1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
743 /// [`KeysInterface::derive_channel_signer`].
744 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
748 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
750 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
751 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
752 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
758 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
761 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
771 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
772 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
773 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
774 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
775 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
777 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
778 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
780 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
782 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
783 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
785 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
786 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
787 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
788 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
789 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
790 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
792 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
793 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
795 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
796 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
797 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
798 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
799 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
801 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
802 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
804 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
805 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
807 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
808 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
809 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
810 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
816 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
817 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
819 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
826 macro_rules! secp_check {
827 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
830 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
835 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
836 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
837 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
840 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
843 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
844 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
846 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
849 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
851 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
854 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
855 /// required by us according to the configured or default
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
858 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
860 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
861 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
862 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
863 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
864 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
867 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
868 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
869 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
870 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
871 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
872 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
873 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
876 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
877 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
880 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
881 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
882 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
883 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
884 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
885 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
886 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
892 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
893 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
894 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
895 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
896 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
897 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
898 // We've exhausted our options
901 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
902 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
906 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
907 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
908 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
909 outbound_scid_alias: u64
910 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
911 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
914 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
916 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
917 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
918 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
919 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
921 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
924 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
927 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
928 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
929 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
931 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
934 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
935 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
936 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
937 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
938 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
941 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
943 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
944 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
945 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
949 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
950 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
952 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
953 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
956 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
957 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
958 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
965 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
966 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
967 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
968 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
973 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
975 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
976 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
977 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
979 channel_value_satoshis,
981 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
984 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
985 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
987 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
988 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
991 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
992 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
993 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
994 pending_update_fee: None,
995 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
996 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
997 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
998 update_time_counter: 1,
1000 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1002 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1003 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1004 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1005 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1006 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1007 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1009 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1010 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1011 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1012 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1014 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1015 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1016 closing_fee_limits: None,
1017 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1019 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1021 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1022 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1023 short_channel_id: None,
1024 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1026 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1027 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1028 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1029 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1030 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1031 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1032 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1033 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1034 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1035 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1036 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1038 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1040 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1041 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1042 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1043 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1044 counterparty_parameters: None,
1045 funding_outpoint: None,
1046 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1047 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1049 funding_transaction: None,
1051 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1052 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1053 counterparty_node_id,
1055 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1057 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1059 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1060 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1062 announcement_sigs: None,
1064 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1065 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1066 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1067 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1069 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1071 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1072 outbound_scid_alias,
1074 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1076 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1077 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1079 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1084 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1085 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1086 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1088 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1089 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1090 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1091 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1092 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1093 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1094 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1097 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1098 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1099 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1100 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1101 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1102 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1103 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1104 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1106 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1107 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1116 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1117 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1118 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1119 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1120 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1121 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1122 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1123 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1124 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1127 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1128 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1130 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1131 // support this channel type.
1132 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1133 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1137 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1141 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1142 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1143 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1144 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1145 // publicly announced.
1146 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1147 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1151 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1155 channel_type.clone()
1157 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1159 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1163 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1164 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1165 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1166 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1167 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1168 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1169 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1170 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1171 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1174 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1178 // Check sanity of message fields:
1179 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1182 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1185 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1188 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1189 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1192 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1195 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1198 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1200 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1201 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1204 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1207 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1211 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1212 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1215 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1218 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1221 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1224 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1227 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1230 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1234 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1236 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1237 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1242 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1243 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1244 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1245 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1248 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1251 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1252 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1253 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1255 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1259 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1260 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1261 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1262 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1263 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1267 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1268 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1269 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1270 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1274 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1275 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1276 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1277 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1278 if script.len() == 0 {
1281 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1284 Some(script.clone())
1287 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1288 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1294 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1295 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1298 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1299 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1304 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1305 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1307 let chan = Channel {
1310 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1311 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1313 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1318 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1320 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1321 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1322 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1325 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1328 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1329 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1331 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1332 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1333 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1335 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1337 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1338 pending_update_fee: None,
1339 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1340 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1341 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1342 update_time_counter: 1,
1344 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1346 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1347 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1348 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1349 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1350 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1351 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1353 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1354 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1355 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1356 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1358 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1359 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1360 closing_fee_limits: None,
1361 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1363 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1365 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1366 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1367 short_channel_id: None,
1368 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1370 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1371 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1372 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1373 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1374 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1375 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1376 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1377 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1378 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1379 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1380 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1381 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1383 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1385 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1386 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1387 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1388 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1389 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1390 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1391 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1393 funding_outpoint: None,
1394 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1395 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1397 funding_transaction: None,
1399 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1400 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1401 counterparty_node_id,
1403 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1405 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1407 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1408 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1410 announcement_sigs: None,
1412 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1413 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1415 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1417 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1419 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1420 outbound_scid_alias,
1422 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1424 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1425 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1434 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1435 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1436 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1437 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1438 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1440 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1441 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1442 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1443 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1444 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1445 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1446 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1448 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1449 where L::Target: Logger
1451 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1452 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1453 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1455 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1456 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1457 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1458 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1460 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1461 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1462 if match update_state {
1463 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1464 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1465 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1466 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1467 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1469 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1473 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1474 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1475 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1476 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1478 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1479 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1480 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1482 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1483 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1484 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1485 transaction_output_index: None
1490 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1491 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1492 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1493 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1494 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1497 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1499 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1500 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1501 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1503 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1504 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1507 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1508 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1511 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1513 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1514 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1515 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1517 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1518 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1524 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1525 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1526 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1527 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1528 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1529 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1530 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1534 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1535 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1537 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1539 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1540 if generated_by_local {
1541 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1542 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1551 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1553 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1554 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1555 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1556 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1557 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1558 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1559 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1562 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1563 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1564 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1565 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1569 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1570 preimages.push(preimage);
1574 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1575 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1577 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1579 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1580 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1582 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1583 if !generated_by_local {
1584 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1592 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1593 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1594 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1595 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1596 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1597 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1598 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1599 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1601 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1603 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1604 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1605 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1606 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1608 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1610 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1611 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1612 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1613 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1616 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1617 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1618 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1619 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1621 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1624 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1625 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1626 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1627 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1629 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1632 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1633 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1638 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1639 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1644 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1646 let channel_parameters =
1647 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1648 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1649 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1652 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1657 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1660 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1661 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1662 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1663 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1665 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1666 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1667 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1675 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1676 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1682 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1683 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1684 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1685 // outside of those situations will fail.
1686 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1690 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1695 1 + // script length (0)
1699 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1700 2 + // witness marker and flag
1701 1 + // witness element count
1702 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1703 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1704 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1705 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1706 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1707 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1709 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1710 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1711 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1717 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1718 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1719 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1720 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1722 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1723 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1724 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1726 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1727 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1728 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1729 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1730 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1731 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1734 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1735 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1738 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1739 value_to_holder = 0;
1742 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1743 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1744 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1745 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1747 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1748 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1751 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1752 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1756 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1757 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1758 /// our counterparty!)
1759 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1760 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1761 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1762 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1763 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1764 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1765 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1767 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1771 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1772 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1773 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1774 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1775 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1776 //may see payments to it!
1777 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1778 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1779 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1781 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1784 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1785 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1786 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1787 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1788 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1791 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1794 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1795 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1797 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1799 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1800 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1801 where L::Target: Logger {
1802 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1803 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1804 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1805 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1806 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1807 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1808 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1809 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1813 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1814 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1815 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1816 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1818 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1819 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1821 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1823 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1825 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1826 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1827 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1829 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1830 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1831 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1832 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1833 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1835 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1836 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1837 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1839 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1840 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1842 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1845 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1846 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1850 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1854 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1855 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1856 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1857 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1858 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1859 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1862 // Now update local state:
1864 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1865 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1866 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1867 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1868 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1869 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1870 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1874 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1875 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1876 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1877 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1878 // do not not get into this branch.
1879 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1880 match pending_update {
1881 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1882 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1883 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1884 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1885 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1886 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1887 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1890 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1891 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1892 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1893 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1894 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1895 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1896 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1902 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1903 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1904 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1906 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1907 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1908 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1910 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1911 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1914 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1915 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1917 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1918 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1920 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1921 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1924 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1927 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1928 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1929 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1930 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1935 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1936 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1937 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1938 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1939 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1942 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1943 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1944 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1945 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1946 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1948 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1949 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1950 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1954 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1955 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1956 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1957 /// before we fail backwards.
1959 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1960 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1961 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1962 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1963 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1964 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1965 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
1968 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1969 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1970 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1971 /// before we fail backwards.
1973 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1974 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1975 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1976 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
1977 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1978 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1979 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1981 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1983 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1984 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1985 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1987 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1988 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1989 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1991 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1992 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1993 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1995 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2000 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2007 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2008 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2009 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2010 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2011 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2015 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2016 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2017 force_holding_cell = true;
2020 // Now update local state:
2021 if force_holding_cell {
2022 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2023 match pending_update {
2024 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2025 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2026 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2027 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2031 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2032 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2033 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2034 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2040 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2041 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2042 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2048 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2050 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2051 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2054 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2055 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2056 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2061 // Message handlers:
2063 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2064 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2066 // Check sanity of message fields:
2067 if !self.is_outbound() {
2068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2070 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2073 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2076 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2079 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2082 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2084 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2086 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2087 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2090 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2091 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2094 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2097 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2101 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2102 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2105 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2108 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2111 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2114 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2117 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2120 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2124 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2125 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2128 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2129 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2131 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2134 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2135 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2136 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2137 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2138 if script.len() == 0 {
2141 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2144 Some(script.clone())
2147 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2148 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2154 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2155 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2156 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2157 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2158 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2160 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2161 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2163 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2166 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2167 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2168 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2169 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2170 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2171 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2174 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2175 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2176 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2179 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2180 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2182 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2183 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2188 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2189 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2191 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2192 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2194 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2195 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2196 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2197 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2198 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2199 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2200 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2201 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2202 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2205 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2206 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2208 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2209 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2210 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2211 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2213 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2214 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2216 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2217 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2220 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2221 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2224 pub fn funding_created<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2225 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2226 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2228 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2231 if self.is_outbound() {
2232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2234 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2235 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2236 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2240 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2243 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2244 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2245 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2246 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2249 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2250 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2251 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2252 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2253 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2255 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2257 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2258 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2262 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2263 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2264 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2268 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2269 initial_commitment_tx,
2272 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2273 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2276 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2277 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2279 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2281 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2282 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2283 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2284 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2285 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2286 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2287 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2288 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2289 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2290 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2291 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2293 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2295 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2297 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2298 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2299 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2300 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2302 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2304 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2305 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2307 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2310 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2311 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2312 pub fn funding_signed<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2313 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2314 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2316 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2319 if !self.is_outbound() {
2320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2322 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2325 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2326 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2327 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2328 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2331 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2333 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2334 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2335 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2336 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2338 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2339 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2341 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2342 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2344 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2345 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2346 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2347 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2348 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2353 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2354 initial_commitment_tx,
2357 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2358 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2361 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2362 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2365 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2366 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2367 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2368 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2369 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2370 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2371 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2372 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2373 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2374 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2375 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2376 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2378 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2380 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2382 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2383 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2384 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2385 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2387 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2389 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2392 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2393 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2395 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2396 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2397 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2398 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2401 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2402 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2403 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2404 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2405 // when routing outbound payments.
2406 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2410 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2412 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2413 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2414 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2415 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2416 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2417 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2418 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2419 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2420 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2422 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2423 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2424 let expected_point =
2425 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2426 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2428 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2430 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2431 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2432 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2433 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2434 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2436 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2444 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2445 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2447 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2449 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2452 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2453 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2454 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2455 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2461 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2462 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2463 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2464 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2465 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2466 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2467 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2468 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2469 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2472 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2475 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2476 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2477 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2479 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2480 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2481 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2482 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2483 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2484 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2486 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2487 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2493 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2494 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2495 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2496 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2497 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2498 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2499 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2500 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2501 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2504 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2507 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2508 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2509 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2511 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2512 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2513 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2514 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2515 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2516 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2518 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2519 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2523 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2524 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2525 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2526 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2527 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2528 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2529 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2531 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2532 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2534 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2541 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2542 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2543 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2544 /// corner case properly.
2545 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2546 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2547 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2549 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2550 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2551 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2552 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2555 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2557 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2558 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2559 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2562 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2563 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2564 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2565 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2567 outbound_capacity_msat,
2568 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2569 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2570 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2576 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2577 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2580 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2581 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2582 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2583 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2584 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2585 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2588 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2589 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2591 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2592 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2595 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2596 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2597 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2599 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2600 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2602 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2605 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2606 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2608 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2609 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2611 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2612 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2614 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2615 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2619 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2620 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2626 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2627 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2628 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2631 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2632 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2633 included_htlcs += 1;
2636 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2637 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2641 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2642 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2643 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2644 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2645 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2646 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2651 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2653 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2654 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2659 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2660 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2664 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2665 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2666 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2669 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2670 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2672 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2673 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2674 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2676 total_pending_htlcs,
2677 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2678 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2679 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2681 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2682 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2683 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2685 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2687 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2692 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2693 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2694 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2696 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2697 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2699 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2702 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2703 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2705 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2706 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2708 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2709 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2711 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2712 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2716 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2717 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2723 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2724 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2725 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2726 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2727 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2728 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2731 included_htlcs += 1;
2734 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2735 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2738 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2739 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2741 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2742 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2743 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2748 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2749 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2753 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2754 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2756 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2757 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2759 total_pending_htlcs,
2760 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2761 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2762 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2764 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2765 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2766 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2768 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2770 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2775 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2776 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2777 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2778 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2779 if local_sent_shutdown {
2780 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2782 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2783 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2784 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2787 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2790 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2793 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2796 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2800 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2801 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2802 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2803 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2805 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2806 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2808 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2809 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2810 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2811 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2812 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2813 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2814 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2815 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2816 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2817 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2818 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2820 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2821 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2822 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2823 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2824 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2825 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2829 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2832 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2833 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2834 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2836 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2837 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2838 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2839 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2840 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2841 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2842 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2846 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2847 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2848 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2849 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2850 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2851 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2852 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2856 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2857 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2858 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2859 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2860 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2864 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2865 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2866 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2867 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2868 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2870 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2874 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2875 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2878 if !self.is_outbound() {
2879 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2880 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2881 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2882 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2883 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2884 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2885 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2886 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2887 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2888 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2889 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2890 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2891 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2892 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2893 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2896 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2897 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2898 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2899 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2903 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2906 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2907 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2910 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2911 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2912 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2916 // Now update local state:
2917 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2918 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2919 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2920 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2921 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2922 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2923 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2928 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2930 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2931 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2932 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2933 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2934 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2935 None => fail_reason.into(),
2936 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2937 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2938 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2939 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2941 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2945 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2947 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2948 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2950 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2956 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2959 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2960 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2963 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2967 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2970 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2971 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2972 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2974 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2975 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2978 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2982 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2983 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2986 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2990 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2994 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2995 where L::Target: Logger
2997 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2998 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3000 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3001 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3003 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3004 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3007 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3009 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3011 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3012 let commitment_txid = {
3013 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3014 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3015 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3017 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3018 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3019 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3020 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3021 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3022 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3026 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3028 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3029 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3030 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3031 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3034 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3035 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3036 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3037 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3040 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3042 if self.is_outbound() {
3043 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3044 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3045 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3046 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3047 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3048 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3049 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3050 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3051 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3052 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3058 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3059 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3062 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3063 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3064 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3065 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3066 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3067 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3068 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3070 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3071 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3072 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3073 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3074 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3075 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3076 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3077 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3079 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3081 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3085 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3086 commitment_stats.tx,
3088 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3089 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3090 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3093 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3094 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3095 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3096 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3098 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3099 let mut need_commitment = false;
3100 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3101 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3102 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3103 need_commitment = true;
3107 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3108 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3109 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3110 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3111 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3112 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3116 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3117 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3118 Some(forward_info.clone())
3120 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3121 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3122 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3123 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3124 need_commitment = true;
3127 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3128 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3129 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3130 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3131 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3132 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3133 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3134 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3135 need_commitment = true;
3139 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3140 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3141 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3142 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3144 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3145 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3146 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3147 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3148 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3149 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3150 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3151 // includes the right HTLCs.
3152 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3153 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3154 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3155 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3156 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3157 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3159 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3160 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3161 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3164 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3165 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3166 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3167 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3168 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3169 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3170 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3171 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3172 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3176 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3177 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3179 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3180 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3181 per_commitment_secret,
3182 next_per_commitment_point,
3183 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3186 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3187 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3188 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3189 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3190 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3191 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3192 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3193 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3196 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3197 /// for our counterparty.
3198 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3199 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3200 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3201 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3202 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3204 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3205 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3206 updates: Vec::new(),
3209 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3210 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3211 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3212 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3213 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3214 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3215 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3216 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3217 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3218 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3219 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3220 // to rebalance channels.
3221 match &htlc_update {
3222 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3223 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3224 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3227 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3228 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3229 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3230 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3231 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3232 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3233 // into the holding cell without ever being
3234 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3235 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3236 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3239 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3245 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3246 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3247 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3248 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3249 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3250 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3251 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3252 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3253 (msg, monitor_update)
3254 } else { unreachable!() };
3255 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3256 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3258 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3259 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3260 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3261 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3262 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3263 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3264 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3265 // for a full revocation before failing.
3266 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3269 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3271 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3278 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3279 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3281 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3282 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3287 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3288 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3289 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3290 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3291 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3293 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3294 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3295 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3297 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3299 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3301 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3304 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3306 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3310 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3311 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3312 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3313 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3314 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3315 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3316 where L::Target: Logger,
3318 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3319 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3321 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3324 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3328 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3330 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3331 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3336 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3337 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3338 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3339 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3340 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3341 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3342 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3343 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3347 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3349 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3350 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3353 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3354 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3356 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3358 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3359 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3360 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3361 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3362 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3363 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3364 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3365 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3369 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3370 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3371 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3372 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3373 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3374 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3375 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3376 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3378 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3379 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3382 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3383 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3384 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3385 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3386 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3387 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3388 let mut require_commitment = false;
3389 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3392 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3393 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3394 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3396 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3397 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3398 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3399 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3400 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3401 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3406 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3407 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3408 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3409 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3410 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3412 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3413 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3414 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3419 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3420 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3422 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3426 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3427 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3429 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3430 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3431 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3432 require_commitment = true;
3433 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3434 match forward_info {
3435 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3436 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3437 require_commitment = true;
3439 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3440 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3441 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3443 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3444 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3445 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3449 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3450 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3451 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3452 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3458 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3459 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3460 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3461 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3463 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3464 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3465 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3466 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3467 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3468 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3469 require_commitment = true;
3473 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3475 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3476 match update_state {
3477 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3478 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3479 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3480 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3481 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3483 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3484 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3485 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3486 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3487 require_commitment = true;
3488 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3489 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3494 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3495 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3496 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3497 if require_commitment {
3498 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3499 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3500 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3501 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3502 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3503 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3504 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3505 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3506 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3508 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3509 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3510 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3511 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3512 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3513 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3514 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3516 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3520 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3521 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3522 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3523 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3524 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3526 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3527 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3528 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3531 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3532 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3533 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3534 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3537 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3538 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3539 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3540 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3542 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3545 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3546 if require_commitment {
3547 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3549 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3550 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3551 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3552 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3554 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3555 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3557 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3558 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3559 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3561 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3565 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3566 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3567 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3570 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3572 commitment_update: None,
3573 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3574 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3575 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3582 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3583 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3584 /// commitment update.
3585 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3586 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3587 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3590 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3591 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3592 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3593 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3595 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3596 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3597 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3598 if !self.is_outbound() {
3599 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3601 if !self.is_usable() {
3602 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3604 if !self.is_live() {
3605 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3608 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3609 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3610 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3611 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3612 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3613 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3614 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3615 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3616 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3617 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3621 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3622 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3623 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3624 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3625 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3628 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3629 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3633 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3634 force_holding_cell = true;
3637 if force_holding_cell {
3638 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3642 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3643 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3645 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3646 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3651 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3652 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3654 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3656 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3657 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3658 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3659 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3663 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3664 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3665 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3669 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3670 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3673 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3674 // will be retransmitted.
3675 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3676 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3677 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3679 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3680 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3682 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3683 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3684 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3685 // this HTLC accordingly
3686 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3689 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3690 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3691 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3692 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3695 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3696 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3697 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3698 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3699 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3700 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3705 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3707 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3708 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3709 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3710 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3714 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3715 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3716 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3717 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3718 // the update upon reconnection.
3719 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3723 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3724 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3727 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3728 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3729 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3730 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3731 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3732 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3734 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3735 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3736 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3737 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3738 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3739 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3741 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3742 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3743 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3744 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3745 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3746 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3747 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3750 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3751 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3752 /// to the remote side.
3753 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3754 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3755 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3757 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3758 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3759 // first received the funding_signed.
3760 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3761 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3762 self.funding_transaction.take()
3764 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3765 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3766 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3767 funding_broadcastable = None;
3770 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3771 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3772 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3773 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3774 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3775 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3776 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3777 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3778 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3779 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3780 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3781 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3782 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3783 next_per_commitment_point,
3784 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3788 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3790 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3791 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3792 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3793 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3794 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3795 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3797 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3798 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3799 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3800 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3801 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3802 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3806 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3807 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3809 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3810 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3813 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3814 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3815 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3816 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3817 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3818 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3819 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3820 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3821 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3825 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3826 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3828 if self.is_outbound() {
3829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3831 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3834 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3835 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3837 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3838 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3839 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3840 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3841 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3842 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3843 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3844 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3845 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3846 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3847 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3849 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3851 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3852 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3853 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3859 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3860 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3861 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3862 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3863 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3864 per_commitment_secret,
3865 next_per_commitment_point,
3869 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3870 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3871 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3872 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3873 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3875 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3876 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3877 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3878 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3879 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3880 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3881 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3882 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3883 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3888 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3889 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3891 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3892 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3893 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3894 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3895 reason: err_packet.clone()
3898 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3899 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3900 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3901 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3902 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3903 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3906 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3907 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3908 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3909 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3910 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3917 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3918 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3919 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3920 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3924 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3925 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3926 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3927 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3928 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3929 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3933 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3934 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3936 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3937 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3938 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3939 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3940 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3941 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3942 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3943 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3944 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3945 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3946 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3947 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3950 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3951 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3955 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3956 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3957 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3958 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3959 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3960 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3961 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3964 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3965 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3966 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3967 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3968 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3971 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3972 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3973 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3974 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3975 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3976 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3977 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3978 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3981 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3985 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3986 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3987 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3988 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3990 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3994 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3995 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3996 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3998 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3999 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4000 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4001 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4002 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4006 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
4008 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4009 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4010 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4011 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4012 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4013 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4015 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4016 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4017 channel_ready: None,
4018 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4019 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4020 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4024 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4025 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4026 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4027 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4028 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4029 next_per_commitment_point,
4030 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4032 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4033 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4034 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4038 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4039 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4040 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4042 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4043 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4044 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4047 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4053 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4054 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4055 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4056 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4057 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4059 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4060 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4061 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4062 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4063 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4064 next_per_commitment_point,
4065 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4069 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4070 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4071 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4073 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4076 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4077 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4078 raa: required_revoke,
4079 commitment_update: None,
4080 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4082 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4083 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4084 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4086 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4089 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4090 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4091 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4092 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4093 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4094 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4097 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4098 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4099 raa: required_revoke,
4100 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4101 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4105 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4109 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4110 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4111 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4112 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4114 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4116 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4118 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4119 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4120 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4121 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4122 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4123 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4125 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4126 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4127 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4128 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4129 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4131 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4132 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4133 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4134 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4137 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4138 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4139 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4140 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4141 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4142 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4143 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4144 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4145 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4146 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4147 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4148 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4149 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4150 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4151 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4153 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4156 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4157 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4160 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4161 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4162 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4163 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4164 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4165 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4166 self.channel_state &
4167 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4168 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4169 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4170 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4173 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4174 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4175 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4176 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4177 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4178 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4181 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4187 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4188 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4189 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4190 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4192 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4193 return Ok((None, None));
4196 if !self.is_outbound() {
4197 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4198 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4200 return Ok((None, None));
4203 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4205 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4206 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4207 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4208 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4210 let sig = self.holder_signer
4211 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4212 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4214 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4215 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4216 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4217 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4219 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4220 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4221 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4226 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4227 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4228 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4229 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4231 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4234 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4235 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4236 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4237 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4240 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4241 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4245 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4247 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4248 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4251 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4252 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4253 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4256 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4259 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4260 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4261 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4262 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4264 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4267 assert!(send_shutdown);
4268 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4269 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4272 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4277 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4279 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4280 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4282 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4283 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4284 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4285 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4286 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4287 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4291 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4292 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4293 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4294 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4298 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4299 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4300 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4301 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4302 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4303 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4305 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4306 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4313 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4314 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4316 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4319 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4320 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4322 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4324 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4325 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4326 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4327 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4328 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4329 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4330 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4331 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4332 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4334 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4335 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4338 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4342 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4343 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4344 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4345 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4347 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4350 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4353 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4356 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4360 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4364 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4365 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4366 return Ok((None, None));
4369 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4370 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4371 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4372 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4374 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4376 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4379 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4380 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4381 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4382 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4383 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4387 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4388 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4393 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4394 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4395 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4396 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4397 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4398 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4399 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4403 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4405 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4406 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4407 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4408 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4410 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4413 let sig = self.holder_signer
4414 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4415 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4417 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4418 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4419 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4420 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4424 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4425 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4426 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4427 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4429 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4430 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4431 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4437 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4438 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4441 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4444 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4445 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4448 if !self.is_outbound() {
4449 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4450 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4451 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4452 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4454 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4455 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4456 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4458 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4459 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4462 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4463 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4464 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4465 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4466 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4467 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4468 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4469 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4471 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4474 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4475 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4476 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4477 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4479 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4483 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4484 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4485 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4486 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4488 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4494 // Public utilities:
4496 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4500 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4504 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4505 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4506 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4510 /// Gets the channel's type
4511 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4515 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4516 /// is_usable() returns true).
4517 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4518 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4519 self.short_channel_id
4522 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4523 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4524 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4527 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4528 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4529 self.outbound_scid_alias
4531 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4532 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4533 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4534 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4535 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4538 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4539 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4540 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4541 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4544 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4545 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4546 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4549 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4550 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4551 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4552 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4556 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4559 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4560 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4563 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4564 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4567 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4568 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4569 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4572 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4573 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4576 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4577 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4578 self.counterparty_node_id
4581 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4582 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4583 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4586 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4587 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4588 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4591 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4592 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4594 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4595 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4596 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4597 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4599 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4603 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4604 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4605 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4608 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4609 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4610 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4613 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4614 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4615 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4617 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4618 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4623 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4624 self.channel_value_satoshis
4627 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4628 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4631 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4632 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4635 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4636 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4639 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4640 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4641 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4644 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4645 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4646 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4649 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4650 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4651 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4654 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4655 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4656 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4657 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4658 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4661 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4663 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4664 self.prev_config = None;
4668 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4669 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4673 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4674 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4675 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4676 let did_channel_update =
4677 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4678 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4679 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4680 if did_channel_update {
4681 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4682 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4683 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4684 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4686 self.config.options = *config;
4690 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4691 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4692 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4693 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4694 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4695 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4696 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4698 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4699 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4702 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4704 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4705 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4711 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4712 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4713 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4714 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4715 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4716 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4717 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4719 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4720 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4727 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4731 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4732 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4733 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4734 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4735 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4736 // which are near the dust limit.
4737 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4738 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4739 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4740 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4741 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4743 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4744 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4746 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4749 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4750 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4753 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4754 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4757 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4758 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4762 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4767 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4769 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4770 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4771 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4772 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4773 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4774 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4776 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4778 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4786 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4787 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4791 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4792 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4793 self.update_time_counter
4796 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4797 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4800 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4801 self.config.announced_channel
4804 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4805 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4808 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4809 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4810 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4811 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4814 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4815 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4816 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4819 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4820 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4821 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4822 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4823 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4826 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4827 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4828 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4829 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4830 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4833 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4834 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4835 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4836 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4839 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4840 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4841 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4844 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4845 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4846 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4848 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4849 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4850 if self.channel_state &
4851 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4852 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4853 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4854 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4855 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4858 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4859 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4860 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4861 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4862 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4863 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4865 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4866 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4867 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4869 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4870 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4871 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4872 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4873 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4874 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4880 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4881 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4882 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4885 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4886 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4887 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4890 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4891 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4892 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4895 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4896 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4897 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4898 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4899 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4900 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4905 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4906 self.channel_update_status
4909 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4910 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4911 self.channel_update_status = status;
4914 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4916 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4917 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4918 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4922 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4923 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4924 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4927 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4931 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4932 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4933 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4935 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4936 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4937 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4939 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4940 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4943 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4944 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4945 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4946 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4947 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4948 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4949 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4950 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4951 self.channel_state);
4953 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4957 if need_commitment_update {
4958 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4960 let next_per_commitment_point =
4961 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4962 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4963 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4964 next_per_commitment_point,
4965 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4969 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4975 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4976 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4977 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4978 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4979 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4980 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4981 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4982 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4983 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4984 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4985 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4986 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4987 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4988 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4989 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4990 if self.is_outbound() {
4991 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4992 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4993 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4994 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4995 // channel and move on.
4996 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4997 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4999 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5000 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5001 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5003 if self.is_outbound() {
5004 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5005 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5006 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5007 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5008 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5009 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5013 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5014 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5015 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5016 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5017 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5021 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5022 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5023 // may have already happened for this block).
5024 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5025 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5026 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
5027 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5030 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5031 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5032 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5033 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5041 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5042 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5043 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5044 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5046 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5047 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5050 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5052 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5053 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5054 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5057 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5058 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5059 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5060 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5061 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5063 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5064 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5066 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5067 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5068 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5076 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5078 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5079 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5080 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5082 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5083 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5086 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5087 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5088 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5089 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5090 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5091 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5092 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5093 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5094 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5097 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5098 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5099 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5100 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5102 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5103 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5104 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5106 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5107 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5108 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5109 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5111 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5112 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5113 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5114 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5115 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5116 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5117 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5120 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5121 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5123 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5126 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5127 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5128 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5129 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5130 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5131 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5132 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5133 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5134 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5135 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5136 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5137 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5138 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5139 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5140 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5141 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5142 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5148 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5153 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5154 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5156 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5157 if !self.is_outbound() {
5158 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5160 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5161 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5164 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5165 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5168 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5169 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5173 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5174 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5175 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5176 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5177 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5178 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5179 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5180 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5181 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5182 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5183 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5184 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5185 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5186 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5187 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5188 first_per_commitment_point,
5189 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5190 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5191 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5192 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5194 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5198 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5199 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5202 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5203 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5204 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5205 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5208 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5209 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5211 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5212 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5213 if self.is_outbound() {
5214 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5216 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5217 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5219 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5220 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5222 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5223 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5226 self.user_id = user_id;
5227 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5229 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5232 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5233 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5234 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5236 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5237 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5238 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5239 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5241 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5242 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5243 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5244 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5245 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5246 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5247 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5248 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5249 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5250 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5251 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5252 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5253 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5254 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5255 first_per_commitment_point,
5256 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5257 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5258 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5260 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5264 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5265 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5267 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5269 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5270 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5273 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5274 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5275 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5276 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5277 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5278 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5281 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5282 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5283 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5284 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5285 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5286 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5287 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5288 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5289 if !self.is_outbound() {
5290 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5292 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5293 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5295 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5296 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5297 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5298 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5301 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5302 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5304 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5307 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5308 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5313 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5315 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5317 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5318 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5319 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5321 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5322 temporary_channel_id,
5323 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5324 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5329 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5330 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5331 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5332 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5334 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5337 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5338 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5339 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5340 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5342 if !self.is_usable() {
5343 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5346 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5348 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5349 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5351 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5352 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5353 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5354 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5355 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5356 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5362 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5363 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5364 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5368 if !self.is_usable() {
5372 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5373 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5377 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5381 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5382 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5385 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5389 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5391 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5396 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5398 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5399 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5400 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5401 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5402 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5406 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5408 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5409 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5410 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5412 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5413 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5414 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5415 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5416 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5417 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5418 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5419 contents: announcement,
5422 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5426 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5427 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5428 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5429 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5430 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5432 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5434 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5435 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5436 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5437 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5439 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5441 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5442 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5445 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5446 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5447 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5448 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5451 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5454 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5455 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5456 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5457 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5460 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5462 Err(_) => return None,
5464 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5465 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5470 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5471 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5472 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5473 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5474 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5475 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5476 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5477 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5478 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5479 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5480 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5481 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5482 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5483 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5484 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5485 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5486 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5487 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5488 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5491 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5492 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5493 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5494 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5497 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5498 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5499 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5500 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5501 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5502 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5503 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5504 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5506 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5507 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5508 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5509 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5510 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5511 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5512 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5513 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5514 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5516 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5522 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5524 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5525 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5526 /// commitment update.
5528 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5529 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5530 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5531 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5533 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5534 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5536 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5537 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5542 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5543 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5545 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5547 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5548 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5550 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5551 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5552 /// regenerate them.
5554 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5555 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5557 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5558 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5559 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5560 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5561 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5562 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5564 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5565 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5566 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5569 if amount_msat == 0 {
5570 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5573 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5574 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5577 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5578 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5579 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5580 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5581 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5582 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5583 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5584 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5587 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5588 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5589 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5590 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5592 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5593 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5594 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5597 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5598 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5599 if !self.is_outbound() {
5600 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5601 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5602 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5603 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5604 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5605 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5609 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5612 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5613 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5614 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5616 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5617 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5618 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5619 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5620 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5621 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5625 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5626 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5627 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5628 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5629 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5630 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5634 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5635 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5636 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5639 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5640 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5641 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5642 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5644 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5645 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5648 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5649 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5650 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5651 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5652 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5655 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5656 force_holding_cell = true;
5659 // Now update local state:
5660 if force_holding_cell {
5661 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5666 onion_routing_packet,
5671 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5672 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5674 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5676 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5680 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5681 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5682 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5686 onion_routing_packet,
5688 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5693 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5694 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5695 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5696 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5697 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5699 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5700 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5701 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5703 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5704 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5708 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5709 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5710 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5711 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5712 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5713 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5714 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5717 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5718 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5719 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5720 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5721 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5722 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5725 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5727 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5728 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5729 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5730 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5731 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5732 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5734 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5737 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5738 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5741 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5742 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5743 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5744 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5745 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5746 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5747 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5748 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5751 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5752 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5755 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5756 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5757 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5758 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5759 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5760 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5761 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5765 if !self.is_outbound() {
5766 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5767 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5768 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5769 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5770 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5771 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5772 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5773 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5774 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5775 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5782 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5783 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5787 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5788 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5790 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5792 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5793 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5794 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5795 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5797 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5798 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5799 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5800 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5801 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5802 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5806 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5807 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5810 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5813 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5814 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5816 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5817 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5818 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5819 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5820 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5821 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5822 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5828 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5829 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5830 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5833 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5834 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5837 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5838 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5839 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5840 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5846 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5847 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5848 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5849 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5850 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5851 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5852 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5853 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5856 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5857 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5858 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5860 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5861 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5864 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5865 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5866 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5869 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5872 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5873 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5874 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5876 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5881 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5882 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5883 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5884 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5886 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5888 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5890 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5891 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5892 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5893 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5894 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5895 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5899 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5900 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5901 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5904 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5905 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5906 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5907 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5908 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5910 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5911 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5918 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5921 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5922 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5923 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5924 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5925 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5926 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5927 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5928 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5929 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5930 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5931 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5933 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5934 // return them to fail the payment.
5935 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5936 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5937 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5939 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5940 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5945 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5946 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5947 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5948 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5949 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5950 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5951 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5952 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5953 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5954 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5955 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5956 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5957 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5962 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5963 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5964 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5967 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5968 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5969 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5971 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5972 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5976 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5980 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
5981 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5983 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5989 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5990 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5991 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5992 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5993 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5995 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5996 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5997 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5998 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6004 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6005 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6006 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6007 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6008 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6009 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6014 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6015 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6016 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6017 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6019 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6020 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6021 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6022 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6027 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6028 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6029 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6030 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6031 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6032 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6037 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6038 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6039 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6042 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6044 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6045 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6046 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6047 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6048 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6050 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6051 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6052 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6053 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6055 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6056 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6057 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6059 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6061 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6062 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6063 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6064 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6065 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6066 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6068 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6069 // deserialized from that format.
6070 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6071 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6072 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6074 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6076 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6077 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6078 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6080 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6081 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6082 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6083 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6086 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6087 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6088 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6091 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6092 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6093 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6094 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6096 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6097 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6099 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6101 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6103 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6105 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6108 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6110 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6115 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6117 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6118 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6119 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6120 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6121 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6122 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6123 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6125 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6127 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6129 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6132 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6133 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6134 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6137 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6139 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6140 preimages.push(preimage);
6142 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6143 reason.write(writer)?;
6145 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6147 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6148 preimages.push(preimage);
6150 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6151 reason.write(writer)?;
6156 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6157 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6159 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6161 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6162 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6163 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6164 source.write(writer)?;
6165 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6167 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6169 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6170 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6172 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6174 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6175 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6180 match self.resend_order {
6181 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6182 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6185 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6186 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6187 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6189 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6190 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6191 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6192 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6195 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6196 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6197 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6198 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6199 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6202 if self.is_outbound() {
6203 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6204 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6205 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6207 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6208 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6209 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6211 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6213 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6214 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6215 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6216 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6218 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6219 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6220 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6221 // consider the stale state on reload.
6224 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6225 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6226 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6228 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6229 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6230 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6232 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6233 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6235 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6236 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6237 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6239 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6240 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6242 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6245 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6246 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6247 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6249 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6252 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6253 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6255 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6256 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6257 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6259 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6261 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6263 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6265 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6266 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6267 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6268 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6269 htlc.write(writer)?;
6272 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6273 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6274 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6276 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6277 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6279 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6280 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6281 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6282 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6283 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6284 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6285 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6287 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6288 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6289 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6290 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6291 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6293 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6295 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6296 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6297 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6298 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6300 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6301 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6302 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6303 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6304 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6305 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6306 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6308 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6309 (2, chan_type, option),
6310 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6311 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6312 (5, self.config, required),
6313 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6314 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6315 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6316 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6317 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6318 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6319 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6320 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6321 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6322 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6323 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6324 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6331 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6332 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6333 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6334 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6335 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6336 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6338 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6339 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6340 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6341 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6343 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6345 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6346 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6347 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6351 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6352 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6355 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6356 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6357 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6359 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6361 let mut keys_data = None;
6363 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6364 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6365 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6367 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6368 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6369 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6370 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6371 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6372 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6376 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6377 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6378 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6381 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6383 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6384 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6385 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6387 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6389 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6390 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6391 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6392 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6393 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6394 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6395 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6396 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6397 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6398 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6399 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6400 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6405 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6406 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6407 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6408 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6409 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6410 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6411 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6412 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6413 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6414 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6415 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6416 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6418 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6419 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6422 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6423 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6426 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6427 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6429 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6434 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6435 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6436 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6437 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6438 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6439 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6440 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6441 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6442 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6443 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6445 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6446 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6447 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6449 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6450 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6451 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6453 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6457 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6458 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6459 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6460 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6463 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6465 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6467 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6469 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6470 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6473 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6474 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6475 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6476 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6479 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6481 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6489 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6490 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6491 // consider the stale state on reload.
6492 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6495 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6497 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6502 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6503 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6507 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6509 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6511 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6512 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6514 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6515 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6517 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6518 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6521 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6523 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6524 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6526 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6527 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6530 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6532 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6533 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6534 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6535 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6537 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6540 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6541 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6543 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6545 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6546 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6548 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6549 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6553 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6554 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6555 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6557 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6558 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6559 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6563 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6564 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6565 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6567 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6573 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6574 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6575 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6576 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6577 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6578 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6579 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6580 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6581 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6582 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6584 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6585 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6586 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6587 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6588 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6589 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6591 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6592 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6594 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6595 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6596 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6597 (2, channel_type, option),
6598 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6599 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6600 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6601 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6602 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6603 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6604 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6605 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6606 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6607 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6608 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6609 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6610 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6611 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6612 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6615 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6616 let mut holder_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6617 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6618 // required channel parameters.
6619 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6620 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6621 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6623 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6625 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6626 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6627 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6628 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6631 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6632 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6633 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6635 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6636 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6638 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6639 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6644 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6645 if iter.next().is_some() {
6646 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6650 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6651 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6652 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6653 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6654 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6657 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6658 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6659 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6662 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6663 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6665 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6666 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6667 // separate u64 values.
6668 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6673 config: config.unwrap(),
6677 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6678 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6679 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6683 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6685 channel_value_satoshis,
6687 latest_monitor_update_id,
6690 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6693 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6694 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6697 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6698 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6699 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6703 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6704 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6705 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6706 monitor_pending_forwards,
6707 monitor_pending_failures,
6708 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6711 holding_cell_update_fee,
6712 next_holder_htlc_id,
6713 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6714 update_time_counter,
6717 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6718 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6720 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6722 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6723 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6724 closing_fee_limits: None,
6725 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6727 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6729 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6730 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6732 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6734 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6735 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6736 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6737 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6738 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6739 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6740 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6741 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6742 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6745 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6747 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6748 funding_transaction,
6750 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6751 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6752 counterparty_node_id,
6754 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6758 channel_update_status,
6759 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6764 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6766 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6768 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6770 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6771 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6772 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6774 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6776 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6777 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6779 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6788 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6789 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6790 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6791 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6792 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6794 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6795 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6796 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6797 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6798 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6799 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6800 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6801 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6802 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6803 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6804 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6805 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6806 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6807 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6808 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6809 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6810 use crate::util::test_utils;
6811 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6812 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6813 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6814 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6815 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6816 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6817 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6818 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6819 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6820 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6821 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6822 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6823 use crate::prelude::*;
6825 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6828 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6829 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6835 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6836 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6837 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6838 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6842 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6843 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6844 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6845 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6846 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6847 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6848 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6852 signer: InMemorySigner,
6854 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6855 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6857 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6858 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6859 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6860 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6861 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6862 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6863 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6864 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6867 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6868 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6869 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6870 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6873 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6874 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6876 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6879 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6880 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6881 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6884 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6885 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6886 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6890 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6891 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6892 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6893 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6895 let seed = [42; 32];
6896 let network = Network::Testnet;
6897 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6898 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6899 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6902 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6903 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6904 let config = UserConfig::default();
6905 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6906 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6907 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6909 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6910 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6914 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6915 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6917 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6918 let original_fee = 253;
6919 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6920 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6921 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6922 let seed = [42; 32];
6923 let network = Network::Testnet;
6924 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6926 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6927 let config = UserConfig::default();
6928 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6930 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6931 // same as the old fee.
6932 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6933 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6934 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6938 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6939 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6940 // dust limits are used.
6941 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6942 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6943 let seed = [42; 32];
6944 let network = Network::Testnet;
6945 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6946 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6948 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6949 // they have different dust limits.
6951 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6952 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6953 let config = UserConfig::default();
6954 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6956 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6957 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6958 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6959 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6960 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6962 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6963 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6964 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6965 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6966 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6968 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6969 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6970 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6972 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6973 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6974 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6975 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6978 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6980 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6981 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6982 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6983 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6984 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6986 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6987 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6988 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6989 payment_secret: None,
6990 payment_params: None,
6994 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6995 // the dust limit check.
6996 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6997 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6998 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6999 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7001 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7002 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7003 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7004 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7005 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7006 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7007 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7011 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7012 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7013 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7014 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7015 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7016 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7017 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7018 let seed = [42; 32];
7019 let network = Network::Testnet;
7020 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7022 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7023 let config = UserConfig::default();
7024 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7026 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7027 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7029 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7030 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7031 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7032 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7033 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7034 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7036 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7037 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7038 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7039 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7040 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7042 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7044 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7045 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7046 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7047 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7048 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7050 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7051 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7052 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7053 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7054 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7058 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7059 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7060 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7061 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7062 let seed = [42; 32];
7063 let network = Network::Testnet;
7064 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7065 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7066 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7068 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7070 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7071 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7072 let config = UserConfig::default();
7073 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7075 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7076 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7077 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7078 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7080 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7081 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7082 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7084 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7085 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7086 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7087 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7089 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7090 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7091 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7093 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7094 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7096 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7097 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7098 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7099 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7100 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7101 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7102 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7103 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7104 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7109 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7111 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7112 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7113 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7114 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7115 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7116 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7117 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7124 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7125 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7126 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7127 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7128 let seed = [42; 32];
7129 let network = Network::Testnet;
7130 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7131 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7132 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7134 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7135 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7136 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7137 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7138 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7139 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7140 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7141 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7143 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7144 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7145 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7146 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7147 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7148 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7150 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7151 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7152 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7153 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7155 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7157 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7158 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7159 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7160 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7161 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7162 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7164 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7165 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7166 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7167 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7169 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7170 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7171 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7172 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7173 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7175 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7176 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7178 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7179 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7180 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7182 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7183 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7184 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7185 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7186 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7188 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7189 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7191 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7192 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7193 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7197 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7199 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7200 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7201 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7203 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7204 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7205 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7206 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7208 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7209 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7210 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7212 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7214 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7215 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7218 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7219 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7220 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7221 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7222 let seed = [42; 32];
7223 let network = Network::Testnet;
7224 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7225 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7226 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7229 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7230 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7231 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7233 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7234 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7236 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7237 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7238 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7240 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7241 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7243 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7245 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7246 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7248 // Channel Negotiations failed
7249 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7250 assert!(result.is_err());
7255 fn channel_update() {
7256 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7257 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7258 let seed = [42; 32];
7259 let network = Network::Testnet;
7260 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7261 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7263 // Create a channel.
7264 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7265 let config = UserConfig::default();
7266 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7267 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7268 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7269 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7271 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7272 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7273 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7275 short_channel_id: 0,
7278 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7279 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7280 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7282 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7283 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7285 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7287 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7289 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7290 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7291 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7292 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7294 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7295 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7296 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7298 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7302 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7304 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7305 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7306 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7307 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7308 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7309 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7310 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7311 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7312 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7313 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7314 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7315 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7316 use crate::sync::Arc;
7318 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7319 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7320 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7321 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7323 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7325 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7326 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7327 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7328 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7329 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7330 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7332 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7333 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7338 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7339 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7340 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7342 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7343 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7344 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7345 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7346 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7347 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7349 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7351 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7352 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7353 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7354 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7355 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7356 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7358 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7359 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7360 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7361 selected_contest_delay: 144
7363 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7364 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7366 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7367 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7369 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7370 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7372 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7373 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7375 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7376 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7377 // build_commitment_transaction.
7378 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7379 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7380 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7381 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7382 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7384 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7385 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7386 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7387 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7391 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7392 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7393 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7394 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7398 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7399 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7400 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7402 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7403 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7405 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7406 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7408 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7410 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7411 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7412 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7413 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7414 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7415 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7416 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7418 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7419 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7420 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7421 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7423 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7424 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7425 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7427 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7429 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7430 commitment_tx.clone(),
7431 counterparty_signature,
7432 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7433 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7434 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7436 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7437 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7439 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7440 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7441 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7443 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7444 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7447 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7448 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7450 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7451 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7452 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7453 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7454 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7455 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7456 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7457 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7459 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7462 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7463 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7464 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7468 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7471 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7472 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7473 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7475 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7476 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7477 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7478 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7479 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7480 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7481 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7482 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7484 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7488 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7489 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7491 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7492 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7493 "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", {});
7495 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7496 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7497 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7498 "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", {});
7500 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7501 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7503 amount_msat: 1000000,
7505 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7506 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7508 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7511 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7512 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7514 amount_msat: 2000000,
7516 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7517 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7519 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7522 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7523 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7525 amount_msat: 2000000,
7527 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7528 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7529 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7531 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7534 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7535 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7537 amount_msat: 3000000,
7539 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7540 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7541 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7543 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7546 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7547 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7549 amount_msat: 4000000,
7551 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7552 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7554 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7558 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7559 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7560 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7562 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7563 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7564 "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", {
7567 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7568 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7569 "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" },
7572 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7573 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7574 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7577 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7578 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7579 "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" },
7582 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7583 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7584 "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" },
7587 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7588 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7589 "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" }
7592 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7593 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7594 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7596 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7597 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7598 "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", {
7601 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7602 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7603 "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" },
7606 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7607 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7608 "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" },
7611 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7612 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7613 "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" },
7616 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7617 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7618 "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" },
7621 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7622 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7623 "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" }
7626 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7627 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7628 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7630 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7631 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7632 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7635 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7636 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7637 "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" },
7640 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7641 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7642 "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" },
7645 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7646 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7647 "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" },
7650 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7651 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7652 "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" }
7655 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7656 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7657 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7658 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7660 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7661 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7662 "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", {
7665 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7666 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7667 "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" },
7670 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7671 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7672 "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" },
7675 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7676 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7677 "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" },
7680 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7681 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7682 "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" }
7685 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7686 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7687 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7688 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7690 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7691 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7692 "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", {
7695 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7696 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7697 "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" },
7700 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7701 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7702 "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" },
7705 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7706 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7707 "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" },
7710 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7711 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7712 "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" }
7715 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7716 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7717 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7719 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7720 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7721 "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", {
7724 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7725 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7726 "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" },
7729 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7730 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7731 "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" },
7734 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7735 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7736 "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" }
7739 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7740 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7741 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7743 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7744 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7745 "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", {
7748 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7749 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7750 "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" },
7753 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7754 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7755 "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" },
7758 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7759 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7760 "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" }
7763 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7764 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7765 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7767 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7768 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7769 "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", {
7772 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7773 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7774 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7777 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7778 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7779 "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" }
7782 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7783 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7784 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7785 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7787 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7788 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7789 "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", {
7792 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7793 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7794 "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" },
7797 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7798 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7799 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7802 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7803 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7804 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7805 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7807 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7808 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7809 "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", {
7812 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7813 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7814 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7817 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7818 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7819 "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" }
7822 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7823 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7824 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7826 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7827 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7828 "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", {
7831 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7832 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7833 "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" }
7836 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7837 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7838 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7839 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7841 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7842 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7843 "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", {
7846 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7847 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7848 "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" }
7851 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7852 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7853 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7854 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7856 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7857 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7858 "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", {
7861 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7862 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7863 "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" }
7866 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7867 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7868 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7869 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7871 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7872 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7873 "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", {});
7875 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7876 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7877 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7878 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7880 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7881 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7882 "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", {});
7884 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7885 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7886 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7887 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7889 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7890 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7891 "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", {});
7893 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7894 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7895 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7897 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7898 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7899 "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", {});
7901 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7902 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7903 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7904 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7906 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7907 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7908 "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", {});
7910 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7911 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7912 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7913 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7915 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7916 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7917 "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", {});
7919 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7920 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7921 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7922 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7923 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7924 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7926 amount_msat: 2000000,
7928 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7929 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7931 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7934 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7935 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7936 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7938 amount_msat: 5000000,
7940 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7941 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7942 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7944 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7947 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7948 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7950 amount_msat: 5000000,
7952 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7953 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7954 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7956 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7960 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7961 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7962 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a79f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f014730440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7965 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7966 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7967 "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" },
7969 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7970 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7971 "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" },
7973 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7974 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7975 "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" }
7978 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7979 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7980 "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", {
7983 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7984 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7985 "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" },
7987 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7988 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7989 "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" },
7991 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7992 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7993 "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" }
7998 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7999 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8001 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8002 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8003 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8004 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8006 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8007 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8008 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8010 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8011 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8013 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8014 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8016 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8017 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8018 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8022 fn test_key_derivation() {
8023 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8024 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8026 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8027 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8029 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8030 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8032 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8033 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8035 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8036 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8038 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8039 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8041 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8042 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8044 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8045 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8049 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8050 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8051 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8052 let seed = [42; 32];
8053 let network = Network::Testnet;
8054 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8055 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8057 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8058 let config = UserConfig::default();
8059 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8060 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8062 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8063 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8065 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8066 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8067 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8068 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8069 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8070 assert!(res.is_ok());