1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
598 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
600 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
601 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
605 (0, update, required),
608 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
609 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
610 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
611 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
612 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
614 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
615 /// in a timely manner.
616 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
619 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
620 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
621 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
623 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
624 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
625 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
626 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
630 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
631 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
632 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
634 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
635 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
636 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
637 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
639 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
643 /// The current channel ID.
644 channel_id: ChannelId,
645 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
646 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
647 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
650 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
651 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
653 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
654 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
655 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
657 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
658 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
659 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
660 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
662 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
663 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
665 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
667 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
668 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
669 destination_script: Script,
671 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
672 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
673 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
675 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
676 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
677 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
678 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
679 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
680 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
682 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
683 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
684 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
685 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
686 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
687 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
689 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
691 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
692 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
693 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
695 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
696 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
697 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
698 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
699 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
700 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
701 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
703 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
705 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
706 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
707 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
708 // HTLCs with similar state.
709 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
710 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
711 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
712 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
713 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
714 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
715 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
716 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
717 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
720 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
721 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
722 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
724 update_time_counter: u32,
726 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
727 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
728 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
729 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
730 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
731 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
733 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
734 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
736 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
737 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
738 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
739 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
741 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
742 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
744 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
746 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
748 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
749 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
750 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
751 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
752 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
753 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
754 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
755 channel_creation_height: u32,
757 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
760 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
762 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
765 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
767 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
770 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
772 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
774 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
775 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
778 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
780 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
782 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
783 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
785 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
787 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
788 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
789 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
791 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
793 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
794 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
796 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
797 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
798 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
800 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
802 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
804 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
805 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
806 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
807 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
809 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
810 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
811 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
813 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
814 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
815 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
817 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
818 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
819 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
820 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
821 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
822 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
823 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
824 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
826 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
827 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
828 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
829 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
830 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
832 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
833 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
835 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
836 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
837 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
838 /// unblock the state machine.
840 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
841 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
842 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
844 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
845 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
846 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
848 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
849 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
850 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
851 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
852 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
853 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
854 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
855 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
857 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
858 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
860 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
861 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
862 // the channel's funding UTXO.
864 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
865 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
866 // associated channel mapping.
868 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
869 // to store all of them.
870 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
872 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
873 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
874 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
875 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
876 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
878 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
879 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
881 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
882 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
884 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
885 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
886 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
888 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
889 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
890 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
893 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
894 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
895 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
896 self.update_time_counter
899 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
900 self.latest_monitor_update_id
903 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
904 self.config.announced_channel
907 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
908 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
911 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
912 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
913 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
914 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
917 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
918 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
919 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
922 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
923 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
924 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
925 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
926 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
929 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
930 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
931 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
932 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
934 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
935 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
937 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
938 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
940 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
941 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
943 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
946 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
947 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
948 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
949 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
951 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
952 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
953 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
954 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
957 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
958 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
959 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
960 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
961 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
966 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
970 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
972 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
973 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
974 self.temporary_channel_id
977 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
981 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
982 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
983 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
987 /// Gets the channel's type
988 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
992 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
994 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
995 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
996 self.short_channel_id
999 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1000 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1001 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1004 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1005 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1006 self.outbound_scid_alias
1009 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1010 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1011 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1012 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1013 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1014 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1017 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1018 /// get_funding_created.
1019 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1020 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1023 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1024 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1025 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1028 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1029 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1030 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1031 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1035 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1038 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1039 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1042 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1043 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1046 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1047 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1048 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1051 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1052 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1055 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1056 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1057 self.counterparty_node_id
1060 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1061 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1062 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1065 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1066 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1067 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1070 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1071 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1073 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1074 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1075 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1076 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1078 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1082 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1083 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1084 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1087 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1088 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1089 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1092 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1093 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1094 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1096 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1097 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1102 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1103 self.channel_value_satoshis
1106 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1107 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1110 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1111 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1114 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1115 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1116 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1118 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1119 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1120 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1121 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1122 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1124 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1128 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1129 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1130 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1133 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1134 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1135 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1138 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1139 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1140 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1143 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1144 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1145 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1148 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1149 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1150 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1153 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1154 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1155 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1158 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1159 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1160 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1161 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1162 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1165 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1167 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1168 self.prev_config = None;
1172 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1173 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1177 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1178 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1179 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1180 let did_channel_update =
1181 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1182 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1183 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1184 if did_channel_update {
1185 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1186 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1187 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1188 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1190 self.config.options = *config;
1194 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1195 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1196 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1199 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1200 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1201 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1202 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1203 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1205 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1206 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1207 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1208 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1209 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1210 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1211 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1213 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1214 where L::Target: Logger
1216 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1217 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1218 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1220 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1221 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1222 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1223 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1225 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1226 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1227 if match update_state {
1228 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1229 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1230 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1231 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1232 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1234 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1238 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1239 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1240 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1242 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1244 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1245 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1246 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1248 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1249 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1250 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1251 transaction_output_index: None
1256 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1257 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1258 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1259 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1260 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1263 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1265 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1266 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1267 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1269 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1270 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1273 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1274 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1277 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1279 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1280 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1281 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1283 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1284 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1290 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1291 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1292 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1293 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1294 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1295 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1296 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1300 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1301 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1303 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1305 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1306 if generated_by_local {
1307 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1308 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1317 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1319 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1320 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1321 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1322 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1323 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1325 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1328 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1329 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1330 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1331 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1335 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1336 preimages.push(preimage);
1340 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1341 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1343 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1345 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1346 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1348 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1349 if !generated_by_local {
1350 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1358 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1359 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1360 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1361 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1362 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1363 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1364 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1365 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1367 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1369 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1370 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1371 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1372 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1374 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1376 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1377 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1378 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1379 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1382 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1383 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1384 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1385 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1387 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1390 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1391 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1392 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1393 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1395 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1398 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1399 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1404 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1405 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1410 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1412 let channel_parameters =
1413 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1414 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1415 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1422 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1425 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1426 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1427 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1428 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1430 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1431 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1432 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1440 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1441 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1447 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1448 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1449 /// our counterparty!)
1450 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1451 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1452 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1453 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1454 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1455 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1456 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1458 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1462 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1463 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1464 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1465 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1466 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1467 //may see payments to it!
1468 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1469 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1470 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1472 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1475 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1476 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1477 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1478 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1479 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1482 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1483 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1486 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1490 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1491 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1492 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1493 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1494 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1495 // which are near the dust limit.
1496 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1497 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1498 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1499 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1500 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1502 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1503 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1505 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1508 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1509 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1510 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1513 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1514 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1516 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1517 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1518 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1519 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1520 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1521 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1522 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1525 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1528 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1529 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1530 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1532 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1533 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1534 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1535 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1536 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1537 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1540 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1546 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1547 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1549 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1550 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1551 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1552 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1553 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1554 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1555 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1558 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1561 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1562 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1563 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1565 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1566 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1567 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1568 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1569 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1570 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1572 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1573 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1577 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1578 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1579 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1580 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1581 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1582 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1583 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1585 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1586 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1588 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1595 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1596 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1597 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1598 /// corner case properly.
1599 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1600 -> AvailableBalances
1601 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1603 let context = &self;
1604 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1605 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1606 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1608 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1609 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1611 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1613 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1615 if context.is_outbound() {
1616 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1617 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1619 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1620 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1622 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1623 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1624 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1625 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1628 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1629 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1630 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1631 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1633 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1634 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1635 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1636 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1637 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1638 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1639 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1640 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1641 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1642 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1644 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1647 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1648 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1649 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1650 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1651 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1654 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1655 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1657 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1658 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1659 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1661 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1662 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1663 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1664 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1668 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1670 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1671 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1672 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1673 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1674 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1675 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1676 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1678 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1679 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1681 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1682 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1683 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1685 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1686 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1688 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1689 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1692 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1693 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1694 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1695 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1696 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1697 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1700 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1701 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1702 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1704 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1708 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1709 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1711 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1712 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1716 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1717 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1718 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1719 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1721 outbound_capacity_msat,
1722 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1723 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1727 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1728 let context = &self;
1729 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1732 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1733 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1735 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1736 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1738 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1739 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1741 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1742 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1743 let context = &self;
1744 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1746 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1749 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1750 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1752 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1753 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1755 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1756 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1758 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1759 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1763 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1764 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1770 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1771 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1772 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1775 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1776 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1777 included_htlcs += 1;
1780 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1781 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1785 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1786 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1787 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1788 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1789 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1790 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1795 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1797 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1798 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1803 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1804 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1808 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1809 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1810 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1813 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1814 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1816 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1817 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1818 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1820 total_pending_htlcs,
1821 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1822 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1825 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1826 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1827 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1829 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1831 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1836 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1837 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1839 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1840 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1842 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1843 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1845 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1846 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1847 let context = &self;
1848 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1850 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1853 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1854 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1856 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1857 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1859 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1860 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1862 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1863 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1867 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1868 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1874 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1875 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1876 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1877 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1878 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1879 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1882 included_htlcs += 1;
1885 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1886 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1889 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1890 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1892 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1893 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1894 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1899 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1900 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1904 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1905 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1907 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1908 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1910 total_pending_htlcs,
1911 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1912 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1913 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1915 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1916 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1917 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1919 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1921 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1926 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1927 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1929 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1935 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1936 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1937 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1938 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1939 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1940 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1941 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1942 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1943 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1944 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1945 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1947 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1948 // return them to fail the payment.
1949 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1950 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1951 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1953 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1954 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1959 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1960 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1961 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1962 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1963 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1964 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1965 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1966 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1967 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1968 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1969 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1970 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1971 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1976 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1977 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1978 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1982 // Internal utility functions for channels
1984 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1985 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1986 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1988 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1990 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1991 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1992 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1994 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1997 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1999 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2002 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2003 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2004 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2006 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2008 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2009 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2010 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2011 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2012 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2015 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2016 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2017 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2018 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2019 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2020 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2021 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2024 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2025 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2027 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2028 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2031 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2032 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2033 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2034 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2035 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2036 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2039 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2040 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2041 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2042 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2045 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2046 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2048 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2049 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2050 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2054 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2055 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2056 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2058 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2059 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2060 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2061 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2063 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2064 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2065 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2066 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2067 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2068 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2069 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2070 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2071 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2072 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2077 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2078 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2079 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2080 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2081 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2082 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2084 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2086 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2087 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2088 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2089 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2090 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2091 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2092 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2093 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2095 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2096 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2106 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2107 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2108 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2109 // outside of those situations will fail.
2110 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2114 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2119 1 + // script length (0)
2123 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2124 2 + // witness marker and flag
2125 1 + // witness element count
2126 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2127 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2128 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2129 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2130 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2131 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2133 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2134 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2135 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2141 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2142 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2143 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2144 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2146 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2147 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2148 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2150 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2151 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2152 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2153 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2154 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2155 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2158 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2159 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2162 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2163 value_to_holder = 0;
2166 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2167 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2168 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2169 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2171 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2172 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2175 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2176 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2179 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2182 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2183 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2185 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2187 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2188 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2189 where L::Target: Logger {
2190 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2191 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2192 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2193 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2194 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2195 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2196 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2197 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2201 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2202 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2203 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2204 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2206 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2207 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2209 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2211 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2212 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2213 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2215 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2216 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2217 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2218 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2219 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2220 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2221 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2223 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2224 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2225 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2227 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2228 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2230 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2233 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2234 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2238 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2242 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2243 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2244 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2245 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2246 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2247 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2250 // Now update local state:
2252 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2253 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2254 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2255 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2256 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2257 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2258 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2262 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2263 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2264 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2265 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2266 // do not not get into this branch.
2267 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2268 match pending_update {
2269 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2270 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2271 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2272 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2273 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2274 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2275 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2278 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2279 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2280 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2281 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2282 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2283 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2284 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2290 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2291 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2292 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2295 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2296 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2298 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2299 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2302 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2303 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2305 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2306 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2308 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2309 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2312 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2315 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2316 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2317 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2318 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2323 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2324 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2325 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2326 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2327 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2328 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2329 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2330 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2331 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2332 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2333 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2334 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2335 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2336 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2337 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2339 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2340 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2341 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2342 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2343 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2346 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2347 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2348 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2354 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2355 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2357 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2361 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2362 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2363 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2364 /// before we fail backwards.
2366 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2367 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2368 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2369 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2370 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2371 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2372 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2375 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2376 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2377 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2378 /// before we fail backwards.
2380 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2381 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2382 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2383 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2384 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2385 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2386 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2388 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2390 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2391 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2392 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2394 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2395 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2396 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2398 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2399 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2400 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2402 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2407 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2408 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2414 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2415 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2416 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2417 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2418 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2422 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2423 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2424 force_holding_cell = true;
2427 // Now update local state:
2428 if force_holding_cell {
2429 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2430 match pending_update {
2431 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2432 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2433 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2434 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2438 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2439 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2440 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2441 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2447 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2448 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2449 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2455 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2457 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2458 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2461 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2462 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2463 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2468 // Message handlers:
2470 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2471 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2472 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2473 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2474 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2478 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2481 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2484 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2485 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2486 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2487 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2490 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2492 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2493 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2494 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2495 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2497 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2498 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2500 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2501 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2503 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2504 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2505 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2506 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2507 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2512 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2513 initial_commitment_tx,
2516 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2517 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2520 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2521 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2524 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2525 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2526 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2527 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2528 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2529 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2530 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2531 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2532 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2533 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2534 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2535 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2537 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2539 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2540 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2541 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2542 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2543 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2544 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2545 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2547 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2548 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2549 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2550 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2552 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2554 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2555 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2559 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2560 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2562 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2563 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2564 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2565 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2567 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2570 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2571 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2572 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2575 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2576 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2577 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2578 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2579 // when routing outbound payments.
2580 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2584 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2586 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2587 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2588 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2589 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2590 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2591 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2592 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2593 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2594 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2596 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2597 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2598 let expected_point =
2599 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2600 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2602 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2603 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2604 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2605 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2606 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2607 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2609 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2610 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2611 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2612 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2613 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2615 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2616 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2623 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2624 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2626 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2628 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2631 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2632 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2633 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2634 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2635 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2636 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2638 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2639 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2640 if local_sent_shutdown {
2641 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2643 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2644 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2645 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2648 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2651 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2654 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2655 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2657 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2661 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2662 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2663 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2666 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2669 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2670 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2671 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2672 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2673 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2674 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2675 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2676 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2677 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2678 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2679 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2681 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2682 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2683 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2684 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2685 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2686 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2690 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2691 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2694 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2695 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2696 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2698 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2699 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2700 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2701 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2702 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2703 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2704 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2708 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2709 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2710 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2711 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2712 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2713 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2714 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2718 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2719 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2720 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2721 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2722 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2723 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2726 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2727 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2728 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2729 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2730 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2732 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2736 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2737 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2740 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2741 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2742 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2743 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2744 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2745 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2746 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2747 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2748 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2749 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2750 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2751 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2752 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2753 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2754 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2755 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2758 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2759 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2760 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2761 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2765 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2768 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2772 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2773 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2774 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2778 // Now update local state:
2779 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2780 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2781 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2782 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2783 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2784 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2785 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2790 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2792 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2793 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2794 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2795 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2796 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2797 None => fail_reason.into(),
2798 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2799 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2800 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2803 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2807 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2809 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2810 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2812 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2818 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2821 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2822 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2825 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2829 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2832 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2833 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2836 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2840 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2844 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2845 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2848 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2852 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2856 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2857 where L::Target: Logger
2859 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2862 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2865 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2869 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2871 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2873 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2874 let commitment_txid = {
2875 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2876 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2877 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2879 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2880 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2881 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2882 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2883 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2888 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2890 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2891 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2892 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2893 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2896 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2897 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2898 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2902 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2904 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2905 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2906 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2907 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2908 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2909 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2910 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2911 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2912 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2913 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2914 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2920 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2921 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2924 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2925 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2926 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2927 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2928 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2929 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2930 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2931 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2932 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2933 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2934 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2935 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2936 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2939 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2940 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2941 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2942 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2943 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2944 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2945 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2947 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2948 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2949 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2950 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2951 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2952 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
2953 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2956 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2957 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2960 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2962 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2963 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2964 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2967 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2970 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2971 commitment_stats.tx,
2973 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2974 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2975 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2978 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2979 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2981 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2982 let mut need_commitment = false;
2983 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2984 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2985 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2986 need_commitment = true;
2990 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2991 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2992 Some(forward_info.clone())
2994 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2995 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2996 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2997 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2998 need_commitment = true;
3001 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3002 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3003 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3004 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3005 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3006 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3007 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3008 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3009 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3010 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3011 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3012 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3013 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3014 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3016 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3018 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3019 need_commitment = true;
3023 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3024 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3025 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3026 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3027 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3028 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3030 nondust_htlc_sources,
3034 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3035 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3036 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3037 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3039 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3040 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3041 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3042 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3043 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3044 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3045 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3046 // includes the right HTLCs.
3047 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3048 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3049 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3050 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3051 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3052 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3054 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3055 &self.context.channel_id);
3056 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3059 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3060 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3061 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3062 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3063 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3064 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3065 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3066 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3067 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3071 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3072 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3073 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3074 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3077 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3078 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3079 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3080 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3081 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3082 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3083 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3085 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3086 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3087 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3088 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3091 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3092 /// for our counterparty.
3093 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3094 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3095 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3096 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3098 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3099 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3100 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3101 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3103 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3104 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3105 updates: Vec::new(),
3108 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3109 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3110 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3111 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3112 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3113 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3114 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3115 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3116 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3117 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3118 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3119 // to rebalance channels.
3120 match &htlc_update {
3121 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3122 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3123 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3125 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3126 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3128 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3131 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3132 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3133 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3134 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3135 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3136 // into the holding cell without ever being
3137 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3138 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3139 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3142 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3148 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3149 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3150 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3151 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3152 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3153 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3154 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3155 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3156 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3157 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3158 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3159 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3161 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3162 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3163 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3164 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3165 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3166 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3167 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3168 // for a full revocation before failing.
3169 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3170 update_fail_count += 1;
3173 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3175 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3182 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3183 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3185 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3186 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3191 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3192 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3193 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3194 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3195 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3197 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3198 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3199 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3201 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3202 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3208 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3209 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3210 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3211 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3212 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3213 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3214 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3215 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3216 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3218 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3221 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3224 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3228 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3230 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3231 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3236 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3237 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3238 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3239 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3240 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3241 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3242 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3243 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3247 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3249 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3250 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3253 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3254 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3255 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3256 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3258 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3262 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3263 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3264 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3265 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3266 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3267 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3268 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3269 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3273 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3274 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3275 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3276 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3277 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3278 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3279 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3280 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3281 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3283 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3284 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3287 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3288 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3289 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3290 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3291 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3292 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3293 let mut require_commitment = false;
3294 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3297 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3298 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3299 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3301 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3302 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3303 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3304 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3305 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3306 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3311 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3312 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3313 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3314 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3315 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3317 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3318 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3319 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3324 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3325 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3327 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3331 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3332 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3334 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3335 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3336 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3337 require_commitment = true;
3338 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3339 match forward_info {
3340 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3341 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3342 require_commitment = true;
3344 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3345 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3346 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3348 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3349 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3350 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3354 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3355 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3356 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3357 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3363 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3364 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3365 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3366 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3368 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3369 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3370 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3371 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3372 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3373 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3374 require_commitment = true;
3378 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3380 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3381 match update_state {
3382 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3383 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3384 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3385 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3386 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3388 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3389 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3390 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3391 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3392 require_commitment = true;
3393 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3394 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3399 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3400 let release_state_str =
3401 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3402 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3403 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3404 if !release_monitor {
3405 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3406 update: monitor_update,
3408 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3410 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3415 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3416 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3417 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3418 if require_commitment {
3419 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3420 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3421 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3422 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3423 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3424 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3425 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3426 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3427 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3429 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3430 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3431 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3432 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3433 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3436 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3437 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3438 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3439 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3440 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3441 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3443 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3444 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3446 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3447 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3449 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3450 if require_commitment {
3451 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3453 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3454 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3455 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3456 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3458 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3459 &self.context.channel_id(),
3460 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3463 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3464 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3466 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3467 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3469 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3470 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3476 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3477 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3478 /// commitment update.
3479 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3480 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3481 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3483 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3484 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3487 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3488 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3489 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3490 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3492 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3493 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3494 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3495 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3496 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3497 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3498 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3500 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3501 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3503 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3504 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3506 if !self.context.is_live() {
3507 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3510 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3511 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3512 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3513 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3514 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3515 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3516 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3517 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3518 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3519 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3523 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3524 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3525 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3526 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3527 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3528 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3531 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3532 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3536 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3537 force_holding_cell = true;
3540 if force_holding_cell {
3541 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3545 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3546 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3548 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3549 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3554 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3555 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3557 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3559 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3560 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3561 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3562 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3566 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3567 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3568 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3572 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3573 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3576 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3577 // will be retransmitted.
3578 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3579 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3580 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3582 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3583 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3585 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3586 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3587 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3588 // this HTLC accordingly
3589 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3592 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3593 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3594 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3595 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3598 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3599 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3600 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3601 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3602 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3603 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3608 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3610 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3611 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3612 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3613 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3617 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3618 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3619 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3620 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3621 // the update upon reconnection.
3622 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3626 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3628 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3629 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3632 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3633 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3634 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3635 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3636 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3637 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3638 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3640 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3641 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3642 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3643 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3644 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3645 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3646 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3648 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3649 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3650 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3651 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3652 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3653 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3654 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3657 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3658 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3659 /// to the remote side.
3660 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3661 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3662 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3663 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3666 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3668 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3669 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3671 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3672 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3673 // first received the funding_signed.
3674 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3675 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3676 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3678 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3679 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3680 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3681 funding_broadcastable = None;
3684 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3685 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3686 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3687 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3688 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3689 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3690 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3691 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3692 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3693 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3694 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3695 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3696 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3697 next_per_commitment_point,
3698 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3702 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3704 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3705 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3706 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3707 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3708 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3709 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3711 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3712 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3713 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3714 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3715 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3716 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3720 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3721 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3723 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3724 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3725 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3728 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3729 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3730 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3731 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3732 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3733 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3734 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3735 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3736 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3740 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3741 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3743 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3746 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3749 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3750 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3752 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3753 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3754 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3755 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3756 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3757 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3758 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3759 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3760 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3761 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3762 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3763 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3764 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3765 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3767 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3768 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3769 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3775 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3776 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3777 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3778 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3779 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3780 per_commitment_secret,
3781 next_per_commitment_point,
3783 next_local_nonce: None,
3787 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3788 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3789 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3790 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3791 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3793 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3794 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3795 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3796 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3797 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3798 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3799 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3800 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3801 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3802 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3807 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3808 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3810 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3811 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3812 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3813 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3814 reason: err_packet.clone()
3817 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3818 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3819 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3820 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3821 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3822 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3825 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3826 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3827 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3828 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3829 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3836 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3837 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3838 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3839 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3843 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3844 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3845 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3846 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3847 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3848 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3852 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3853 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3854 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3855 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3856 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3857 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3858 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3863 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3864 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3866 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3867 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3868 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3869 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3870 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3871 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3872 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3873 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3876 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3878 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3879 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3880 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3881 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3885 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3886 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3890 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3891 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3892 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3893 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3894 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3897 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3898 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3899 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3900 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3901 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3904 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3905 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3906 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3907 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3908 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3909 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3910 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3911 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3915 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3916 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3917 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3918 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3920 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3924 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3925 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3926 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3927 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3929 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3931 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3933 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3934 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3935 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3936 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3937 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3940 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3941 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3942 channel_ready: None,
3943 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3944 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3945 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3949 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3950 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3951 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3952 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3953 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3954 next_per_commitment_point,
3955 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3957 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3958 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3959 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3963 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3964 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3965 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3967 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3968 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3969 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3972 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3975 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3978 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3979 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3980 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3981 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3982 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3983 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3984 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3986 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3988 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3989 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3990 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3991 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3992 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3993 next_per_commitment_point,
3994 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3998 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3999 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4000 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4002 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4005 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4006 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4007 raa: required_revoke,
4008 commitment_update: None,
4009 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4011 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4012 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4013 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4015 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4018 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4019 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4020 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4021 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4022 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4023 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4026 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4027 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4028 raa: required_revoke,
4029 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4030 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4034 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4038 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4039 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4040 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4041 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4043 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4045 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4047 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4048 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4049 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4050 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4051 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4052 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4054 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4055 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4056 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4057 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4058 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4060 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4061 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4062 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4063 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4066 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4067 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4068 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4069 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4070 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4071 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4072 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4073 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4074 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4075 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4076 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4077 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4078 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4079 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4080 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4082 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4085 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4086 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4089 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4090 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4091 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4092 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4093 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4094 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4097 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4098 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4099 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4100 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4101 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4102 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4105 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4111 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4112 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4113 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4114 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4116 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4117 return Ok((None, None));
4120 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4121 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4122 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4124 return Ok((None, None));
4127 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4129 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4130 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4131 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4132 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4134 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4135 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4137 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4138 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4140 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4141 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4142 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4143 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4145 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4146 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4147 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4154 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4155 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4157 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4158 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4161 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4162 /// within our expected timeframe.
4164 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4165 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4166 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4169 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4172 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4173 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4177 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4178 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4180 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4181 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4183 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4184 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4185 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4186 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4187 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4189 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4190 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4194 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4196 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4197 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4200 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4201 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4202 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4205 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4208 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4209 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4210 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4211 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4213 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4216 assert!(send_shutdown);
4217 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4218 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4219 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4221 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4224 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4229 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4231 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4232 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4234 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4235 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4236 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4237 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4238 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4239 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4242 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4243 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4245 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4246 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4247 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4248 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4252 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4253 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4254 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4255 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4256 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4257 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4259 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4260 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4267 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4268 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4270 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4273 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4274 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4276 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4278 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4279 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4280 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4281 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4282 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4283 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4284 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4285 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4286 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4288 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4289 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4292 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4296 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4297 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4298 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4299 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4301 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4304 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4307 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4310 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4314 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4318 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4319 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4320 return Ok((None, None));
4323 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4324 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4325 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4328 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4330 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4333 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4334 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4335 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4336 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4337 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4341 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4342 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4347 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4348 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4349 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4350 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4351 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4352 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4353 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4357 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4359 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4360 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4361 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4362 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4364 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4367 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4368 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4370 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4371 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4373 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4374 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4375 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4376 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4380 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4381 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4382 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4383 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4385 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4386 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4387 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4395 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4396 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4399 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4400 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4402 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4403 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4406 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4407 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4408 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4409 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4410 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4412 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4414 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4416 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4417 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4420 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4421 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4422 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4423 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4424 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4425 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4426 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4427 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4432 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4433 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4434 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4435 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4441 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4442 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4443 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4444 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4446 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4452 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4453 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4454 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4455 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4456 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4457 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4458 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4460 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4461 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4464 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4466 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4467 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4473 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4474 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4475 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4476 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4477 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4478 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4479 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4481 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4482 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4489 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4490 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4493 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4494 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4497 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4498 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4502 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4503 &self.context.holder_signer
4507 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4509 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4510 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4511 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4512 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4513 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4514 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4516 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4518 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4526 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4527 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4531 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4532 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4533 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4534 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4537 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4538 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4539 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4540 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4543 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4544 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4545 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4546 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4547 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4548 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4551 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4552 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4553 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4554 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4555 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4556 if !release_monitor {
4557 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4566 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4567 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4570 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4571 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4572 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4574 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4575 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4576 if self.context.channel_state &
4577 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4578 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4579 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4580 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4581 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4584 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4585 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4586 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4587 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4588 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4589 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4591 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4592 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4593 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4595 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4596 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4597 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4598 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4599 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4600 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4606 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4607 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4608 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4611 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4612 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4613 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4616 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4617 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4618 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4621 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4622 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4623 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4624 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4625 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4626 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4631 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4632 self.context.channel_update_status
4635 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4636 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4637 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4640 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4642 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4643 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4644 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4648 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4649 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4650 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4653 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4657 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4658 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4659 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4661 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4662 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4663 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4665 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4666 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4669 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4670 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4671 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4672 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4673 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4674 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4675 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4676 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4677 self.context.channel_state);
4679 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4683 if need_commitment_update {
4684 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4685 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4686 let next_per_commitment_point =
4687 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4688 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4689 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4690 next_per_commitment_point,
4691 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4695 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4701 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4702 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4703 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4704 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4705 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4706 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4707 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4709 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4712 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4713 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4714 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4715 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4716 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4717 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4718 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4719 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4720 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4721 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4722 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4723 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4724 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4725 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4726 // channel and move on.
4727 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4728 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4730 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4731 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4732 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4734 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4735 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4736 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4737 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4738 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4739 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4740 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4741 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4746 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4747 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4748 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4749 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4750 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4753 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4754 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4755 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4756 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4757 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4758 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4761 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4762 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4763 // may have already happened for this block).
4764 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4765 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4766 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4767 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4770 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4771 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4772 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4773 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4781 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4782 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4783 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4784 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4786 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4787 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4790 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4792 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4793 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4794 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4795 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4797 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4800 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4803 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4804 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4805 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4806 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4808 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4811 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4812 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4813 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4815 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4816 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4818 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4819 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4820 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4828 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4830 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4831 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4832 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4834 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4835 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4838 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4839 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4840 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4841 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4842 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4843 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4844 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4845 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4846 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4849 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4850 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4851 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4852 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4854 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4855 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4856 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4858 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4859 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4860 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4861 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4863 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4864 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4865 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4866 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4867 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4868 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4869 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4872 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4873 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4875 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4878 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4879 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4880 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4881 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4882 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4883 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4884 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4885 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4886 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4887 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4888 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4889 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4890 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4891 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4892 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4893 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4894 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4900 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4905 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4906 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4908 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4909 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4910 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4911 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4913 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4916 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4918 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4919 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4920 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4921 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4922 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4923 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4925 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4926 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4929 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4930 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4931 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4932 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4933 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4934 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4936 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4937 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4940 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4941 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4942 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4943 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4944 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4950 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4951 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4952 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4953 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4955 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4958 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4962 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4966 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4967 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4971 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4975 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4976 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4979 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4983 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4985 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4990 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4991 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4992 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4994 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4999 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5001 None => return None,
5004 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5006 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5007 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5009 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5010 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5016 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5018 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5019 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5020 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5021 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5022 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5023 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5024 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5026 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5027 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5028 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5029 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5030 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5031 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5032 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5033 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5034 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5035 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5036 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5037 contents: announcement,
5042 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5046 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5047 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5048 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5049 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5050 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5051 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5052 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5053 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5055 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5057 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5059 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5060 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5062 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5064 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5065 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5068 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5069 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5070 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5071 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5074 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5077 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5078 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5079 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5080 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5081 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5082 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5085 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5087 Err(_) => return None,
5089 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5090 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5095 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5096 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5097 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5098 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5099 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5100 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5101 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5102 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5103 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5104 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5105 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5106 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5107 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5108 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5109 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5110 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5113 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5116 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5117 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5118 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5119 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5120 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5121 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5122 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5123 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5124 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5126 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5127 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5128 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5129 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5130 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5131 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5132 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5133 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5134 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5136 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5137 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5138 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5139 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5140 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5141 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5142 next_funding_txid: None,
5147 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5149 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5150 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5151 /// commitment update.
5153 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5154 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5155 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5156 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5157 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5158 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5159 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5162 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5163 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5164 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5166 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5167 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5172 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5173 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5175 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5177 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5178 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5180 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5181 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5182 /// regenerate them.
5184 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5185 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5187 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5188 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5189 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5190 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5191 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5192 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5193 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5195 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5196 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5198 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5199 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5200 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5203 if amount_msat == 0 {
5204 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5207 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5208 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5209 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5210 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5213 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5214 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5215 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5218 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5219 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5220 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5221 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5222 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5223 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5224 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5225 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5228 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5229 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5230 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5231 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5232 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5233 else { "to peer" });
5235 if need_holding_cell {
5236 force_holding_cell = true;
5239 // Now update local state:
5240 if force_holding_cell {
5241 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5246 onion_routing_packet,
5252 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5253 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5255 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5257 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5262 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5263 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5264 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5268 onion_routing_packet,
5271 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5276 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5277 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5278 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5279 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5281 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5282 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5283 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5285 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5286 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5290 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5291 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5292 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5293 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5294 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5295 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5296 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5299 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5300 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5301 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5302 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5303 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5304 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5307 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5309 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5310 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5311 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5312 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5313 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5315 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5316 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5319 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5320 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5321 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5322 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5323 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5324 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5325 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5326 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5327 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5328 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5329 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5332 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5336 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5337 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5338 where L::Target: Logger
5340 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5341 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5342 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5344 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5346 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5347 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5348 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5349 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5350 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5351 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5352 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5353 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5354 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5355 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5356 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5362 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5365 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5366 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5367 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5368 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5369 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5370 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5372 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5373 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5374 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5376 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5377 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5378 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5381 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5382 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5386 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5387 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5389 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5391 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5392 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5393 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5394 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5396 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5397 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5398 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5399 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5400 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5401 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5405 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5406 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5410 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5411 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5416 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5417 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5419 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5420 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5421 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5422 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5423 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5424 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5425 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5426 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5428 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5429 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5430 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5433 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5434 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5435 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5441 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5442 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5445 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5446 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5447 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5448 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5454 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5455 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5457 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5458 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5459 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5460 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5461 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5463 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5464 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5465 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5468 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5469 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5472 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5473 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5476 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5477 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5479 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5480 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5481 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5484 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5485 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5486 let mut chan_closed = false;
5487 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5491 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5493 None if !chan_closed => {
5494 // use override shutdown script if provided
5495 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5496 Some(script) => script,
5498 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5499 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5500 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5501 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5505 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5506 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5508 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5514 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5515 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5516 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5517 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5519 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5521 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5523 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5524 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5525 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5526 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5527 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5528 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5531 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5532 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5534 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5535 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5536 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5539 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5540 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5541 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5542 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5543 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5545 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5546 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5553 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5554 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5556 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5559 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5560 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5561 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5563 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5564 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5568 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5572 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5573 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5574 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5575 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5578 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5579 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5580 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5581 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5582 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5583 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5584 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5585 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5587 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5588 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5589 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5590 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5592 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5595 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5596 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5598 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5599 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5600 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5602 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5603 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5605 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5606 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5607 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5608 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5609 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5612 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5613 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5615 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5616 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5618 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5620 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5622 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5623 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5624 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5625 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5628 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5629 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5631 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5632 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5633 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5634 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5638 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5639 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5640 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5644 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5645 Ok(script) => script,
5646 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5649 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5652 context: ChannelContext {
5655 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5656 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5657 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5658 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5663 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5665 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5666 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5667 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5668 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5670 channel_value_satoshis,
5672 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5674 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5675 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5678 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5679 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5682 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5683 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5684 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5685 pending_update_fee: None,
5686 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5687 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5688 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5689 update_time_counter: 1,
5691 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5693 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5694 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5695 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5696 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5697 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5698 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5701 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5702 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5703 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5705 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5706 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5707 closing_fee_limits: None,
5708 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5710 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5711 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5712 short_channel_id: None,
5713 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5715 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5716 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5717 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5718 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5719 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5720 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5721 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5722 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5723 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5724 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5725 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5726 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5728 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5730 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5731 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5732 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5733 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5734 counterparty_parameters: None,
5735 funding_outpoint: None,
5736 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5738 funding_transaction: None,
5740 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5741 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5742 counterparty_node_id,
5744 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5746 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5748 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5749 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5751 announcement_sigs: None,
5753 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5754 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5755 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5756 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5758 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5759 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5761 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5762 outbound_scid_alias,
5764 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5765 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5767 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5768 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5773 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5775 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5779 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5780 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5781 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5782 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5783 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5784 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5785 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5786 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5787 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5792 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5793 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5794 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5795 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5796 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5797 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5798 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5799 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5800 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5801 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5802 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5804 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5805 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5807 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5808 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5809 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5810 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5813 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5814 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5816 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5819 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5820 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5821 return Err((self, e));
5825 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5827 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5829 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5830 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5832 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5833 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5834 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5835 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5836 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5837 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5840 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5842 let channel = Channel {
5843 context: self.context,
5846 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5847 temporary_channel_id,
5848 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5849 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5852 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5854 next_local_nonce: None,
5858 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5859 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5860 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5861 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5862 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5863 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5864 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5865 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5866 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5867 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5870 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5871 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5872 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5873 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5874 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5875 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5881 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5882 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5883 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5884 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5885 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5886 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5888 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5890 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5891 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5892 // We've exhausted our options
5895 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5896 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5899 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5900 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5901 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5902 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5904 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5905 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5906 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5907 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5908 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5909 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5911 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5913 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5914 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5917 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5918 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5919 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5921 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5922 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5925 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5926 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5929 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5930 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5934 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5935 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5936 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5937 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5938 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5939 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5940 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5941 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5942 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5943 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5944 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5945 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5946 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5947 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5948 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5949 first_per_commitment_point,
5950 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5951 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5952 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5953 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5955 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5960 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5961 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5963 // Check sanity of message fields:
5964 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5967 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5970 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5971 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5973 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5976 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5979 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5980 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5981 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5983 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5984 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5987 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5988 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5991 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5994 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5998 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5999 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6002 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6005 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6008 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6011 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6014 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6017 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6021 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6022 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6025 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6026 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6028 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6029 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6032 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6033 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6036 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6037 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6038 &Some(ref script) => {
6039 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6040 if script.len() == 0 {
6043 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6046 Some(script.clone())
6049 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6056 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6057 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6058 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6059 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6060 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6062 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6063 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6065 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6068 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6069 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6070 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6071 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6072 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6073 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6076 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6077 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6078 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6081 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6082 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6084 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6085 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6091 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6092 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6093 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6094 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6097 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6098 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6099 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6100 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6101 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6102 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6103 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6104 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6105 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6106 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6107 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6110 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6112 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6113 // support this channel type.
6114 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6115 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6119 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6120 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6121 // `static_remote_key`.
6122 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6125 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6126 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6129 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6132 channel_type.clone()
6134 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6135 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6141 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6142 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6143 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6144 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6145 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6146 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6147 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6148 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6149 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6152 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6156 // Check sanity of message fields:
6157 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6160 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6163 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6166 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6167 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6170 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6171 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6173 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6176 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6178 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6179 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6182 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6185 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6189 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6190 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6193 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6196 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6199 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6202 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6205 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6208 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6212 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6214 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6215 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6216 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6220 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6221 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6222 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6223 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6226 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6229 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6230 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6231 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6233 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6237 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6238 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6239 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6240 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6241 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6245 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6246 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6247 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6248 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6252 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6253 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6254 &Some(ref script) => {
6255 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6256 if script.len() == 0 {
6259 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6262 Some(script.clone())
6265 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6272 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6273 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6274 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6275 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6279 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6280 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6285 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6286 Ok(script) => script,
6287 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6290 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6291 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6293 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6296 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6300 context: ChannelContext {
6303 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6304 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6306 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6311 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6313 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6314 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6315 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6316 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6319 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6321 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6322 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6325 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6326 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6327 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6329 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6330 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6331 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6332 pending_update_fee: None,
6333 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6334 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6335 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6336 update_time_counter: 1,
6338 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6340 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6341 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6342 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6343 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6344 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6345 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6347 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6348 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6349 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6350 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6352 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6353 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6354 closing_fee_limits: None,
6355 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6357 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6358 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6359 short_channel_id: None,
6360 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6362 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6363 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6364 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6365 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6366 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6367 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6368 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6369 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6370 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6371 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6372 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6373 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6376 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6378 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6379 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6380 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6381 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6382 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6383 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6384 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6386 funding_outpoint: None,
6387 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6389 funding_transaction: None,
6391 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6392 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6393 counterparty_node_id,
6395 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6397 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6399 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6400 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6402 announcement_sigs: None,
6404 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6405 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6406 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6407 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6409 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6410 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6412 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6413 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6415 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6416 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6418 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6419 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6424 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6426 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6432 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6433 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6435 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6436 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6437 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6438 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6440 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6441 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6443 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6444 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6447 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6450 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6451 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6452 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6454 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6455 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6456 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6457 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6459 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6460 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6461 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6462 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6463 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6464 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6465 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6466 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6467 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6468 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6469 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6470 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6471 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6472 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6473 first_per_commitment_point,
6474 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6475 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6476 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6478 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6480 next_local_nonce: None,
6484 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6485 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6487 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6489 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6490 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6493 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6494 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6496 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6497 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6499 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6500 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6501 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6502 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6503 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6504 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6505 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6506 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6507 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6510 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6511 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6513 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6514 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6515 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6516 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6518 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6519 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6520 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6521 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6522 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6524 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6525 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6530 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6531 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6532 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6536 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6537 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6539 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6540 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6541 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6543 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6545 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6546 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6547 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6548 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6551 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6552 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6553 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6554 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6555 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6557 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6559 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6560 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6561 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6564 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6565 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6566 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6570 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6571 initial_commitment_tx,
6574 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6575 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6578 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6579 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6582 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6584 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6585 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6586 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6587 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6588 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6589 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6590 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6591 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6592 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6593 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6594 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6596 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6598 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6599 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6600 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6601 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6602 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6603 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6605 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6606 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6607 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6608 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6610 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6612 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6613 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6614 let mut channel = Channel {
6615 context: self.context,
6617 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6618 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6619 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6621 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6625 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6626 }, channel_monitor))
6630 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6631 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6633 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6639 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6640 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6641 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6642 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6643 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6645 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6646 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6647 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6648 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6654 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6655 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6656 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6657 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6658 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6659 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6664 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6665 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6666 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6667 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6669 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6670 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6671 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6672 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6677 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6678 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6679 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6680 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6681 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6682 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6687 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6688 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6689 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6692 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6694 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6695 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6696 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6697 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6698 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6700 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6701 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6702 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6703 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6705 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6706 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6707 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6709 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6711 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6712 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6713 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6714 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6715 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6716 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6717 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6719 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6720 // deserialized from that format.
6721 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6722 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6723 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6725 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6727 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6728 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6729 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6731 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6732 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6733 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6734 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6737 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6738 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6739 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6742 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6743 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6744 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6745 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6747 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6748 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6750 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6752 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6754 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6756 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6759 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6761 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6766 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6767 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6769 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6770 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6771 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6772 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6773 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6774 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6775 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6777 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6779 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6781 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6784 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6785 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6786 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6789 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6791 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6792 preimages.push(preimage);
6794 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6795 reason.write(writer)?;
6797 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6799 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6800 preimages.push(preimage);
6802 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6803 reason.write(writer)?;
6806 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6807 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6808 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6810 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6811 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6812 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6816 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6817 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6818 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6820 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6821 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6825 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6826 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6827 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6828 source.write(writer)?;
6829 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6831 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6832 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6833 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6835 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6836 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6838 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6840 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6841 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6843 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6845 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6846 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6851 match self.context.resend_order {
6852 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6853 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6856 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6857 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6858 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6860 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6861 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6862 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6863 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6866 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6867 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6868 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6869 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6870 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6873 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6874 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6875 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6876 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6878 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6879 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6880 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6882 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6884 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6885 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6886 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6887 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6889 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6890 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6891 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6892 // consider the stale state on reload.
6895 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6896 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6897 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6899 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6900 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6901 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6903 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6904 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6906 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6907 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6908 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6910 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6911 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6913 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6916 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6917 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6918 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6920 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6923 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6924 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6926 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6927 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6928 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6930 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6932 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6934 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6936 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6937 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6938 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6939 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6940 htlc.write(writer)?;
6943 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6944 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6945 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6947 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6948 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6950 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6951 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6952 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6953 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6954 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6955 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6956 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6958 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6959 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6960 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6961 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6962 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6964 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6965 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6967 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6968 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6969 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6970 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6972 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6974 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6975 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6976 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6977 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6978 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6979 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6980 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6982 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6983 (2, chan_type, option),
6984 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6985 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6986 (5, self.context.config, required),
6987 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6988 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6989 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6990 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6991 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6992 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6993 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6994 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6995 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6996 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6997 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6998 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6999 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7000 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7001 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7002 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7003 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7004 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7011 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7012 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7014 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7015 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7017 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7018 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7019 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7021 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7022 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7023 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7024 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7028 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7029 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7030 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7035 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7038 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7040 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7042 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 let mut keys_data = None;
7046 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7047 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7048 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7050 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7051 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7052 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7053 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7054 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7055 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7059 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7060 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7061 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7064 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7073 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7074 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7075 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7076 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7077 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7078 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7079 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7080 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7081 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7082 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7083 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7084 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7089 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7091 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7092 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7093 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7094 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7095 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7096 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7097 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7098 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7099 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7100 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7102 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7103 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7106 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7107 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7110 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7111 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7113 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7115 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7119 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7120 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7121 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7122 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7123 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7124 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7125 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7126 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7127 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7128 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7129 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7131 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7132 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7133 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7135 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7136 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7137 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7139 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7143 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7144 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7145 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7146 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7149 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7154 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7155 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7156 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7159 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7160 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7161 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7162 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7165 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7167 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7169 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7170 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7172 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7175 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7176 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7177 // consider the stale state on reload.
7178 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7181 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7182 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7188 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7189 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7190 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7192 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7193 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7194 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7195 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7197 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7198 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7200 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7201 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7203 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7205 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7207 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7209 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7210 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7212 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7213 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7216 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7218 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7219 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7220 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7221 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7223 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7226 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7227 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7229 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7231 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7232 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7234 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7235 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7237 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7239 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7240 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7243 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7244 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7245 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7249 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7250 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7251 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7253 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7259 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7260 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7261 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7262 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7263 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7264 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7265 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7266 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7267 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7268 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7270 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7271 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7272 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7273 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7274 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7275 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7276 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7278 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7279 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7280 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7281 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7283 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7285 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7286 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7288 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7289 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7290 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7291 (2, channel_type, option),
7292 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7293 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7294 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7295 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7296 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7297 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7298 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7299 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7300 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7301 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7302 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7303 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7304 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7305 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7306 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7307 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7308 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7309 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7310 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7311 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7312 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7315 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7316 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7317 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7318 // required channel parameters.
7319 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7320 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7321 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7323 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7325 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7326 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7327 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7328 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7331 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7332 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7333 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7335 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7336 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7338 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7339 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7344 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7345 if iter.next().is_some() {
7346 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7350 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7351 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7352 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7353 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7354 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7357 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7358 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7359 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7361 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7362 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7364 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7365 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7366 // separate u64 values.
7367 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7369 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7371 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7372 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7373 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7374 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7376 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7377 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7379 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7380 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7381 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7382 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7383 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7386 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7387 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7391 context: ChannelContext {
7394 config: config.unwrap(),
7398 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7399 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7400 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7403 temporary_channel_id,
7405 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7407 channel_value_satoshis,
7409 latest_monitor_update_id,
7411 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7412 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7415 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7416 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7419 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7420 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7421 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7422 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7426 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7427 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7428 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7429 monitor_pending_forwards,
7430 monitor_pending_failures,
7431 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7434 holding_cell_update_fee,
7435 next_holder_htlc_id,
7436 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7437 update_time_counter,
7440 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7441 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7442 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7443 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7445 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7446 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7447 closing_fee_limits: None,
7448 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7450 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7451 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7453 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7455 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7456 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7457 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7458 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7459 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7460 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7461 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7462 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7463 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7466 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7468 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7469 funding_transaction,
7471 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7472 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7473 counterparty_node_id,
7475 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7479 channel_update_status,
7480 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7484 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7485 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7486 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7487 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7489 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7490 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7492 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7493 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7494 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7496 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7497 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7499 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7500 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7502 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7505 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7514 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7515 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7516 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7517 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7518 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7520 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7521 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7522 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7523 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7524 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7525 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7526 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7527 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7528 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7529 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7530 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7531 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7532 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7533 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7534 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7535 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7536 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7537 use crate::util::test_utils;
7538 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7539 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7540 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7541 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7542 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7543 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7544 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7545 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7546 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7547 use crate::prelude::*;
7549 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7552 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7553 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7559 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7560 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7561 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7562 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7566 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7567 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7568 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7569 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7570 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7571 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7572 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7573 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7577 signer: InMemorySigner,
7580 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7581 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7584 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7585 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7587 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7588 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7591 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7595 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7597 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7598 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7599 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7600 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7601 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7604 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7605 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7606 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7607 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7611 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7612 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7613 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7617 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7618 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7619 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7620 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7622 let seed = [42; 32];
7623 let network = Network::Testnet;
7624 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7625 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7626 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7629 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7630 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7631 let config = UserConfig::default();
7632 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7633 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7634 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7636 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7637 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7641 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7642 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7644 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7645 let original_fee = 253;
7646 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7647 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7648 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7649 let seed = [42; 32];
7650 let network = Network::Testnet;
7651 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7653 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7654 let config = UserConfig::default();
7655 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7657 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7658 // same as the old fee.
7659 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7660 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7661 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7665 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7666 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7667 // dust limits are used.
7668 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7669 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7670 let seed = [42; 32];
7671 let network = Network::Testnet;
7672 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7673 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7674 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7676 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7677 // they have different dust limits.
7679 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7680 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7681 let config = UserConfig::default();
7682 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7684 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7685 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7686 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7687 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7688 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7690 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7691 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7692 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7693 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7694 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7696 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7697 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7698 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7699 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7701 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7702 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7703 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7705 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7706 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7708 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7709 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7710 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7712 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7713 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7714 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7715 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7718 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7720 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7721 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7722 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7723 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7724 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7725 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7726 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7727 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7728 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7730 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7733 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7734 // the dust limit check.
7735 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7736 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7737 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7738 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7740 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7741 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7742 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7743 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7744 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7745 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7746 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7750 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7751 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7752 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7753 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7754 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7755 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7756 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7757 let seed = [42; 32];
7758 let network = Network::Testnet;
7759 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7761 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7762 let config = UserConfig::default();
7763 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7765 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7766 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7768 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7769 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7770 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7771 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7772 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7773 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7775 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7776 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7777 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7778 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7779 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7781 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7783 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7784 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7785 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7786 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7787 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7789 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7790 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7791 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7792 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7793 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7797 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7798 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7799 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7800 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7801 let seed = [42; 32];
7802 let network = Network::Testnet;
7803 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7804 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7805 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7807 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7809 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7810 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7811 let config = UserConfig::default();
7812 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7814 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7815 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7816 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7817 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7819 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7820 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7821 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7823 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7824 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7825 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7826 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7828 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7829 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7830 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7832 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7833 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7835 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7836 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7837 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7838 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7839 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7840 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7841 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7843 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7845 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7846 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7847 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7848 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7849 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7853 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7854 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7855 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7856 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7857 let seed = [42; 32];
7858 let network = Network::Testnet;
7859 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7860 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7861 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7863 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7864 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7865 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7866 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7867 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7868 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7869 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7870 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7872 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7873 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7874 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7875 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7876 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7877 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7879 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7880 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7881 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7882 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7884 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7886 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7887 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7888 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7889 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7890 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7891 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7893 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7894 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7895 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7896 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7898 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7899 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7900 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7901 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7902 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7904 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7905 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7907 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7908 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7909 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7911 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7912 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7913 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7914 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7915 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7917 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7918 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7920 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7921 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7922 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7926 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7928 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7929 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7930 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7932 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7933 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7934 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7935 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7937 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7938 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7939 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7941 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7943 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7944 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7947 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7948 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7949 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7950 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7951 let seed = [42; 32];
7952 let network = Network::Testnet;
7953 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7954 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7955 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7958 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7959 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7960 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7962 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7963 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7965 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7966 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7967 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7969 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7970 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7972 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7974 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7975 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7977 // Channel Negotiations failed
7978 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7979 assert!(result.is_err());
7984 fn channel_update() {
7985 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7986 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7987 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7988 let seed = [42; 32];
7989 let network = Network::Testnet;
7990 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7991 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7992 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7994 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7995 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7996 let config = UserConfig::default();
7997 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7999 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8000 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8001 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8002 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8003 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8005 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8006 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8007 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8008 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8009 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8011 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8012 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8013 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8014 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8016 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8017 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8018 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8020 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8021 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8023 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8024 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8025 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8027 short_channel_id: 0,
8030 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8031 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8032 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8034 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8035 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8037 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8039 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8041 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8042 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8043 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8044 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8046 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8047 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8048 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8050 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8054 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8056 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8057 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8058 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8059 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8060 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8061 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8062 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8063 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8064 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8065 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8066 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8067 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8068 use crate::sync::Arc;
8070 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8071 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8072 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8073 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8075 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8077 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8078 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8079 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8080 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8081 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8083 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8084 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8090 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8091 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8092 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8094 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8095 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8096 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8097 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8098 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8099 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8101 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8103 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8104 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8105 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8106 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8107 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8108 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8110 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8111 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8112 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8113 selected_contest_delay: 144
8115 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8116 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8118 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8119 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8121 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8122 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8124 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8125 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8127 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8128 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8129 // build_commitment_transaction.
8130 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8131 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8132 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8133 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8134 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8136 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8137 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8138 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8139 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8143 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8144 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8145 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8146 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8150 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8151 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8152 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8154 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8155 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8157 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8158 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8160 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8162 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8163 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8164 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8165 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8166 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8167 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8168 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8170 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8171 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8172 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8173 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8175 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8176 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8177 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8179 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8181 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8182 commitment_tx.clone(),
8183 counterparty_signature,
8184 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8185 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8186 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8188 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8189 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8191 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8192 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8193 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8195 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8196 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8199 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8200 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8202 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8203 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8204 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8205 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8206 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8207 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8208 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8209 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8211 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8214 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8215 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8216 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8220 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8223 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8224 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8225 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8227 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8228 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8229 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8230 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8231 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8232 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8233 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8234 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8236 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8240 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8241 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8242 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8243 "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", {});
8245 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8246 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8248 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8249 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8250 "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", {});
8252 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8253 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8254 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8255 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8257 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8258 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8260 amount_msat: 1000000,
8262 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8263 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8265 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8268 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8269 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8271 amount_msat: 2000000,
8273 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8274 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8276 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8279 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8280 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8282 amount_msat: 2000000,
8284 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8285 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8286 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8287 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8289 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8292 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8293 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8295 amount_msat: 3000000,
8297 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8298 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8299 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8300 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8302 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8305 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8306 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8308 amount_msat: 4000000,
8310 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8311 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8313 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8317 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8318 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8319 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8321 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8322 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8323 "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", {
8326 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8327 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8328 "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" },
8331 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8332 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8333 "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" },
8336 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8337 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8338 "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" },
8341 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8342 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8343 "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" },
8346 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8347 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8348 "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" }
8351 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8352 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8353 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8355 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8356 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8357 "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", {
8360 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8361 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8362 "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" },
8365 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8366 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8367 "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" },
8370 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8371 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8372 "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" },
8375 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8376 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8377 "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" },
8380 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8381 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8382 "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" }
8385 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8386 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8387 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8389 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8390 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8391 "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", {
8394 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8395 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8396 "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" },
8399 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8400 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8401 "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" },
8404 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8405 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8406 "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" },
8409 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8410 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8411 "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" }
8414 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8415 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8416 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8417 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8419 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8420 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8421 "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", {
8424 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8425 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8426 "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" },
8429 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8430 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8431 "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" },
8434 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8435 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8436 "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" },
8439 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8440 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8441 "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" }
8444 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8445 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8446 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8447 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8449 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8450 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8451 "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", {
8454 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8455 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8456 "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" },
8459 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8460 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8461 "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" },
8464 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8465 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8466 "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" },
8469 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8470 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8471 "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" }
8474 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8478 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8479 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8480 "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", {
8483 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8484 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8485 "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" },
8488 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8489 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8490 "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" },
8493 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8494 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8495 "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" }
8498 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8499 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8500 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8502 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8503 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8504 "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", {
8507 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8508 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8509 "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" },
8512 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8513 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8514 "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" },
8517 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8518 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8519 "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" }
8522 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8523 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8524 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8526 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8527 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8528 "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", {
8531 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8532 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8533 "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" },
8536 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8537 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8538 "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" }
8541 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8542 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8543 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8544 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8545 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8546 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8548 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8549 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8550 "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", {
8553 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8554 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8555 "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" },
8558 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8559 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8560 "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" }
8563 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8564 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8565 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8566 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8567 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8569 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8570 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8571 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8574 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8575 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8576 "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" },
8579 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8580 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8581 "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" }
8584 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8585 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8586 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8588 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8589 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8590 "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", {
8593 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8594 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8595 "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" }
8598 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8599 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8600 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8601 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8602 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8604 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8605 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8606 "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", {
8609 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8610 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8611 "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" }
8614 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8615 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8616 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8617 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8618 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8620 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8621 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8622 "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", {
8625 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8626 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8627 "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" }
8630 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8631 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8632 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8633 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8635 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8636 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8637 "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", {});
8639 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8640 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8641 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8642 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8643 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8645 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8646 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8647 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8649 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8650 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8651 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8652 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8653 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8655 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8656 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8657 "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", {});
8659 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8660 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8661 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8663 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8664 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8665 "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", {});
8667 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8668 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8669 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8670 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8671 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8673 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8674 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8675 "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", {});
8677 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8678 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8679 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8680 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8681 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8683 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8684 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8685 "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", {});
8687 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8688 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8689 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8690 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8691 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8692 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8694 amount_msat: 2000000,
8696 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8697 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8699 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8702 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8703 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8704 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8706 amount_msat: 5000001,
8708 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8709 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8710 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8711 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8713 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8716 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8717 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8719 amount_msat: 5000000,
8721 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8722 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8723 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8724 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8726 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8730 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8731 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8732 "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", {
8735 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8736 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8737 "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" },
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8741 "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" },
8743 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8744 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8745 "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" }
8748 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8749 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8750 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8751 "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", {
8754 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8755 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8756 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8758 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8759 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8760 "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" },
8762 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8763 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8764 "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" }
8769 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8770 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8772 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8773 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8774 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8775 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8777 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8778 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8779 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8781 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8782 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8784 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8785 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8787 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8788 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8789 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8793 fn test_key_derivation() {
8794 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8795 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8797 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8798 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8800 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8801 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8803 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8804 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8806 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8807 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8809 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8810 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8812 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8813 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8815 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8816 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8820 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8821 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8822 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8823 let seed = [42; 32];
8824 let network = Network::Testnet;
8825 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8826 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8828 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8829 let config = UserConfig::default();
8830 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8831 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8833 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8834 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8836 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8837 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8838 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8839 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8840 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8841 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8842 assert!(res.is_ok());
8846 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8847 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8848 // resulting `channel_type`.
8849 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8850 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8851 let network = Network::Testnet;
8852 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8853 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8855 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8856 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8858 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8859 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8861 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8862 // need to signal it.
8863 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8864 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8865 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8868 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8870 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8871 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8872 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8874 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8875 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8876 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8879 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8880 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8881 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8882 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8883 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8886 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8887 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8891 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8892 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8893 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8894 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8895 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8896 let network = Network::Testnet;
8897 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8898 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8900 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8901 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8903 let config = UserConfig::default();
8905 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8906 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8907 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8908 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8909 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8911 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8912 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8913 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8916 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8917 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8918 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8920 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8921 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8922 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8923 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8924 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8925 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8927 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8931 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8932 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8934 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8935 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8936 let network = Network::Testnet;
8937 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8938 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8940 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8941 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8943 let config = UserConfig::default();
8945 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8946 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8947 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8948 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8949 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8950 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8951 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8952 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8954 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8955 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8956 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8957 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8958 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8959 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8962 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8963 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8965 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8966 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8967 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8968 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8970 assert!(res.is_err());
8972 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8973 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8974 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8976 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8977 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8978 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8981 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8983 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8984 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8985 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8986 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8989 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8990 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8992 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8993 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8995 assert!(res.is_err());