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3671 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3672 self.channel_update_status
3675 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3676 self.channel_update_status = status;
3679 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3680 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3684 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3685 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3686 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3689 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3693 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3694 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3695 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3697 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3698 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3699 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3701 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3702 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3704 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3705 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3707 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3711 if need_commitment_update {
3712 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3713 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3714 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3715 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3716 next_per_commitment_point,
3719 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3725 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3726 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3727 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3728 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3729 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3730 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3731 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3732 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3733 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3734 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3735 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3736 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3737 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3738 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3739 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3740 if self.is_outbound() {
3741 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3742 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3743 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3744 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3745 // channel and move on.
3746 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3747 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3749 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3750 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3751 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3752 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3755 if self.is_outbound() {
3756 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3757 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3758 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3759 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3760 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3761 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3765 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3766 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3767 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3768 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3769 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3773 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3774 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3775 // may have already happened for this block).
3776 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3777 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3778 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3781 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3782 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3783 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3784 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3785 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3786 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3795 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3796 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3797 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3798 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3800 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3801 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3804 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3806 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3807 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3808 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3809 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3810 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3812 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3813 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3814 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3822 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3824 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3825 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3826 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3829 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3830 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3831 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3832 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3833 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3834 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3835 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3836 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3837 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3840 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3841 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3842 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3843 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3844 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3845 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3846 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3847 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
3852 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3855 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3856 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3857 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3858 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3859 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3860 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3861 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3862 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3863 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3864 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3865 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3866 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3867 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
3868 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3869 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3870 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3876 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3881 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3882 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3884 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3885 if !self.is_outbound() {
3886 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3888 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3889 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3892 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3893 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3896 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3897 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3901 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3902 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3903 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3904 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3905 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3906 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3907 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3908 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3909 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3910 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3911 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3912 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3913 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3914 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3915 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3916 first_per_commitment_point,
3917 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3918 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3919 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
3920 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
3925 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3926 if self.is_outbound() {
3927 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3929 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3930 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3932 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3933 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3936 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3937 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3939 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3940 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3941 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3942 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3943 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3944 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3945 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
3946 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3947 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3948 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3949 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3950 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3951 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3952 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3953 first_per_commitment_point,
3954 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3955 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
3956 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
3961 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3962 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3963 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3964 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3965 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3966 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3969 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3970 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3971 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3972 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3973 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3974 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3975 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3976 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3977 if !self.is_outbound() {
3978 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3980 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3981 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3983 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3984 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3985 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3986 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3989 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3990 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3992 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3995 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3996 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4001 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4003 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4005 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4006 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4007 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4009 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4010 temporary_channel_id,
4011 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4012 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4017 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4018 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4019 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4020 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4021 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4023 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4024 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4026 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4027 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4028 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4029 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4031 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4032 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4034 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4035 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4038 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4040 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4041 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4043 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4044 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4045 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4046 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4047 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4048 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4051 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4052 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4057 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4059 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4060 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4061 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4063 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4064 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4065 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4066 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4067 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4068 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4069 contents: announcement,
4072 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4076 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4077 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4078 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4079 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4080 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4082 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4084 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4086 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4087 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4089 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4091 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4092 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4095 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4097 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4100 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4101 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4102 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4103 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4105 Err(_) => return None,
4107 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4108 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4109 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4114 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4115 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4116 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4117 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4118 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4119 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4120 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4121 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4122 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4123 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4124 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4125 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4126 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4127 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4128 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4129 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4130 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4131 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4132 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4135 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4136 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4137 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4138 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4141 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4142 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4143 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4144 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4145 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4146 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4147 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4148 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4150 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4151 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4152 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4153 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4154 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4155 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4156 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4157 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4158 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4160 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4166 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4168 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4169 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4171 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4173 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4174 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4176 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4177 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4180 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4182 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4183 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4184 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4185 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4187 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4188 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4192 if amount_msat == 0 {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4196 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4197 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4200 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4201 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4202 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4203 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4204 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4205 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4206 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4207 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4210 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4211 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4212 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4214 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4215 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4216 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4219 if !self.is_outbound() {
4220 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4221 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4222 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4223 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4224 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4225 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4226 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4230 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
4231 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4232 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4235 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4236 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4237 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4238 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4240 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4241 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4244 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4245 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4246 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4247 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4248 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4251 // Now update local state:
4252 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4253 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4258 onion_routing_packet,
4263 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4264 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4266 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4268 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4272 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4273 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4274 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4278 onion_routing_packet,
4280 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4285 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4286 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4287 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4288 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4289 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4290 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4291 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4293 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4294 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4296 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4297 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4299 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4300 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4302 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4303 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4304 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4305 have_updates = true;
4307 if have_updates { break; }
4309 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4310 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4311 have_updates = true;
4313 if have_updates { break; }
4316 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4318 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4320 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4321 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4322 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4323 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4325 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4326 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4327 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4329 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4333 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4334 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4335 Some(fail_reason.take())
4337 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4340 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4342 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4343 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4344 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4345 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4346 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4347 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4349 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4352 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4353 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4354 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4355 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4356 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4357 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4358 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4359 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4362 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4363 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4366 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4367 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4368 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4369 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4370 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4371 if self.is_outbound() {
4372 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4376 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4377 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4378 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4379 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4381 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4383 if !self.is_outbound() {
4384 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4385 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4386 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4387 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4388 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4389 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4390 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4391 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4392 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4393 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4400 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4401 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4405 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4406 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4408 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4410 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4411 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4412 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4413 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4415 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4416 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4417 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4418 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4419 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4420 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4424 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4425 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4428 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4431 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4432 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4433 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4435 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4436 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4437 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4438 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4439 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4445 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4446 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4447 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4450 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4451 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4454 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4455 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4456 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4457 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4463 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4464 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4465 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4466 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4467 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4468 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4469 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4472 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4473 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4474 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4476 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4477 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4480 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4481 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4482 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4485 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4488 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4489 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4490 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer. script: ({})", shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().into_inner().to_bytes().to_hex()) });
4492 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4497 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4498 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4499 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4501 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4503 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4505 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4506 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4507 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4508 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4509 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4510 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4514 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4515 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4516 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4519 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4520 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4521 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4522 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4523 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4525 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4526 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4533 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4536 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4537 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4538 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4539 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4540 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4541 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4542 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4543 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4544 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4545 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4546 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4548 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4549 // return them to fail the payment.
4550 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4551 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4553 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4554 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4559 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4560 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4561 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4562 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4563 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4564 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4565 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4566 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4567 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4568 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4569 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4570 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4571 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4576 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4577 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4578 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4582 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4583 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4585 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4591 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4592 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4593 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4594 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4595 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4597 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4598 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4599 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4600 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4606 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4607 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4608 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4609 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4610 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4611 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4616 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4617 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4618 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4621 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4623 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4625 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4626 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4627 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4628 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4629 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4630 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4632 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4633 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4634 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4636 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4638 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4639 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4640 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4641 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4642 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4643 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4645 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
4646 // deserialized from that format.
4647 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
4648 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
4649 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
4651 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4653 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4654 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4655 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4657 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4658 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4659 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4660 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4663 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4664 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4665 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4668 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4669 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4670 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4671 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4673 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4674 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4676 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4678 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4680 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4682 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4685 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4687 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4692 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4693 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4694 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4695 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4696 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4697 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4698 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4700 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4702 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4704 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4707 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4708 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4709 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4712 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4714 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4716 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4718 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4723 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4724 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4726 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4728 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4729 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4730 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4731 source.write(writer)?;
4732 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4734 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4736 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4737 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4739 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4741 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4742 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4747 match self.resend_order {
4748 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4749 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4752 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4753 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4754 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4756 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4757 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4758 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4759 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4762 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4763 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4764 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4765 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4766 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4769 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4770 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4772 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4773 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4774 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4775 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4777 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4778 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4780 feerate.write(writer)?;
4784 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4787 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4788 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4789 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4791 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4792 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4793 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4795 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4796 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4798 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4799 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4800 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4802 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4803 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4805 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4808 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4809 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4810 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4812 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4815 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4816 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4818 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4819 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4820 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4822 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4824 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4826 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4828 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4829 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4830 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4831 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
4832 htlc.write(writer)?;
4835 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
4836 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
4837 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
4838 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
4839 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
4840 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
4841 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
4843 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
4844 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
4845 (5, self.config, required),
4846 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
4853 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4854 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4855 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4856 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4857 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4859 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4861 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
4863 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
4864 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
4865 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
4866 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
4867 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4869 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
4870 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4873 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4874 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4875 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4877 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4879 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4880 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4881 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4882 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4883 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4884 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4885 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4886 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4888 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4890 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
4891 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
4892 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
4895 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4897 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4898 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4899 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4901 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4902 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4903 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4904 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4905 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4906 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4907 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4908 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4909 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4910 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4911 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4912 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4913 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4914 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4919 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4920 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4921 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4922 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4923 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4924 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4925 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4926 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4927 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4928 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4929 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4930 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4931 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4932 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4933 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4934 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4939 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4940 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4941 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4942 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4943 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4944 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4945 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4946 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4947 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4948 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4950 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4951 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4952 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4954 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4955 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4956 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4958 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4962 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4963 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4964 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4965 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4968 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4969 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4970 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4972 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4973 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4974 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4975 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4978 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4979 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4980 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4981 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4984 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4985 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4987 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4988 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4989 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4990 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4992 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4994 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4995 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4998 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4999 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5000 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5002 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5003 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5004 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5005 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5007 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5008 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5010 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5011 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5013 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5014 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5015 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5017 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5019 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5020 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5022 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5023 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5026 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5028 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5029 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5030 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5031 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5033 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5036 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5037 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5039 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5041 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5042 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5044 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5045 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5047 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5049 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5050 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5051 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5053 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5054 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5055 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5059 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5060 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5061 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5062 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5063 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5064 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5065 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5068 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5069 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5074 config: config.unwrap(),
5078 channel_value_satoshis,
5080 latest_monitor_update_id,
5083 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5086 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5087 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5090 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5091 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5092 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5096 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5097 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5098 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5099 monitor_pending_forwards,
5100 monitor_pending_failures,
5103 holding_cell_update_fee,
5104 next_holder_htlc_id,
5105 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5106 update_time_counter,
5109 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5110 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5111 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5112 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5114 last_sent_closing_fee,
5116 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5117 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5120 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5121 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5122 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5123 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5124 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5125 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5126 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5129 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5131 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5132 funding_transaction,
5134 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5135 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5136 counterparty_node_id,
5138 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5142 channel_update_status,
5146 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5147 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5148 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5149 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5151 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5153 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5154 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5161 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5162 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5163 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5164 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5165 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5166 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5167 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5168 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5170 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5171 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5172 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5173 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5174 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5175 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5176 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5178 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5179 use chain::BestBlock;
5180 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5181 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5182 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5183 use util::config::UserConfig;
5184 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5185 use util::errors::APIError;
5186 use util::test_utils;
5187 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5188 use util::logger::Logger;
5189 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5190 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5191 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5192 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5193 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5194 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5195 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5196 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5200 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5203 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5204 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5210 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5211 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5212 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5216 signer: InMemorySigner,
5218 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5219 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5221 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5222 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5223 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5224 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5225 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5226 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5229 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5230 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5231 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5232 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5235 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5238 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5239 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5240 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5243 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5244 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5248 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5249 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5250 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5251 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5253 let seed = [42; 32];
5254 let network = Network::Testnet;
5255 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5256 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey { returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script });
5258 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5259 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5260 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5261 let config = UserConfig::default();
5262 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5263 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
5264 assert_eq!(err, "Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer. script: (60020028)");
5266 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5267 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5271 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5272 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5274 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5275 let original_fee = 253;
5276 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5277 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5278 let seed = [42; 32];
5279 let network = Network::Testnet;
5280 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5282 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5283 let config = UserConfig::default();
5284 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5286 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5287 // same as the old fee.
5288 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5289 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5290 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5294 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5295 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5296 // dust limits are used.
5297 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5298 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5299 let seed = [42; 32];
5300 let network = Network::Testnet;
5301 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5303 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5304 // they have different dust limits.
5306 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5307 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5308 let config = UserConfig::default();
5309 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5311 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5312 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5313 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5314 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5315 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5317 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5318 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5319 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5320 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5321 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5323 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5324 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5325 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5327 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5328 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5329 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5330 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5333 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5335 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5336 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5337 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5338 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5339 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5341 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5342 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5346 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5347 // the dust limit check.
5348 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5349 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5350 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5351 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5353 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5354 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5355 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5356 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5357 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5358 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5359 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5363 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5364 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5365 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5366 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5367 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5368 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5369 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5370 let seed = [42; 32];
5371 let network = Network::Testnet;
5372 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5374 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5375 let config = UserConfig::default();
5376 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5378 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5379 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5381 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5382 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5383 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5384 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5385 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5386 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5388 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5389 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5390 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5391 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5392 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5394 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5396 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5397 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5398 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5399 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5400 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5402 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5403 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5404 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5405 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5406 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5410 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5411 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5412 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5413 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5414 let seed = [42; 32];
5415 let network = Network::Testnet;
5416 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5417 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5418 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5420 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5422 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5423 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5424 let config = UserConfig::default();
5425 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5427 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5428 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5429 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5430 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5432 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5433 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5434 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5436 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5437 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5438 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5439 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5441 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5442 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5443 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5445 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5446 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5448 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5449 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5450 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5451 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5452 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5453 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5454 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5455 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5456 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5461 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5463 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5464 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5465 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5466 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5467 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5468 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5469 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5476 fn channel_update() {
5477 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5478 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5479 let seed = [42; 32];
5480 let network = Network::Testnet;
5481 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5482 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5484 // Create a channel.
5485 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5486 let config = UserConfig::default();
5487 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5488 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5489 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5490 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5492 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5493 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5494 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5496 short_channel_id: 0,
5499 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5500 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5501 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5503 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5504 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5506 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5508 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5510 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5511 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5512 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5513 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5515 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5516 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5517 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5519 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5524 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5525 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5526 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5527 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5528 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5530 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5532 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5533 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5534 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5535 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5536 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5538 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5539 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5544 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5545 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5546 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5548 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5549 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5550 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5551 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5552 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5553 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5555 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5557 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5558 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5559 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5560 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5561 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5562 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5564 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5565 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5566 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5567 selected_contest_delay: 144
5569 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5570 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5572 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5573 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5575 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5576 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5578 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5579 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5581 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5582 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5583 // build_commitment_transaction.
5584 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5585 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5586 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5587 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5588 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5590 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5591 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5592 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5594 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5595 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5597 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5598 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5602 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5603 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5604 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5605 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5606 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5607 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5609 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5610 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5611 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5612 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5614 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5615 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5616 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5618 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5620 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5621 commitment_tx.clone(),
5622 counterparty_signature,
5623 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5624 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5625 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5627 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5628 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5630 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5631 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5632 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5634 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5635 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5638 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5640 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5641 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5642 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5643 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5644 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5645 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5646 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5648 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5651 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5652 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5653 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5657 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5660 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5661 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5663 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5664 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5665 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5666 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5667 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5668 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5669 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5671 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5675 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5676 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5678 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5679 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5680 "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", {});
5682 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5683 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5685 amount_msat: 1000000,
5687 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5688 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5690 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5693 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5694 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5696 amount_msat: 2000000,
5698 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5699 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5701 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5704 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5705 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5707 amount_msat: 2000000,
5709 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5710 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5711 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5713 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5716 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5717 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5719 amount_msat: 3000000,
5721 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5722 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5723 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5725 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5728 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5729 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5731 amount_msat: 4000000,
5733 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5734 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5736 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5740 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5741 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5742 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5744 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5745 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5746 "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", {
5749 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5750 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5751 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
5754 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5755 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5756 "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" },
5759 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5760 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5761 "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" },
5764 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5765 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5766 "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" },
5769 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5770 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5771 "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" }
5774 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5775 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5776 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5778 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5779 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5780 "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", {
5783 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5784 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5785 "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" },
5788 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5789 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5790 "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" },
5793 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5794 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5795 "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" },
5798 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5799 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5800 "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" },
5803 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5804 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5805 "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" }
5808 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5809 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5810 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5812 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5813 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5814 "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", {
5817 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5818 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5819 "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" },
5822 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5823 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5824 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
5827 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5828 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5829 "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" },
5832 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5833 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5834 "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" }
5837 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5838 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5839 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5841 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5842 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5843 "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", {
5846 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5847 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5848 "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" },
5851 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5852 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5853 "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" },
5856 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5857 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5858 "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" },
5861 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5862 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5863 "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" }
5866 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5867 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5868 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5870 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5871 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5872 "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", {
5875 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5876 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5877 "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" },
5880 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5881 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5882 "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" },
5885 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5886 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5887 "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" }
5890 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5891 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5892 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5894 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5895 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5896 "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", {
5899 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5900 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5901 "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" },
5904 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5905 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5906 "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" },
5909 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5910 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5911 "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" }
5914 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5915 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5916 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5918 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5919 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5920 "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", {
5923 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5924 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5925 "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" },
5928 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5929 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5930 "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" }
5933 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5934 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5935 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5937 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5938 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5939 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5942 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5943 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5944 "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" },
5947 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5948 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5949 "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" }
5952 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5953 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5954 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5956 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5957 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5958 "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", {
5961 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5962 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5963 "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" }
5966 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5967 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5968 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5970 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5971 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5972 "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", {
5975 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5976 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5977 "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" }
5980 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5981 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5982 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5984 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5985 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5986 "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", {});
5988 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5989 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5990 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5992 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5993 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5994 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5996 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5997 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5998 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6000 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6001 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6002 "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", {});
6004 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6005 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6006 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6008 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6009 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6010 "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", {});
6012 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6013 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6014 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6015 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6016 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6017 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6019 amount_msat: 2000000,
6021 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6022 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6024 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6027 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6028 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6029 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6031 amount_msat: 5000000,
6033 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6034 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6035 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6037 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6040 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6041 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6043 amount_msat: 5000000,
6045 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6046 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6047 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6049 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6053 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6054 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6055 "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", {
6058 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6059 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6060 "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" },
6062 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6063 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6064 "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" },
6066 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6067 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6068 "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" }
6073 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6074 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6076 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6077 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6078 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6079 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6081 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6082 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6083 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6085 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6086 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6088 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6089 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6091 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6092 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6093 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6097 fn test_key_derivation() {
6098 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6099 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6101 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6102 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6104 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6105 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6107 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6108 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6110 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6111 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6113 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6114 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6116 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6117 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6119 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6120 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());