1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
502 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
505 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
506 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
508 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
509 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
510 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
512 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
513 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
514 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
515 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
517 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
518 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
520 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
522 holder_signer: Signer,
523 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
524 destination_script: Script,
526 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
527 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
528 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
530 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
532 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
533 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
534 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
535 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
537 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
538 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
539 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
540 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
541 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
542 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
544 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
546 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
547 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
548 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
550 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
551 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
552 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
553 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
554 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
555 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
556 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
558 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
560 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
561 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
562 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
563 // HTLCs with similar state.
564 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
565 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
566 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
567 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
568 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
569 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
570 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
571 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
572 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
575 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
576 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
577 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
579 update_time_counter: u32,
581 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
582 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
583 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
584 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
585 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
586 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
588 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
589 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
591 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
592 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
593 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
594 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
596 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
597 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
599 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
601 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
603 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
604 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
605 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
606 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
607 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
608 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
610 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
611 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
612 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
613 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
614 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
616 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
617 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
618 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
619 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
620 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
621 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
622 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
623 channel_creation_height: u32,
625 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
628 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
630 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
635 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
638 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
643 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
646 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
650 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
651 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
653 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
657 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
659 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
661 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
662 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
664 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
666 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
668 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
670 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
672 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
673 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
674 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
675 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
677 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
678 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
679 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
681 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
682 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
683 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
685 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
686 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
687 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
688 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
690 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
691 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
692 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
694 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
695 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
696 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
697 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
698 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
700 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
701 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
703 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
704 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
705 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
706 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
707 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
708 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
709 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
710 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
712 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
713 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
715 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
716 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
717 // the channel's funding UTXO.
719 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
720 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
721 // associated channel mapping.
723 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
724 // to store all of them.
725 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
727 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
728 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
729 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
730 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
731 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
733 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
734 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
736 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
737 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
739 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
740 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
741 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
743 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
744 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
745 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
746 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
747 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
751 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
753 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
754 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
755 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
759 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
761 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
762 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
763 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
764 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
768 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
770 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
772 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
774 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
775 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
776 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
777 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
778 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
780 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
781 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
783 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
785 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
786 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
788 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
789 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
790 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
791 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
792 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
793 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
795 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
796 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
798 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
799 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
800 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
801 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
802 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
804 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
805 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
807 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
808 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
810 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
811 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
812 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
813 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
819 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
820 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
822 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
823 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
824 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
829 macro_rules! secp_check {
830 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
833 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
838 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
839 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
840 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
843 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
845 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
846 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
847 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
849 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
852 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
854 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
857 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
858 /// required by us according to the configured or default
859 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
861 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
863 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
864 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
865 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
866 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
867 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
870 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
871 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
872 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
873 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
874 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
875 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
876 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
879 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
880 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
883 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
884 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
885 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
886 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
887 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
888 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
889 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
890 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
891 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
892 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
895 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
896 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
897 // `only_static_remotekey`.
899 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
900 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
901 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
902 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
909 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
910 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
911 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
912 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
913 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
914 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
915 // We've exhausted our options
918 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
919 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
922 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
923 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
924 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
925 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
927 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
929 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
930 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
931 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
932 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
934 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
936 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
940 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
941 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
942 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
943 outbound_scid_alias: u64
944 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
945 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
946 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
949 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
950 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
951 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
952 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
954 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
957 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
960 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
961 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
964 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
967 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
968 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
969 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
970 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
971 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
974 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
975 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
977 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
979 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
980 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
981 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
985 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
986 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
988 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
989 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
992 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
993 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
994 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
998 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1003 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1004 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1005 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1006 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1011 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1013 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1014 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1015 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1016 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1018 channel_value_satoshis,
1020 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1023 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1024 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1026 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1027 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1030 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1031 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1032 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1033 pending_update_fee: None,
1034 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1035 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1036 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1037 update_time_counter: 1,
1039 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1041 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1042 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1043 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1044 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1045 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1046 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1048 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1049 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1050 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1051 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1053 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1054 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1055 closing_fee_limits: None,
1056 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1058 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1060 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1061 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1062 short_channel_id: None,
1063 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1065 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1066 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1067 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1068 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1069 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1070 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1071 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1072 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1073 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1074 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1075 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1077 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1079 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1080 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1081 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1082 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1083 counterparty_parameters: None,
1084 funding_outpoint: None,
1085 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1086 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1088 funding_transaction: None,
1090 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1091 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1092 counterparty_node_id,
1094 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1096 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1098 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1099 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1101 announcement_sigs: None,
1103 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1104 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1105 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1106 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1108 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1110 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1111 outbound_scid_alias,
1113 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1114 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1116 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1117 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1122 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1126 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1127 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1128 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1130 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1131 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1132 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1133 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1134 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1135 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1136 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1139 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1140 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1141 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1142 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1143 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1144 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1145 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1146 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1148 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1149 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1158 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1159 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1160 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1161 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1162 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1163 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1164 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1165 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1166 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1167 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1171 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1173 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1174 // support this channel type.
1175 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1176 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1180 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1181 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1182 // `static_remote_key`.
1183 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1186 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1187 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1190 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1193 channel_type.clone()
1195 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1196 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1201 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1203 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1204 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1205 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1206 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1207 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1208 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1209 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1210 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1211 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1214 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1218 // Check sanity of message fields:
1219 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1222 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1225 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1228 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1229 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1232 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1235 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1238 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1240 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1241 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1244 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1247 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1251 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1252 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1258 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1261 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1264 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1267 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1270 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1274 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1276 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1277 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1282 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1283 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1285 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1288 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1291 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1292 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1293 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1295 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1299 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1300 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1301 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1302 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1303 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1307 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1308 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1309 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1310 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1314 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1315 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1316 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1317 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1318 if script.len() == 0 {
1321 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1324 Some(script.clone())
1327 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1328 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1334 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1335 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1338 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1339 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1344 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1345 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1347 let chan = Channel {
1350 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1351 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1353 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1358 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1360 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1361 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1362 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1363 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1366 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1369 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1370 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1372 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1373 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1374 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1376 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1377 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1378 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1379 pending_update_fee: None,
1380 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1381 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1382 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1383 update_time_counter: 1,
1385 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1387 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1388 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1389 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1390 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1391 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1392 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1394 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1395 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1396 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1397 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1399 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1400 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1401 closing_fee_limits: None,
1402 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1404 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1406 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1407 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1408 short_channel_id: None,
1409 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1411 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1412 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1413 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1414 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1415 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1416 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1417 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1418 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1419 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1420 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1421 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1422 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1424 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1426 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1427 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1428 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1429 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1430 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1431 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1432 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1434 funding_outpoint: None,
1435 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1436 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1438 funding_transaction: None,
1440 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1441 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1442 counterparty_node_id,
1444 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1446 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1448 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1449 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1451 announcement_sigs: None,
1453 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1454 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1458 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1460 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1461 outbound_scid_alias,
1463 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1464 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1466 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1467 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1472 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1478 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1479 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1480 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1481 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1482 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1484 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1485 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1486 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1487 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1488 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1489 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1490 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1492 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1493 where L::Target: Logger
1495 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1496 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1497 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1499 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1500 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1501 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1502 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1504 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1505 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1506 if match update_state {
1507 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1508 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1509 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1510 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1511 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1513 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1517 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1518 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1519 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1520 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1522 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1523 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1524 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1526 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1527 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1528 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1529 transaction_output_index: None
1534 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1535 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1536 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1537 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1538 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1541 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1543 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1544 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1545 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1547 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1548 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1551 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1552 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1555 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1557 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1558 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1559 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1561 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1562 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1568 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1569 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1570 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1571 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1572 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1573 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1574 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1578 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1579 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1581 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1583 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1584 if generated_by_local {
1585 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1586 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1595 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1597 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1598 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1599 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1600 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1601 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1602 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1603 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1606 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1607 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1608 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1609 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1613 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1614 preimages.push(preimage);
1618 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1619 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1621 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1623 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1624 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1626 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1627 if !generated_by_local {
1628 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1636 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1637 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1638 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1639 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1640 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1641 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1642 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1643 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1645 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1647 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1648 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1649 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1650 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1652 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1654 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1655 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1656 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1657 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1660 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1661 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1662 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1663 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1665 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1668 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1669 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1670 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1671 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1673 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1676 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1677 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1682 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1683 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1688 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1690 let channel_parameters =
1691 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1692 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1693 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1696 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1701 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1704 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1705 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1706 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1707 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1709 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1710 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1711 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1719 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1720 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1726 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1727 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1728 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1729 // outside of those situations will fail.
1730 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1734 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1739 1 + // script length (0)
1743 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1744 2 + // witness marker and flag
1745 1 + // witness element count
1746 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1747 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1748 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1749 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1750 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1751 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1753 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1754 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1755 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1761 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1762 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1763 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1764 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1766 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1767 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1768 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1770 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1771 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1772 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1773 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1774 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1775 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1778 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1779 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1782 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1783 value_to_holder = 0;
1786 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1787 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1788 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1789 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1791 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1792 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1795 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1796 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1800 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1801 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1802 /// our counterparty!)
1803 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1804 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1805 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1806 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1807 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1808 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1809 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1811 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1815 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1816 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1817 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1818 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1819 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1820 //may see payments to it!
1821 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1822 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1823 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1825 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1828 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1829 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1830 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1831 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1832 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1835 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1838 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1839 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1841 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1843 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1844 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1845 where L::Target: Logger {
1846 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1847 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1848 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1849 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1850 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1851 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1852 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1853 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1857 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1858 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1859 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1860 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1862 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1863 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1865 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1867 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1869 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1870 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1871 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1873 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1874 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1875 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1876 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1877 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1879 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1880 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1881 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1883 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1884 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1886 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1889 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1890 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1894 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1898 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1900 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1901 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1902 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1903 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1906 // Now update local state:
1908 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1909 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1910 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1911 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1912 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1913 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1914 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1918 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1919 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1920 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1921 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1922 // do not not get into this branch.
1923 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1924 match pending_update {
1925 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1926 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1927 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1928 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1929 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1930 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1931 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1934 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1935 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1936 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1937 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1938 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1939 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1940 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1946 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1947 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1948 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1950 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1951 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1952 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1954 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1955 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1958 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1959 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1961 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1962 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1964 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1965 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1968 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1971 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1972 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1973 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1974 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1979 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1980 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1981 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1982 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1983 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1984 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1985 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1986 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1987 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1988 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1989 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1990 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1994 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1995 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1996 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1997 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1998 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
2002 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2006 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2007 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2008 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2009 /// before we fail backwards.
2011 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2012 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2013 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2014 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2015 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2016 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2017 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2020 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2021 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2022 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2023 /// before we fail backwards.
2025 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2026 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2027 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2028 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2029 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2030 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2031 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2033 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2035 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2036 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2037 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2039 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2040 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2041 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2043 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2044 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2045 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2047 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2052 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2059 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2060 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2061 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2062 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2063 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2067 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2068 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2069 force_holding_cell = true;
2072 // Now update local state:
2073 if force_holding_cell {
2074 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2075 match pending_update {
2076 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2077 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2078 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2079 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2083 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2084 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2085 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2092 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2093 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2094 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2100 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2102 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2103 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2106 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2107 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2108 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2113 // Message handlers:
2115 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2116 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2118 // Check sanity of message fields:
2119 if !self.is_outbound() {
2120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2122 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2125 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2126 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2128 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2131 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2134 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2136 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2138 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2139 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2142 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2143 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2146 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2149 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2153 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2154 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2157 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2160 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2163 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2166 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2169 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2172 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2176 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2177 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2180 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2181 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2183 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2184 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2187 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2190 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2191 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2192 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2193 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2194 if script.len() == 0 {
2197 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2200 Some(script.clone())
2203 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2204 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2210 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2211 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2212 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2213 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2214 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2216 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2217 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2219 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2222 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2223 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2224 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2225 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2226 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2227 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2230 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2231 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2232 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2235 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2236 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2238 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2239 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2244 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2245 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2247 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2248 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2250 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2251 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2252 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2253 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2254 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2255 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2256 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2257 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2258 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2261 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2262 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2264 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2265 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2266 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2267 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2269 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2270 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2272 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2273 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2276 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2277 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2280 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2281 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2282 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2284 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2287 if self.is_outbound() {
2288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2290 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2291 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2292 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2296 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2299 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2300 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2301 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2302 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2305 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2306 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2307 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2308 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2309 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2311 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2313 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2314 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2318 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2319 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2320 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2324 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2325 initial_commitment_tx,
2328 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2329 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2332 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2333 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2335 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2337 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2338 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2339 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2340 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2341 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2342 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2343 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2344 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2345 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2346 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2347 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2349 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2351 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2353 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2354 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2355 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2356 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2358 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2360 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2361 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2363 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2364 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2366 }, channel_monitor))
2369 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2370 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2371 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2372 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2373 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2375 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2378 if !self.is_outbound() {
2379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2381 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2384 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2385 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2386 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2387 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2390 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2392 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2393 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2394 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2395 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2397 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2398 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2400 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2401 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2403 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2404 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2405 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2406 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2407 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2412 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2413 initial_commitment_tx,
2416 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2417 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2420 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2421 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2424 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2425 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2426 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2427 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2428 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2429 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2430 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2431 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2432 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2433 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2434 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2435 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2437 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2439 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2441 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2442 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2443 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2444 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2446 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2448 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2449 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2453 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2454 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2456 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2457 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2458 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2459 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2461 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2464 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2465 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2466 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2469 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2470 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2471 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2472 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2473 // when routing outbound payments.
2474 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2478 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2480 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2481 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2482 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2483 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2484 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2485 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2486 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2487 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2488 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2490 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2491 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2492 let expected_point =
2493 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2494 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2496 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2497 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2498 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2499 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2500 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2501 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2503 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2504 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2505 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2506 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2507 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2509 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2510 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2514 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2517 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2518 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2520 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2522 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2525 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2526 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2527 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2528 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2534 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2535 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2536 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2537 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2538 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2539 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2540 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2541 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2542 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2545 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2548 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2549 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2550 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2552 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2553 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2554 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2555 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2556 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2557 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2559 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2560 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2566 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2567 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2568 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2569 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2570 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2571 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2572 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2573 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2574 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2577 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2580 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2581 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2582 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2584 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2585 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2586 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2587 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2588 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2589 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2591 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2592 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2596 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2597 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2598 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2599 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2600 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2601 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2602 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2604 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2605 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2607 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2614 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2615 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2616 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2617 /// corner case properly.
2618 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2619 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2620 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2622 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2623 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2624 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2625 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2628 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2630 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2631 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2632 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2635 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2636 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2637 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2638 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2640 outbound_capacity_msat,
2641 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2642 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2643 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2649 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2650 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2653 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2654 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2655 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2656 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2657 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2658 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2661 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2662 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2664 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2665 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2668 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2669 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2670 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2672 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2673 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2675 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2678 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2679 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2681 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2682 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2684 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2685 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2687 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2688 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2692 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2693 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2699 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2700 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2701 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2704 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2705 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2706 included_htlcs += 1;
2709 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2710 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2714 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2715 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2716 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2717 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2718 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2719 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2724 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2726 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2727 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2732 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2733 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2737 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2738 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2739 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2742 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2743 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2745 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2746 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2747 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2749 total_pending_htlcs,
2750 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2751 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2752 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2754 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2755 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2756 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2758 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2760 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2765 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2766 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2767 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2769 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2770 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2772 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2775 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2776 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2778 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2779 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2781 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2782 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2784 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2785 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2789 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2790 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2796 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2797 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2798 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2799 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2800 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2801 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2804 included_htlcs += 1;
2807 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2808 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2811 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2812 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2814 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2815 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2816 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2821 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2822 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2823 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2826 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2827 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2829 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2830 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2832 total_pending_htlcs,
2833 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2834 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2835 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2837 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2838 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2839 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2841 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2843 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2848 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2849 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2850 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2851 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2852 if local_sent_shutdown {
2853 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2855 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2856 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2857 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2860 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2863 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2866 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2869 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2873 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2874 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2875 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2878 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2881 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2882 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2883 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2884 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2885 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2886 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2887 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2888 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2889 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2890 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2891 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2893 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2894 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2895 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2896 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2897 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2898 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2902 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2905 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2906 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2907 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2909 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2910 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2911 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2912 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2913 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2914 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2915 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2919 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2920 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2921 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2922 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2923 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2924 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2925 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2929 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2930 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2931 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2932 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2933 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2937 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2938 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2939 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2940 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2941 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2943 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2947 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2951 if !self.is_outbound() {
2952 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2953 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2954 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2955 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2956 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2957 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2958 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2959 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2960 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2961 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2962 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2963 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2964 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2965 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2966 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2969 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2970 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2971 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2972 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2976 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2979 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2983 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2984 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2985 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2989 // Now update local state:
2990 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2991 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2992 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2993 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2994 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2995 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2996 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3001 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3003 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3004 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3005 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3006 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3007 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3008 None => fail_reason.into(),
3009 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3010 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3011 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3014 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3018 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3020 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3021 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3023 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3029 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3032 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3033 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3036 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3040 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3043 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3044 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3047 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3051 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3055 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3056 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3059 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3063 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3067 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3068 where L::Target: Logger
3070 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3073 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3076 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3080 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3082 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3084 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3085 let commitment_txid = {
3086 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3087 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3088 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3090 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3091 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3092 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3093 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3094 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3099 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3101 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3102 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3103 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3104 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3107 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3108 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3109 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3113 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3115 if self.is_outbound() {
3116 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3117 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3118 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3119 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3120 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3121 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3122 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3123 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3124 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3125 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3131 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3135 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3136 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3137 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3138 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3139 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3140 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3141 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3143 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3144 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3145 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3146 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3147 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3148 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3149 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3152 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3154 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3158 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3159 commitment_stats.tx,
3161 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3162 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3163 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3166 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3167 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3169 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3170 let mut need_commitment = false;
3171 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3172 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3173 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3174 need_commitment = true;
3178 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3179 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3180 Some(forward_info.clone())
3182 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3183 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3184 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3185 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3186 need_commitment = true;
3189 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3190 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3191 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3192 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3193 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3194 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3195 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3196 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3197 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3198 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3199 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3200 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3201 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3202 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3204 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3206 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3207 need_commitment = true;
3211 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3212 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3213 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3214 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3215 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3216 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3221 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3222 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3223 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3224 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3226 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3227 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3228 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3229 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3230 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3231 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3232 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3233 // includes the right HTLCs.
3234 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3235 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3236 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3237 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3238 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3239 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3241 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3242 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3243 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3244 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3247 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3248 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3249 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3250 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3251 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3252 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3253 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3254 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3255 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3259 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3260 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3261 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3262 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3263 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3266 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3267 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3268 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3269 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3270 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3271 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3272 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3273 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3276 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3277 /// for our counterparty.
3278 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3279 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3280 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3281 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3282 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3284 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3285 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3286 updates: Vec::new(),
3289 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3290 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3291 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3292 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3293 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3294 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3295 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3296 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3297 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3298 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3299 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3300 // to rebalance channels.
3301 match &htlc_update {
3302 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3303 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3304 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3307 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3308 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3309 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3310 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3311 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3312 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3313 // into the holding cell without ever being
3314 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3315 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3316 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3319 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3325 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3326 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3327 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3328 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3329 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3330 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3331 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3332 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3333 (msg, monitor_update)
3334 } else { unreachable!() };
3335 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3336 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3338 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3339 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3340 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3341 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3342 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3343 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3344 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3345 // for a full revocation before failing.
3346 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3349 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3351 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3358 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3359 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3361 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3362 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3367 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3368 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3369 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3370 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3371 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3373 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3374 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3375 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3377 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3378 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3379 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3385 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3386 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3387 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3388 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3389 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3390 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3391 where L::Target: Logger,
3393 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3396 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3399 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3400 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3403 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3405 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3406 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3411 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3412 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3413 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3414 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3415 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3416 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3417 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3418 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3422 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3424 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3425 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3428 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3429 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3431 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3433 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3434 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3435 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3436 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3437 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3438 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3439 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3440 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3444 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3445 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3446 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3447 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3448 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3449 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3450 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3451 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3453 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3454 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3457 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3458 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3459 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3460 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3461 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3462 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3463 let mut require_commitment = false;
3464 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3467 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3468 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3469 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3471 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3472 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3473 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3474 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3475 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3476 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3481 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3482 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3483 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3484 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3485 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3487 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3488 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3489 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3494 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3495 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3497 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3501 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3502 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3504 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3505 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3506 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3507 require_commitment = true;
3508 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3509 match forward_info {
3510 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3511 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3512 require_commitment = true;
3514 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3515 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3516 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3518 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3519 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3520 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3524 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3525 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3526 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3527 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3533 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3534 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3535 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3536 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3538 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3539 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3540 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3541 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3542 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3543 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3544 require_commitment = true;
3548 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3550 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3551 match update_state {
3552 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3553 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3554 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3555 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3556 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3558 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3559 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3560 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3561 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3562 require_commitment = true;
3563 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3564 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3569 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3570 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3571 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3572 if require_commitment {
3573 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3574 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3575 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3576 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3577 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3578 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3579 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3580 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3581 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3583 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3584 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3585 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3586 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3587 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3588 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3591 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3592 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3593 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3594 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3595 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3596 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3597 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3599 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3600 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3601 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3603 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3604 if require_commitment {
3605 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3607 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3608 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3609 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3610 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3612 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3613 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3614 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3615 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3616 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3618 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3619 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3620 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3621 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3627 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3628 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3629 /// commitment update.
3630 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3631 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3632 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3635 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3636 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3637 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3638 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3640 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3641 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3642 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3643 if !self.is_outbound() {
3644 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3646 if !self.is_usable() {
3647 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3649 if !self.is_live() {
3650 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3653 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3654 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3655 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3656 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3657 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3658 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3659 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3660 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3661 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3662 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3666 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3667 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3668 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3669 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3670 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3673 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3674 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3678 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3679 force_holding_cell = true;
3682 if force_holding_cell {
3683 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3687 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3688 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3690 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3691 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3696 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3697 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3699 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3701 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3702 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3703 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3704 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3708 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3709 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3710 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3714 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3715 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3718 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3719 // will be retransmitted.
3720 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3721 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3722 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3724 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3725 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3727 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3728 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3729 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3730 // this HTLC accordingly
3731 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3734 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3735 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3736 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3737 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3740 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3741 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3742 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3743 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3744 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3745 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3750 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3752 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3753 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3754 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3755 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3759 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3760 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3761 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3762 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3763 // the update upon reconnection.
3764 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3768 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3769 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3772 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3773 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3774 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3775 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3776 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3777 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3778 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3780 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3781 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3782 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3783 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3784 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3785 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3786 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3788 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3789 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3790 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3791 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3792 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3793 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3794 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3797 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3798 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3799 /// to the remote side.
3800 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3801 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3802 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3803 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3806 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3808 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3809 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3810 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3812 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3813 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3814 // first received the funding_signed.
3815 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3816 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3817 self.funding_transaction.take()
3819 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3820 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3821 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3822 funding_broadcastable = None;
3825 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3826 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3827 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3828 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3829 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3830 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3831 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3832 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3833 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3834 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3835 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3836 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3837 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3838 next_per_commitment_point,
3839 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3843 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3845 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3846 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3847 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3848 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3849 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3850 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3853 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3854 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3855 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3856 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3857 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3861 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3862 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3864 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3865 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3868 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3869 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3870 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3871 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3872 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3873 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3874 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3875 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3876 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3880 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3881 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3883 if self.is_outbound() {
3884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3886 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3889 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3890 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3892 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3893 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3894 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3895 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3896 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3897 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3898 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3899 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3900 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3901 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3902 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3903 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3904 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3906 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3908 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3914 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3915 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3916 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3917 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3918 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3919 per_commitment_secret,
3920 next_per_commitment_point,
3924 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3925 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3926 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3927 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3928 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3930 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3931 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3932 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3933 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3934 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3935 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3936 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3937 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3938 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3943 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3944 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3946 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3947 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3948 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3949 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3950 reason: err_packet.clone()
3953 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3954 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3955 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3956 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3957 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3958 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3961 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3962 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3963 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3964 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3965 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3972 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3973 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3974 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3975 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3979 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3980 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3981 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3982 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3983 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3984 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3988 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3989 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3991 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3992 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3993 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3994 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3995 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3996 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3997 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3998 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4001 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4003 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4004 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4005 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4006 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4010 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4011 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4012 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4015 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4016 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4017 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4018 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4019 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4020 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4021 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4024 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4025 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4026 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4027 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4028 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4031 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4032 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4033 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4034 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4035 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4036 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4037 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4038 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4041 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4045 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4046 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4047 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4048 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4050 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4054 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4055 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4056 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4058 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4059 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4060 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4061 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4062 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4066 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4068 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4069 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4070 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4071 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4072 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4075 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4076 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4077 channel_ready: None,
4078 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4079 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4080 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4084 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4085 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4086 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4087 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4088 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4089 next_per_commitment_point,
4090 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4092 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4093 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4094 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4098 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4099 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4100 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4102 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4103 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4104 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4107 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4113 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4114 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4115 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4116 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4117 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4119 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4120 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4121 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4122 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4123 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4124 next_per_commitment_point,
4125 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4129 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4130 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4131 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4133 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4136 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4137 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4138 raa: required_revoke,
4139 commitment_update: None,
4140 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4142 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4143 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4144 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4146 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4149 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4150 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4151 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4152 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4153 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4154 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4157 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4158 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4159 raa: required_revoke,
4160 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4161 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4165 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4169 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4170 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4171 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4172 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4174 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4176 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4178 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4179 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4180 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4181 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4182 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4183 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4185 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4186 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4187 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4188 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4189 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4191 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4192 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4193 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4194 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4197 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4198 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4199 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4200 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4201 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4202 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4203 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4204 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4205 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4206 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4207 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4208 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4209 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4210 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4211 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4213 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4216 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4217 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4220 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4221 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4222 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4223 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4224 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4225 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4226 self.channel_state &
4227 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4228 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4229 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4230 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4233 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4234 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4235 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4236 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4237 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4238 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4241 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4247 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4248 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4249 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4250 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4252 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4253 return Ok((None, None));
4256 if !self.is_outbound() {
4257 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4258 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4260 return Ok((None, None));
4263 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4265 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4266 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4267 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4268 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4270 let sig = self.holder_signer
4271 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4272 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4274 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4275 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4276 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4277 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4279 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4280 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4281 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4286 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4287 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4288 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4289 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4291 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4294 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4295 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4296 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4297 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4300 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4301 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4305 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4307 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4311 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4312 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4313 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4316 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4319 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4320 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4321 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4322 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4324 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4327 assert!(send_shutdown);
4328 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4329 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4332 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4337 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4339 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4340 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4342 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4343 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4344 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4345 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4346 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4347 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4350 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4351 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4352 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4354 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4355 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4356 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4357 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4361 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4362 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4363 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4364 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4365 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4366 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4368 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4369 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4376 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4377 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4379 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4382 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4383 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4385 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4387 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4388 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4389 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4390 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4391 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4392 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4393 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4394 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4395 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4397 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4398 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4401 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4405 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4406 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4407 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4408 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4410 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4413 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4416 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4419 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4423 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4427 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4428 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4429 return Ok((None, None));
4432 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4433 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4434 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4435 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4437 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4439 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4442 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4443 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4444 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4445 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4446 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4450 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4451 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4456 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4457 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4458 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4459 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4460 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4461 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4462 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4466 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4468 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4469 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4470 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4471 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4473 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4476 let sig = self.holder_signer
4477 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4478 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4480 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4481 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4482 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4483 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4487 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4488 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4489 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4490 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4492 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4493 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4494 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4500 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4501 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4502 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4504 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4505 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4507 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4508 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4511 if !self.is_outbound() {
4512 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4513 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4514 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4515 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4517 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4518 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4519 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4521 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4522 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4525 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4526 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4527 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4528 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4529 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4530 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4531 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4532 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4537 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4538 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4539 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4540 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4542 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4546 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4547 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4548 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4549 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4551 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4557 // Public utilities:
4559 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4563 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4565 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4566 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4567 self.temporary_channel_id
4570 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4574 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4575 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4576 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4580 /// Gets the channel's type
4581 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4585 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4586 /// is_usable() returns true).
4587 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4588 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4589 self.short_channel_id
4592 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4593 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4594 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4597 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4598 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4599 self.outbound_scid_alias
4601 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4602 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4603 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4604 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4605 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4608 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4609 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4610 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4611 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4614 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4615 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4616 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4619 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4620 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4621 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4622 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4626 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4629 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4630 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4633 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4634 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4637 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4638 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4639 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4642 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4643 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4646 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4647 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4648 self.counterparty_node_id
4651 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4652 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4653 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4656 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4657 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4658 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4661 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4662 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4664 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4665 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4666 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4667 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4669 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4673 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4674 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4675 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4678 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4679 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4680 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4683 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4684 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4685 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4687 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4688 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4693 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4694 self.channel_value_satoshis
4697 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4698 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4701 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4702 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4705 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4706 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4709 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4710 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4711 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4714 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4715 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4716 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4719 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4720 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4721 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4724 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4725 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4726 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4729 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4730 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4731 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4734 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4735 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4736 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4739 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4740 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4741 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4742 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4743 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4746 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4748 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4749 self.prev_config = None;
4753 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4754 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4758 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4759 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4760 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4761 let did_channel_update =
4762 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4763 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4764 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4765 if did_channel_update {
4766 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4767 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4768 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4769 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4771 self.config.options = *config;
4775 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4776 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4777 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4778 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4779 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4780 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4781 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4783 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4784 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4787 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4789 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4790 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4796 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4797 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4798 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4799 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4800 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4801 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4802 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4804 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4805 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4812 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4816 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4817 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4818 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4819 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4820 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4821 // which are near the dust limit.
4822 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4823 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4824 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4825 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4826 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4828 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4829 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4831 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4834 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4835 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4838 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4839 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4842 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4843 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4847 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4852 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4854 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4855 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4856 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4857 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4858 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4859 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4861 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4863 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4871 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4872 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4876 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4877 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4878 self.update_time_counter
4881 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4882 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4885 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4886 self.config.announced_channel
4889 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4890 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4893 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4894 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4895 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4896 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4899 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4900 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4901 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4904 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4905 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4906 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4907 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4908 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4911 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4912 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4913 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4914 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4915 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4918 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4919 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4920 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4921 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4924 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4925 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4928 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4929 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4930 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4933 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4934 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4935 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4937 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4938 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4939 if self.channel_state &
4940 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4941 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4942 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4943 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4944 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4947 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4948 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4949 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4950 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4951 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4952 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4954 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4955 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4956 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4958 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4959 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4960 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4961 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4962 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4963 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4969 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4970 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4971 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4974 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4975 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4976 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4979 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4980 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4981 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4984 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4985 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4986 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4987 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4988 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4989 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4994 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4995 self.channel_update_status
4998 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4999 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5000 self.channel_update_status = status;
5003 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5005 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5006 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5007 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5011 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5012 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5013 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5016 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5020 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5021 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5022 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5024 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5025 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5026 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5028 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5029 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5032 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5033 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5034 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5035 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5036 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5037 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5038 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5039 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5040 self.channel_state);
5042 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5046 if need_commitment_update {
5047 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5048 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5049 let next_per_commitment_point =
5050 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5051 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5052 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5053 next_per_commitment_point,
5054 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5058 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5064 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5065 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5066 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5067 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5068 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5069 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5070 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5072 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5075 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5076 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5077 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5078 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5079 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5080 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5081 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5082 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5083 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5084 if self.is_outbound() {
5085 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5086 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5087 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5088 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5089 // channel and move on.
5090 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5091 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5093 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5094 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5095 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5097 if self.is_outbound() {
5098 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5099 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5100 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5101 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5102 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5103 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5107 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5108 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5109 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5110 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5111 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5115 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5116 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5117 // may have already happened for this block).
5118 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5119 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5120 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5121 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5124 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5125 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5126 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5127 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5135 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5136 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5137 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5138 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5140 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5141 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5144 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5146 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5147 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5148 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5149 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5151 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5154 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5157 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5158 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5159 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5160 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5162 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5165 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5166 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5167 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5169 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5170 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5172 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5173 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5174 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5182 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5184 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5185 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5186 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5188 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5189 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5192 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5193 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5194 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5195 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5196 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5197 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5198 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5199 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5200 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5203 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5204 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5205 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5206 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5208 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5209 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5210 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5212 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5213 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5214 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5215 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5217 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5218 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5219 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5220 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5221 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5222 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5223 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5226 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5227 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5229 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5232 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5233 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5234 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5235 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5236 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5237 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5238 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5239 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5240 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5241 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5242 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5243 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5244 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5245 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5246 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5247 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5248 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5254 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5259 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5260 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5262 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5263 if !self.is_outbound() {
5264 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5266 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5267 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5270 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5271 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5274 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5275 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5279 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5280 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5281 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5282 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5283 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5284 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5285 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5286 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5287 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5288 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5289 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5290 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5291 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5292 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5293 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5294 first_per_commitment_point,
5295 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5296 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5297 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5298 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5300 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5304 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5305 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5308 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5309 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5310 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5311 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5314 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5315 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5317 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5318 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5319 if self.is_outbound() {
5320 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5322 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5323 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5325 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5326 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5328 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5329 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5332 self.user_id = user_id;
5333 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5335 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5338 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5339 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5340 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5342 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5343 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5344 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5345 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5347 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5348 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5349 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5350 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5351 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5352 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5353 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5354 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5355 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5356 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5357 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5358 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5359 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5360 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5361 first_per_commitment_point,
5362 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5363 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5364 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5366 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5370 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5371 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5373 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5375 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5376 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5379 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5380 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5381 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5382 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5383 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5384 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5387 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5388 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5389 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5390 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5391 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5392 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5393 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5394 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5395 if !self.is_outbound() {
5396 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5398 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5399 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5401 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5402 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5403 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5404 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5407 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5408 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5410 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5413 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5414 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5419 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5421 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5423 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5424 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5425 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5427 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5428 temporary_channel_id,
5429 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5430 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5435 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5436 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5437 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5438 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5440 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5443 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5444 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5445 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5446 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5447 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5448 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5450 if !self.is_usable() {
5451 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5454 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5455 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5456 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5457 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5459 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5460 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5462 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5463 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5464 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5465 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5466 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5467 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5473 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5474 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5475 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5476 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5478 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5481 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5485 if !self.is_usable() {
5489 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5490 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5494 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5498 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5499 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5502 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5506 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5508 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5513 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5515 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5520 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5522 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5523 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5524 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5525 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5526 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5530 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5532 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5533 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5534 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5535 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5536 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5537 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5538 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5540 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5541 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5542 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5543 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5544 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5545 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5546 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5547 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5548 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5549 contents: announcement,
5552 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5556 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5557 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5558 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5559 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5560 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5561 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5562 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5563 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5565 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5567 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5568 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5569 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5570 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5572 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5573 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5574 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5575 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5578 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5579 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5580 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5581 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5584 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5587 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5588 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5589 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5590 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5591 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5592 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5595 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5597 Err(_) => return None,
5599 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5600 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5605 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5606 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5607 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5608 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5609 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5610 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5611 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5612 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5613 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5614 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5615 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5616 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5617 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5618 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5619 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5620 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5621 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5622 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5623 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5626 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5627 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5628 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5629 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5632 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5633 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5634 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5635 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5636 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5637 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5638 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5639 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5641 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5642 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5643 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5644 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5645 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5646 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5647 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5648 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5649 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5651 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5657 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5659 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5660 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5661 /// commitment update.
5663 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5664 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5665 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5666 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5668 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5669 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5671 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5672 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5677 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5678 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5680 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5682 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5683 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5685 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5686 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5687 /// regenerate them.
5689 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5690 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5692 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5693 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5694 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5695 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5696 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5697 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5699 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5700 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5701 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5704 if amount_msat == 0 {
5705 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5708 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5709 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5712 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5713 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5714 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5715 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5716 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5717 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5718 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5719 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5722 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5723 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5724 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5725 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5727 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5728 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5729 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5732 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5733 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5734 if !self.is_outbound() {
5735 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5736 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5737 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5738 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5739 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5740 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5744 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5747 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5748 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5749 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5751 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5752 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5753 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5754 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5755 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5756 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5760 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5761 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5762 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5763 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5764 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5765 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5769 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5770 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5771 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5774 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5775 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5776 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5777 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5779 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5780 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5783 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5784 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5785 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5786 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5787 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5790 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5791 force_holding_cell = true;
5794 // Now update local state:
5795 if force_holding_cell {
5796 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5801 onion_routing_packet,
5806 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5807 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5809 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5811 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5815 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5816 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5817 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5821 onion_routing_packet,
5823 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5828 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5829 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5830 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5831 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5833 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5834 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5835 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5837 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5842 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5843 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5844 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5845 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5846 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5847 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5848 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5851 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5852 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5853 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5854 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5855 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5856 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5859 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5861 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5862 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5863 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5865 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5866 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5869 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5870 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5871 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5872 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5873 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5874 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5875 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5876 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5879 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5883 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5884 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5885 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5886 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5890 if !self.is_outbound() {
5891 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5892 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5893 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5894 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5895 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5896 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5897 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5898 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5899 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5900 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5906 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5909 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5910 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5911 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5912 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5913 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5914 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5916 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5917 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5918 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5919 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5922 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5923 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5927 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5928 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5930 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5932 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5933 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5934 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5935 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5937 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5938 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5939 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5940 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5941 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5942 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5946 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5947 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5950 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5953 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5954 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5956 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5957 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5958 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5959 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5960 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5963 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5964 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5965 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5966 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5972 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5973 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5974 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5977 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5978 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5979 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5981 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5982 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5983 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5984 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5990 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5991 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5993 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5994 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5995 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5996 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5997 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5998 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5999 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6000 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6001 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6004 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6005 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6008 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6012 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6013 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6014 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6017 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6018 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6019 let mut chan_closed = false;
6020 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6024 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6026 None if !chan_closed => {
6027 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6028 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6029 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6031 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6037 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6038 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6039 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6040 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6042 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6044 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6046 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6047 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6048 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6049 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6050 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6051 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6054 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6055 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6056 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6058 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6059 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6060 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6063 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6064 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6065 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6066 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6067 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6069 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6070 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6077 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6078 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6080 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6083 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6084 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6085 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6086 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6087 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6088 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6089 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6090 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6091 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6092 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6093 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6095 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6096 // return them to fail the payment.
6097 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6098 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6099 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6101 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6102 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6107 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6108 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6109 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6110 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6111 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6112 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6113 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6114 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6115 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6116 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6117 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6118 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6119 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6124 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6125 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6126 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6129 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6130 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6131 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6133 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6134 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6138 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6142 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6143 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6145 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6151 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6152 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6153 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6154 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6155 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6157 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6158 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6159 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6160 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6166 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6167 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6168 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6169 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6170 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6171 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6176 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6177 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6178 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6179 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6181 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6182 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6183 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6184 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6189 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6190 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6191 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6192 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6193 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6194 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6199 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6200 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6201 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6204 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6206 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6207 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6208 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6209 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6210 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6212 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6213 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6214 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6215 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6217 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6218 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6219 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6221 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6223 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6224 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6225 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6226 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6227 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6228 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6230 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6231 // deserialized from that format.
6232 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6233 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6234 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6236 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6238 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6239 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6240 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6242 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6243 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6244 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6245 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6248 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6249 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6250 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6253 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6254 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6255 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6256 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6258 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6259 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6261 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6263 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6265 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6267 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6270 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6272 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6277 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6279 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6280 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6281 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6282 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6283 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6284 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6285 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6287 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6289 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6291 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6294 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6295 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6296 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6299 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6301 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6302 preimages.push(preimage);
6304 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6305 reason.write(writer)?;
6307 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6309 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6310 preimages.push(preimage);
6312 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6313 reason.write(writer)?;
6318 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6319 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6321 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6323 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6324 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6325 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6326 source.write(writer)?;
6327 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6329 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6331 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6332 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6334 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6336 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6337 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6342 match self.resend_order {
6343 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6344 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6347 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6348 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6349 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6351 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6352 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6353 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6354 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6357 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6358 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6359 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6360 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6361 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6364 if self.is_outbound() {
6365 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6366 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6367 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6369 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6370 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6371 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6373 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6375 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6376 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6377 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6378 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6380 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6381 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6382 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6383 // consider the stale state on reload.
6386 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6387 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6388 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6390 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6391 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6392 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6394 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6395 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6397 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6398 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6399 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6401 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6402 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6404 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6407 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6408 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6409 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6411 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6414 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6415 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6417 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6418 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6419 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6421 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6423 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6425 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6428 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6429 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6430 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6431 htlc.write(writer)?;
6434 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6435 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6436 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6438 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6439 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6441 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6442 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6443 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6444 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6445 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6446 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6447 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6449 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6450 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6451 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6452 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6453 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6455 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6456 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6458 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6459 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6460 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6461 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6463 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6464 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6465 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6466 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6467 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6468 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6469 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6471 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6472 (2, chan_type, option),
6473 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6474 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6475 (5, self.config, required),
6476 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6477 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6478 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6479 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6480 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6481 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6482 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6483 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6484 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6485 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6486 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6487 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6488 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6489 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6496 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6497 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6499 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6500 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6502 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6503 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6504 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6506 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6507 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6508 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6509 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6511 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6513 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6514 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6515 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6517 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6520 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6525 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6527 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let mut keys_data = None;
6531 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6532 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6533 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6534 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6535 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6536 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6537 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6538 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6539 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6540 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6544 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6545 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6546 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6549 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6552 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6553 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6555 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6557 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6558 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6559 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6560 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6561 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6562 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6563 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6564 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6565 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6566 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6567 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6568 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6573 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6574 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6575 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6576 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6577 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6578 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6579 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6580 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6581 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6582 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6583 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6584 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6586 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6590 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6591 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6594 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6595 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6597 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6602 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6603 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6604 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6605 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6606 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6607 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6608 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6609 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6610 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6611 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6613 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6614 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6615 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6617 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6618 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6619 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6621 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6625 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6626 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6627 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6628 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6631 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6632 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6635 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6636 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6637 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6638 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6641 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6642 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6643 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6644 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6647 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6652 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6656 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6657 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6658 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6659 // consider the stale state on reload.
6660 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6663 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6670 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6671 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6672 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6675 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6677 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6679 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6680 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6682 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6683 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6685 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6687 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6689 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6691 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6692 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6694 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6695 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6698 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6700 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6701 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6702 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6703 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6705 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6708 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6709 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6711 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6713 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6714 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6716 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6719 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6721 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6722 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6723 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6725 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6726 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6727 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6731 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6732 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6733 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6735 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6741 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6742 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6743 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6744 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6745 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6746 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6747 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6748 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6749 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6750 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6752 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6753 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6754 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6755 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6756 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6757 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6758 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6760 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6761 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6762 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6764 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6765 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6766 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6767 (2, channel_type, option),
6768 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6769 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6770 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6771 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6772 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6773 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6774 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6775 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6776 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6777 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6778 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6779 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6780 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6781 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6782 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6783 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6784 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6787 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6788 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6789 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6790 // required channel parameters.
6791 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6792 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6793 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6795 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6797 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6798 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6799 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6800 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6803 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6804 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6805 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6807 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6808 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6810 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6811 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6816 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6817 if iter.next().is_some() {
6818 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6822 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6823 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6824 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6825 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6826 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6829 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6830 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6832 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6833 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6834 // separate u64 values.
6835 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6840 config: config.unwrap(),
6844 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6845 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6846 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6849 temporary_channel_id,
6851 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6853 channel_value_satoshis,
6855 latest_monitor_update_id,
6858 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6861 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6862 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6865 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6866 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6867 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6871 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6872 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6873 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6874 monitor_pending_forwards,
6875 monitor_pending_failures,
6876 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6879 holding_cell_update_fee,
6880 next_holder_htlc_id,
6881 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6882 update_time_counter,
6885 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6886 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6887 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6888 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6890 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6891 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6892 closing_fee_limits: None,
6893 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6895 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6897 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6898 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6900 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6902 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6903 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6904 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6905 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6906 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6907 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6908 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6909 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6910 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6913 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6915 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6916 funding_transaction,
6918 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6919 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6920 counterparty_node_id,
6922 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6926 channel_update_status,
6927 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6931 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6932 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6933 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6934 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6936 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6938 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6939 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6940 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6942 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6943 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6945 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6946 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6948 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6951 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6959 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6960 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6961 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6962 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6963 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6965 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6966 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6968 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6969 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6970 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6971 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6972 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6973 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6974 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6975 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6976 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6977 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6978 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6979 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6980 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6981 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6982 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6983 use crate::util::test_utils;
6984 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6985 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6986 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6987 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6988 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6989 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6990 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6991 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6992 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6993 use crate::prelude::*;
6995 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6998 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6999 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7005 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7006 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7007 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7008 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7012 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7013 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7014 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7015 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7016 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7017 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7018 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7022 signer: InMemorySigner,
7025 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7026 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7029 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7030 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7032 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7033 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7036 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7040 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7042 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7043 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7044 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7045 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7046 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7049 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7050 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7051 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7052 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7056 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7057 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7058 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7062 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7063 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7064 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7065 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7067 let seed = [42; 32];
7068 let network = Network::Testnet;
7069 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7070 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7071 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7074 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7075 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7076 let config = UserConfig::default();
7077 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7078 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7079 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7081 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7082 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7086 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7087 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7089 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7090 let original_fee = 253;
7091 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7092 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7093 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7094 let seed = [42; 32];
7095 let network = Network::Testnet;
7096 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7098 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7099 let config = UserConfig::default();
7100 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7102 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7103 // same as the old fee.
7104 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7105 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7106 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7110 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7111 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7112 // dust limits are used.
7113 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7114 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7115 let seed = [42; 32];
7116 let network = Network::Testnet;
7117 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7118 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7120 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7121 // they have different dust limits.
7123 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7124 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7125 let config = UserConfig::default();
7126 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7128 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7129 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7130 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7131 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7132 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7134 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7135 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7136 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7137 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7138 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7140 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7141 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7142 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7144 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7145 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7146 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7147 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7150 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7152 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7153 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7154 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7155 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7156 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7158 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7159 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7160 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7161 payment_secret: None,
7165 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7166 // the dust limit check.
7167 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7168 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7169 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7170 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7172 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7173 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7174 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7175 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7176 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7177 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7178 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7182 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7183 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7184 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7185 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7186 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7187 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7188 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7189 let seed = [42; 32];
7190 let network = Network::Testnet;
7191 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7193 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7194 let config = UserConfig::default();
7195 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7197 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7198 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7200 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7201 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7202 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7203 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7204 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7205 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7207 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7208 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7209 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7210 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7211 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7213 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7215 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7216 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7217 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7218 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7219 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7221 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7222 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7223 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7224 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7225 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7229 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7230 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7231 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7232 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7233 let seed = [42; 32];
7234 let network = Network::Testnet;
7235 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7236 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7237 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7239 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7241 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7242 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7243 let config = UserConfig::default();
7244 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7246 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7247 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7248 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7249 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7251 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7252 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7253 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7255 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7256 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7257 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7258 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7260 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7261 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7262 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7264 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7265 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7267 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7268 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7269 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7270 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7271 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7272 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7273 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7274 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7275 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7280 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7282 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7283 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7284 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7285 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7286 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7287 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7288 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7295 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7296 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7297 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7298 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7299 let seed = [42; 32];
7300 let network = Network::Testnet;
7301 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7302 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7303 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7305 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7306 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7307 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7308 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7309 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7310 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7311 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7312 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7314 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7315 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7316 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7317 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7318 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7319 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7321 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7322 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7323 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7324 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7326 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7328 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7329 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7330 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7331 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7332 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7333 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7335 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7336 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7337 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7338 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7340 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7341 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7342 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7343 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7344 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7346 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7347 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7349 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7350 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7351 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7353 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7354 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7355 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7356 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7357 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7359 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7360 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7362 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7363 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7364 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7368 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7370 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7371 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7372 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7374 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7375 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7376 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7377 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7379 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7380 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7381 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7383 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7385 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7386 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7389 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7390 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7391 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7392 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7393 let seed = [42; 32];
7394 let network = Network::Testnet;
7395 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7396 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7397 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7400 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7401 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7402 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7404 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7405 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7407 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7408 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7409 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7411 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7412 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7414 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7416 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7417 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7419 // Channel Negotiations failed
7420 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7421 assert!(result.is_err());
7426 fn channel_update() {
7427 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7428 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7429 let seed = [42; 32];
7430 let network = Network::Testnet;
7431 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7432 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7434 // Create a channel.
7435 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7436 let config = UserConfig::default();
7437 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7438 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7439 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7440 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7442 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7443 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7444 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7446 short_channel_id: 0,
7449 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7450 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7451 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7453 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7454 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7456 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7458 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7460 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7461 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7462 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7463 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7465 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7466 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7467 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7469 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7473 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7475 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7476 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7477 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7478 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7479 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7480 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7481 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7482 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7483 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7484 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7485 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7486 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7487 use crate::sync::Arc;
7489 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7490 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7491 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7492 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7494 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7496 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7497 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7498 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7499 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7500 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7502 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7503 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7508 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7509 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7510 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7512 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7513 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7514 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7515 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7516 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7517 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7519 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7521 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7522 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7523 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7524 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7525 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7526 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7528 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7529 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7530 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7531 selected_contest_delay: 144
7533 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7534 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7536 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7537 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7539 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7540 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7542 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7543 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7545 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7546 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7547 // build_commitment_transaction.
7548 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7549 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7550 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7551 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7552 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7554 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7555 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7556 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7557 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7561 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7562 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7563 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7564 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7568 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7569 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7570 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7572 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7573 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7575 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7576 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7578 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7580 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7581 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7582 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7583 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7584 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7585 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7586 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7588 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7589 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7590 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7591 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7593 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7594 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7595 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7597 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7599 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7600 commitment_tx.clone(),
7601 counterparty_signature,
7602 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7603 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7604 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7606 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7607 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7609 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7610 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7611 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7613 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7614 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7617 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7618 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7620 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7621 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7622 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7623 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7624 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7625 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7626 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7627 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7629 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7632 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7633 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7634 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7638 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7641 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7642 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7643 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7645 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7646 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7647 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7648 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7649 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7650 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7651 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7652 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7654 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7658 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7659 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7660 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7661 "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", {});
7663 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7664 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7666 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7667 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7668 "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", {});
7670 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7671 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7672 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7673 "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", {});
7675 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7676 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7678 amount_msat: 1000000,
7680 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7681 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7683 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7686 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7687 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7689 amount_msat: 2000000,
7691 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7692 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7694 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7697 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7698 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7700 amount_msat: 2000000,
7702 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7703 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7704 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7706 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7709 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7710 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7712 amount_msat: 3000000,
7714 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7715 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7716 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7718 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7721 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7722 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7724 amount_msat: 4000000,
7726 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7727 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7729 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7733 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7734 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7735 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7737 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7738 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7739 "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", {
7742 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7743 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7744 "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" },
7747 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7748 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7749 "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" },
7752 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7753 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7754 "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" },
7757 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7758 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7759 "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" },
7762 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7763 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7764 "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" }
7767 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7768 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7769 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7771 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7772 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7773 "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", {
7776 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7777 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7778 "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" },
7781 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7782 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7783 "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" },
7786 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7787 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7788 "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" },
7791 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7792 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7793 "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" },
7796 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7797 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7798 "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" }
7801 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7802 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7803 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7805 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7806 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7807 "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", {
7810 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7811 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7812 "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" },
7815 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7816 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7817 "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" },
7820 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7821 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7822 "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" },
7825 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7826 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7827 "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" }
7830 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7831 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7832 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7833 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7835 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7836 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7837 "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", {
7840 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7841 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7842 "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" },
7845 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7846 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7847 "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" },
7850 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7851 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7852 "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" },
7855 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7856 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7857 "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" }
7860 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7861 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7862 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7863 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7865 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7866 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7867 "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", {
7870 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7871 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7872 "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" },
7875 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7876 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7877 "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" },
7880 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7881 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7882 "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" },
7885 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7886 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7887 "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" }
7890 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7891 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7892 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7894 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7895 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7896 "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", {
7899 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7900 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7901 "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" },
7904 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7905 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7906 "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" },
7909 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7910 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7911 "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" }
7914 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7915 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7916 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7918 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7919 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7920 "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", {
7923 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7924 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7925 "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" },
7928 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7929 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7930 "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" },
7933 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7934 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7935 "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" }
7938 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7939 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7940 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7942 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7943 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7944 "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", {
7947 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7948 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7949 "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" },
7952 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7953 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7954 "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" }
7957 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7958 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7959 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7960 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7962 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7963 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7964 "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", {
7967 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7968 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7969 "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" },
7972 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7973 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7974 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7977 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7978 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7979 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7980 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7982 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7983 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7984 "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", {
7987 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7988 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7989 "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" },
7992 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7993 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7994 "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" }
7997 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7998 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7999 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8001 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8002 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8003 "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", {
8006 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8007 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8008 "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" }
8011 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8012 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8013 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8014 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8016 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8017 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8018 "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", {
8021 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8022 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8023 "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" }
8026 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8027 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8028 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8029 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8031 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8032 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8033 "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", {
8036 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8037 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8038 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8041 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8042 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8043 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8044 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8046 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8047 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8048 "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", {});
8050 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8051 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8052 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8053 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8055 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8056 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8057 "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", {});
8059 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8060 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8061 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8062 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8064 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8065 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8066 "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", {});
8068 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8069 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8070 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8072 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8073 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8074 "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", {});
8076 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8077 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8078 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8079 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8081 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8082 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8083 "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", {});
8085 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8086 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8087 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8088 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8090 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8091 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8092 "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", {});
8094 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8095 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8096 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8097 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8098 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8099 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8101 amount_msat: 2000000,
8103 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8104 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8106 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8109 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8110 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8111 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8113 amount_msat: 5000001,
8115 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8116 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8117 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8119 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8122 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8123 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8125 amount_msat: 5000000,
8127 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8128 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8129 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8131 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8135 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8136 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8137 "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", {
8140 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8141 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8142 "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" },
8144 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8145 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8146 "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" },
8148 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8149 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8150 "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" }
8153 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8154 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8155 "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", {
8158 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8159 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8160 "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" },
8162 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8163 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8164 "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" },
8166 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8167 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8168 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a183483045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8173 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8174 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8176 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8177 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8178 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8179 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8181 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8182 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8183 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8185 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8186 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8188 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8189 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8191 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8192 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8193 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8197 fn test_key_derivation() {
8198 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8199 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8201 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8202 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8204 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8205 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8207 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8208 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8210 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8211 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8213 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8214 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8216 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8217 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8219 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8220 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8224 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8225 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8226 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8227 let seed = [42; 32];
8228 let network = Network::Testnet;
8229 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8230 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8232 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8233 let config = UserConfig::default();
8234 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8235 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8237 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8238 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8240 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8241 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8242 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8243 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8244 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8245 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8246 assert!(res.is_ok());
8251 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8252 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8253 // resulting `channel_type`.
8254 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8255 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8256 let network = Network::Testnet;
8257 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8258 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8260 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8261 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8263 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8264 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8266 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8267 // need to signal it.
8268 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8269 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8270 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8273 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8275 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8276 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8277 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8279 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8280 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8281 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8284 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8285 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8286 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8287 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8288 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8291 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8292 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8297 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8298 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8299 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8300 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8301 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8302 let network = Network::Testnet;
8303 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8304 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8306 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8307 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8309 let config = UserConfig::default();
8311 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8312 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8313 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8314 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8315 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8317 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8318 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8319 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8322 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8323 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8324 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8326 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8327 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8328 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8329 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8330 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8331 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8333 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8338 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8339 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8341 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8342 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8343 let network = Network::Testnet;
8344 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8345 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8347 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8348 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8350 let config = UserConfig::default();
8352 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8353 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8354 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8355 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8356 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8357 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8358 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8359 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8361 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8362 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8363 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8364 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8365 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8366 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8369 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8370 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8372 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8373 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8374 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8375 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8377 assert!(res.is_err());
8379 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8380 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8381 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8383 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8384 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8385 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8388 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8390 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8391 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8392 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8393 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8396 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8397 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8399 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8400 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8402 assert!(res.is_err());