1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
196 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
199 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
202 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
203 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
208 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
209 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
217 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
221 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
222 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
227 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
228 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
232 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
247 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
248 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
249 /// move on to ChannelReady.
250 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
251 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
252 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
254 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
255 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
256 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
257 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
258 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
259 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
260 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
262 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
263 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
264 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
266 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
267 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
268 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
273 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
274 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
276 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
277 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
278 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
279 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
280 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
281 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
282 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
283 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
284 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
286 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
287 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
288 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
289 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
290 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
291 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
292 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
293 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
294 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
295 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
296 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
297 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
299 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
300 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
302 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
304 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
305 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
306 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
307 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
308 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
309 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
311 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
313 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
315 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
317 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
321 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
323 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
324 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
325 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
327 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
328 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
330 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
331 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
332 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
333 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
334 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
336 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
337 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
341 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
347 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
350 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
351 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 holding_cell_msat: u64,
354 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
357 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
358 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
359 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
360 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
361 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
362 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
363 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
364 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
369 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
370 struct HTLCCandidate {
372 origin: HTLCInitiator,
376 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
384 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
386 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
388 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
389 htlc_value_msat: u64,
390 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
395 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
396 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
397 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
398 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
399 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
401 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
402 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
403 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
404 htlc_value_msat: u64,
405 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
406 /// in the holding cell).
407 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
416 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
419 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
420 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
421 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
422 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
425 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
426 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
427 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
428 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
429 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
430 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
431 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
432 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
433 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
434 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
435 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
438 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
439 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
440 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
441 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
442 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
443 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
740 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
741 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
743 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
744 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
745 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
748 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
749 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
751 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
752 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
753 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
757 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
759 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
761 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
762 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
766 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
768 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
770 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
772 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
773 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
774 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
775 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
776 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
778 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
779 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
781 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
783 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
784 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
786 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
787 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
788 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
789 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
790 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
791 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
793 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
794 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
796 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
797 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
798 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
799 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
800 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
802 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
803 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
805 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
806 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
808 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
809 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
810 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
811 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
817 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
818 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
820 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
822 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
827 macro_rules! secp_check {
828 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
831 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
836 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
837 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
838 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
839 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
841 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
843 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
844 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
845 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
847 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
850 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
852 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
855 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
856 /// required by us according to the configured or default
857 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
859 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
861 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
862 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
863 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
864 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
865 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
868 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
869 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
870 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
871 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
872 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
873 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
874 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
877 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
878 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
881 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
882 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
883 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
884 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
885 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
886 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
887 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
888 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
889 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
890 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
893 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
894 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
895 // `only_static_remotekey`.
897 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
898 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
899 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
900 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
907 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
908 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
909 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
910 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
911 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
912 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
913 // We've exhausted our options
916 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
917 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
920 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
921 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
922 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
923 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
925 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
926 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
927 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
928 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
929 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
930 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
932 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
934 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
938 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
939 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
940 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
941 outbound_scid_alias: u64
942 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
943 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
944 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
945 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
947 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
948 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
949 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
950 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
952 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
953 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
955 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
956 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
958 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
959 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
962 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
963 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
965 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
966 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
967 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
968 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
969 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
972 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
973 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
975 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
977 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
978 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
979 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
983 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
984 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
986 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
987 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
990 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
991 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
992 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
999 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1000 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1001 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1002 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1007 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1009 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1010 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1011 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1013 channel_value_satoshis,
1015 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1018 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1019 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1021 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1022 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1025 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1026 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1027 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1028 pending_update_fee: None,
1029 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1030 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1031 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1032 update_time_counter: 1,
1034 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1036 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1037 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1038 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1039 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1040 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1041 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1043 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1044 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1045 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1046 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1048 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1049 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1050 closing_fee_limits: None,
1051 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1053 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1055 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1056 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1057 short_channel_id: None,
1058 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1060 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1061 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1062 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1063 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1064 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1065 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1066 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1067 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1068 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1069 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1070 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1072 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1074 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1075 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1076 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1077 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1078 counterparty_parameters: None,
1079 funding_outpoint: None,
1080 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1081 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1083 funding_transaction: None,
1085 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1086 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1087 counterparty_node_id,
1089 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1091 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1093 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1094 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1096 announcement_sigs: None,
1098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1099 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1100 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1101 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1103 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1105 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1106 outbound_scid_alias,
1108 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1110 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1111 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1118 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1119 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1120 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1122 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1123 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1124 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1125 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1126 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1127 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1128 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1131 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1132 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1133 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1134 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1135 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1136 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1137 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1138 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1140 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1141 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1150 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1151 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1152 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1153 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1154 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1155 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1156 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1157 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1158 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1163 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1165 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1166 // support this channel type.
1167 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1168 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1172 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1173 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1174 // `static_remote_key`.
1175 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1178 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1179 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1182 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1185 channel_type.clone()
1187 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1188 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1193 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1195 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1196 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1197 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1198 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1199 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1200 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1201 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1202 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1203 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1206 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1210 // Check sanity of message fields:
1211 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1214 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1220 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1221 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1224 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1227 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1230 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1232 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1233 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1236 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1239 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1243 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1244 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1247 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1250 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1253 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1256 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1259 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1266 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1268 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1269 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1274 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1275 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1276 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1277 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1280 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1283 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1285 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1287 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1291 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1292 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1293 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1294 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1295 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1299 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1300 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1301 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1302 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1306 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1307 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1308 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1309 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1310 if script.len() == 0 {
1313 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1316 Some(script.clone())
1319 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1320 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1326 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1327 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1330 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1331 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1336 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1337 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1339 let chan = Channel {
1342 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1343 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1345 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1350 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1352 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1353 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1357 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1360 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1361 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1363 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1365 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1367 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1369 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1370 pending_update_fee: None,
1371 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1372 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1373 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1374 update_time_counter: 1,
1376 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1378 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1379 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1380 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1381 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1383 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1385 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1386 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1387 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1388 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1390 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1391 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1392 closing_fee_limits: None,
1393 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1395 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1397 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1398 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1399 short_channel_id: None,
1400 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1402 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1403 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1404 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1405 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1406 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1407 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1408 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1409 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1410 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1411 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1412 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1413 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1415 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1417 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1418 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1419 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1420 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1421 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1422 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1423 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1425 funding_outpoint: None,
1426 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1427 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1429 funding_transaction: None,
1431 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1432 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1433 counterparty_node_id,
1435 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1437 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1439 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1440 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1442 announcement_sigs: None,
1444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1445 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1447 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1449 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1451 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1452 outbound_scid_alias,
1454 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1456 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1457 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1466 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1467 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1468 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1469 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1470 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1472 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1473 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1474 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1475 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1476 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1477 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1478 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1480 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1481 where L::Target: Logger
1483 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1484 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1485 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1487 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1488 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1489 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1490 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1492 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1493 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1494 if match update_state {
1495 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1496 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1497 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1498 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1499 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1501 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1505 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1506 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1507 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1508 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1510 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1511 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1512 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1514 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1515 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1516 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1517 transaction_output_index: None
1522 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1523 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1524 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1525 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1526 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1529 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1531 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1532 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1533 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1535 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1536 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1539 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1540 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1543 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1545 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1546 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1547 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1549 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1550 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1556 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1557 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1558 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1559 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1560 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1566 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1567 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1569 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1571 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1572 if generated_by_local {
1573 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1574 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1583 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1585 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1586 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1587 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1588 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1589 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1594 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1595 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1596 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1597 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1601 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1602 preimages.push(preimage);
1606 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1607 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1609 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1611 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1612 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1614 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1615 if !generated_by_local {
1616 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1624 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1625 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1626 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1627 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1628 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1629 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1630 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1631 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1633 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1635 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1636 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1637 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1638 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1640 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1642 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1643 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1644 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1645 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1648 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1649 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1650 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1651 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1653 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1656 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1657 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1658 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1659 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1661 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1664 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1665 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1670 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1671 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1676 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1678 let channel_parameters =
1679 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1680 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1681 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1684 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1689 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1692 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1693 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1694 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1695 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1697 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1698 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1699 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1707 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1708 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1714 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1715 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1716 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1717 // outside of those situations will fail.
1718 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1722 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1727 1 + // script length (0)
1731 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1732 2 + // witness marker and flag
1733 1 + // witness element count
1734 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1735 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1736 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1737 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1738 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1739 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1741 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1742 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1743 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1749 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1750 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1751 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1752 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1754 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1755 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1756 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1758 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1759 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1760 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1761 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1762 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1763 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1766 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1767 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1770 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1771 value_to_holder = 0;
1774 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1775 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1776 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1777 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1779 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1780 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1783 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1784 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1788 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1789 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1790 /// our counterparty!)
1791 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1792 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1793 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1794 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1795 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1796 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1797 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1799 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1803 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1804 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1805 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1806 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1807 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1808 //may see payments to it!
1809 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1810 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1811 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1813 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1816 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1817 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1818 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1819 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1820 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1823 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1826 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1827 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1829 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1831 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1832 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1833 where L::Target: Logger {
1834 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1835 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1836 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1837 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1838 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1839 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1840 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1841 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1845 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1846 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1847 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1848 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1850 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1851 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1853 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1855 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1857 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1858 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1859 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1861 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1862 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1863 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1864 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1865 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1867 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1868 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1869 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1871 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1872 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1874 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1877 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1878 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1882 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1886 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1887 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1888 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1889 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1890 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1891 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1894 // Now update local state:
1896 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1897 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1898 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1899 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1900 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1901 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1902 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1906 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1907 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1908 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1909 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1910 // do not not get into this branch.
1911 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1912 match pending_update {
1913 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1914 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1915 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1916 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1917 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1918 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1919 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1922 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1923 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1924 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1925 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1926 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1927 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1928 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1934 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1935 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1936 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1938 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1939 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1940 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1942 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1943 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1946 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1947 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1949 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1950 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1952 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1953 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1956 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1959 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1960 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1961 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1962 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1967 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1968 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1969 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1970 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1971 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1974 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1975 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1976 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1977 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1978 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1980 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1981 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1982 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1986 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1987 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1988 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1989 /// before we fail backwards.
1991 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1992 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1993 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1994 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1995 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1996 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1997 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2000 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2001 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2002 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2003 /// before we fail backwards.
2005 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2006 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2007 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2008 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2009 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2010 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2011 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2013 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2015 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2016 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2017 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2019 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2020 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2021 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2023 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2024 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2025 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2027 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2032 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2033 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2039 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2040 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2041 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2042 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2043 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2047 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2048 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2049 force_holding_cell = true;
2052 // Now update local state:
2053 if force_holding_cell {
2054 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2055 match pending_update {
2056 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2057 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2058 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2059 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2063 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2064 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2065 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2066 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2072 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2073 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2074 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2080 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2082 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2083 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2086 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2087 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2088 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2093 // Message handlers:
2095 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2096 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2098 // Check sanity of message fields:
2099 if !self.is_outbound() {
2100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2102 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2105 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2108 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2111 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2114 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2116 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2118 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2119 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2122 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2123 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2126 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2129 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2133 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2134 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2137 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2140 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2143 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2146 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2149 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2152 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2156 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2157 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2160 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2161 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2163 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2164 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2167 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2170 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2171 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2172 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2173 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2174 if script.len() == 0 {
2177 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2180 Some(script.clone())
2183 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2184 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2190 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2191 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2192 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2193 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2194 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2196 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2197 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2199 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2202 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2203 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2204 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2205 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2206 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2207 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2210 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2211 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2212 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2215 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2216 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2218 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2219 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2224 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2225 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2227 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2228 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2230 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2231 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2232 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2233 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2234 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2235 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2236 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2237 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2238 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2241 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2242 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2244 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2245 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2246 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2247 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2249 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2250 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2252 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2253 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2256 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2257 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2260 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2261 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2262 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2264 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2267 if self.is_outbound() {
2268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2270 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2271 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2272 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2276 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2279 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2280 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2281 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2282 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2285 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2286 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2287 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2288 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2289 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2291 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2293 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2294 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2298 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2299 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2300 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2304 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2305 initial_commitment_tx,
2308 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2309 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2312 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2313 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2315 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2317 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2318 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2319 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2320 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2321 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2322 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2323 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2324 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2325 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2326 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2327 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2329 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2331 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2333 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2334 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2335 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2336 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2338 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2340 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2341 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2343 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2346 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2347 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2348 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2349 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2350 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2352 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2355 if !self.is_outbound() {
2356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2358 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2361 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2362 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2363 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2364 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2367 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2369 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2370 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2371 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2372 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2374 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2375 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2377 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2378 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2380 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2381 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2382 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2383 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2384 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2389 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2390 initial_commitment_tx,
2393 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2394 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2397 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2398 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2401 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2402 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2403 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2404 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2405 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2406 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2407 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2408 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2409 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2410 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2411 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2412 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2414 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2416 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2418 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2419 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2420 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2421 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2423 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2425 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2428 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2429 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2431 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2432 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2433 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2434 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2436 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2439 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2440 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2441 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2444 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2445 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2446 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2447 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2448 // when routing outbound payments.
2449 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2453 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2455 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2456 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2457 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2458 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2459 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2460 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2461 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2462 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2463 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2465 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2466 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2467 let expected_point =
2468 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2469 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2471 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2473 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2474 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2475 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2476 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2477 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2479 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2487 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2488 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2490 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2492 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2495 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2496 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2497 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2498 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2504 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2505 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2506 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2507 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2508 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2509 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2510 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2511 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2512 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2515 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2518 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2519 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2520 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2522 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2523 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2524 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2525 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2526 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2527 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2529 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2530 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2536 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2537 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2538 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2539 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2540 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2541 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2542 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2543 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2544 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2547 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2550 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2551 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2552 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2554 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2555 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2556 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2557 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2558 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2559 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2561 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2562 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2566 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2567 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2568 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2569 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2570 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2571 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2572 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2574 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2575 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2577 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2584 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2585 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2586 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2587 /// corner case properly.
2588 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2589 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2590 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2592 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2593 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2594 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2595 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2598 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2600 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2601 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2602 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2605 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2606 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2607 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2608 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2610 outbound_capacity_msat,
2611 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2612 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2613 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2619 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2620 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2623 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2624 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2625 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2626 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2627 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2628 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2631 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2632 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2634 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2635 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2638 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2639 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2640 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2642 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2643 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2645 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2648 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2649 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2651 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2652 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2654 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2655 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2657 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2658 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2662 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2663 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2669 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2670 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2671 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2674 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2675 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2676 included_htlcs += 1;
2679 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2680 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2684 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2685 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2686 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2687 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2688 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2689 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2694 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2696 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2697 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2702 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2703 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2707 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2708 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2712 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2713 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2715 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2716 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2717 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2719 total_pending_htlcs,
2720 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2721 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2722 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2724 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2725 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2726 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2728 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2730 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2735 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2736 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2737 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2739 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2740 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2742 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2745 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2746 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2748 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2749 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2751 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2752 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2754 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2755 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2759 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2760 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2766 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2767 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2768 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2769 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2770 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2771 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2774 included_htlcs += 1;
2777 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2778 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2781 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2782 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2784 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2785 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2786 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2791 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2792 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2793 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2796 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2797 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2799 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2800 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2802 total_pending_htlcs,
2803 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2804 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2805 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2807 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2808 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2809 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2811 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2813 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2818 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2819 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2820 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2821 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2822 if local_sent_shutdown {
2823 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2825 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2826 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2827 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2830 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2833 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2836 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2839 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2843 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2844 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2845 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2848 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2851 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2852 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2853 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2854 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2855 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2856 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2857 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2858 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2859 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2860 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2861 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2863 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2864 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2865 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2866 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2867 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2868 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2872 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2875 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2876 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2877 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2879 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2880 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2881 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2882 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2883 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2884 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2885 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2889 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2890 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2891 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2892 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2893 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2894 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2895 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2899 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2900 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2901 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2902 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2903 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2907 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2908 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2909 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2910 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2911 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2913 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2917 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2921 if !self.is_outbound() {
2922 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2923 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2924 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2925 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2926 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2927 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2928 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2929 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2930 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2931 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2932 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2933 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2934 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2935 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2936 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2939 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2940 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2941 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2942 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2946 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2947 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2949 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2953 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2954 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2955 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2959 // Now update local state:
2960 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2961 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2962 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2963 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2964 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2965 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2966 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2971 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2973 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2974 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2975 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2976 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2977 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2978 None => fail_reason.into(),
2979 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2980 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2981 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2984 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2988 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2990 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2991 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2993 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2999 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3002 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3003 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3006 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3010 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3013 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3014 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3015 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3017 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3018 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3021 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3025 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3026 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3027 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3029 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3033 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3037 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
3038 where L::Target: Logger
3040 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3041 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3043 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3044 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3046 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3047 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3050 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3052 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3054 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3055 let commitment_txid = {
3056 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3057 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3058 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3060 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3061 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3062 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3063 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3064 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3065 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3069 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3071 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3072 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3073 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3074 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3077 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3078 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3079 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3080 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3083 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3085 if self.is_outbound() {
3086 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3087 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3088 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3089 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3090 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3091 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3092 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3093 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3094 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3095 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3101 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3102 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3105 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3106 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3107 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3108 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3109 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3110 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3111 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3113 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3114 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3115 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3116 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3117 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3118 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3119 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3120 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3122 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3124 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3128 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3129 commitment_stats.tx,
3131 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3132 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3133 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3136 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3137 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3138 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3139 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3141 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3142 let mut need_commitment = false;
3143 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3144 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3145 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3146 need_commitment = true;
3150 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3151 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3152 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3153 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3154 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3155 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3159 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3160 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3161 Some(forward_info.clone())
3163 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3164 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3165 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3166 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3167 need_commitment = true;
3170 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3171 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3172 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3173 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3174 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3175 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3176 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3177 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3178 need_commitment = true;
3182 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3183 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3184 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3185 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3187 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3188 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3189 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3190 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3191 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3192 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3193 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3194 // includes the right HTLCs.
3195 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3196 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3197 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3198 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3199 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3200 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3202 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3203 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3204 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3207 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3208 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3209 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3210 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3211 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3212 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3213 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3214 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3215 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3219 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3220 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3222 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3223 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3224 per_commitment_secret,
3225 next_per_commitment_point,
3226 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3229 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3230 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3231 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3232 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3233 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3234 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3235 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3236 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3239 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3240 /// for our counterparty.
3241 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3242 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3243 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3244 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3245 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3247 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3248 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3249 updates: Vec::new(),
3252 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3253 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3254 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3255 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3256 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3257 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3258 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3259 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3260 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3261 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3262 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3263 // to rebalance channels.
3264 match &htlc_update {
3265 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3266 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3267 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3270 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3271 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3272 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3273 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3274 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3275 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3276 // into the holding cell without ever being
3277 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3278 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3279 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3282 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3288 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3289 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3290 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3291 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3292 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3293 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3294 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3295 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3296 (msg, monitor_update)
3297 } else { unreachable!() };
3298 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3299 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3301 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3302 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3303 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3304 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3305 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3306 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3307 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3308 // for a full revocation before failing.
3309 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3312 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3314 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3321 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3322 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3324 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3325 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3330 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3331 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3332 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3333 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3334 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3336 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3337 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3338 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3340 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3342 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3344 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3347 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3349 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3353 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3354 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3355 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3356 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3357 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3358 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3359 where L::Target: Logger,
3361 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3364 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3367 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3371 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3373 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3374 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3379 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3380 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3381 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3382 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3383 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3384 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3385 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3386 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3392 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3393 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3396 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3397 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3399 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3401 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3402 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3403 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3404 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3405 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3406 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3407 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3408 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3412 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3413 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3414 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3415 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3416 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3417 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3418 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3419 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3421 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3422 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3425 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3426 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3427 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3428 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3429 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3430 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3431 let mut require_commitment = false;
3432 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3435 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3436 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3437 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3439 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3440 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3441 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3442 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3443 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3444 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3449 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3450 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3451 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3452 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3453 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3455 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3456 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3457 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3462 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3463 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3465 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3469 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3470 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3472 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3473 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3474 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3475 require_commitment = true;
3476 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3477 match forward_info {
3478 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3479 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3480 require_commitment = true;
3482 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3483 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3484 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3486 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3487 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3488 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3492 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3493 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3494 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3495 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3501 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3502 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3503 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3504 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3506 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3507 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3508 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3509 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3510 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3511 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3512 require_commitment = true;
3516 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3518 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3519 match update_state {
3520 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3521 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3522 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3523 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3524 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3526 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3527 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3528 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3529 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3530 require_commitment = true;
3531 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3532 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3537 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3538 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3539 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3540 if require_commitment {
3541 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3542 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3543 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3544 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3545 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3546 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3547 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3548 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3549 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3551 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3552 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3553 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3554 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3555 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3556 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3557 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3559 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3563 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3564 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3565 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3566 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3567 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3569 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3570 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3571 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3574 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3575 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3576 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3577 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3580 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3581 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3582 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3583 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3585 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3588 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3589 if require_commitment {
3590 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3592 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3593 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3594 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3595 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3597 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3598 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3600 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3601 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3602 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3604 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3608 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3609 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3610 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3613 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3615 commitment_update: None,
3616 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3617 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3618 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3625 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3626 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3627 /// commitment update.
3628 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3629 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3630 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3633 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3634 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3635 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3636 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3638 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3639 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3640 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3641 if !self.is_outbound() {
3642 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3644 if !self.is_usable() {
3645 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3647 if !self.is_live() {
3648 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3651 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3652 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3653 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3654 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3655 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3656 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3657 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3658 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3659 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3660 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3664 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3665 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3666 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3667 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3668 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3671 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3672 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3676 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3677 force_holding_cell = true;
3680 if force_holding_cell {
3681 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3685 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3686 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3688 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3689 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3694 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3695 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3697 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3699 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3700 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3701 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3702 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3706 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3707 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3708 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3712 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3713 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3716 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3717 // will be retransmitted.
3718 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3719 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3720 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3722 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3723 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3725 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3726 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3727 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3728 // this HTLC accordingly
3729 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3732 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3733 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3734 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3735 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3738 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3739 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3740 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3741 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3742 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3743 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3748 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3750 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3751 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3752 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3753 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3757 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3758 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3759 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3760 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3761 // the update upon reconnection.
3762 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3766 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3767 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3770 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3771 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3772 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3773 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3774 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3775 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3777 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3778 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3779 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3780 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3781 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3782 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3784 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3785 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3786 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3787 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3788 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3789 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3790 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3793 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3794 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3795 /// to the remote side.
3796 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3797 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3798 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3799 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3802 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3804 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3805 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3807 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3808 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3809 // first received the funding_signed.
3810 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3811 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3812 self.funding_transaction.take()
3814 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3815 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3816 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3817 funding_broadcastable = None;
3820 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3821 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3822 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3823 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3824 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3825 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3826 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3827 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3828 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3829 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3830 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3831 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3832 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3833 next_per_commitment_point,
3834 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3838 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3840 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3841 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3842 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3843 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3844 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3845 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3847 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3848 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3849 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3850 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3851 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3852 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3856 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3857 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3859 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3860 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3863 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3864 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3865 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3866 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3867 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3868 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3869 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3870 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3871 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3875 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3876 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3878 if self.is_outbound() {
3879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3881 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3884 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3885 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3887 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3888 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3889 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3890 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3891 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3892 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3893 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3894 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3895 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3896 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3897 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3898 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3899 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3901 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3902 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3903 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3909 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3910 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3911 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3912 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3913 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3914 per_commitment_secret,
3915 next_per_commitment_point,
3919 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3920 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3921 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3922 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3923 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3925 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3926 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3927 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3928 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3929 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3930 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3931 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3932 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3933 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3938 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3939 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3941 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3942 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3943 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3944 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3945 reason: err_packet.clone()
3948 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3949 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3950 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3951 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3952 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3953 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3956 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3957 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3958 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3959 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3960 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3967 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3968 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3969 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3970 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3974 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3975 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3976 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3977 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3978 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3979 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3983 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3984 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3986 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3987 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3988 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3989 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3990 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3991 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3992 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3993 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3996 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3998 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3999 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4000 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4001 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4005 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4006 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4010 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4011 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4012 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4013 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4014 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4015 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4016 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4019 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4020 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4021 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4022 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4023 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4026 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4027 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4028 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4029 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4030 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4031 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4032 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4033 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4036 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4040 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4041 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4042 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4043 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4045 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4049 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4050 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4051 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4053 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4054 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4055 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4056 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4057 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4061 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4063 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4064 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4065 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4066 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4067 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4070 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4071 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4072 channel_ready: None,
4073 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4074 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4075 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4079 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4080 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4081 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4082 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4083 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4084 next_per_commitment_point,
4085 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4087 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4088 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4089 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4093 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4094 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4095 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4097 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4098 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4099 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4102 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4105 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4108 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4109 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4110 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4111 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4112 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4114 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4115 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4116 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4117 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4118 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4119 next_per_commitment_point,
4120 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4124 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4125 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4126 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4128 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4131 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4132 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4133 raa: required_revoke,
4134 commitment_update: None,
4135 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4137 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4138 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4139 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4141 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4144 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4145 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4146 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4147 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4148 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4149 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4152 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4153 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4154 raa: required_revoke,
4155 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4156 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4160 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4164 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4165 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4166 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4167 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4169 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4171 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4173 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4174 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4175 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4176 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4177 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4178 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4180 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4181 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4182 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4183 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4184 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4186 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4187 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4188 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4189 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4192 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4193 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4194 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4195 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4196 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4197 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4198 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4199 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4200 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4201 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4202 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4203 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4204 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4205 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4206 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4208 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4211 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4212 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4215 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4216 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4217 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4218 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4219 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4220 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4221 self.channel_state &
4222 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4223 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4224 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4225 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4228 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4229 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4230 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4231 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4232 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4233 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4236 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4242 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4243 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4244 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4245 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4247 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4248 return Ok((None, None));
4251 if !self.is_outbound() {
4252 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4253 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4255 return Ok((None, None));
4258 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4260 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4261 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4262 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4263 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4265 let sig = self.holder_signer
4266 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4267 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4269 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4270 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4271 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4272 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4274 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4275 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4276 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4281 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4282 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4283 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4284 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4286 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4289 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4290 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4291 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4292 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4295 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4296 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4300 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4302 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4306 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4307 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4311 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4314 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4315 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4316 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4317 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4319 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4322 assert!(send_shutdown);
4323 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4324 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4327 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4332 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4334 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4335 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4337 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4338 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4339 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4340 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4341 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4342 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4346 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4347 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4348 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4349 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4353 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4354 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4355 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4356 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4357 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4358 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4360 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4361 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4368 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4369 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4371 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4374 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4375 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4377 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4379 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4380 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4381 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4382 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4383 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4384 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4385 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4386 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4387 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4389 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4390 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4393 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4397 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4398 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4399 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4400 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4402 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4403 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4405 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4408 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4411 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4415 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4419 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4420 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4421 return Ok((None, None));
4424 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4425 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4426 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4429 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4431 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4434 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4435 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4436 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4437 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4438 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4442 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4443 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4448 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4449 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4450 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4451 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4452 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4453 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4454 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4458 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4460 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4461 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4462 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4463 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4465 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4468 let sig = self.holder_signer
4469 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4470 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4472 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4475 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4479 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4480 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4481 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4482 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4484 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4485 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4486 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4492 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4493 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4496 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4497 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4499 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4503 if !self.is_outbound() {
4504 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4505 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4506 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4507 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4509 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4511 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4513 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4514 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4517 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4518 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4519 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4520 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4521 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4522 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4523 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4524 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4529 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4530 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4531 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4532 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4538 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4539 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4540 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4541 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4543 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4549 // Public utilities:
4551 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4555 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4559 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4560 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4561 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4565 /// Gets the channel's type
4566 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4570 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4571 /// is_usable() returns true).
4572 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4573 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4574 self.short_channel_id
4577 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4578 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4579 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4582 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4583 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4584 self.outbound_scid_alias
4586 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4587 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4588 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4589 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4590 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4593 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4594 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4595 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4596 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4599 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4600 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4601 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4604 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4605 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4606 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4607 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4611 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4614 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4615 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4618 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4619 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4622 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4623 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4624 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4627 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4628 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4631 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4632 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4633 self.counterparty_node_id
4636 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4637 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4638 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4641 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4642 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4643 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4646 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4647 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4649 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4650 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4651 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4652 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4654 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4658 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4659 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4660 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4663 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4664 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4665 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4668 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4669 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4670 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4672 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4673 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4678 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4679 self.channel_value_satoshis
4682 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4683 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4686 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4687 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4690 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4691 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4694 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4695 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4696 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4699 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4700 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4701 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4704 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4705 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4706 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4709 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4710 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4711 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4712 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4713 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4716 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4718 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4719 self.prev_config = None;
4723 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4724 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4728 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4729 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4730 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4731 let did_channel_update =
4732 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4733 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4734 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4735 if did_channel_update {
4736 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4737 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4738 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4739 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4741 self.config.options = *config;
4745 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4746 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4747 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4748 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4749 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4750 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4751 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4753 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4754 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4757 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4759 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4760 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4766 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4767 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4768 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4769 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4770 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4771 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4772 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4774 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4775 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4782 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4786 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4787 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4788 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4789 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4790 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4791 // which are near the dust limit.
4792 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4793 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4794 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4795 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4796 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4798 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4799 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4801 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4804 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4805 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4808 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4809 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4812 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4813 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4817 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4822 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4824 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4825 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4826 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4827 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4828 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4829 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4831 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4833 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4841 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4842 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4846 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4847 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4848 self.update_time_counter
4851 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4852 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4855 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4856 self.config.announced_channel
4859 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4860 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4863 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4864 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4865 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4866 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4869 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4870 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4871 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4874 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4875 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4876 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4877 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4878 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4881 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4882 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4883 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4884 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4885 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4888 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4890 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4891 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4894 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4895 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4896 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4899 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4900 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4901 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4903 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4904 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4905 if self.channel_state &
4906 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4907 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4908 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4909 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4910 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4913 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4914 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4915 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4916 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4917 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4918 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4920 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4921 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4922 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4924 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4925 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4926 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4927 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4928 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4929 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4935 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4936 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4937 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4940 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4941 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4942 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4945 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4946 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4947 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4950 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4951 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4952 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4953 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4954 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4955 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4960 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4961 self.channel_update_status
4964 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4965 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4966 self.channel_update_status = status;
4969 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4971 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4972 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4973 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4977 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4978 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4979 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4982 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4986 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4987 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4988 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4990 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4991 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4992 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4994 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4995 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4998 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4999 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5000 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5001 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5002 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5003 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5004 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5005 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5006 self.channel_state);
5008 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5012 if need_commitment_update {
5013 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5014 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5015 let next_per_commitment_point =
5016 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5017 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5018 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5019 next_per_commitment_point,
5020 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5024 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5030 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5031 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5032 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5033 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5034 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5035 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5036 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5038 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5041 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5042 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5043 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5044 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5045 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5046 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5047 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5048 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5049 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5050 if self.is_outbound() {
5051 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5052 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5053 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5054 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5055 // channel and move on.
5056 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5057 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5059 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5060 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5061 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5063 if self.is_outbound() {
5064 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5065 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5066 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5067 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5068 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5069 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5073 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5074 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5075 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5076 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5077 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5081 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5082 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5083 // may have already happened for this block).
5084 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5085 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5086 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5087 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5090 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5091 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5092 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5093 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5101 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5102 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5103 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5104 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5106 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5107 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5110 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5112 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5113 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5114 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5115 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5117 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5120 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5123 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5124 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5125 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5126 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5128 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5131 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5132 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5133 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5135 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5136 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5139 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5140 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5148 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5150 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5151 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5152 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5154 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5155 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5158 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5159 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5160 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5161 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5162 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5163 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5164 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5165 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5166 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5169 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5170 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5171 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5172 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5174 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5175 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5176 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5178 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5179 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5180 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5181 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5183 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5184 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5185 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5186 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5187 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5188 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5189 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5192 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5193 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5195 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5198 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5199 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5200 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5201 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5202 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5203 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5204 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5205 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5206 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5207 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5208 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5209 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5210 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5211 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5212 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5213 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5214 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5220 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5225 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5226 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5228 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5229 if !self.is_outbound() {
5230 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5232 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5233 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5236 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5237 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5240 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5241 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5245 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5246 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5247 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5248 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5249 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5250 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5251 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5252 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5253 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5254 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5255 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5256 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5257 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5258 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5259 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5260 first_per_commitment_point,
5261 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5262 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5263 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5264 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5266 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5270 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5271 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5274 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5275 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5276 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5277 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5280 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5281 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5283 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5284 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5285 if self.is_outbound() {
5286 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5288 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5289 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5291 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5292 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5294 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5295 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5298 self.user_id = user_id;
5299 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5301 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5304 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5305 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5306 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5308 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5309 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5310 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5311 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5313 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5314 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5315 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5316 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5317 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5318 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5319 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5320 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5321 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5322 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5323 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5324 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5325 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5326 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5327 first_per_commitment_point,
5328 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5329 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5330 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5332 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5336 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5337 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5339 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5341 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5342 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5345 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5346 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5347 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5348 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5349 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5350 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5353 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5354 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5355 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5356 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5357 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5358 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5359 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5360 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5361 if !self.is_outbound() {
5362 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5364 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5365 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5367 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5368 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5369 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5370 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5373 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5374 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5376 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5379 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5380 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5385 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5387 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5389 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5390 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5391 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5393 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5394 temporary_channel_id,
5395 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5396 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5401 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5402 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5403 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5404 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5406 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5409 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5410 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5411 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5412 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5413 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5414 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5416 if !self.is_usable() {
5417 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5420 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5421 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5422 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5423 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5425 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5426 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5428 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5429 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5430 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5431 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5432 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5433 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5439 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5440 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5441 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5442 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5444 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5447 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5451 if !self.is_usable() {
5455 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5456 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5460 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5464 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5465 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5468 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5472 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5474 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5479 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5481 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5486 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5488 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5489 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5490 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5491 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5492 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5496 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5498 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5499 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5500 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5501 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5502 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5503 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5504 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5506 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5507 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5508 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5509 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5510 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5511 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5512 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5513 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5514 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5515 contents: announcement,
5518 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5522 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5523 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5524 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5525 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5526 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5527 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5528 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5529 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5531 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5533 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5535 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5536 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5538 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5540 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5541 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5544 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5545 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5546 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5547 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5550 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5553 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5554 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5555 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5556 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5557 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5558 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5561 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5563 Err(_) => return None,
5565 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5566 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5571 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5572 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5573 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5574 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5575 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5576 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5577 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5578 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5579 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5580 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5581 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5582 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5583 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5584 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5585 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5586 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5587 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5588 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5589 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5592 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5593 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5594 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5595 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5598 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5599 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5600 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5601 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5602 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5603 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5604 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5605 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5607 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5608 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5609 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5610 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5611 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5612 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5613 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5614 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5615 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5617 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5623 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5625 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5626 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5627 /// commitment update.
5629 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5630 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5631 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5632 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5634 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5635 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5637 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5638 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5643 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5644 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5646 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5648 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5649 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5651 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5652 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5653 /// regenerate them.
5655 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5656 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5658 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5659 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5660 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5661 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5662 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5663 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5665 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5666 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5667 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5670 if amount_msat == 0 {
5671 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5674 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5675 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5678 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5679 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5680 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5681 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5682 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5683 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5684 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5685 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5688 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5689 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5690 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5691 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5693 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5694 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5695 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5698 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5699 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5700 if !self.is_outbound() {
5701 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5702 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5703 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5704 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5705 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5706 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5710 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5713 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5714 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5715 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5717 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5718 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5719 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5720 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5721 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5722 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5726 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5727 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5728 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5729 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5730 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5731 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5735 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5736 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5737 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5740 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5741 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5742 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5743 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5745 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5746 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5749 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5750 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5751 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5752 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5753 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5756 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5757 force_holding_cell = true;
5760 // Now update local state:
5761 if force_holding_cell {
5762 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5767 onion_routing_packet,
5772 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5773 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5775 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5777 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5781 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5782 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5783 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5787 onion_routing_packet,
5789 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5794 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5795 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5796 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5797 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5798 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5800 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5801 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5802 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5804 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5805 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5809 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5810 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5811 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5812 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5813 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5814 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5815 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5818 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5819 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5820 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5821 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5822 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5823 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5826 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5828 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5829 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5830 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5831 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5832 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5833 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5835 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5838 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5839 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5842 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5843 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5844 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5845 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5846 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5847 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5848 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5849 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5852 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5853 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5856 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5857 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5858 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5859 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5860 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5861 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5862 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5864 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5866 if !self.is_outbound() {
5867 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5868 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5869 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5870 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5871 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5872 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5873 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5874 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5875 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5876 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5883 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5884 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5888 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5889 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5891 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5893 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5894 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5895 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5896 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5898 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5899 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5900 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5901 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5902 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5903 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5907 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5908 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5911 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5914 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5915 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5917 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5918 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5919 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5920 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5921 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5922 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5923 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5929 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5930 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5931 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5934 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5935 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5938 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5939 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5940 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5941 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5947 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5948 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5949 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5950 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5951 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5952 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5953 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5957 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5958 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5959 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5961 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5962 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5965 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5966 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5967 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5970 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5973 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5974 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5975 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5977 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5982 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5983 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5984 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5985 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5987 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5989 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5991 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5992 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5993 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5994 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5995 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5996 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6000 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6001 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6002 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6005 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6006 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6007 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6008 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6009 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6011 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6012 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6019 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6022 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6023 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6024 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6025 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6026 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6027 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6028 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6029 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6030 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6031 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6032 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6034 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6035 // return them to fail the payment.
6036 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6037 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6038 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6040 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6041 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6046 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6047 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6048 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6049 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6050 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6051 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6052 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6053 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6054 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6055 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6056 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6057 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6058 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6063 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6064 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6065 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6068 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6069 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6070 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6072 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6073 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6077 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6081 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6082 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6084 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6090 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6091 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6092 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6093 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6094 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6096 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6097 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6098 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6099 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6105 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6106 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6107 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6108 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6109 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6110 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6115 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6116 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6117 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6118 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6120 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6121 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6122 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6123 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6128 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6129 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6130 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6131 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6132 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6133 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6138 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6139 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6140 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6143 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6145 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6146 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6147 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6148 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6149 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6151 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6152 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6153 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6154 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6156 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6157 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6158 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6160 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6162 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6163 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6164 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6165 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6166 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6167 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6169 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6170 // deserialized from that format.
6171 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6172 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6173 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6175 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6177 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6178 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6179 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6181 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6182 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6183 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6184 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6187 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6188 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6189 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6192 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6193 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6194 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6195 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6197 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6198 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6200 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6202 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6204 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6206 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6209 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6211 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6216 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6218 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6219 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6220 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6221 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6222 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6223 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6224 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6226 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6228 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6230 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6233 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6234 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6235 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6238 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6240 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6241 preimages.push(preimage);
6243 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6244 reason.write(writer)?;
6246 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6248 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6249 preimages.push(preimage);
6251 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6252 reason.write(writer)?;
6257 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6258 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6260 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6262 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6263 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6264 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6265 source.write(writer)?;
6266 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6268 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6270 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6271 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6273 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6275 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6276 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6281 match self.resend_order {
6282 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6283 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6286 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6287 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6288 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6290 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6291 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6292 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6293 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6296 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6297 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6298 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6299 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6300 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6303 if self.is_outbound() {
6304 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6305 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6306 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6308 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6309 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6310 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6312 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6314 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6315 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6316 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6317 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6319 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6320 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6321 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6322 // consider the stale state on reload.
6325 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6326 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6327 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6329 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6330 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6331 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6333 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6334 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6336 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6337 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6338 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6340 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6341 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6343 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6346 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6347 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6348 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6350 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6353 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6354 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6356 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6357 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6358 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6360 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6362 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6364 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6366 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6367 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6368 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6369 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6370 htlc.write(writer)?;
6373 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6374 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6375 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6377 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6378 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6380 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6381 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6382 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6383 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6384 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6385 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6386 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6388 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6389 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6390 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6391 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6392 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6394 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6396 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6397 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6398 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6399 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6401 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6402 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6403 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6404 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6405 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6406 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6407 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6409 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6410 (2, chan_type, option),
6411 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6412 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6413 (5, self.config, required),
6414 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6415 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6416 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6417 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6418 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6419 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6420 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6421 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6422 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6423 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6424 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6425 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6432 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6433 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6435 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6436 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6438 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6439 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6440 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6442 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6443 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6444 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6445 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6449 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6450 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6452 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6455 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6456 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6463 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6465 let mut keys_data = None;
6467 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6468 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6469 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6471 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6472 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6473 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6474 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6475 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6476 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6480 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6481 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6482 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6485 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6493 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6494 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6495 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6496 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6497 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6498 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6499 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6500 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6501 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6502 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6503 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6504 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6509 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6510 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6511 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6512 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6513 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6514 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6515 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6516 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6517 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6518 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6519 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6520 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6522 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6526 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6527 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6530 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6531 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6533 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6538 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6539 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6540 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6541 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6542 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6543 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6544 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6545 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6546 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6547 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6549 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6550 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6551 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6553 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6554 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6555 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6557 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6561 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6562 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6563 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6564 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6567 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6569 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6571 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6572 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6573 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6574 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6577 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6578 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6579 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6580 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6583 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6585 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6588 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6589 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6590 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6592 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6593 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6594 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6595 // consider the stale state on reload.
6596 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6599 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6600 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6601 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6603 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6606 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6607 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6611 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6612 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6613 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6615 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6616 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6618 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6619 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6627 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6628 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6630 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6631 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6634 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6636 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6637 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6638 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6639 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6641 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6644 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6652 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6655 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6657 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6658 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6659 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6661 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6662 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6663 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6667 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6668 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6669 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6671 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6677 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6678 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6679 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6680 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6681 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6682 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6683 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6684 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6685 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6686 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6688 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6689 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6690 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6691 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6692 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6693 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6695 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6696 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6698 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6699 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6700 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6701 (2, channel_type, option),
6702 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6703 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6704 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6705 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6706 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6707 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6708 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6709 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6710 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6711 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6712 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6713 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6714 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6715 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6716 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6719 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6720 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6721 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6722 // required channel parameters.
6723 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6724 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6725 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6727 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6729 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6730 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6731 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6732 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6735 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6736 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6737 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6739 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6740 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6742 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6743 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6748 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6749 if iter.next().is_some() {
6750 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6754 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6755 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6756 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6757 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6758 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6761 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6762 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6764 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6765 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6766 // separate u64 values.
6767 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6772 config: config.unwrap(),
6776 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6777 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6778 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6782 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6784 channel_value_satoshis,
6786 latest_monitor_update_id,
6789 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6792 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6793 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6796 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6797 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6798 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6802 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6803 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6804 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6805 monitor_pending_forwards,
6806 monitor_pending_failures,
6807 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6810 holding_cell_update_fee,
6811 next_holder_htlc_id,
6812 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6813 update_time_counter,
6816 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6817 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6818 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6819 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6821 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6822 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6823 closing_fee_limits: None,
6824 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6826 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6828 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6829 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6831 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6833 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6834 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6835 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6836 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6837 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6838 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6839 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6840 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6841 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6844 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6846 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6847 funding_transaction,
6849 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6850 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6851 counterparty_node_id,
6853 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6857 channel_update_status,
6858 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6862 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6863 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6864 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6865 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6867 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6869 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6870 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6871 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6873 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6875 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6876 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6878 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6887 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6888 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6889 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6890 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6891 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6893 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6894 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6896 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6897 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6898 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6899 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6900 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6901 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6902 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6903 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6904 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6905 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6906 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6907 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6908 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6909 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6910 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6911 use crate::util::test_utils;
6912 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6913 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6914 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6915 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6916 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6917 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6918 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6919 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6920 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6921 use crate::prelude::*;
6923 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6926 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6927 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6933 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6934 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6935 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6936 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6940 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6941 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6942 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6943 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6944 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6945 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6946 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6950 signer: InMemorySigner,
6953 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6954 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6957 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6958 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6960 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6961 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6964 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6968 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6970 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6971 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6972 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6973 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6974 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6977 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6978 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6979 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6980 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6984 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6985 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6986 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6990 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6991 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6992 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6993 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6995 let seed = [42; 32];
6996 let network = Network::Testnet;
6997 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6998 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6999 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7002 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7003 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7004 let config = UserConfig::default();
7005 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7006 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7007 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7009 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7010 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7014 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7015 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7017 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7018 let original_fee = 253;
7019 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7020 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7021 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7022 let seed = [42; 32];
7023 let network = Network::Testnet;
7024 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7026 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7027 let config = UserConfig::default();
7028 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7030 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7031 // same as the old fee.
7032 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7033 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7034 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7038 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7039 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7040 // dust limits are used.
7041 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7042 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7043 let seed = [42; 32];
7044 let network = Network::Testnet;
7045 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7046 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7048 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7049 // they have different dust limits.
7051 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7052 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7053 let config = UserConfig::default();
7054 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7056 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7057 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7058 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7059 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7060 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7062 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7063 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7064 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7065 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7066 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7068 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7069 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7070 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7072 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7073 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7074 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7075 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7078 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7080 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7081 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7082 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7083 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7084 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7086 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7087 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7088 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7089 payment_secret: None,
7090 payment_params: None,
7094 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7095 // the dust limit check.
7096 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7097 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7098 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7099 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7101 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7102 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7103 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7104 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7105 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7106 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7107 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7111 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7112 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7113 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7114 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7115 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7116 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7117 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7118 let seed = [42; 32];
7119 let network = Network::Testnet;
7120 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7122 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7123 let config = UserConfig::default();
7124 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7126 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7127 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7129 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7130 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7131 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7132 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7133 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7134 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7136 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7137 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7138 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7139 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7140 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7142 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7144 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7145 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7146 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7147 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7148 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7150 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7151 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7152 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7153 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7154 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7158 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7159 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7160 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7161 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7162 let seed = [42; 32];
7163 let network = Network::Testnet;
7164 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7165 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7166 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7168 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7170 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7171 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7172 let config = UserConfig::default();
7173 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7175 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7176 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7177 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7178 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7180 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7181 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7182 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7184 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7185 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7186 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7187 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7189 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7190 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7191 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7193 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7194 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7196 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7197 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7198 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7199 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7200 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7201 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7202 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7203 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7204 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7209 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7211 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7212 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7213 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7214 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7215 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7216 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7217 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7224 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7225 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7226 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7227 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7228 let seed = [42; 32];
7229 let network = Network::Testnet;
7230 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7231 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7232 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7234 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7235 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7236 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7237 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7238 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7239 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7240 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7241 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7243 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7244 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7245 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7246 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7247 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7248 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7250 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7251 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7252 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7253 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7255 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7257 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7258 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7259 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7260 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7261 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7262 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7264 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7265 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7266 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7267 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7269 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7270 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7271 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7272 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7273 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7275 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7276 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7278 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7279 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7280 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7282 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7283 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7284 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7285 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7286 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7288 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7289 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7291 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7292 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7293 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7297 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7299 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7300 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7301 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7303 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7304 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7305 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7306 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7308 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7309 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7310 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7312 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7314 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7315 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7318 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7319 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7320 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7321 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7322 let seed = [42; 32];
7323 let network = Network::Testnet;
7324 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7325 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7326 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7329 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7330 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7331 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7333 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7334 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7336 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7337 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7338 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7340 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7341 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7343 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7345 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7346 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7348 // Channel Negotiations failed
7349 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7350 assert!(result.is_err());
7355 fn channel_update() {
7356 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7357 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7358 let seed = [42; 32];
7359 let network = Network::Testnet;
7360 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7361 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7363 // Create a channel.
7364 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7365 let config = UserConfig::default();
7366 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7367 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7368 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7369 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7371 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7372 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7373 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7375 short_channel_id: 0,
7378 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7379 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7380 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7382 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7383 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7385 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7387 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7389 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7390 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7391 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7392 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7394 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7395 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7396 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7398 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7402 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7404 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7405 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7406 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7407 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7408 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7409 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7410 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7411 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7412 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7413 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7414 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7415 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7416 use crate::sync::Arc;
7418 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7419 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7420 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7421 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7423 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7425 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7426 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7427 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7428 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7429 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7431 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7432 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7437 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7438 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7439 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7441 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7442 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7443 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7444 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7445 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7446 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7448 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7450 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7451 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7452 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7453 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7454 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7455 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7457 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7458 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7459 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7460 selected_contest_delay: 144
7462 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7463 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7465 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7466 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7468 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7469 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7471 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7472 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7474 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7475 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7476 // build_commitment_transaction.
7477 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7478 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7479 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7480 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7481 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7483 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7484 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7485 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7486 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7490 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7491 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7492 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7493 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7497 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7498 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7499 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7501 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7502 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7504 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7505 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7507 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7509 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7510 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7511 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7512 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7513 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7514 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7515 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7517 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7518 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7519 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7520 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7522 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7523 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7524 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7526 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7528 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7529 commitment_tx.clone(),
7530 counterparty_signature,
7531 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7532 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7533 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7535 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7536 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7538 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7539 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7540 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7542 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7543 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7546 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7547 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7549 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7550 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7551 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7552 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7553 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7554 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7555 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7556 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7558 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7561 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7562 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7563 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7567 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7570 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7571 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7572 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7574 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7575 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7576 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7577 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7578 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7579 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7580 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7581 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7583 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7587 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7588 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7590 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7591 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7592 "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", {});
7594 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7595 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7596 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7597 "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", {});
7599 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7600 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7602 amount_msat: 1000000,
7604 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7605 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7607 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7610 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7611 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7613 amount_msat: 2000000,
7615 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7616 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7618 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7621 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7622 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7624 amount_msat: 2000000,
7626 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7627 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7628 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7630 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7633 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7634 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7636 amount_msat: 3000000,
7638 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7639 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7640 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7642 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7645 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7646 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7648 amount_msat: 4000000,
7650 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7651 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7653 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7657 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7658 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7659 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7661 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7662 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7663 "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", {
7666 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7667 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7668 "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" },
7671 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7672 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7673 "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" },
7676 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7677 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7678 "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" },
7681 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7682 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7683 "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" },
7686 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7687 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7688 "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" }
7691 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7692 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7693 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7695 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7696 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7697 "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", {
7700 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7701 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7702 "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" },
7705 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7706 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7707 "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" },
7710 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7711 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7712 "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" },
7715 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7716 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7717 "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" },
7720 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7721 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7722 "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" }
7725 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7726 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7727 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7729 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7730 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7731 "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", {
7734 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7735 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7736 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7739 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7740 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7741 "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" },
7744 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7745 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7746 "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" },
7749 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7750 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7751 "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" }
7754 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7755 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7756 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7757 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7759 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7760 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7761 "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", {
7764 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7765 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7766 "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" },
7769 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7770 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7771 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7774 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7775 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7776 "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" },
7779 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7780 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7781 "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" }
7784 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7785 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7786 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7787 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7789 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7790 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7791 "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", {
7794 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7795 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7796 "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" },
7799 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7800 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7801 "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" },
7804 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7805 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7806 "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" },
7809 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7810 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7811 "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" }
7814 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7815 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7816 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7818 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7819 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7820 "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", {
7823 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7824 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7825 "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" },
7828 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7829 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7830 "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" },
7833 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7834 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7835 "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" }
7838 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7839 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7840 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7842 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7843 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7844 "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", {
7847 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7848 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7849 "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" },
7852 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7853 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7854 "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" },
7857 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7858 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7859 "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" }
7862 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7863 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7864 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7866 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7867 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7868 "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", {
7871 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7872 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7873 "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" },
7876 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7877 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7878 "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" }
7881 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7882 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7883 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7884 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7886 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7887 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7888 "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", {
7891 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7892 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7893 "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" },
7896 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7897 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7898 "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" }
7901 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7902 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7903 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7904 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7906 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7907 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7908 "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", {
7911 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7912 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7913 "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" },
7916 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7917 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7918 "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" }
7921 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7922 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7923 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7925 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7926 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7927 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7930 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7931 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7932 "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" }
7935 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7936 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7937 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7938 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7940 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7941 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7942 "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", {
7945 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7946 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7947 "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" }
7950 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7951 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7952 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7953 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7955 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7956 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7957 "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", {
7960 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7961 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7962 "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" }
7965 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7966 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7967 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7968 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7970 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7971 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7972 "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", {});
7974 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7975 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7976 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7977 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7979 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7980 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7981 "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", {});
7983 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7984 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7985 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7986 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7988 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7989 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7990 "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", {});
7992 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7993 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7994 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7996 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7997 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7998 "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", {});
8000 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8001 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8002 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8003 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8005 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8006 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8007 "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", {});
8009 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8010 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8011 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8012 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8014 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8015 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8016 "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", {});
8018 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8019 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8020 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8021 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8022 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8023 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8025 amount_msat: 2000000,
8027 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8028 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8030 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8033 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8034 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8035 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8037 amount_msat: 5000000,
8039 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8040 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8041 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8043 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8046 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8047 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8049 amount_msat: 5000000,
8051 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8052 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8053 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8055 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8059 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8060 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8061 "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", {
8064 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8065 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8066 "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" },
8068 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8069 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8070 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8072 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8073 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8074 "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" }
8077 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8078 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8079 "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", {
8082 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8083 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8084 "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" },
8086 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8087 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8088 "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" },
8090 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8091 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8092 "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" }
8097 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8098 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8100 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8101 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8102 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8103 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8105 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8106 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8107 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8109 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8110 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8112 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8113 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8115 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8116 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8117 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8121 fn test_key_derivation() {
8122 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8123 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8125 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8126 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8128 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8129 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8131 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8132 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8134 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8135 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8137 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8138 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8140 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8141 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8143 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8144 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8148 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8149 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8150 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8151 let seed = [42; 32];
8152 let network = Network::Testnet;
8153 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8154 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8156 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8157 let config = UserConfig::default();
8158 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8159 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8161 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8162 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8164 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8165 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8166 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8167 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8168 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8169 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8170 assert!(res.is_ok());
8175 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8176 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8177 // resulting `channel_type`.
8178 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8179 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8180 let network = Network::Testnet;
8181 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8182 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8184 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8185 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8187 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8188 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8190 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8191 // need to signal it.
8192 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8193 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8194 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8197 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8199 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8200 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8201 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8203 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8204 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8205 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8208 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8209 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8210 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8211 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8212 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8215 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8216 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8221 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8222 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8223 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8224 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8225 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8226 let network = Network::Testnet;
8227 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8228 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8230 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8231 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8233 let config = UserConfig::default();
8235 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8236 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8237 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8238 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8239 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8241 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8242 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8243 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8246 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8247 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8248 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8250 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8251 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8252 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8253 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8254 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8255 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8257 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8262 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8263 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8265 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8266 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8267 let network = Network::Testnet;
8268 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8269 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8271 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8272 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8274 let config = UserConfig::default();
8276 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8277 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8278 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8279 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8280 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8281 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8282 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8283 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8285 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8286 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8287 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8288 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8289 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8290 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8293 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8294 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8296 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8297 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8298 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8299 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8301 assert!(res.is_err());
8303 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8304 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8305 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8307 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8308 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8309 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8312 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8314 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8315 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8316 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8317 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8320 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8321 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8323 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8324 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8326 assert!(res.is_err());