1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
108 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
109 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
110 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
112 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
113 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
115 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
117 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
118 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
119 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
121 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
125 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
127 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
130 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
134 enum InboundHTLCState {
135 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
136 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
137 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
139 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
140 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
141 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
142 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
143 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
144 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
145 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
146 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
147 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
148 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
149 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
151 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
152 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
153 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
154 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
155 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
156 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
157 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
158 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
159 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
160 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
161 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
162 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
163 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
164 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
166 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
167 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
168 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
169 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
170 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
171 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
172 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
173 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
175 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
176 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
178 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
179 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
180 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
181 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
182 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
183 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
184 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
185 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
188 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
190 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
191 /// through the following states in the state machine:
192 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
193 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
194 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
195 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
196 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
197 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
198 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
200 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
201 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
202 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
203 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
204 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
205 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
206 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
207 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
208 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
210 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
211 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
212 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
213 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
215 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
216 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
217 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
218 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
219 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
220 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
221 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
222 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
224 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
227 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
228 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
230 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
232 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
233 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
234 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
235 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
236 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
238 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
240 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
241 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
242 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
247 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
248 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
249 (2, Committed) => {},
250 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
251 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
254 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
258 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
259 state: InboundHTLCState,
262 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
264 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
266 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
267 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
268 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
270 /// The amount in msat.
271 pub amount_msat: u64,
272 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
273 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
274 /// The payment hash.
275 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
276 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
278 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
279 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
281 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
283 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
284 /// states may result in `None` here.
285 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
286 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
287 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
288 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
289 /// transactions as well.
291 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
292 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
295 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
296 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
300 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
301 (0, htlc_id, required),
302 (2, amount_msat, required),
303 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
304 (6, payment_hash, required),
305 (7, state, upgradable_option),
306 (8, is_dust, required),
309 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
310 enum OutboundHTLCState {
311 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
312 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
313 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
314 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
315 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
316 /// money back (though we won't), and,
317 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
318 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
319 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
320 /// we'll never get out of sync).
321 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
322 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
323 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
325 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
326 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
327 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
328 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
329 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
330 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
331 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
332 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
333 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
334 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
335 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
336 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
337 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
338 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
339 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
342 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
344 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
345 /// through the following states in the state machine:
346 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
347 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
348 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
349 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
350 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
351 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
352 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
354 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
356 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
357 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
358 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
359 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
360 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
361 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
363 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
364 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
366 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
367 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
368 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
369 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
370 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
371 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
372 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
373 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
374 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
375 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
378 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
379 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
381 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
382 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
383 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
384 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
385 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
388 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
390 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
391 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
392 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
393 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
394 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
396 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
401 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
402 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
403 (2, Committed) => {},
404 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
405 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
409 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
410 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
411 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
412 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
413 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
416 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
417 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
419 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
420 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
425 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
426 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
428 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
429 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
434 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
435 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
440 state: OutboundHTLCState,
442 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
443 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
448 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
450 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
451 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
452 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
454 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
455 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
456 /// The amount in msat.
457 pub amount_msat: u64,
458 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
459 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
460 /// The payment hash.
461 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
462 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
464 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
465 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
467 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
469 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
470 /// states may result in `None` here.
471 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
472 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
473 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
475 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
476 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
477 /// transactions as well.
479 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
480 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
483 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
484 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
489 (0, htlc_id, required),
490 (2, amount_msat, required),
491 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
492 (6, payment_hash, required),
493 (7, state, upgradable_option),
494 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
495 (10, is_dust, required),
498 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
499 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
500 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
501 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
507 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
508 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
509 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
510 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
513 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
518 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
527 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
528 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
529 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
530 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
531 struct $flag_type(u32);
536 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
539 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
541 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
544 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
547 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
548 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
551 Ok($flag_type(flags))
556 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
558 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
560 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
562 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
566 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
569 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
571 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
573 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
574 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
576 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
578 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
580 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
581 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
584 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
585 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
587 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
590 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
592 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
594 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
597 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
598 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
600 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
601 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
602 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
603 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
604 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
605 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
606 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
607 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
609 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
611 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
613 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
614 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
616 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
618 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
620 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
621 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
623 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
624 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
626 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
627 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
632 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
635 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
636 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
637 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
638 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
639 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
640 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
641 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
642 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
643 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
644 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
645 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
646 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
647 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
648 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
652 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
654 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
655 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
656 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
657 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
658 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
659 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
660 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
661 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
662 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
663 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
664 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
665 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
666 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
667 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
672 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
673 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
674 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
675 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
676 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
677 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
682 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
683 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
684 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
685 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
686 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
687 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
688 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
689 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
690 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
691 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
692 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
693 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
694 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
695 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
700 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
701 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
702 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
703 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
704 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
705 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
706 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
707 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
711 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
712 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
713 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
715 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
716 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
717 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
718 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
719 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
721 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
722 /// funding transaction to confirm.
723 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
724 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
726 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
727 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
728 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
732 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
733 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
735 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
738 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
747 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
749 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
753 fn $clear(&mut self) {
756 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
758 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
762 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
763 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
765 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
766 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
771 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
773 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
774 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
776 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
777 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
778 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
779 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
780 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
781 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
782 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
783 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
791 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
793 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
794 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
795 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
796 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
797 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
801 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
802 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
805 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
806 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
809 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
811 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
812 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
813 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
817 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
819 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
820 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
821 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
822 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
824 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
830 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
831 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
832 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
833 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
834 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
835 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
836 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
837 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
840 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
842 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
844 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
845 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
846 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
847 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
851 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
853 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
855 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
857 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
858 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
859 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
860 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
861 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
863 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
864 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
866 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
868 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
869 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
871 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
872 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
873 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
874 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
875 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
876 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
878 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
879 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
881 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
882 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
883 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
884 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
885 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
887 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
888 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
890 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
891 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
893 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
894 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
895 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
896 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
902 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
903 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
905 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
906 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
907 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
912 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
913 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
915 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
916 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
917 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
922 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
924 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
925 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
928 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
929 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
930 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
931 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
932 self.logger.log(record)
936 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
937 where L::Target: Logger {
938 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
939 where S::Target: SignerProvider
943 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
944 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
949 macro_rules! secp_check {
950 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
953 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
958 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
959 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
960 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
961 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
962 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
963 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
964 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
965 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
967 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
969 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
971 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
975 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
977 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
978 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
979 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
981 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
982 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
984 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
985 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
986 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
987 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
988 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
990 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
991 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
995 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
1001 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
1004 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1005 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1006 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1007 holding_cell_msat: u64,
1008 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
1011 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
1012 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
1013 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
1014 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
1015 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
1016 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
1017 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
1018 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1019 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1020 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
1021 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
1024 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
1025 struct HTLCCandidate {
1027 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1030 impl HTLCCandidate {
1031 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1039 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1041 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1043 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1044 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1045 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1050 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1051 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1052 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1053 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1054 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1056 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1057 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1058 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1059 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1061 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1062 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1066 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1067 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1068 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1069 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1070 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1071 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1072 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1073 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1074 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1075 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1076 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1077 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1080 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1082 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1083 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1084 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1085 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1088 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1089 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1090 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1091 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1092 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1093 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1094 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1095 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1098 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1100 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1101 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1102 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1103 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1104 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1105 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1106 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1107 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1108 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1109 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1110 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1111 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1112 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1113 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1114 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1117 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1118 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1119 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1120 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1121 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1122 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1123 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1124 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1125 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1126 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1127 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1128 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1129 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1130 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1131 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1133 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1134 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1135 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1136 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1138 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1139 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1140 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1141 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1143 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1144 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1145 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1146 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1147 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1149 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1150 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1151 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1152 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1154 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1155 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1156 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1158 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1159 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1160 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1161 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1162 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1164 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1165 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1168 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1169 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1171 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1172 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1173 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1174 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1176 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1177 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1179 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1180 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1183 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1184 (0, update, required),
1187 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1188 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1189 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1190 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1191 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1192 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1193 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1194 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1195 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1196 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1199 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1200 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1201 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1203 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1205 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1206 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1207 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1208 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1209 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1210 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1211 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1215 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1217 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1218 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1219 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1220 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1221 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1222 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1223 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1228 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1229 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1230 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1231 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1232 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1234 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1235 /// in a timely manner.
1236 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1239 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1240 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1241 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1243 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1244 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1245 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1246 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1250 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1251 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1252 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1254 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1255 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1256 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1257 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1259 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1263 /// The current channel ID.
1264 channel_id: ChannelId,
1265 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1266 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1267 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1268 channel_state: ChannelState,
1270 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1271 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1273 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1274 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1275 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1277 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1278 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1279 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1280 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1282 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1283 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1285 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1287 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1288 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1289 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1291 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1292 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1293 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1295 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1296 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1297 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1298 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1299 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1300 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1302 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1303 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1304 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1305 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1306 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1307 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1309 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1311 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1312 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1313 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1315 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1316 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1317 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1318 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1319 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1320 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1321 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1322 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1324 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1325 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1326 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1328 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1329 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1330 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1331 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1332 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1333 /// outbound or inbound.
1334 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1336 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1338 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1339 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1340 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1341 // HTLCs with similar state.
1342 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1343 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1344 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1345 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1346 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1347 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1348 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1349 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1350 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1351 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1353 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1354 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1355 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1357 update_time_counter: u32,
1359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1360 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1361 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1362 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1363 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1364 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1366 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1367 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1369 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1370 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1371 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1372 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1374 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1375 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1377 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1379 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1381 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1382 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1383 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1384 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1385 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1387 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1388 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1390 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1391 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1392 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1394 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1395 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1396 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1397 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1398 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1399 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1400 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1401 channel_creation_height: u32,
1403 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1406 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1408 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1411 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1413 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1416 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1418 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1420 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1421 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1424 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1426 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1428 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1429 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1431 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1433 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1434 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1435 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1437 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1439 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1440 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1441 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1443 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1444 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1445 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1447 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1449 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1451 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1452 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1453 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1454 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1456 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1457 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1458 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1460 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1461 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1462 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1464 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1465 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1466 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1467 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1468 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1469 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1470 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1471 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1473 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1474 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1475 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1476 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1477 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1479 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1480 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1482 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1483 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1484 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1485 /// unblock the state machine.
1487 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1488 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1489 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1491 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1492 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1493 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1495 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1496 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1497 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1498 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1499 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1500 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1501 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1502 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1504 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1505 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1507 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1508 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1509 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1511 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1512 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1513 // associated channel mapping.
1515 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1516 // to store all of them.
1517 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1519 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1520 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1521 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1522 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1523 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1525 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1526 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1528 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1529 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1531 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1532 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1534 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1535 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1537 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1539 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1541 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1542 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1543 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1546 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1547 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1548 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1549 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1550 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1551 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1552 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1554 config: &'a UserConfig,
1555 current_chain_height: u32,
1558 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1559 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1560 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1561 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1562 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1564 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1565 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1567 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1568 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1570 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1572 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id));
1573 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1575 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1577 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1578 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1579 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1581 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1582 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1585 // Check sanity of message fields:
1586 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1587 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1588 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1589 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1590 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1592 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1595 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1596 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1598 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1599 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1600 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1602 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1603 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1605 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1606 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1608 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1610 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1611 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1612 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1614 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1617 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1618 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1621 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1622 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1625 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1628 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1629 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1631 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1632 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1634 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1635 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1637 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1638 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1640 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1641 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1644 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1646 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1647 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1652 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1653 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1654 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1657 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1660 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1661 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1662 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1664 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1668 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1669 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1670 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1671 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1675 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1676 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1677 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1681 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1682 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1683 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1684 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1688 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1689 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1690 &Some(ref script) => {
1691 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1692 if script.len() == 0 {
1695 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1696 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1698 Some(script.clone())
1701 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1703 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1708 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1709 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1710 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1711 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1715 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1716 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1717 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1721 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1722 Ok(script) => script,
1723 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1726 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1727 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1729 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1732 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1735 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1737 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1739 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1742 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1743 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1745 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1750 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1752 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1753 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1754 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1755 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1757 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1760 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1762 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1763 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1766 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1767 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1770 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1771 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1772 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1773 pending_update_fee: None,
1774 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1775 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1776 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1777 update_time_counter: 1,
1779 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1781 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1782 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1783 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1784 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1785 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1786 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1787 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1789 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1790 signer_pending_funding: false,
1793 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1794 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1795 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1796 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1798 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1799 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1800 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1801 closing_fee_limits: None,
1802 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1804 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1805 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1806 short_channel_id: None,
1807 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1809 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1810 channel_value_satoshis,
1811 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1812 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1813 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1814 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1815 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1816 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1817 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1818 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1819 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1820 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1823 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1825 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1826 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1827 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1828 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1829 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1830 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1831 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1833 funding_outpoint: None,
1834 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1836 funding_transaction: None,
1837 is_batch_funding: None,
1839 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1840 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1841 counterparty_node_id,
1843 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1845 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1847 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1848 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1850 announcement_sigs: None,
1852 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1853 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1855 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1857 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1858 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1860 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1861 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1863 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1864 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1866 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1867 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1872 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1874 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1880 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1881 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1882 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1883 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1884 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1885 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1886 funding_satoshis: u64,
1889 config: &'a UserConfig,
1890 current_chain_height: u32,
1891 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1892 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1893 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1894 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1895 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1896 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1897 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1899 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1901 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1903 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1904 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1906 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1908 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1911 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1914 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1915 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1916 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1918 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1922 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1923 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1925 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1926 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1928 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1930 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1932 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1933 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1934 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1935 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1938 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1939 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1941 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1942 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1943 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1944 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1948 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1949 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1950 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1954 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1955 Ok(script) => script,
1956 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1959 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1964 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1965 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1966 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1967 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1972 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1974 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1975 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1976 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1977 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1979 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1980 channel_value_satoshis,
1982 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1984 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1985 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1988 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1989 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1992 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1993 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1994 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1995 pending_update_fee: None,
1996 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1997 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1998 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1999 update_time_counter: 1,
2001 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2003 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2004 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2005 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2006 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2007 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2008 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2009 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
2011 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
2012 signer_pending_funding: false,
2014 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
2015 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2016 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2017 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2018 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2019 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2021 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2022 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2023 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
2024 closing_fee_limits: None,
2025 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2027 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2028 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2029 short_channel_id: None,
2030 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2032 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
2033 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2034 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2035 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2036 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
2037 // receive `accept_channel2`.
2038 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2039 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2040 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2041 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2042 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2043 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2044 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2045 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2047 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2049 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2050 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2051 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2052 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2053 counterparty_parameters: None,
2054 funding_outpoint: None,
2055 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2057 funding_transaction: None,
2058 is_batch_funding: None,
2060 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2061 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2062 counterparty_node_id,
2064 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2066 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2068 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2069 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2071 announcement_sigs: None,
2073 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2074 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2076 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2078 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2079 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2081 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2082 outbound_scid_alias,
2084 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2085 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2087 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2088 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2093 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2094 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2098 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2099 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2100 self.update_time_counter
2103 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2104 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2107 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2108 self.config.announced_channel
2111 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2112 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2115 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2117 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2118 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2121 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2122 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2123 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2126 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2127 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2128 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2129 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2130 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2131 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2132 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2135 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2136 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2137 match self.channel_state {
2138 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2139 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2140 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2141 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2142 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2143 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2144 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2146 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2148 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2149 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2153 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2154 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2155 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2156 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2157 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2158 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2161 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2162 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2163 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2167 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2168 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2169 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2170 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2171 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2174 // Public utilities:
2176 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2180 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2182 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2183 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2184 self.temporary_channel_id
2187 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2191 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2192 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2193 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2197 /// Gets the channel's type
2198 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2202 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2204 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2205 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2206 self.short_channel_id
2209 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2210 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2211 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2214 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2215 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2216 self.outbound_scid_alias
2219 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2221 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2222 return &self.holder_signer
2225 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2226 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2227 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2228 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2229 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2230 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2233 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2234 /// get_funding_created.
2235 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2236 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2239 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2240 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2241 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2242 if conf_height > 0 {
2249 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2250 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2251 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2254 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2255 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2256 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2257 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2261 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2264 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2265 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2268 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2269 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2272 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2273 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2274 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2277 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2278 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2281 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2282 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2283 self.counterparty_node_id
2286 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2287 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2288 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2291 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2292 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2293 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2296 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2297 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2299 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2300 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2301 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2302 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2304 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2308 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2309 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2310 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2313 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2314 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2315 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2318 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2319 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2320 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2322 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2323 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2328 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2329 self.channel_value_satoshis
2332 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2333 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2336 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2337 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2340 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
2341 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
2342 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2344 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2345 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2346 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
2347 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
2348 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
2350 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2354 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2355 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2356 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2359 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2360 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2361 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2364 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2365 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2366 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2369 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2370 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2371 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2374 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2375 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2376 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2379 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2380 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2381 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2384 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2385 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2386 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2387 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2388 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2391 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2393 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2394 self.prev_config = None;
2398 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2399 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2403 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2404 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2405 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2406 let did_channel_update =
2407 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2408 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2409 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2410 if did_channel_update {
2411 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2412 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2413 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2414 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2416 self.config.options = *config;
2420 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2421 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2422 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2423 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2424 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2427 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2428 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2429 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2430 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2431 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2433 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2434 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2435 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2436 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2437 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2438 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2439 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2441 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2442 where L::Target: Logger
2444 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2445 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2446 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2448 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2449 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2450 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2451 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2453 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2454 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2455 if match update_state {
2456 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2457 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2458 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2459 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2460 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2462 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2466 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2467 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2468 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2470 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2472 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2473 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2474 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2476 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2477 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2478 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2479 transaction_output_index: None
2484 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2485 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2486 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2487 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2488 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2491 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2493 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2494 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2495 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2497 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2498 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2501 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2502 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2505 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2507 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2508 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2509 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2511 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2512 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2518 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2520 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2521 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2522 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2523 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2524 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2525 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2526 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2530 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2531 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2533 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2535 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2536 if generated_by_local {
2537 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2538 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2539 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2549 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2551 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2552 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2553 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2554 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2555 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2556 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2557 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2560 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2561 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2562 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2563 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2567 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2568 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2572 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2573 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2575 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2577 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2578 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2580 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2581 if !generated_by_local {
2582 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2590 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2591 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2592 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2593 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2594 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2595 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2596 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2597 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2599 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2601 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2602 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2603 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2604 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2606 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2608 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2609 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2610 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2611 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2614 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2615 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2616 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2617 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2619 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2622 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2623 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2624 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2625 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2627 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2630 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2631 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2636 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2637 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2642 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2644 let channel_parameters =
2645 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2646 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2647 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2654 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2657 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2658 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2659 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2660 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2668 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2669 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2670 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2671 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2676 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2677 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2678 /// our counterparty!)
2679 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2680 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2681 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2682 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2683 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2684 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2685 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2687 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2691 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2692 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2693 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2694 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2695 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2696 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2697 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2699 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2702 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2703 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2704 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2705 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2706 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2709 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2710 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2713 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2717 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2718 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2719 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2720 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2721 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2722 // which are near the dust limit.
2723 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2724 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2725 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2726 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2727 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2729 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2730 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2732 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2733 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2736 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2737 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2738 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2741 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2742 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2744 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2745 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2746 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2747 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2748 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2749 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2750 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2753 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2756 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2757 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2758 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2760 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2761 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2762 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2763 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2764 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2765 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2767 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2768 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2774 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2775 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2777 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2778 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2779 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2780 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2781 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2782 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2783 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2786 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2789 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2790 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2791 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2793 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2794 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2795 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2796 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2797 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2798 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2800 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2801 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2805 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2806 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2807 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2808 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2809 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2810 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2811 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2813 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2814 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2816 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2823 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2824 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2825 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2826 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2827 match holding_cell_update {
2828 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2829 holding_cell_states.insert(
2831 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2834 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2835 holding_cell_states.insert(
2837 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2840 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2841 holding_cell_states.insert(
2843 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2847 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2850 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2851 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2854 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2855 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2857 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2858 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2859 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2860 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2861 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2862 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2863 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2864 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2865 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2866 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2873 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2874 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2875 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2876 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2879 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2880 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2882 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2883 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2884 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2885 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2886 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2887 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2888 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2889 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2890 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2891 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2894 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2895 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2901 } = *holding_cell_update {
2902 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2904 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2905 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2906 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2907 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2908 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2909 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2916 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2917 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2918 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2919 /// corner case properly.
2920 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2921 -> AvailableBalances
2922 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2924 let context = &self;
2925 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2926 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2927 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2929 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2930 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2931 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2932 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2935 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2937 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2938 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2940 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2942 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2944 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2945 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2949 if context.is_outbound() {
2950 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2951 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2953 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2954 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2956 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2957 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2958 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2959 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2962 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2963 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2964 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2965 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2966 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2967 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2968 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2971 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2972 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2973 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2974 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2975 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2976 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2977 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2978 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2979 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2980 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2981 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2983 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2986 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2987 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2988 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2989 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2990 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2993 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2994 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2996 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2997 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2998 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
3000 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3001 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3002 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3003 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3007 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3009 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3010 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3011 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3012 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3013 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3014 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3015 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3017 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3018 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3020 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3021 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3022 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3024 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3025 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3026 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3027 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
3028 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3031 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3032 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3033 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3034 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3035 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
3036 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3039 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3040 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3041 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3043 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3047 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3048 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
3050 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3051 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3055 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3056 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3057 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3058 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3060 outbound_capacity_msat,
3061 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3062 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3067 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3068 let context = &self;
3069 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3072 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3073 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3075 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3076 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3078 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3079 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3081 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3082 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3083 let context = &self;
3084 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3086 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3089 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3090 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3092 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3093 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3095 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3096 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3098 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3099 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3103 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3104 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3110 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3111 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3112 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3115 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3116 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3117 included_htlcs += 1;
3120 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3121 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3125 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3126 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3127 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3128 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3129 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3130 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3135 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3137 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3138 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3143 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3144 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3148 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3149 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3150 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3153 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3154 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3156 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3157 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3158 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3160 total_pending_htlcs,
3161 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3162 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3163 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3165 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3166 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3167 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3169 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3171 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3176 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3177 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3179 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3180 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3182 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3183 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3185 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3186 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3187 let context = &self;
3188 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3190 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3193 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3194 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3196 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3197 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3199 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3200 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3202 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3203 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3207 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3208 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3214 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3215 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3216 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3217 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3218 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3219 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3222 included_htlcs += 1;
3225 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3226 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3229 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3230 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3232 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3233 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3234 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3239 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3240 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3244 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3245 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3247 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3248 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3250 total_pending_htlcs,
3251 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3252 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3253 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3255 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3256 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3257 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3259 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3261 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3266 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3267 match self.channel_state {
3268 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3269 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3270 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3271 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3281 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3283 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3284 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3287 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3289 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3290 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3291 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3295 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3296 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3297 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3300 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3302 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3303 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3306 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3307 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3308 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3309 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3310 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3311 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3312 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3313 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3314 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3315 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3316 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3318 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3319 // return them to fail the payment.
3320 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3321 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3322 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3324 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3325 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3330 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3331 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3332 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3333 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3334 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3335 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3336 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3337 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3338 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3339 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3340 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3341 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3342 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3343 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3344 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3348 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3349 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3351 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3352 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3356 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3357 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3358 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3359 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3360 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3361 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3362 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3363 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3367 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3368 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3369 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3370 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3372 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3373 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3374 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3375 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3377 match &self.holder_signer {
3378 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3379 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3380 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3381 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3382 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3385 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3389 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3390 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3391 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3393 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3394 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3395 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3397 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3398 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3399 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3402 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3403 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3405 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3411 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3412 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3413 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3414 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3415 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3418 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3420 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3422 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3423 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3428 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3429 // We've exhausted our options
3432 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3433 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3436 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3437 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3438 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3439 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3441 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3442 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3443 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3444 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3445 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3446 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3448 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3450 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3455 // Internal utility functions for channels
3457 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3458 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3459 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3461 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3463 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3464 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3465 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3467 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3470 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3472 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3475 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3476 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3477 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3479 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3481 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3482 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3483 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3484 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3485 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3488 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3489 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3490 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3491 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3492 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3493 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3494 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3497 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3498 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3500 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3502 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3503 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3504 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3505 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3506 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3507 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3508 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3511 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3512 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3514 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3515 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3518 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3519 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3520 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3521 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3522 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3523 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3526 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3527 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3528 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3529 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3530 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3531 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3532 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3533 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3534 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3535 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3536 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3537 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3540 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3541 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3542 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3543 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3544 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3545 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3548 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3549 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3551 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3552 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3553 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3557 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3558 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3559 trait FailHTLCContents {
3560 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3561 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3562 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3563 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3565 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3566 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3567 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3568 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3570 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3571 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3573 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3574 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3577 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3578 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3579 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3580 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3583 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3584 failure_code: self.1
3587 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3588 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3590 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3591 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3593 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3594 failure_code: self.1
3599 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3600 fn name() -> &'static str;
3602 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3603 fn name() -> &'static str {
3607 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3608 fn name() -> &'static str {
3609 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3613 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3614 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3615 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
3617 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3618 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3619 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3620 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3622 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3623 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3625 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3627 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3628 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3629 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3630 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3632 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3633 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3643 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3644 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3645 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3646 // outside of those situations will fail.
3647 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3651 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3656 1 + // script length (0)
3660 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3661 2 + // witness marker and flag
3662 1 + // witness element count
3663 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3664 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3665 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3666 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3667 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3668 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3670 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3671 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3672 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3678 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3679 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3680 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3681 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3683 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3684 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3685 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3687 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3688 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3689 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3690 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3691 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3692 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3695 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3696 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3699 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3700 value_to_holder = 0;
3703 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3704 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3705 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3706 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3708 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3709 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3712 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3713 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3716 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3719 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3720 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3722 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3724 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3725 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3726 where L::Target: Logger {
3727 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3728 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3729 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3730 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3731 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3732 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3733 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3734 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3738 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3739 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3740 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3741 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3743 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3744 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3747 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3748 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3749 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3751 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3752 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3753 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3754 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3755 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3756 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3757 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3759 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3760 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3761 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3763 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3764 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3766 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3769 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3770 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3774 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3778 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3779 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3780 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3781 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3782 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3783 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3786 // Now update local state:
3788 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3789 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3790 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3791 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3792 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3793 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3794 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3795 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3797 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3800 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3801 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3802 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3803 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3804 // do not not get into this branch.
3805 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3806 match pending_update {
3807 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3808 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3809 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3810 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3811 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3812 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3813 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3816 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3817 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3819 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3820 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3821 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3822 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3823 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3824 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3830 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3831 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3832 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3835 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3836 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3838 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3839 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3842 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3843 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3845 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3846 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3848 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3849 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3852 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3855 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3856 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3857 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3858 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3863 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3864 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3865 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3866 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3867 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3868 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3869 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3870 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3871 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3872 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3873 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3874 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3875 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3876 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3877 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3879 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3880 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3881 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3882 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3883 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3886 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3887 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3888 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3894 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3895 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3897 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3901 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3902 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3903 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3904 /// before we fail backwards.
3906 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3907 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3908 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3909 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3910 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3911 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3912 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3915 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3916 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3918 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3919 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3920 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3921 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3922 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3923 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3926 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3927 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3928 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3929 /// before we fail backwards.
3931 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3932 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3933 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3934 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3935 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3937 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3938 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3939 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3942 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3943 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3944 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3946 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3947 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3948 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3950 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3951 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3952 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3954 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3959 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3960 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3966 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3968 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3969 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3970 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3974 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3975 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3976 force_holding_cell = true;
3979 // Now update local state:
3980 if force_holding_cell {
3981 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3982 match pending_update {
3983 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3984 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3985 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3986 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3990 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3991 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3993 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3994 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3995 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
4001 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
4002 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4006 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4007 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4009 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4010 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4013 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4016 // Message handlers:
4017 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4018 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4019 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4020 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4021 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4022 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4023 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4026 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4028 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4030 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4031 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4032 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4033 debug_assert!(matches!(
4034 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4036 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4037 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4040 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4041 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4043 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4044 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4045 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4046 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4048 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4051 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4052 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4056 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4057 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4058 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4059 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4060 // when routing outbound payments.
4061 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4065 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4066 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4067 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4068 match &self.context.channel_state {
4069 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4070 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4071 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4072 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4073 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4074 check_reconnection = true;
4075 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4076 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4077 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4078 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4079 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4081 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4082 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4085 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4086 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4087 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4089 if check_reconnection {
4090 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4091 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4092 let expected_point =
4093 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4094 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4096 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4097 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4098 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4099 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4100 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4101 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4103 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4104 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4105 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4106 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4107 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4109 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4115 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4116 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4118 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4120 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4123 pub fn update_add_htlc(
4124 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4125 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4126 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4129 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4130 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4133 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4136 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4139 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4142 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4143 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4146 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4147 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4150 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4154 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4155 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4156 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4157 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4158 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4159 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4160 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4161 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4162 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4163 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4164 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4166 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4167 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4168 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4169 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4170 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4171 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4175 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4176 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4177 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4178 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4179 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4183 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4184 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4186 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4187 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4188 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4190 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4191 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4195 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4198 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4203 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4204 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4208 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4209 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4210 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4211 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4212 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4213 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4216 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4219 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4223 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4224 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4225 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4229 // Now update local state:
4230 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4231 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4232 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4233 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4234 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4235 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4236 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4237 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4243 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4245 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4246 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4247 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4248 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4249 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4250 None => fail_reason.into(),
4251 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4252 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4253 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4256 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4260 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4262 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4263 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4265 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4271 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4274 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4275 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4278 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4279 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4282 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4285 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4286 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4289 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4293 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4297 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4298 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4301 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4305 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4309 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4310 where L::Target: Logger
4312 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4313 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4315 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4318 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4319 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4322 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4324 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4326 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4327 let commitment_txid = {
4328 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4329 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4330 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4332 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4333 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4334 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4335 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4336 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4341 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4343 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4344 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4345 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4346 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4349 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4350 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4351 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4355 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4357 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4358 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4359 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4360 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4361 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4362 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4363 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4364 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4365 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4366 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4367 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4373 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4377 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4378 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4379 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4380 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4381 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4382 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4383 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4384 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4385 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4386 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4387 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4388 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4389 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4392 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4393 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4394 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4395 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4396 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4397 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4398 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4400 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4401 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4402 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4403 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4404 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4405 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4406 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4409 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4410 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4413 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4415 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4416 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4417 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4420 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4423 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4424 commitment_stats.tx,
4426 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4427 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4428 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4431 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4432 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4434 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4435 let mut need_commitment = false;
4436 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4437 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4438 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4439 need_commitment = true;
4443 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4444 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4445 Some(resolution.clone())
4447 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4448 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4449 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4450 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4451 need_commitment = true;
4454 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4455 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4456 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4457 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4458 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4459 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4460 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4461 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4462 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4463 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4464 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4465 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4466 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4467 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4469 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4471 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4472 need_commitment = true;
4476 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4477 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4478 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4479 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4480 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4481 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4482 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4484 nondust_htlc_sources,
4486 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4489 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4490 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4491 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4492 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4493 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4495 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4496 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4497 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4498 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4499 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4500 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4501 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4502 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4503 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4504 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4505 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4506 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4507 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4508 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4510 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4511 &self.context.channel_id);
4512 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4515 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4516 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4517 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4518 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4519 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4520 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4521 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4522 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4523 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4527 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4528 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4529 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4530 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4533 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4534 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4535 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4536 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4537 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4538 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4539 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4541 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4542 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4543 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4546 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4547 /// for our counterparty.
4548 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4549 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4550 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4551 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4553 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4554 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4555 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4556 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4558 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4559 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4560 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4561 updates: Vec::new(),
4562 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4565 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4566 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4567 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4568 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4569 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4570 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4571 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4572 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4573 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4574 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4575 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4576 // to rebalance channels.
4577 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4578 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4579 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4580 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4582 match self.send_htlc(
4583 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4584 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4586 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4589 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4590 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4591 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4592 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4593 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4594 // into the holding cell without ever being
4595 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4596 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4597 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4600 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4607 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4608 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4609 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4610 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4611 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4612 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4613 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4614 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4615 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4616 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4617 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4618 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4621 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4622 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4623 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4625 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4626 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4627 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4630 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4632 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4633 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4634 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4635 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4636 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4637 // for a full revocation before failing.
4638 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4639 update_fail_count += 1;
4641 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4643 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4648 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4649 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4651 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4652 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4657 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4658 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4659 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4660 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4661 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4663 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4664 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4665 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4667 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4668 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4674 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4675 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4676 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4677 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4678 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4679 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4680 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4681 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4682 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4684 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4687 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4688 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4690 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4691 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4694 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4696 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4697 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4698 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4702 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4703 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4704 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4705 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4706 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4707 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4708 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4709 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4713 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4715 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4716 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4719 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4720 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4721 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4722 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4724 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4726 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4731 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4732 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4733 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4734 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4735 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4736 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4737 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4738 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4739 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4741 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4744 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4745 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4746 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4747 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4748 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4749 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4750 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4751 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4752 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4754 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4755 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4758 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4759 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4760 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4761 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4762 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4763 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4764 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4765 let mut require_commitment = false;
4766 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4769 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4770 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4771 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4772 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4774 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4775 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4776 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4777 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4778 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4779 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4781 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4785 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4786 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4787 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4788 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4789 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4791 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4792 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4793 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4798 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4799 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4801 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4805 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4806 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4808 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4809 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4810 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4811 require_commitment = true;
4812 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4814 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4815 match pending_htlc_status {
4816 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4817 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4818 require_commitment = true;
4820 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4821 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4822 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4824 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4825 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4826 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4830 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4831 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4832 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4833 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4836 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4837 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4838 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4839 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4845 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4846 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4847 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4848 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4849 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4851 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4852 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4853 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4854 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4855 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4856 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4857 require_commitment = true;
4861 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4863 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4864 match update_state {
4865 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4866 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4867 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4868 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4869 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4870 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4872 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4873 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4874 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4875 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4876 require_commitment = true;
4877 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4878 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4883 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4884 let release_state_str =
4885 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4886 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4887 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4888 if !release_monitor {
4889 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4890 update: monitor_update,
4892 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4894 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4899 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4901 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4902 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4903 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4904 if require_commitment {
4905 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4906 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4907 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4908 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4910 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4911 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4912 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4913 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4914 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4916 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4917 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4918 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4919 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4920 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4923 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4924 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4925 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4926 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4927 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4928 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4930 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4931 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4933 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4934 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4936 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4937 if require_commitment {
4938 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4940 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4941 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4942 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4943 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4945 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4946 &self.context.channel_id(),
4947 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4950 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4951 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4953 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4954 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4956 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4957 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4963 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4964 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4965 /// commitment update.
4966 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4967 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4968 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4970 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4971 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4974 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4975 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4976 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4977 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4979 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4980 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4981 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4982 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4983 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4984 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4985 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4987 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4988 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4990 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4991 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4993 if !self.context.is_live() {
4994 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4997 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4998 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4999 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
5000 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5001 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5002 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5003 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5004 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5005 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5006 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5010 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5011 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5012 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5013 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
5014 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5015 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5018 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5019 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5023 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5024 force_holding_cell = true;
5027 if force_holding_cell {
5028 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5032 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5033 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5035 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5036 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5041 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5042 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5044 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5046 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5047 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5048 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5049 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5053 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5054 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5055 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5059 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5060 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5063 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5064 // will be retransmitted.
5065 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5066 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5067 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5069 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5070 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5072 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5073 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5074 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5075 // this HTLC accordingly
5076 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5079 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5080 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5081 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5082 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5085 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5086 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5087 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5088 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5089 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5090 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5095 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5097 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5098 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5099 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5100 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5104 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5105 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5106 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5107 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5108 // the update upon reconnection.
5109 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5113 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5115 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5116 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5120 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5121 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5122 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5123 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5124 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5125 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5126 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5128 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5129 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5130 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5131 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5132 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5133 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5134 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5136 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5137 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5138 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5139 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5140 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5141 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5142 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5145 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5146 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5147 /// to the remote side.
5148 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5149 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5150 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5151 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5154 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5156 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5157 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5159 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5160 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5161 // first received the funding_signed.
5162 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5163 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5164 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5165 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5167 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5169 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5170 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5171 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5172 funding_broadcastable = None;
5175 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5176 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5177 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5178 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5179 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5180 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5181 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5182 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5183 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5184 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5185 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5186 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5187 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5188 next_per_commitment_point,
5189 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5193 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5195 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5196 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5197 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5198 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5199 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5200 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5201 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5202 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5204 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5205 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5206 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5207 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5208 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5209 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5210 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5214 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5215 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5217 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5218 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5220 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5221 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5224 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5225 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5226 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5227 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5228 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5229 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5230 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5231 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5232 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5233 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5237 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5238 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5240 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5243 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5246 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5248 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5249 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5250 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5251 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5252 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5253 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5254 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5255 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5256 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
5257 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5259 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
5261 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5263 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
5269 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5271 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5272 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5273 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5274 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5276 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5277 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5279 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5280 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5283 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5284 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5285 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5286 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5288 SignerResumeUpdates {
5295 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5296 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5297 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5298 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5299 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5300 per_commitment_secret,
5301 next_per_commitment_point,
5303 next_local_nonce: None,
5307 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5308 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5309 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5310 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5311 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5312 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5314 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5315 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5316 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5317 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5318 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5319 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5320 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5321 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5322 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5323 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5324 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5329 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5330 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5332 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5333 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5334 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5335 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5336 reason: err_packet.clone()
5339 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5340 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5341 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5342 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5343 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5344 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5347 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5348 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5349 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5350 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5351 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5358 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5359 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5360 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5361 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5365 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5366 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5367 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5368 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5369 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5370 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5371 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5375 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5376 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5378 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5379 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5380 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5381 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5386 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5387 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5392 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5393 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5394 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5395 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5396 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5397 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5398 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5403 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5404 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5406 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5407 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5408 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5409 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5410 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5411 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5412 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5413 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5416 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5418 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5419 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5420 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5421 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5425 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5426 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5427 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5430 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5431 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5432 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5433 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5434 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5435 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5438 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5439 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5440 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5441 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5442 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5445 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5446 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5447 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5448 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5449 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5450 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5451 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5452 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5456 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5457 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5458 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5459 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5460 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5461 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5462 our_commitment_transaction
5466 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5467 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5468 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5469 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5471 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5473 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5475 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5476 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5477 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5478 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5479 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5482 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5483 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5484 channel_ready: None,
5485 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5486 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5487 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5491 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5492 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5493 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5494 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5495 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5496 next_per_commitment_point,
5497 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5499 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5500 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5501 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5505 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5506 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5507 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5509 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5510 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5511 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5514 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5517 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5518 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5519 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5520 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5521 our_commitment_transaction
5525 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5526 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5527 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5528 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5529 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5530 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5531 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5533 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5535 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5536 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5537 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5538 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5539 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5540 next_per_commitment_point,
5541 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5545 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5546 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5547 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5549 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5552 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5553 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5554 raa: required_revoke,
5555 commitment_update: None,
5556 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5558 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5559 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5560 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5562 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5565 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5566 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5567 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5568 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5569 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5570 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5573 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5574 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5575 raa: required_revoke,
5576 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5577 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5580 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5581 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5582 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5583 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5584 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5587 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5588 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5589 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5590 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5595 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5596 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5597 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5598 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5600 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5602 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5604 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5605 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5606 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5607 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5608 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5609 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5610 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5611 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5613 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5614 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5615 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5616 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5617 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5619 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5620 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5621 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5622 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5625 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5626 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5627 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5628 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5629 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5630 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5631 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5632 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5633 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5634 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5635 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5636 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5637 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5638 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5639 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5641 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5644 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5645 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5648 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5649 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5650 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5651 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5652 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5653 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5656 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5657 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5658 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5659 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5660 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5661 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5664 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5670 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5671 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5672 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5673 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5675 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5676 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5677 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5678 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5679 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5680 return Ok((None, None, None));
5683 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5684 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5685 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5687 return Ok((None, None, None));
5690 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5691 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5692 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5693 return Ok((None, None, None));
5696 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5698 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5699 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5700 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5701 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5703 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5704 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5706 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5707 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5709 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5710 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5711 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5712 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5714 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5715 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5716 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5720 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5726 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5727 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5729 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5730 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5733 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5734 /// within our expected timeframe.
5736 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5737 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5738 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5741 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5744 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5745 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5749 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5750 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5752 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5755 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5756 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5757 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5758 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5761 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5762 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5766 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5768 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5769 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5772 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5773 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5774 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5777 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5780 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5781 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5782 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5783 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5785 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5788 assert!(send_shutdown);
5789 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5790 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5791 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5793 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5794 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5796 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5801 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5803 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5804 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5806 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5807 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5808 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5809 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5810 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5811 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5812 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5814 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5816 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5817 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5819 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5820 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5821 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5822 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5826 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5827 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5828 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5829 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5830 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5831 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5833 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5834 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5841 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5842 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5844 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5847 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5848 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5850 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5852 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5853 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5854 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5855 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5856 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5857 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5858 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5859 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5860 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5862 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5863 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5866 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5870 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5871 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5872 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5873 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5875 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5878 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5881 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5884 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5888 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5889 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5892 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5893 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5894 return Ok((None, None, None));
5897 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5898 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5899 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5902 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5904 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5907 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5908 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5909 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5910 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5911 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5915 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5916 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5921 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5922 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5924 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5927 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5928 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5929 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5930 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5932 monitor_update: None,
5933 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5934 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5935 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5936 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5937 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5938 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5939 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5940 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5942 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5943 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5944 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5945 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5949 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5951 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5952 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5953 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5954 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5956 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5959 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5960 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5962 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5963 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5964 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5965 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5967 monitor_update: None,
5968 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5969 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5970 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5971 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5972 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5973 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5974 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5975 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5977 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5978 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5979 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5980 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5985 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5986 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5987 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5988 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5990 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5991 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5992 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5994 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5996 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6003 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
6004 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
6005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
6007 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6010 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6014 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6015 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6016 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6017 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6018 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6020 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6022 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6024 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6025 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6028 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6029 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6030 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6031 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6032 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6033 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6034 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6035 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6040 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6041 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6042 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6043 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6049 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6050 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6051 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6052 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6054 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6060 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6061 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6062 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6063 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6064 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6065 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6066 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6068 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6069 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6072 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6074 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6075 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6081 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6082 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6083 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6084 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6085 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6086 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6087 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6089 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6090 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6097 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6098 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6099 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6101 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6104 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6105 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6108 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
6109 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
6110 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
6111 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6114 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6115 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6116 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6118 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6119 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6120 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6121 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6122 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6123 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6124 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6128 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6129 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6130 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6131 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6132 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6133 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6134 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6138 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6139 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6144 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6145 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6146 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6147 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6148 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6149 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6153 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6154 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6155 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6156 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6158 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6159 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6160 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6161 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6162 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6163 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6164 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6165 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6166 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6168 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6169 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6170 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6177 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6178 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6181 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6182 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6185 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6186 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6190 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6191 &self.context.holder_signer
6195 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6197 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6198 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6199 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6200 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6201 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6202 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6204 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6206 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6214 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6215 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6219 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6220 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6221 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6222 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6225 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6226 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6227 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6228 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6231 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6232 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6233 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6234 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6235 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6236 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6239 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6240 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6241 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6242 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6243 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6244 if !release_monitor {
6245 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6254 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6255 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6256 /// here after logging them.
6257 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6258 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6259 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6260 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6263 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6264 update.update.update_id,
6274 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6275 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6278 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6279 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6280 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6282 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6283 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6285 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6286 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6288 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6289 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6290 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6293 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6294 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6295 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6296 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6297 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6298 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6300 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6301 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6302 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6304 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6305 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6306 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6307 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6308 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6309 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6315 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6316 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6317 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6318 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6321 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6322 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6323 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6326 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6327 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6328 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6331 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6332 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6333 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6336 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6337 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6338 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6339 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6340 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6343 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6344 self.context.channel_update_status
6347 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6348 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6349 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6352 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6354 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6355 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6356 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6360 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6361 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6362 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6365 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6369 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6370 // channel_ready yet.
6371 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6375 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6376 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6377 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6378 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6380 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6381 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6382 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6384 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6385 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6388 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6389 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6391 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6392 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6393 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6394 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6395 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6396 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6397 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6398 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6400 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6404 if need_commitment_update {
6405 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6406 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6407 let next_per_commitment_point =
6408 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6409 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6410 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6411 next_per_commitment_point,
6412 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6416 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6422 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6423 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6424 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6425 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6426 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6427 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6428 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6430 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6433 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6434 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6435 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6436 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6437 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6438 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6439 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6440 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6441 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6442 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6443 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6444 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6445 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6446 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6447 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6448 // channel and move on.
6449 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6450 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6452 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6453 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6454 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6456 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6457 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6458 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6459 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6460 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6461 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6462 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6463 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6468 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6469 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6470 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6471 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6472 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6475 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6476 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6477 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6478 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6479 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6480 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6483 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6484 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6485 // may have already happened for this block).
6486 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6487 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6488 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6489 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6492 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6493 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6494 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6495 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6503 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6504 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6505 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6506 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6508 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6509 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6512 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6514 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6515 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6516 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6517 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6519 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6522 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6525 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6526 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6527 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6528 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6530 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6533 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6534 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6535 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6537 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6538 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6540 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6541 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6542 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6550 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6552 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6553 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6554 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6556 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6557 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6560 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6561 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6562 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6563 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6564 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6565 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6566 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6567 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6570 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6571 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6572 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6573 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6575 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6576 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6577 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6579 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6580 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6581 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6582 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6584 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6585 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6586 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6587 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6588 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6589 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6590 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6593 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6594 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6596 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6599 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6600 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6601 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6602 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6603 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6604 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6605 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6606 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6607 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6608 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6609 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6610 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6611 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6612 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6613 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6614 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6615 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6621 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6626 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6627 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6629 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6630 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6631 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6632 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6634 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6637 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6639 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6640 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6641 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6642 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6643 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6644 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6646 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6647 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6650 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6651 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6652 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6653 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6654 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6655 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6657 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6658 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6661 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6662 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6663 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6664 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6665 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6671 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6672 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6673 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6674 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6676 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6679 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6683 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6687 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6688 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6692 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6696 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6697 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6700 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6704 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6706 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6711 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6712 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6713 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6715 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6720 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6722 None => return None,
6725 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6727 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6728 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6730 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6731 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6734 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6740 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6742 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6743 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6744 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6745 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6746 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6747 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6748 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6750 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6751 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6752 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6753 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6754 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6755 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6756 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6757 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6758 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6759 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6760 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6761 contents: announcement,
6764 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6769 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6773 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6774 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6775 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6776 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6777 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6778 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6779 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6780 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6782 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6784 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6785 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6786 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6787 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6789 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6791 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6792 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6795 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6796 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6797 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6798 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6801 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6804 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6805 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6806 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6807 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6808 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6809 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6812 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6814 Err(_) => return None,
6816 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6817 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6822 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6823 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6824 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6825 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6826 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6827 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6828 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6829 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6830 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6831 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6832 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6833 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6834 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6835 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6836 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6837 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6840 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6843 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6844 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6845 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6846 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6847 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6848 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6849 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6850 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6851 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6853 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6854 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6855 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6856 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6857 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6858 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6859 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6860 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6861 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6863 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6864 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6865 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6866 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6867 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6868 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6869 next_funding_txid: None,
6874 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6876 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6877 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6878 /// commitment update.
6880 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6881 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6882 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6883 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6884 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6885 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6886 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6889 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6890 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6891 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6893 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6894 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6899 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6900 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6902 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6904 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6905 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6907 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6908 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6909 /// regenerate them.
6911 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6912 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6914 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6915 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6916 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6917 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6918 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6919 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6920 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6921 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6923 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6924 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6925 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6927 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6929 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6930 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6931 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6934 if amount_msat == 0 {
6935 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6938 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6939 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6940 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6941 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6944 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6945 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6946 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6949 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6950 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6951 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6952 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6953 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6954 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6955 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6956 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6959 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6960 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6961 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6962 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6963 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6964 else { "to peer" });
6966 if need_holding_cell {
6967 force_holding_cell = true;
6970 // Now update local state:
6971 if force_holding_cell {
6972 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6977 onion_routing_packet,
6984 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6985 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6987 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6989 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6995 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6996 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6997 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7001 onion_routing_packet,
7005 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
7010 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7011 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7012 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7013 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7015 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7016 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7017 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7019 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7020 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7024 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7025 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7026 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7027 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7028 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7029 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7030 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7033 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7034 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7035 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7036 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7037 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7038 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7041 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7043 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7044 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7045 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7046 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7047 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7049 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7050 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7053 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7054 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7055 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7056 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7057 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7058 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7059 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7060 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7061 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7062 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7063 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7064 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7066 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7068 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7072 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7073 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7074 where L::Target: Logger
7076 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7077 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7078 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7080 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7082 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7083 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7084 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7085 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7086 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7087 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7088 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7089 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7090 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7091 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7092 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7098 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7101 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7102 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7103 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7104 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7105 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7106 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7108 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7109 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7110 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7112 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7113 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7114 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7117 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7118 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7122 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7123 &commitment_stats.tx,
7124 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7125 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7126 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7127 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7129 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7131 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7132 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7133 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7134 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7136 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7137 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7138 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7139 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7140 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7141 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7145 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7146 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7150 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7151 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7153 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7159 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7160 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7162 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7163 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7164 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7165 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7166 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7167 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7168 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7169 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7171 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7172 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7173 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7176 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7177 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7178 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7184 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7186 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7187 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7188 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7189 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7190 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7192 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7194 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7200 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7201 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7202 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7203 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7204 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7206 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7207 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7208 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7211 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7212 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7214 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7215 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7217 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7218 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7220 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7221 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7222 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7225 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7228 // use override shutdown script if provided
7229 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7230 Some(script) => script,
7232 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7233 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7234 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7235 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7239 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7240 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7242 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7247 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7248 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7249 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7250 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7251 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7253 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7254 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7255 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7256 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7257 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7258 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7259 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7261 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7263 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7264 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7266 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7267 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7268 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7271 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7272 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7273 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7274 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7275 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7277 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7278 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7285 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7286 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7288 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7291 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7292 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7293 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7295 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7296 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7300 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7304 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7305 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7306 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7307 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7310 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7311 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7312 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7313 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7314 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7315 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7316 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7317 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7319 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7320 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7321 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7322 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7323 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7324 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7327 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7328 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7329 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7332 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7336 counterparty_node_id,
7338 channel_value_satoshis,
7342 current_chain_height,
7343 outbound_scid_alias,
7344 temporary_channel_id,
7345 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7350 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7355 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7356 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7357 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7358 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7359 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7360 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7361 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7362 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7363 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7365 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7370 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7371 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7372 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7375 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7376 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7377 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7378 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7381 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7383 next_local_nonce: None,
7387 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7388 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7389 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7390 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7391 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7392 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7393 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7394 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7395 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7396 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7397 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7400 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7401 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7403 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7405 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7406 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7407 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7408 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7411 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7412 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7414 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7416 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7417 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7419 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7420 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7421 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7422 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7423 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7424 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7427 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7428 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7430 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7431 if funding_created.is_none() {
7432 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7433 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7435 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7436 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7437 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7438 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7446 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7447 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7448 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7449 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7450 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7451 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7453 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7455 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7456 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7459 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7460 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7461 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7463 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7464 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7467 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7468 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7471 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7472 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7475 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7477 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7478 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7479 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7480 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7481 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7482 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7483 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7484 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7485 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7486 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7487 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7488 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7489 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7490 first_per_commitment_point,
7491 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7492 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7493 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7494 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7496 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7498 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7499 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7504 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7505 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7507 // Check sanity of message fields:
7508 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7509 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7511 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7512 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7514 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7517 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7518 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7520 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7523 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7525 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7527 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7528 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7529 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7531 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7532 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7535 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7536 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7538 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7542 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7543 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7544 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7546 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7547 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7549 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7550 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7552 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7555 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7556 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7558 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7561 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7562 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7565 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7566 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7569 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7570 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7572 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7573 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7576 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7577 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7580 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7581 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7582 &Some(ref script) => {
7583 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7584 if script.len() == 0 {
7587 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7590 Some(script.clone())
7593 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7600 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7601 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7602 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7603 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7604 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7606 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7607 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7609 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7612 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7613 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7614 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7615 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7616 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7617 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7620 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7621 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7622 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7625 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7626 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7628 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7629 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7631 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7636 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7637 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7638 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7639 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7640 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7644 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7645 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7647 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7648 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7650 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7651 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7652 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7653 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7656 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7658 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7659 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7660 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7661 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7663 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7664 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7666 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7667 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7669 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7670 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7671 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7672 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7673 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7674 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7678 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7679 initial_commitment_tx,
7682 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7683 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7687 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7688 if validated.is_err() {
7689 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7692 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7693 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7694 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7695 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7696 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7697 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7698 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7699 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7700 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7701 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7702 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7703 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7705 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7706 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7707 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7708 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7709 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7710 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7711 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7712 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7714 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7715 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7716 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7718 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7720 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7721 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7723 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7725 let mut channel = Channel {
7726 context: self.context,
7727 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7728 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7731 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7732 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7733 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7736 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7738 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7739 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7740 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7741 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7742 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7747 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7748 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7749 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7750 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7753 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7754 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7755 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7756 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7757 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7758 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7759 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7760 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7764 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7765 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7766 // `static_remote_key`.
7767 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7770 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7771 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7774 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7775 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7778 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7780 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7781 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7788 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7789 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7790 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7791 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7792 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7793 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7794 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7795 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7796 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7797 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7801 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7803 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7804 // support this channel type.
7805 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7807 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7808 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7809 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7810 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7811 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7812 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7813 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7817 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7821 counterparty_node_id,
7825 current_chain_height,
7830 counterparty_pubkeys,
7832 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7833 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7835 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7837 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7842 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7843 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7845 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7846 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7847 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7848 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7851 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7852 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7854 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7856 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7857 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7860 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7863 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7864 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7865 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7867 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7868 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7869 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7870 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7872 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7873 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7874 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7875 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7876 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7877 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7878 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7879 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7880 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7881 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7882 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7883 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7884 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7885 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7886 first_per_commitment_point,
7887 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7888 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7889 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7891 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7893 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7895 next_local_nonce: None,
7899 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7900 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7902 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7904 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7905 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7908 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7909 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7911 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7912 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7913 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7914 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7915 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7916 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7917 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7918 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7919 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7920 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7921 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7923 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7926 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7927 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7928 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7932 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7933 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7936 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7937 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7939 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7940 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7942 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7944 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7945 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7946 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7947 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7950 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7951 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7952 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7953 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7954 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7956 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7958 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7959 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7960 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7963 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7964 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7965 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7969 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7970 initial_commitment_tx,
7973 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7974 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7977 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7978 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7981 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7983 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7984 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7985 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7986 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7988 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7990 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7991 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7992 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7993 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7994 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7995 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7996 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7997 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7998 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7999 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
8000 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8002 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8003 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8004 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8005 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8006 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8007 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8008 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8010 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8011 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8013 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8014 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8015 let mut channel = Channel {
8016 context: self.context,
8017 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8018 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8020 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
8021 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8023 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8027 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8028 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8029 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8030 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8031 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8032 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8033 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8036 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8037 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8038 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8039 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8040 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8041 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8042 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8043 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8044 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8045 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8047 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8048 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8049 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8051 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8053 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8054 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8056 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8057 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8060 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8064 counterparty_node_id,
8070 current_chain_height,
8071 outbound_scid_alias,
8072 temporary_channel_id,
8073 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8078 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8079 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8080 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8081 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8082 funding_tx_locktime,
8083 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8089 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8090 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8091 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8092 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8093 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8094 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8096 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8098 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8099 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8102 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8103 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8104 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8107 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8108 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8111 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8112 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8113 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8114 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8115 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8116 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8117 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8119 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8120 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8122 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8123 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8124 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8125 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8126 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8127 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8128 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8129 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8130 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8131 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8132 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8133 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8134 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8135 first_per_commitment_point,
8136 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8137 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8138 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8139 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8141 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8143 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8144 second_per_commitment_point,
8145 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8146 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8151 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8152 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8153 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8154 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8155 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8156 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8159 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8160 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8161 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8162 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8163 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8164 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8165 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8166 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8167 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8168 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8169 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8173 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8174 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8175 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8176 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8177 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8179 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8180 // support this channel type.
8181 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8183 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8185 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8187 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8188 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8189 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8190 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8191 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8192 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8195 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8199 counterparty_node_id,
8203 current_chain_height,
8209 counterparty_pubkeys,
8211 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8212 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8213 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8214 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8216 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8217 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8218 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8219 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8223 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8224 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8225 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8226 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8227 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8228 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8235 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8236 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8238 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8239 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8240 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8241 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8244 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8245 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8247 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8249 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8250 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8253 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8256 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8257 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8258 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8260 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8261 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8262 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8263 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8264 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8265 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8266 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8268 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8269 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8270 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8271 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8272 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8273 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8274 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8275 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8276 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8277 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8278 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8279 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8280 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8281 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8282 first_per_commitment_point,
8283 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8284 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8285 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8287 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8289 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8290 second_per_commitment_point,
8291 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8295 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8296 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8298 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8300 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8301 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8305 // Unfunded channel utilities
8307 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8308 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8309 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8310 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8311 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8312 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8313 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8314 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8315 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8316 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8319 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8320 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8321 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8322 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8323 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8324 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8330 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8331 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8333 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8339 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8340 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8341 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8342 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8343 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8345 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8346 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8347 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8348 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8354 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8355 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8356 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8357 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8358 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8359 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8364 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8365 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8366 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8367 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8369 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8370 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8371 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8372 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8377 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8378 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8379 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8380 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8381 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8382 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8387 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8388 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8389 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8392 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8393 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8394 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8395 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8399 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8401 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8403 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8405 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8406 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8407 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8408 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8409 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8411 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8412 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8413 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8414 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8416 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8418 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8419 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8420 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8422 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8424 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8426 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8428 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8430 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8431 // deserialized from that format.
8432 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8433 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8434 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8436 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8438 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8439 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8440 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8442 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8443 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8444 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8445 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8448 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8449 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8450 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8453 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8454 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8455 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8456 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8458 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8459 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8461 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8462 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8463 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8468 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8471 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8473 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8474 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8475 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8480 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8483 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8486 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8488 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8493 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8494 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8495 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8497 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8498 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8499 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8500 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8501 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8502 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8503 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8505 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8507 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8509 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8512 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8513 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8514 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8517 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8519 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8520 preimages.push(preimage);
8522 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8523 reason.write(writer)?;
8525 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8527 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8528 preimages.push(preimage);
8530 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8531 reason.write(writer)?;
8534 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8535 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8538 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8539 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8540 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8541 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8542 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8543 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8545 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8546 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8547 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8550 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8551 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8552 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8553 source.write(writer)?;
8554 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8556 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8557 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8559 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8561 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8562 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8564 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8566 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8567 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8569 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8570 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8572 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8573 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8574 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8576 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8578 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8579 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8584 match self.context.resend_order {
8585 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8586 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8589 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8590 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8591 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8593 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8594 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8595 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8596 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8599 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8600 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8601 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8602 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8603 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8606 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8607 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8608 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8609 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8611 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8612 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8613 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8615 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8617 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8618 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8619 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8620 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8622 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8623 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8624 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8625 // consider the stale state on reload.
8628 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8629 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8630 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8632 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8633 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8634 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8636 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8637 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8639 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8640 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8641 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8643 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8644 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8646 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8649 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8650 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8651 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8653 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8656 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8657 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8659 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8660 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8661 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8663 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8665 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8667 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8669 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8670 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8671 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8672 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8673 htlc.write(writer)?;
8676 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8677 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8678 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8680 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8681 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8683 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8684 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8685 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8686 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8687 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8688 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8689 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8691 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8692 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8693 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8694 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8695 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8697 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8698 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8700 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8701 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8702 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8703 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8705 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8707 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8708 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8709 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8712 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8713 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8714 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8715 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8716 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8717 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8718 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8720 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8721 (2, chan_type, option),
8722 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8723 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8724 (5, self.context.config, required),
8725 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8726 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8727 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8728 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8729 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8730 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8731 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8732 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8733 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8734 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8735 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8736 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8737 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8738 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8739 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8740 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8741 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8742 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8743 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8744 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8745 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8746 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8747 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8748 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8749 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8756 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8757 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8759 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8760 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8762 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8763 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8764 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8766 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8767 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8768 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8769 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8771 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8773 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8774 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8775 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8776 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8777 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8779 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8780 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8783 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8784 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8785 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8787 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8789 let mut keys_data = None;
8791 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8792 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8793 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8794 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8795 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8796 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8797 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8798 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8799 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8800 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8804 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8805 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8806 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8809 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8811 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8812 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8813 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8815 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8817 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8818 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8819 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8820 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8821 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8822 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8823 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8824 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8826 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8827 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8829 Readable::read(reader)?
8831 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8834 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8835 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8837 Readable::read(reader)?
8839 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8841 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8842 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8843 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8848 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8849 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8850 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8851 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8852 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8853 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8854 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8855 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8856 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8857 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8858 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8859 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8861 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8862 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8865 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8866 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8869 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8870 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8872 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8874 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8875 blinding_point: None,
8879 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8880 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8881 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8882 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8883 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8884 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8885 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8886 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8887 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8888 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8889 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8890 blinding_point: None,
8892 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8893 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8894 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8896 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8897 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8898 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8900 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8904 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8905 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8906 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8907 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8910 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8911 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8912 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8914 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8915 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8916 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8917 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8920 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8921 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8922 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8923 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8926 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8928 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8930 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8931 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8932 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8933 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8935 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8936 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8937 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8938 // consider the stale state on reload.
8939 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8942 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8943 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8944 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8946 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8949 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8950 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8951 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8953 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8954 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8955 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8956 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8958 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8959 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8961 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8962 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8964 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8965 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8966 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8968 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8970 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8971 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8973 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8974 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8977 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8979 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8980 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8981 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8982 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8984 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8987 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8988 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8990 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8992 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8993 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8995 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8996 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8998 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9000 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9001 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9002 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9004 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9005 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9006 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9010 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9011 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9012 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9014 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9020 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9021 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9022 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9023 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9024 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9025 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9026 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9027 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9028 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9029 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9031 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9032 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9033 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9034 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9035 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9036 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9037 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9039 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9040 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9041 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9042 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9044 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9046 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9047 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9049 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9051 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9053 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9054 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9056 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9057 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9059 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9060 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9061 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9062 (2, channel_type, option),
9063 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9064 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9065 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9066 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9067 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9068 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9069 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9070 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9071 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9072 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9073 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9074 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9075 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9076 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9077 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9078 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9079 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9080 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9081 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9082 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9083 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9084 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9085 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9086 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9087 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9088 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9089 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
9090 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9093 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9094 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9095 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9096 // required channel parameters.
9097 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9098 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9100 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9102 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9103 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9104 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9105 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9108 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9109 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9110 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9112 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9113 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9115 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9116 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9121 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9122 if iter.next().is_some() {
9123 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9127 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9128 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9129 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9130 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9131 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9134 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9135 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9136 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9138 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9139 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9141 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9142 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9143 // separate u64 values.
9144 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9146 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9148 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9149 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9150 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9151 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9153 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9154 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9156 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9157 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9158 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9159 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9160 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9163 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9164 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9166 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9167 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9168 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9169 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9171 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9172 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9174 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9175 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9176 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9177 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9178 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9181 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9182 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9185 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9186 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9187 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9188 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9189 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9190 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9193 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9194 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9195 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9197 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9202 context: ChannelContext {
9205 config: config.unwrap(),
9209 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9210 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9211 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9214 temporary_channel_id,
9216 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9218 channel_value_satoshis,
9220 latest_monitor_update_id,
9222 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9223 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9226 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9227 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9230 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9231 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9232 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9233 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9237 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9238 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9239 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9240 monitor_pending_forwards,
9241 monitor_pending_failures,
9242 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9243 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9245 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9246 signer_pending_funding: false,
9249 holding_cell_update_fee,
9250 next_holder_htlc_id,
9251 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9252 update_time_counter,
9255 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9256 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9257 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9258 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9260 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9261 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9262 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9263 closing_fee_limits: None,
9264 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9266 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9267 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9269 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9271 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9272 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9273 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9274 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9275 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9276 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9277 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9278 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9279 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9282 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9284 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9285 funding_transaction,
9288 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9289 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9290 counterparty_node_id,
9292 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9296 channel_update_status,
9297 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9301 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9302 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9303 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9304 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9306 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9307 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9309 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9310 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9311 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9313 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9314 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9316 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9317 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9319 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9322 local_initiated_shutdown,
9324 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9326 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9327 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9335 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9336 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9337 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9338 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9339 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9340 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9341 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9342 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9343 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9344 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9345 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9346 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9347 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9348 use crate::ln::msgs;
9349 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9350 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9351 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9352 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9353 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9354 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9355 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9356 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9357 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9358 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9359 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9360 use crate::util::test_utils;
9361 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9362 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9363 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9364 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9365 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9366 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9367 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9368 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9369 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9370 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9371 use crate::prelude::*;
9374 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9375 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9376 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9377 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9379 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9380 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9381 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9382 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9385 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9388 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9389 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9395 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9396 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9397 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9398 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9402 signer: InMemorySigner,
9405 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9406 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9409 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9410 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9412 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9414 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9415 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9418 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9422 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9424 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9425 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9426 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9427 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9428 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9431 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9432 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9433 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9434 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9438 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9439 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9440 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9444 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9445 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9446 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9447 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9450 let seed = [42; 32];
9451 let network = Network::Testnet;
9452 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9453 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9454 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9457 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9458 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9459 let config = UserConfig::default();
9460 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9461 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9462 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9464 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9465 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9469 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9470 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9472 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9473 let original_fee = 253;
9474 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9475 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9476 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9477 let seed = [42; 32];
9478 let network = Network::Testnet;
9479 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9481 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9482 let config = UserConfig::default();
9483 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9485 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9486 // same as the old fee.
9487 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9488 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9489 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9493 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9494 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9495 // dust limits are used.
9496 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9497 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9498 let seed = [42; 32];
9499 let network = Network::Testnet;
9500 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9501 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9502 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9504 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9505 // they have different dust limits.
9507 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9508 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9509 let config = UserConfig::default();
9510 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9512 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9513 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9514 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9515 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9516 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9518 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9519 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9520 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9521 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9522 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9524 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9525 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9526 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9527 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9529 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9530 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9531 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9533 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9534 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9535 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9537 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9538 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9539 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9541 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9542 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9543 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9544 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9547 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9549 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9550 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9551 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9552 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9553 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9554 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9555 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9556 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9557 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9559 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9560 blinding_point: None,
9563 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9564 // the dust limit check.
9565 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9566 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9567 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9568 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9570 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9571 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9572 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9573 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9574 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9575 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9576 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9580 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9581 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9582 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9583 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9584 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9585 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9586 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9587 let seed = [42; 32];
9588 let network = Network::Testnet;
9589 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9591 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9592 let config = UserConfig::default();
9593 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9595 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9596 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9598 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9599 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9600 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9601 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9602 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9603 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9605 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9606 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9607 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9608 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9609 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9611 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9613 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9614 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9615 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9616 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9617 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9619 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9620 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9621 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9622 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9623 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9627 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9628 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9629 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9630 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9631 let seed = [42; 32];
9632 let network = Network::Testnet;
9633 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9634 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9635 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9637 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9639 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9640 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9641 let config = UserConfig::default();
9642 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9644 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9645 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9646 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9647 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9649 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9650 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9651 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9653 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9654 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9655 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9656 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9658 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9659 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9660 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9662 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9663 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9664 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9666 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9667 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9668 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9669 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9670 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9671 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9672 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9674 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9676 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9677 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9678 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9679 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9680 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9684 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9685 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9686 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9687 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9688 let seed = [42; 32];
9689 let network = Network::Testnet;
9690 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9691 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9692 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9694 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9695 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9696 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9697 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9698 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9699 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9700 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9701 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9703 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9704 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9705 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9706 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9707 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9708 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9710 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9711 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9712 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9713 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9715 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9717 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9718 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9719 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9720 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9721 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9722 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9724 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9725 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9726 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9727 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9729 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9730 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9731 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9732 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9733 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9735 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9736 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9738 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9739 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9740 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9742 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9743 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9744 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9745 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9746 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9748 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9749 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9751 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9752 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9753 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9757 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9759 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9760 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9761 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9763 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9764 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9765 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9766 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9768 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9769 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9770 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9772 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9774 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9775 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9778 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9779 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9780 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9781 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9782 let seed = [42; 32];
9783 let network = Network::Testnet;
9784 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9785 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9786 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9789 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9790 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9791 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9793 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9794 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9796 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9797 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9798 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9800 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9801 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9803 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9805 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9806 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9808 // Channel Negotiations failed
9809 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9810 assert!(result.is_err());
9815 fn channel_update() {
9816 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9817 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9818 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9819 let seed = [42; 32];
9820 let network = Network::Testnet;
9821 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9822 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9823 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9825 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9826 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9827 let config = UserConfig::default();
9828 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9830 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9831 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9832 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9833 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9834 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9836 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9837 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9838 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9839 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9840 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9842 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9843 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9844 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9845 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9847 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9848 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9849 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9851 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9852 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9853 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9855 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9856 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9857 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9859 short_channel_id: 0,
9862 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9863 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9864 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9866 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9867 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9869 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9871 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9873 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9874 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9875 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9876 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9878 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9879 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9880 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9882 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9885 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9889 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9890 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9892 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9893 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9894 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9895 let seed = [42; 32];
9896 let network = Network::Testnet;
9897 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9898 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9900 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9901 let config = UserConfig::default();
9902 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9903 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9904 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9906 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9907 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9908 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9910 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9911 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9912 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9914 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9915 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9916 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9917 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9918 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9921 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9923 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9924 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9925 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9926 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9930 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9931 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9932 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9934 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9937 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9939 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9940 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9941 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9942 blinding_point: None,
9944 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9945 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9947 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9950 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9953 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9955 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9958 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9959 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9960 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9962 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9963 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9966 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9967 blinding_point: None,
9969 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9970 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9973 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9974 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9976 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9977 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9979 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9982 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9983 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9984 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9985 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9986 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9987 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9988 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9989 } = &mut dummy_add {
9990 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9991 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9993 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9994 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9995 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9997 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10000 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10002 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10003 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10004 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10005 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10006 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10007 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10008 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10009 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10012 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10014 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10015 use bitcoin::sighash;
10016 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10017 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10018 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10019 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10020 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10021 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10022 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10023 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10024 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10025 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10026 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10027 use crate::sync::Arc;
10028 use core::str::FromStr;
10029 use hex::DisplayHex;
10031 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10032 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10033 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10034 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10036 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10038 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10039 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10040 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10041 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10042 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10044 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10045 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10051 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10052 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10053 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10055 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10056 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10057 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10058 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10059 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10060 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10062 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10064 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10065 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10066 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10067 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10068 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10069 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10071 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10072 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10073 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10074 selected_contest_delay: 144
10076 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10077 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10079 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10080 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10082 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10083 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10085 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10086 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10088 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10089 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10090 // build_commitment_transaction.
10091 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10092 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10093 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10094 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10095 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10097 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10098 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10099 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10100 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10104 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10105 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10106 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10107 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10111 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10112 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10113 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10115 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10116 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10118 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10119 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10121 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10123 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10124 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10125 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10126 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10127 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10128 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10129 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10131 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10132 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10133 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10134 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10136 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10137 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10138 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10140 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10142 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10143 commitment_tx.clone(),
10144 counterparty_signature,
10145 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10146 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10147 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10149 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10150 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10152 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10153 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10154 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10156 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10157 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10160 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10161 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10163 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10164 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10165 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10166 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10167 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10168 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10169 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10170 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10172 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10175 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10176 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10177 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10181 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10184 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10185 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10186 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10187 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10188 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10189 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10191 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10192 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10193 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10194 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10195 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10196 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10197 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10198 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10199 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10200 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10202 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10203 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10204 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10205 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10206 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10207 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10209 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10213 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10214 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10215 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10216 "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", {});
10218 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10219 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10221 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10222 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10223 "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", {});
10225 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10226 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10227 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10228 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10230 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10231 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10233 amount_msat: 1000000,
10235 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10236 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10238 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10241 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10242 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10244 amount_msat: 2000000,
10246 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10247 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10249 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10252 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10253 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10255 amount_msat: 2000000,
10257 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10258 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10259 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10260 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10261 blinding_point: None,
10263 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10266 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10267 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10269 amount_msat: 3000000,
10271 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10272 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10273 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10274 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10275 blinding_point: None,
10277 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10280 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10281 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10283 amount_msat: 4000000,
10285 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10286 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10288 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10292 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10293 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10294 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10296 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10297 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10298 "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", {
10301 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10302 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10303 "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" },
10306 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10307 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10308 "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" },
10311 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10312 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10313 "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" },
10316 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10317 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10318 "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" },
10321 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10322 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10323 "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" }
10326 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10327 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10328 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10330 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10331 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10332 "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", {
10335 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10336 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10337 "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" },
10340 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10341 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10342 "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" },
10345 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10346 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10347 "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" },
10350 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10351 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10352 "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" },
10355 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10356 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10357 "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" }
10360 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10361 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10362 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10364 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10365 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10366 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10369 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10370 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10371 "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" },
10374 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10375 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10376 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
10379 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10380 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10381 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10384 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10385 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10386 "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" }
10389 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10390 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10391 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10392 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10394 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10395 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10396 "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", {
10399 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10400 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10401 "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" },
10404 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10405 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10406 "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" },
10409 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10410 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10411 "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" },
10414 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10415 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10416 "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" }
10419 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10420 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10421 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10422 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10424 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10425 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10426 "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", {
10429 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10430 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10431 "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" },
10434 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10435 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10436 "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" },
10439 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10440 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10441 "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" },
10444 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10445 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10446 "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" }
10449 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10450 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10451 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10453 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10454 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10455 "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", {
10458 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10459 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10460 "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" },
10463 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10464 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10465 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10468 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10469 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10470 "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" }
10473 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10474 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10475 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10477 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10478 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10479 "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", {
10482 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10483 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10484 "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" },
10487 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10488 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10489 "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" },
10492 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10493 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10494 "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" }
10497 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10498 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10499 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10501 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10502 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10503 "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", {
10506 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10507 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10508 "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" },
10511 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10512 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10513 "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" }
10516 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10517 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10518 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10519 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10520 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10521 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10523 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10524 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10525 "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", {
10528 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10529 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10530 "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" },
10533 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10534 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10535 "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" }
10538 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10539 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10540 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10541 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10542 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10544 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10545 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10546 "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", {
10549 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10550 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10551 "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" },
10554 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10555 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10556 "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" }
10559 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10560 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10561 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10563 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10564 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10565 "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", {
10568 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10569 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10570 "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" }
10573 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10574 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10575 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10576 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10577 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10579 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10580 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10581 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10584 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10585 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10586 "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" }
10589 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10590 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10591 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10592 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10593 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10595 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10596 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10597 "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", {
10600 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10601 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10602 "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" }
10605 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10606 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10607 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10608 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10610 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10611 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10612 "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", {});
10614 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10615 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10616 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10617 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10618 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10620 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10621 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10622 "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", {});
10624 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10625 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10626 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10627 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10628 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10630 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10631 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10632 "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", {});
10634 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10635 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10636 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10638 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10639 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10640 "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", {});
10642 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10643 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10644 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10645 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10646 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10648 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10649 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10650 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10652 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10653 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10654 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10655 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10656 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10658 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10659 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10660 "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", {});
10662 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10663 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10664 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10665 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10666 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10667 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10669 amount_msat: 2000000,
10671 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10672 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10674 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10677 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10678 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10679 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10681 amount_msat: 5000001,
10683 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10684 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10685 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10686 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10687 blinding_point: None,
10689 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10692 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10693 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10695 amount_msat: 5000000,
10697 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10698 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10699 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10700 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10701 blinding_point: None,
10703 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10707 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10708 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10709 "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", {
10712 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10713 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10714 "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" },
10716 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10717 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10718 "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" },
10720 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10721 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10722 "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" }
10725 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10726 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10727 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10728 "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", {
10731 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10732 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10733 "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" },
10735 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10736 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10737 "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" },
10739 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10740 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10741 "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" }
10746 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10747 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10749 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10750 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10751 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10752 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10754 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10755 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10756 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10758 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10759 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10761 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10762 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10764 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10765 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10766 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10770 fn test_key_derivation() {
10771 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10772 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10774 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10775 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10777 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10778 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10780 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10781 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10783 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10784 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10786 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10787 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10789 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10790 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10794 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10795 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10796 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10797 let seed = [42; 32];
10798 let network = Network::Testnet;
10799 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10800 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10802 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10803 let config = UserConfig::default();
10804 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10805 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10807 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10808 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10810 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10811 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10812 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10813 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10814 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10815 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10816 assert!(res.is_ok());
10820 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10821 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10822 // resulting `channel_type`.
10823 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10824 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10825 let network = Network::Testnet;
10826 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10827 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10829 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10830 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10832 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10833 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10835 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10836 // need to signal it.
10837 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10838 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10839 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10840 &config, 0, 42, None
10842 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10844 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10845 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10846 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10848 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10849 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10850 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10854 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10855 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10856 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10857 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10858 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10861 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10862 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10866 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10867 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10868 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10869 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10870 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10871 let network = Network::Testnet;
10872 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10873 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10875 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10876 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10878 let config = UserConfig::default();
10880 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10881 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10882 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10883 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10884 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10886 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10887 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10888 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10892 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10893 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10894 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10896 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10897 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10898 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10899 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10900 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10901 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10903 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10907 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10908 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10910 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10911 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10912 let network = Network::Testnet;
10913 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10914 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10916 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10917 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10919 let config = UserConfig::default();
10921 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10922 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10923 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10924 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10925 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10926 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10927 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10928 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10930 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10931 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10932 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10933 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10934 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10935 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10939 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10940 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10942 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10943 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10944 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10945 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10947 assert!(res.is_err());
10949 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10950 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10951 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10953 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10954 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10955 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10958 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10960 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10961 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10962 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10963 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10966 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10967 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10969 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10970 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10972 assert!(res.is_err());
10976 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10977 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10978 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10980 let seed = [42; 32];
10981 let network = Network::Testnet;
10982 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10983 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10984 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10986 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10987 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10988 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10989 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10991 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10992 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10993 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10998 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11008 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11009 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11010 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11015 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11016 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11022 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11025 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11026 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11027 &accept_channel_msg,
11028 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11029 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11032 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11033 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11034 let tx = Transaction {
11036 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11040 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11043 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11046 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11047 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11048 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11049 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11050 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11051 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11055 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11056 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11064 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11065 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11066 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11067 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11069 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11070 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11077 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11078 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11079 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11080 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11081 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11083 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11084 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11085 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11093 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11094 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11097 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11098 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11099 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11100 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());