1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
593 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
594 (0, update, required),
597 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
598 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
599 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
601 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
602 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
603 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
604 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
606 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
610 channel_id: [u8; 32],
611 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
614 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
615 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
617 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
618 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
619 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
621 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
622 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
623 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
624 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
626 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
627 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
629 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
631 holder_signer: Signer,
632 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
633 destination_script: Script,
635 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
636 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
637 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
639 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
640 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
641 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
642 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
643 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
644 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
646 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
647 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
648 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
649 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
650 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
651 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
653 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
655 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
656 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
657 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
659 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
660 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
661 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
662 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
663 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
664 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
665 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
667 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
669 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
670 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
671 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
672 // HTLCs with similar state.
673 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
674 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
675 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
676 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
677 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
678 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
679 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
680 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
681 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
684 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
685 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
686 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
688 update_time_counter: u32,
690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
692 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
694 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
695 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
698 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
700 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
701 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
702 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
703 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
705 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
706 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
708 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
710 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
712 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
713 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
714 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
715 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
716 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
717 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
719 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
720 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
721 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
722 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
723 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
725 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
726 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
727 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
728 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
729 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
730 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
731 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
732 channel_creation_height: u32,
734 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
737 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
739 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
742 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
744 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
747 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
749 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
752 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
755 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
757 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
759 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
760 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
762 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
764 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
765 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
766 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
768 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
770 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
771 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
773 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
774 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
775 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
777 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
779 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
781 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
782 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
783 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
784 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
786 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
787 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
788 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
790 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
791 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
792 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
794 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
795 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
796 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
797 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
799 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
800 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
801 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
803 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
804 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
805 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
806 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
807 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
809 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
810 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
812 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
813 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
814 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
815 /// unblock the state machine.
817 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
818 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
819 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
821 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
822 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
823 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
825 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
826 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
827 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
828 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
829 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
830 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
831 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
832 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
834 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
835 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
837 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
838 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
839 // the channel's funding UTXO.
841 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
842 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
843 // associated channel mapping.
845 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
846 // to store all of them.
847 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
849 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
850 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
851 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
852 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
853 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
855 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
856 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
858 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
859 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
861 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
862 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
863 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
865 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
866 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
867 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
870 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
871 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
872 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
873 self.update_time_counter
876 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
877 self.latest_monitor_update_id
880 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
881 self.config.announced_channel
884 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
885 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
888 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
890 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
891 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
894 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
895 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
896 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
899 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
900 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
901 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
902 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
903 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
906 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
907 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
908 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
909 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
911 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
912 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
914 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
915 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
917 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
918 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
920 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
923 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
924 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
925 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
926 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
928 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
929 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
930 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
931 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
934 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
935 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
936 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
937 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
938 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
943 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
947 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
949 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
950 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
951 self.temporary_channel_id
954 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
958 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
959 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
960 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
964 /// Gets the channel's type
965 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
969 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
970 /// is_usable() returns true).
971 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
972 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
973 self.short_channel_id
976 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
977 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
978 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
981 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
982 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
983 self.outbound_scid_alias
986 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
987 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
988 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
989 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
990 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
993 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
994 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
995 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
996 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
999 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1000 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1001 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1004 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1005 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1006 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1007 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1011 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1014 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1015 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1018 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1019 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1022 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1023 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1024 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1027 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1028 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1032 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1033 self.counterparty_node_id
1036 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1037 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1038 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1041 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1042 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1043 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1046 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1047 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1049 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1050 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1051 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1052 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1054 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1058 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1059 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1060 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1063 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1064 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1065 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1068 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1069 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1070 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1072 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1073 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1078 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1079 self.channel_value_satoshis
1082 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1083 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1086 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1087 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1090 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1091 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1094 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1095 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1096 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1099 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1100 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1101 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1104 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1105 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1106 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1109 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1110 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1111 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1114 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1115 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1116 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1119 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1120 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1121 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1124 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1125 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1126 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1127 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1128 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1131 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1133 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1134 self.prev_config = None;
1138 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1139 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1143 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1144 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1145 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1146 let did_channel_update =
1147 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1148 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1149 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1150 if did_channel_update {
1151 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1152 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1153 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1154 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1156 self.config.options = *config;
1160 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1161 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1162 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1165 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1166 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1167 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1168 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1169 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1171 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1172 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1173 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1174 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1175 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1176 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1177 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1179 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1180 where L::Target: Logger
1182 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1183 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1184 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1186 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1187 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1188 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1189 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1191 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1192 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1193 if match update_state {
1194 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1195 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1196 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1197 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1198 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1200 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1204 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1205 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1206 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1207 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1209 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1210 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1211 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1213 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1214 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1215 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1216 transaction_output_index: None
1221 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1222 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1223 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1224 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1225 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1228 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1230 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1231 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1232 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1234 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1235 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1238 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1239 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1242 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1244 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1245 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1246 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1248 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1249 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1255 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1256 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1257 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1258 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1259 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1260 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1261 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1265 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1266 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1268 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1270 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1271 if generated_by_local {
1272 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1273 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1282 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1284 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1285 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1286 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1287 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1288 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1289 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1290 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1293 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1294 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1295 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1296 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1300 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1301 preimages.push(preimage);
1305 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1306 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1308 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1310 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1311 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1313 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1314 if !generated_by_local {
1315 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1323 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1324 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1325 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1326 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1327 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1328 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1329 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1330 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1332 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1334 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1335 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1336 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1337 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1339 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1341 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1342 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1343 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1344 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1347 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1348 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1349 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1350 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1352 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1355 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1356 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1357 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1358 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1360 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1363 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1364 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1369 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1370 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1375 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1377 let channel_parameters =
1378 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1379 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1380 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1387 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1390 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1391 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1392 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1393 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1395 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1396 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1397 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1405 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1406 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1412 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1413 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1414 /// our counterparty!)
1415 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1416 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1417 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1418 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1419 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1420 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1421 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1423 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1427 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1428 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1429 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1430 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1431 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1432 //may see payments to it!
1433 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1434 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1435 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1437 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1440 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1441 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1442 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1443 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1444 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1447 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1448 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1451 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1455 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1456 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1457 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1458 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1459 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1460 // which are near the dust limit.
1461 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1462 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1463 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1464 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1465 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1467 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1468 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1470 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1473 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1474 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1475 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1478 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1479 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1481 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1482 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1483 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1484 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1485 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1486 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1487 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1490 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1493 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1494 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1495 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1497 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1498 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1499 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1500 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1501 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1502 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1504 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1505 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1511 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1512 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1514 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1515 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1516 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1517 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1518 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1519 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1520 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1523 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1526 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1527 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1528 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1530 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1531 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1532 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1533 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1534 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1535 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1537 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1538 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1542 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1543 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1544 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1545 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1546 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1547 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1548 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1550 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1551 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1553 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1560 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1561 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1562 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1563 /// corner case properly.
1564 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1565 let context = &self;
1566 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1567 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1568 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1570 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1571 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1572 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1573 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1576 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1578 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1579 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1581 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1583 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1585 if context.is_outbound() {
1586 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1587 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1589 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1590 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1592 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1593 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1594 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1595 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1598 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1599 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1600 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1601 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1603 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1604 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1605 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1606 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1607 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1608 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1609 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1610 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1611 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1612 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1614 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1617 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1618 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1619 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1620 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1621 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1624 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1625 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1627 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1628 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1629 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1631 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1632 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1633 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1634 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1638 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1640 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1641 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1642 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1643 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1644 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1645 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1647 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1648 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1650 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1651 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1652 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1654 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1655 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1656 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1657 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1658 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1661 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1662 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1663 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1664 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1665 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1666 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1669 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1670 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1671 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1673 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1677 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1678 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1680 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1681 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1685 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1686 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1687 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1688 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1690 outbound_capacity_msat,
1691 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1692 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1697 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1698 let context = &self;
1699 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1702 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1703 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1705 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1706 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1708 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1709 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1711 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1712 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1713 let context = &self;
1714 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1716 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1719 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1720 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1722 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1723 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1725 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1726 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1728 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1729 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1733 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1734 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1740 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1741 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1742 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1745 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1746 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1747 included_htlcs += 1;
1750 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1751 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1755 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1756 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1757 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1758 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1759 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1760 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1765 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1767 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1768 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1773 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1774 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1778 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1779 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1780 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1783 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1784 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1786 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1787 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1788 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1790 total_pending_htlcs,
1791 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1792 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1793 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1795 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1796 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1797 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1799 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1801 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1806 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1807 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1809 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1810 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1812 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1813 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1815 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1816 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1817 let context = &self;
1818 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1820 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1823 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1824 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1826 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1827 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1829 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1830 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1832 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1833 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1837 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1838 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1844 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1845 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1846 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1847 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1848 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1849 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1852 included_htlcs += 1;
1855 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1859 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1860 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1862 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1863 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1864 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1869 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1870 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1874 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1875 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1877 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1878 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1880 total_pending_htlcs,
1881 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1882 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1883 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1885 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1886 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1887 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1889 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1891 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1896 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1897 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1898 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1899 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1905 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1906 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1907 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1908 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1909 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1910 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1911 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1912 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1913 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1914 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1915 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1917 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1918 // return them to fail the payment.
1919 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1920 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1921 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1923 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1924 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1929 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1930 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1931 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1932 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1933 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1934 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1935 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1936 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1937 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1938 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1939 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1940 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1941 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1946 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1947 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1948 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1952 // Internal utility functions for channels
1954 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1955 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1956 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1958 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1960 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1961 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1962 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1964 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1967 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1969 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1972 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1973 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1974 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1976 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1978 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1979 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1980 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1981 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1982 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1985 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1986 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1987 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1988 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1989 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1990 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1991 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1994 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1995 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1997 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1998 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2001 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2002 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2003 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2004 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2005 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2006 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2009 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2010 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2011 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2014 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2015 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2016 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2017 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2020 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2021 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2023 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2024 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2025 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2029 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2030 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2031 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2032 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2034 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2035 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2036 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2037 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2038 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2039 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2040 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2043 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2044 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2045 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2046 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2047 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2048 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2049 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2050 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2052 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2053 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2063 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2064 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2065 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2066 // outside of those situations will fail.
2067 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2071 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2076 1 + // script length (0)
2080 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2081 2 + // witness marker and flag
2082 1 + // witness element count
2083 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2084 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2085 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2086 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2087 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2088 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2090 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2091 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2092 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2098 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2099 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2100 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2101 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2103 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2104 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2105 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2107 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2108 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2109 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2110 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2111 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2112 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2115 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2116 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2119 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2120 value_to_holder = 0;
2123 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2124 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2125 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2126 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2128 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2129 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2132 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2133 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2136 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2139 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2140 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2142 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2144 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2145 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2146 where L::Target: Logger {
2147 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2148 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2149 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2150 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2151 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2152 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2153 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2154 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2158 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2159 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2160 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2161 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2163 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2164 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2166 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2168 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2170 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2171 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2172 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2174 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2175 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2176 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2177 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2178 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2180 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2181 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2182 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2184 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2185 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2187 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2190 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2191 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2195 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2199 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2200 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2201 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2202 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2203 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2204 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2207 // Now update local state:
2209 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2210 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2211 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2212 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2213 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2214 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2215 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2219 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2220 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2221 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2222 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2223 // do not not get into this branch.
2224 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2225 match pending_update {
2226 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2227 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2228 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2229 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2230 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2231 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2232 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2235 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2236 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2237 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2238 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2239 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2240 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2241 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2247 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2248 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2249 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2251 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2252 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2253 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2255 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2256 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2259 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2260 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2262 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2263 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2265 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2266 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2269 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2272 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2273 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2274 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2275 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2280 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2281 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2282 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2283 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2284 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2285 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2286 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2287 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2288 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2289 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2290 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2291 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2292 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2293 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2294 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2296 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2297 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2298 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2299 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2300 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2303 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2304 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2305 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2311 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2312 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2314 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2318 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2319 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2320 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2321 /// before we fail backwards.
2323 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2324 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2325 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2326 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2327 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2328 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2329 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2332 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2333 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2334 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2335 /// before we fail backwards.
2337 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2338 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2339 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2340 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2341 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2342 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2343 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2345 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2347 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2348 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2349 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2351 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2352 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2353 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2355 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2356 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2357 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2359 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2364 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2365 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2371 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2372 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2373 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2374 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2375 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2379 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2380 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2381 force_holding_cell = true;
2384 // Now update local state:
2385 if force_holding_cell {
2386 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2387 match pending_update {
2388 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2389 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2391 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2395 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2396 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2397 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2398 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2404 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2405 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2406 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2412 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2414 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2415 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2418 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2419 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2420 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2425 // Message handlers:
2427 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2428 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2429 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2430 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2431 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2433 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2436 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2439 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2442 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2443 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2444 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2445 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2448 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2450 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2451 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2452 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2453 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2455 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2456 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2458 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2459 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2461 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2462 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2463 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2464 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2465 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2470 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2471 initial_commitment_tx,
2474 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2475 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2478 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2479 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2482 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2483 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2484 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2485 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2486 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2487 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2488 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2489 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2490 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2491 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2492 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2493 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2495 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2497 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2499 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2500 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2501 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2502 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2504 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2506 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2507 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2511 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2512 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2514 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2515 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2516 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2517 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2519 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2522 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2523 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2524 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2527 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2528 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2529 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2530 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2531 // when routing outbound payments.
2532 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2536 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2538 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2539 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2540 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2541 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2542 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2543 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2544 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2545 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2546 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2548 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2549 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2550 let expected_point =
2551 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2552 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2554 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2555 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2556 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2557 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2558 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2559 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2561 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2562 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2563 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2564 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2565 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2567 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2575 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2576 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2578 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2580 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2583 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2584 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2585 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2586 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2587 if local_sent_shutdown {
2588 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2590 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2591 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2592 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2595 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2598 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2601 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2604 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2608 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2609 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2610 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2611 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2613 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2616 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2617 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2618 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2619 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2620 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2621 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2622 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2623 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2624 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2625 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2626 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2628 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2629 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2630 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2631 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2632 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2633 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2637 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2640 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2641 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2642 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2644 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2645 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2646 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2647 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2648 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2649 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2650 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2654 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2655 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2656 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2657 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2658 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2659 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2660 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2664 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2665 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2666 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2667 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2668 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2669 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2672 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2673 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2674 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2675 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2676 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2678 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2682 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2683 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2686 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2687 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2688 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2689 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2690 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2691 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2692 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2693 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2694 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2695 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2696 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2697 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2698 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2699 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2700 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2701 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2704 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2705 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2706 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2707 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2711 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2712 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2714 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2715 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2718 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2719 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2720 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2724 // Now update local state:
2725 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2726 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2727 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2728 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2729 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2730 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2731 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2736 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2738 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2739 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2740 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2741 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2742 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2743 None => fail_reason.into(),
2744 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2745 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2746 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2747 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2749 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2753 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2755 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2756 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2758 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2759 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2764 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2767 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2768 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2771 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2775 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2778 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2779 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2782 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2786 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2790 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2791 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2792 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2794 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2795 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2798 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2802 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2803 where L::Target: Logger
2805 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2808 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2809 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2811 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2815 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2817 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2819 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2820 let commitment_txid = {
2821 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2822 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2823 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2825 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2826 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2827 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2828 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2829 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2834 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2836 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2837 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2838 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2839 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2842 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2843 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2844 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2848 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2850 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2851 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2852 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2853 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2854 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2855 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2856 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2857 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2858 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2859 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2860 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2866 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2870 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2871 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2872 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2873 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2874 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2875 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2876 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2877 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2878 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2879 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2880 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2881 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2882 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2885 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2886 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2887 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2888 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2889 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2890 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2891 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2893 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2894 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2895 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2896 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2897 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2898 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2899 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2902 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2903 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2906 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2908 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2909 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2910 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2913 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2916 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2917 commitment_stats.tx,
2919 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2920 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2921 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2924 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2925 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2927 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2928 let mut need_commitment = false;
2929 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2930 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2931 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2932 need_commitment = true;
2936 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2937 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2938 Some(forward_info.clone())
2940 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2941 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2942 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2943 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2944 need_commitment = true;
2947 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2948 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2949 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2950 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2951 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2952 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2953 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2954 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2955 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2956 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2957 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2958 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2959 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2960 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2962 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2964 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2965 need_commitment = true;
2969 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2970 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2971 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2972 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2973 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2974 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2976 nondust_htlc_sources,
2980 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2981 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2982 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2983 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2985 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2986 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2987 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2988 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2989 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2990 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2991 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2992 // includes the right HTLCs.
2993 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2994 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2995 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2996 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2997 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2998 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3000 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3001 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3002 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3005 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3006 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3007 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3008 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3009 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3010 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3011 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3012 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3013 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3017 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3018 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3019 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3020 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3023 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3024 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3025 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3026 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3027 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3028 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3029 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3030 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3033 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3034 /// for our counterparty.
3035 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3036 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3037 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3038 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3039 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3041 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3042 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3043 updates: Vec::new(),
3046 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3047 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3048 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3049 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3050 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3051 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3052 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3053 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3054 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3055 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3056 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3057 // to rebalance channels.
3058 match &htlc_update {
3059 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3060 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3061 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3063 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3064 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
3066 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3069 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3070 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3071 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3072 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3073 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3074 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3075 // into the holding cell without ever being
3076 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3077 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3078 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3081 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3087 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3088 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3089 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3090 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3091 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3092 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3093 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3094 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3095 (msg, monitor_update)
3096 } else { unreachable!() };
3097 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3098 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3100 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3101 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3102 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3103 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3104 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3105 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3106 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3107 // for a full revocation before failing.
3108 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3111 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3113 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3120 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3121 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3123 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3124 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3129 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3130 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3131 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3132 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3133 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3135 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3136 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3137 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3139 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3140 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3146 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3147 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3148 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3149 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3150 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3151 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3152 where L::Target: Logger,
3154 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3157 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3160 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3164 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3166 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3167 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3172 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3173 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3174 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3175 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3176 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3177 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3178 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3179 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3183 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3185 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3186 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3189 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3190 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3192 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3194 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3195 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3196 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3197 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3198 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3199 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3200 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3201 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3205 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3206 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3207 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3208 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3209 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3210 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3211 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3212 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3213 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3215 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3216 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3219 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3220 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3221 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3222 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3223 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3224 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3225 let mut require_commitment = false;
3226 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3229 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3230 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3231 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3233 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3234 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3235 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3236 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3237 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3238 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3243 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3244 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3245 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3246 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3247 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3249 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3250 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3251 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3256 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3257 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3259 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3263 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3264 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3266 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3267 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3268 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3269 require_commitment = true;
3270 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3271 match forward_info {
3272 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3273 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3274 require_commitment = true;
3276 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3277 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3278 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3280 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3281 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3282 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3286 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3287 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3288 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3289 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3295 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3296 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3297 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3298 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3300 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3301 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3302 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3303 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3304 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3305 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3306 require_commitment = true;
3310 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3312 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3313 match update_state {
3314 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3315 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3316 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3317 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3318 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3320 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3321 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3322 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3323 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3324 require_commitment = true;
3325 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3326 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3331 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3332 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3333 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3334 if require_commitment {
3335 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3336 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3337 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3338 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3339 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3340 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3341 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3342 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3343 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3345 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3346 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3347 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3348 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3349 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3352 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3353 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3354 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3355 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3356 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3357 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3359 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3360 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3362 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3363 if require_commitment {
3364 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3366 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3367 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3368 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3369 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3371 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3372 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3373 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3374 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3376 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3377 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3378 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3384 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3385 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3386 /// commitment update.
3387 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3388 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3389 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3392 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3393 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3394 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3395 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3397 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3398 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3399 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3400 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3401 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3403 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3404 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3406 if !self.context.is_live() {
3407 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3410 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3411 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3412 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3413 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3414 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3415 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3416 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3417 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3418 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3419 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3423 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3424 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3425 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3426 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3427 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3430 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3431 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3435 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3436 force_holding_cell = true;
3439 if force_holding_cell {
3440 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3444 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3445 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3447 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3448 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3453 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3454 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3456 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3458 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3459 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3460 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3461 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3465 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3466 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3467 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3471 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3472 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3475 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3476 // will be retransmitted.
3477 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3478 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3479 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3481 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3482 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3484 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3485 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3486 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3487 // this HTLC accordingly
3488 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3491 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3492 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3493 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3494 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3497 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3498 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3499 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3500 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3501 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3502 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3507 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3509 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3510 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3511 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3512 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3516 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3517 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3518 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3519 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3520 // the update upon reconnection.
3521 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3525 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3527 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3528 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3531 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3532 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3533 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3534 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3535 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3536 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3537 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3539 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3540 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3541 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3542 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3543 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3544 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3545 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3547 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3548 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3549 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3550 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3551 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3552 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3553 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3556 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3557 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3558 /// to the remote side.
3559 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3560 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3561 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3562 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3565 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3567 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3568 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3570 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3571 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3572 // first received the funding_signed.
3573 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3574 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3575 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3577 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3578 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3579 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3580 funding_broadcastable = None;
3583 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3584 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3585 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3586 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3587 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3588 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3589 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3590 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3591 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3592 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3593 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3594 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3595 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3596 next_per_commitment_point,
3597 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3601 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3603 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3604 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3605 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3606 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3607 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3608 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3610 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3611 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3612 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3613 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3614 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3615 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3619 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3620 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3622 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3623 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3624 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3627 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3628 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3629 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3630 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3631 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3632 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3633 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3634 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3635 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3639 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3640 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3642 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3645 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3648 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3649 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3651 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3652 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3653 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3654 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3655 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3656 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3657 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3658 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3659 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3660 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3661 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3662 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3663 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3665 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3666 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3667 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3673 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3674 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3675 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3676 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3677 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3678 per_commitment_secret,
3679 next_per_commitment_point,
3681 next_local_nonce: None,
3685 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3686 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3687 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3688 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3689 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3691 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3692 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3693 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3694 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3695 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3696 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3697 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3698 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3699 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3700 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3705 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3706 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3708 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3709 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3710 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3711 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3712 reason: err_packet.clone()
3715 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3716 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3717 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3718 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3719 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3720 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3723 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3724 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3725 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3726 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3727 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3734 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3735 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3736 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3737 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3741 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3742 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3743 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3744 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3745 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3746 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3750 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3751 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3753 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3754 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3755 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3756 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3757 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3758 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3759 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3760 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3763 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3765 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3766 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3767 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3768 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3772 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3773 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3777 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3778 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3779 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3780 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3781 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3784 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3785 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3786 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3787 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3788 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3791 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3792 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3793 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3794 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3795 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3796 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3797 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3798 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3802 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3803 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3804 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3805 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3807 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3811 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3812 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3813 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3814 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3816 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3817 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3818 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3819 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3820 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3824 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3826 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3827 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3828 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3829 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3830 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3833 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3834 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3835 channel_ready: None,
3836 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3837 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3838 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3842 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3843 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3844 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3845 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3846 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3847 next_per_commitment_point,
3848 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3850 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3851 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3852 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3856 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3857 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3858 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3860 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3861 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3862 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3865 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3871 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3872 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3873 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3874 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3875 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3876 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3877 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3879 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3881 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3882 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3883 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3884 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3885 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3886 next_per_commitment_point,
3887 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3891 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3892 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3893 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3895 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3898 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3899 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3900 raa: required_revoke,
3901 commitment_update: None,
3902 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3904 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3905 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3906 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3908 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3911 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3912 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3913 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3914 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3915 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3916 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3919 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3920 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3921 raa: required_revoke,
3922 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3923 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3927 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3931 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3932 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3933 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3934 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3936 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3938 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3940 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3941 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3942 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3943 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3944 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3945 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3947 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3948 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3949 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3950 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3951 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3953 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3954 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3955 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3956 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3959 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3960 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3961 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3962 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3963 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3964 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3965 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3966 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3967 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3968 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3969 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3970 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3971 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3972 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3973 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3975 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3978 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3979 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3982 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3983 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3984 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3985 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3986 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3987 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
3990 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3991 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3992 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3993 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3994 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3995 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
3996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3998 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4004 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4005 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4006 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4007 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4009 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4010 return Ok((None, None));
4013 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4014 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4015 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4017 return Ok((None, None));
4020 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4022 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4023 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4024 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4025 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4027 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4028 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4029 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4031 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4032 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4033 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4034 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4036 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4037 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4038 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4043 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4044 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4046 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4047 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4050 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4051 /// within our expected timeframe.
4053 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4054 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4055 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4058 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4061 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4062 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4065 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4066 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4067 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4068 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4070 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4073 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4074 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4075 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4076 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4079 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4080 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4084 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4086 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4087 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4090 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4091 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4092 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4095 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4098 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4099 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4100 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4101 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4103 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4106 assert!(send_shutdown);
4107 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4108 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4109 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4111 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4114 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4119 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4121 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4122 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4124 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4125 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4126 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4127 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4128 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4129 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4132 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4133 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4135 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4136 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4137 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4138 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4142 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4143 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4144 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4145 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4146 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4147 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4149 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4150 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4157 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4158 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4160 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4163 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4164 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4166 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4168 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4169 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4170 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4171 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4172 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4173 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4174 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4175 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4176 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4178 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4179 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4182 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4186 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4187 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4188 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4189 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4191 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4194 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4197 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4200 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4204 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4208 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4209 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4210 return Ok((None, None));
4213 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4214 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4215 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4218 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4220 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4223 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4224 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4225 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4226 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4227 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4231 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4232 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4237 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4238 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4239 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4240 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4241 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4242 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4243 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4247 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4249 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4250 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4251 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4252 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4254 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4257 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4258 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4259 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4261 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4262 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4263 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4264 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4268 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4269 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4270 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4271 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4273 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4274 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4275 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4281 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4282 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4285 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4288 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4289 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4292 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4293 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4294 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4295 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4296 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4298 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4300 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4302 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4303 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4306 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4307 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4308 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4309 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4310 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4311 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4312 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4313 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4318 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4319 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4320 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4321 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4327 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4328 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4329 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4330 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4332 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4338 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4339 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4340 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4341 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4342 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4343 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4344 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4346 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4347 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4350 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4352 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4353 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4359 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4360 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4361 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4362 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4363 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4364 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4365 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4367 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4368 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4375 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4376 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4379 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4380 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4383 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4384 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4388 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4389 &self.context.holder_signer
4393 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4395 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4396 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4397 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4398 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4399 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4400 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4402 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4404 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4412 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4413 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4417 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4418 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4419 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4420 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4423 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4424 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4425 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4426 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4429 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4430 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4431 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4432 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4433 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4434 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4437 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4438 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4439 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4440 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4441 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4442 if !release_monitor {
4443 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4452 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4453 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4456 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4457 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4458 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4460 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4461 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4462 if self.context.channel_state &
4463 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4464 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4465 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4466 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4467 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4470 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4471 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4472 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4473 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4474 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4475 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4477 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4478 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4479 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4481 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4482 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4483 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4484 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4485 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4486 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4492 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4493 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4494 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4497 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4498 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4499 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4502 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4503 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4504 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4507 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4508 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4509 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4510 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4511 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4512 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4517 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4518 self.context.channel_update_status
4521 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4522 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4523 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4526 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4528 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4529 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4530 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4534 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4535 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4536 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4539 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4543 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4544 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4545 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4547 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4548 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4549 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4551 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4552 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4555 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4556 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4557 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4558 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4559 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4560 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4561 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4562 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4563 self.context.channel_state);
4565 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4569 if need_commitment_update {
4570 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4571 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4572 let next_per_commitment_point =
4573 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4574 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4575 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4576 next_per_commitment_point,
4577 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4581 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4587 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4588 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4589 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4590 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4591 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4592 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4593 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4595 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4598 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4599 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4600 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4601 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4602 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4603 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4604 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4605 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4606 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4607 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4608 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4609 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4610 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4611 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4612 // channel and move on.
4613 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4614 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4616 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4617 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4618 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4620 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4621 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4622 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4623 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4624 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4625 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4626 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4630 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4631 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4632 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4633 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4634 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4638 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4639 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4640 // may have already happened for this block).
4641 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4642 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4643 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4644 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4647 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4648 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4649 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4650 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4658 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4659 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4660 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4661 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4663 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4664 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4667 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4669 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4670 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4671 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4672 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4674 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4677 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4680 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4681 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4682 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4683 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4685 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4688 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4689 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4690 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4692 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4693 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4695 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4696 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4697 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4705 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4707 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4708 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4709 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4711 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4712 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4715 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4716 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4717 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4718 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4719 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4720 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4721 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4722 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4723 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4726 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4727 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4728 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4729 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4731 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4732 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4733 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4735 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4736 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4737 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4738 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4740 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4741 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4742 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4743 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4744 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4745 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4746 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4749 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4750 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4752 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4755 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4756 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4757 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4758 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4759 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4760 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4761 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4762 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4763 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4764 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4765 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4766 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4767 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4768 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4769 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4770 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4771 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4777 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4782 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4783 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4785 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4786 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4787 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4788 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4790 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4793 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4794 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4795 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4796 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4797 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4798 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4800 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4801 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4804 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4805 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4806 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4807 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4809 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4810 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4812 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4813 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4814 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4815 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4816 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4817 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4823 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4824 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4825 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4826 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4828 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4831 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4835 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4839 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4840 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4844 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4848 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4849 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4852 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4856 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4858 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4863 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4865 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4870 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4872 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4873 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4874 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4875 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4876 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4880 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4882 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4883 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4884 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4885 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4886 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4887 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4888 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4890 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4891 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4892 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4893 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4894 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4895 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4896 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4897 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4898 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4899 contents: announcement,
4902 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4906 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4907 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4908 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4909 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4910 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4911 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4912 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4913 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4915 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4917 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4918 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4919 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4920 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4922 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4924 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4925 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4928 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4929 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4930 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4931 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4934 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4937 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4938 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4939 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4940 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4941 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4942 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4945 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4947 Err(_) => return None,
4949 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4950 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4955 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4956 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4957 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4958 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4959 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4960 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4961 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4962 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4963 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4964 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4965 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4966 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4967 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4968 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4969 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4970 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4973 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4976 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4977 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4978 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4979 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4980 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4981 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4982 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4983 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4984 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4986 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4987 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4988 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4989 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4990 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4991 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4992 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4993 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4994 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4996 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4997 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4998 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4999 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5000 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5001 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5002 next_funding_txid: None,
5007 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5009 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5010 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5011 /// commitment update.
5013 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5014 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
5015 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5016 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5017 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5019 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5020 skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
5021 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5023 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5024 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5029 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5030 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5032 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5034 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5035 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5037 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5038 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5039 /// regenerate them.
5041 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5042 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5044 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5045 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
5046 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5047 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5048 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5049 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5050 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5051 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5053 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5054 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5055 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5058 if amount_msat == 0 {
5059 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5062 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5063 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5064 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5065 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5068 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5069 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5070 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5073 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5074 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5075 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5076 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5077 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5078 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5079 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5080 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5083 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5084 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5085 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5086 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5087 else { "to peer" });
5089 if need_holding_cell {
5090 force_holding_cell = true;
5093 // Now update local state:
5094 if force_holding_cell {
5095 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5100 onion_routing_packet,
5106 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5107 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5109 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5111 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5116 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5117 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5118 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5122 onion_routing_packet,
5125 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5130 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5131 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5132 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5133 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5135 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5136 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5137 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5139 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5140 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5144 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5145 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5146 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5147 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5148 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5149 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5150 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5153 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5154 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5155 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5156 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5157 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5158 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5161 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5163 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5164 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5165 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5167 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5168 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5171 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5172 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5173 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5174 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5175 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5176 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5177 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5178 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5181 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5185 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5186 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5187 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5188 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5190 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5192 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5193 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5194 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5195 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5196 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5197 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5198 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5199 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5200 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5201 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5202 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5208 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5211 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5212 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5213 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5214 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5215 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5216 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5218 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5219 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5220 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5221 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5224 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5225 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5229 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5230 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5232 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5234 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5235 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5236 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5237 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5239 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5240 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5241 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5242 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5243 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5244 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5248 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5249 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5253 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5254 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5257 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5258 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5260 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5261 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5262 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
5263 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5264 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5265 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5266 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5267 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
5268 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5271 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5272 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5273 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5279 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5280 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5283 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5284 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5285 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5286 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5292 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5293 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5295 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5296 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5297 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5298 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5299 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5300 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5301 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5302 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5303 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5306 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5307 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5308 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5310 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5311 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5314 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5315 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5317 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5318 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5319 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5322 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5323 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5324 let mut chan_closed = false;
5325 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5329 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5331 None if !chan_closed => {
5332 // use override shutdown script if provided
5333 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5334 Some(script) => script,
5336 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5337 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5338 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5339 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5343 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5344 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5346 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5352 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5353 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5354 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5355 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5357 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5359 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5361 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5362 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5363 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5364 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5365 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5366 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5369 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5370 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5372 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5373 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5374 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5377 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5378 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5379 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5380 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5381 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5383 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5384 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5391 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5392 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5394 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5397 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5398 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5399 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5401 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5402 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5406 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5410 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5411 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5412 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5415 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5416 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5417 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5418 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5419 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5420 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5421 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5422 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5423 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5425 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5426 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5427 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5428 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5430 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5431 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5433 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5434 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5436 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5437 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5438 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5440 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5441 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5443 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5444 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5445 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5446 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5450 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5451 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5453 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5455 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5456 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5457 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5458 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5461 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5462 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5464 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5465 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5466 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5467 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5471 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5472 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5473 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5477 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5478 Ok(script) => script,
5479 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5482 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5485 context: ChannelContext {
5488 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5489 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5490 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5491 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5496 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5498 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5499 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5500 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5501 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5503 channel_value_satoshis,
5505 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5508 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5511 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5512 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5515 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5516 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5517 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5518 pending_update_fee: None,
5519 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5520 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5521 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5522 update_time_counter: 1,
5524 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5526 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5527 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5528 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5529 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5530 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5531 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5533 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5534 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5535 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5536 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5538 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5539 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5540 closing_fee_limits: None,
5541 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5543 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5545 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5546 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5547 short_channel_id: None,
5548 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5550 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5551 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5552 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5553 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5554 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5555 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5556 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5557 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5558 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5559 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5560 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5561 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5563 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5565 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5566 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5567 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5568 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5569 counterparty_parameters: None,
5570 funding_outpoint: None,
5571 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5573 funding_transaction: None,
5575 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5576 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5577 counterparty_node_id,
5579 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5581 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5583 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5584 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5586 announcement_sigs: None,
5588 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5589 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5590 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5591 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5593 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5594 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5596 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5597 outbound_scid_alias,
5599 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5600 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5602 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5603 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5608 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5613 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5614 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5615 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5616 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5617 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5618 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5621 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5622 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5623 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5624 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5625 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5626 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5627 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5628 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5629 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5630 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5631 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5633 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5634 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5636 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5637 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5638 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5639 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5642 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5643 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5645 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5648 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5649 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5650 return Err((self, e));
5654 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5656 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5658 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5659 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5660 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5662 let channel = Channel {
5663 context: self.context,
5666 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5667 temporary_channel_id,
5668 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5669 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5672 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5674 next_local_nonce: None,
5678 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5679 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5680 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5681 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5682 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5683 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5684 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5685 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5686 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5687 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5690 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5691 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5692 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5693 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5694 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5695 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5701 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5702 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5703 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5704 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5705 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5706 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5707 // We've exhausted our options
5710 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5711 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5714 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5715 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5716 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5717 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5719 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5720 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5721 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5722 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5723 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5725 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5727 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5728 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5731 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5732 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5733 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5735 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5736 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5739 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5740 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5743 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5744 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5748 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5749 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5750 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5751 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5752 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5753 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5754 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5755 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5756 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5757 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5758 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5759 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5760 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5761 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5762 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5763 first_per_commitment_point,
5764 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5765 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5766 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5767 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5769 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5774 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5775 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5777 // Check sanity of message fields:
5778 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5781 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5784 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5785 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5787 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5790 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5793 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5794 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5795 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5797 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5798 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5799 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5801 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5802 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5803 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5805 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5808 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5812 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5813 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5816 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5819 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5822 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5823 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5825 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5828 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5829 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5831 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5835 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5836 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5839 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5840 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5842 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5843 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5846 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5847 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5850 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5851 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5852 &Some(ref script) => {
5853 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5854 if script.len() == 0 {
5857 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5858 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5860 Some(script.clone())
5863 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5870 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5871 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5872 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5873 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5874 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5876 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5877 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5879 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5882 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5883 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5884 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5885 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5886 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5887 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5890 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5891 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5892 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5895 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5896 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5898 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5899 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5905 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5906 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5907 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5910 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5911 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5912 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5913 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5914 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5915 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5916 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5917 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5918 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5919 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5920 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5921 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5924 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5926 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5927 // support this channel type.
5928 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5929 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5933 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5934 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5935 // `static_remote_key`.
5936 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5939 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5940 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5941 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5943 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5946 channel_type.clone()
5948 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5949 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5955 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5956 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5957 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5958 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5959 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5960 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5961 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5962 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5963 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5966 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5970 // Check sanity of message fields:
5971 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
5972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5974 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
5977 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5980 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5981 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
5982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5984 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5987 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5990 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
5992 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5993 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
5994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
5996 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5999 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6003 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6004 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6007 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6010 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6013 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6016 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6019 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6022 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6026 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6028 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6029 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6034 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6035 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6036 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6037 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6040 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6043 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6044 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6045 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6047 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6051 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6052 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6053 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6054 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6055 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6059 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6060 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6061 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6062 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6066 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6067 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6068 &Some(ref script) => {
6069 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6070 if script.len() == 0 {
6073 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6076 Some(script.clone())
6079 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6086 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6087 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6088 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6089 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6093 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6094 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6099 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6100 Ok(script) => script,
6101 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6104 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6105 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6108 context: ChannelContext {
6111 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6112 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6114 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6119 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6121 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6122 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6123 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6124 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6127 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6130 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6133 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6134 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6135 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6137 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6138 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6139 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6140 pending_update_fee: None,
6141 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6142 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6143 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6144 update_time_counter: 1,
6146 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6148 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6149 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6150 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6151 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6152 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6153 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6155 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6156 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6157 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6158 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6160 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6161 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6162 closing_fee_limits: None,
6163 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6165 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6167 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6168 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6169 short_channel_id: None,
6170 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6172 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6173 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6174 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6175 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6176 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6177 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6178 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6179 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6180 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6181 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6182 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6183 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6184 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6186 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6188 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6189 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6190 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6191 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6192 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6193 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6194 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6196 funding_outpoint: None,
6197 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6199 funding_transaction: None,
6201 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6202 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6203 counterparty_node_id,
6205 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6207 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6209 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6210 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6212 announcement_sigs: None,
6214 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6215 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6217 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6219 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6220 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6222 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6223 outbound_scid_alias,
6225 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6226 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6228 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6229 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6234 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6241 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6242 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6245 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6246 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6247 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6248 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6251 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6252 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6254 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6255 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6256 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6257 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6259 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6260 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6262 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6263 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6265 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6266 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6269 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6270 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6272 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6275 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6276 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6277 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6279 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6280 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6281 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6282 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6284 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6285 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6286 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6287 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6288 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6289 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6290 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6291 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6292 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6293 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6294 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6295 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6296 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6297 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6298 first_per_commitment_point,
6299 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6300 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6301 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6303 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6305 next_local_nonce: None,
6309 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6310 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6312 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6314 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6315 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6318 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6319 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6321 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6322 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6324 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6325 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6326 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6327 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6328 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6329 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6330 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6331 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6332 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6335 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6336 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6338 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6339 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6340 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6341 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6343 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6344 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6346 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6347 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6350 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6351 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6352 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6354 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6357 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6358 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6360 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6361 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6362 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6364 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6366 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6367 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6369 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6370 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6371 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6372 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6375 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6376 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6377 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6378 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6379 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6381 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6383 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6384 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6385 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6388 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6389 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6390 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6394 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6395 initial_commitment_tx,
6398 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6399 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6402 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6403 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6406 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6408 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6409 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6410 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6411 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6412 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6413 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6414 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6415 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6416 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6417 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6418 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6420 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6422 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6424 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6425 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6426 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6427 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6429 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6431 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6432 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6433 let mut channel = Channel {
6434 context: self.context,
6436 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6437 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6438 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6440 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6444 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6445 }, channel_monitor))
6449 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6450 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6452 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6458 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6459 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6460 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6461 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6462 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6464 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6465 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6466 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6467 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6473 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6474 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6475 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6476 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6477 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6478 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6483 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6484 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6485 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6486 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6488 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6489 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6490 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6491 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6496 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6497 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6498 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6499 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6500 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6501 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6506 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6507 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6508 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6511 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6513 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6514 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6515 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6516 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6517 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6519 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6520 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6521 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6522 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6524 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6525 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6526 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6528 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6530 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6531 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6532 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6533 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6534 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6535 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6537 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6538 // deserialized from that format.
6539 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6540 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6541 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6543 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6545 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6546 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6547 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6549 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6550 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6551 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6552 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6555 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6556 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6557 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6560 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6561 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6562 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6563 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6565 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6566 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6568 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6570 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6572 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6574 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6577 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6579 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6584 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6585 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6587 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6588 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6589 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6590 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6591 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6592 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6593 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6595 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6597 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6599 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6602 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6603 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6604 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6607 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6609 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6610 preimages.push(preimage);
6612 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6613 reason.write(writer)?;
6615 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6617 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6618 preimages.push(preimage);
6620 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6621 reason.write(writer)?;
6624 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6625 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6626 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6628 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6629 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6630 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6634 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6635 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6636 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6639 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6643 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6644 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6645 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6646 source.write(writer)?;
6647 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6649 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6650 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6651 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6653 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6654 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6656 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6658 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6659 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6661 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6663 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6664 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6669 match self.context.resend_order {
6670 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6671 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6674 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6675 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6676 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6678 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6679 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6680 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6681 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6684 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6685 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6686 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6687 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6688 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6691 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6692 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6693 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6694 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6696 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6697 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6698 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6700 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6702 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6703 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6704 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6705 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6707 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6708 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6709 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6710 // consider the stale state on reload.
6713 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6714 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6715 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6717 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6718 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6719 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6721 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6722 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6724 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6725 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6726 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6728 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6729 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6731 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6734 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6735 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6736 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6738 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6741 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6742 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6744 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6745 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6746 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6748 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6750 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6752 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6754 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6755 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6756 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6757 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6758 htlc.write(writer)?;
6761 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6762 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6763 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6765 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6766 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6768 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6769 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6770 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6771 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6772 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6773 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6774 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6776 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6777 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6778 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6779 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6780 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6782 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6783 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6785 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6786 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6787 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6788 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6790 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6792 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6793 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6794 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6795 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6796 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6797 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6798 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6800 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6801 (2, chan_type, option),
6802 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6803 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6804 (5, self.context.config, required),
6805 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6806 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6807 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6808 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6809 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6810 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6811 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6812 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6813 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6814 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6815 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6816 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6817 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6818 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6819 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6820 (33, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6821 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6822 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6829 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6830 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6832 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6833 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6835 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6836 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6837 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6839 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6840 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6841 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6842 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6846 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6847 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6849 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6852 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6853 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6858 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6860 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6862 let mut keys_data = None;
6864 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6865 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6866 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6868 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6869 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6870 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6871 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6872 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6873 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6877 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6878 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6879 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6882 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6891 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6892 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6893 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6894 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6895 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6896 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6897 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6898 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6899 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6900 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6901 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6902 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6907 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6908 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6909 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6910 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6911 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6912 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6914 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6915 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6916 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6917 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6918 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6920 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6924 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6928 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6931 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6933 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6937 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6939 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6940 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6941 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6942 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6943 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6944 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6945 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6946 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6949 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6950 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6951 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6953 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6954 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6955 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6957 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6961 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6962 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6963 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6964 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6967 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6971 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6973 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6974 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6977 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6978 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6979 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6980 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6983 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6985 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6987 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6993 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6994 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6995 // consider the stale state on reload.
6996 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6999 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7000 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7006 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7015 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7016 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7018 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7019 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7025 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7027 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7028 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7030 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7031 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7036 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7037 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7038 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7039 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7041 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7044 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7045 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7052 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7053 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7058 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7059 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7061 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7063 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7067 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7068 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7069 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7071 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7077 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7078 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7079 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7080 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7081 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7082 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7083 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7084 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7085 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7086 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7088 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7089 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7090 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7091 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7092 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7093 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7094 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7096 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7097 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7098 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7099 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7101 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7103 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7104 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7106 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7107 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7108 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7109 (2, channel_type, option),
7110 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7111 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7112 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7113 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7114 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7115 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7116 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7117 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7118 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7119 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7120 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7121 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7122 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7123 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7124 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7125 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7126 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7127 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7128 (33, blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7129 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7130 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7133 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7134 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7135 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7136 // required channel parameters.
7137 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7138 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7139 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7141 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7143 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7144 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7145 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7146 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7149 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7150 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7151 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7153 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7154 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7156 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7157 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7162 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7163 if iter.next().is_some() {
7164 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7168 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7169 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7170 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7171 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7172 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7175 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7176 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7177 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7179 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7180 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7182 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7183 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7184 // separate u64 values.
7185 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7187 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7189 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7190 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7191 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7192 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7194 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7195 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7197 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7198 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7199 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7200 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7201 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7204 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7205 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7209 context: ChannelContext {
7212 config: config.unwrap(),
7216 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7217 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7218 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7221 temporary_channel_id,
7223 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7225 channel_value_satoshis,
7227 latest_monitor_update_id,
7230 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7233 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7234 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7237 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7238 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7239 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7240 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7244 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7245 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7246 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7247 monitor_pending_forwards,
7248 monitor_pending_failures,
7249 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7252 holding_cell_update_fee,
7253 next_holder_htlc_id,
7254 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7255 update_time_counter,
7258 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7259 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7260 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7261 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7263 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7264 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7265 closing_fee_limits: None,
7266 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7268 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7270 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7271 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7273 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7275 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7276 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7277 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7278 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7279 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7280 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7281 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7282 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7283 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7286 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7288 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7289 funding_transaction,
7291 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7292 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7293 counterparty_node_id,
7295 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7299 channel_update_status,
7300 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7304 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7305 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7306 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7307 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7309 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7310 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7312 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7313 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7314 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7316 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7317 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7319 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7320 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7322 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7325 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7334 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7335 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7336 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7337 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7338 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7340 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7341 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7342 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7343 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7344 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7345 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7346 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7347 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7348 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7349 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7350 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7351 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7352 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7353 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7354 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7355 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7356 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7357 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7358 use crate::util::test_utils;
7359 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7360 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7361 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7362 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7363 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7364 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7365 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7366 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7367 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7368 use crate::prelude::*;
7370 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7373 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7374 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7380 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7381 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7382 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7383 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7387 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7388 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7389 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7390 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7391 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7392 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7393 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7397 signer: InMemorySigner,
7400 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7401 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7404 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7405 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7407 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7408 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7411 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7415 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7417 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7418 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7419 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7420 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7421 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7424 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7425 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7426 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7427 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7431 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7432 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7433 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7437 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7438 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7439 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7440 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7442 let seed = [42; 32];
7443 let network = Network::Testnet;
7444 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7445 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7446 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7449 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7450 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7451 let config = UserConfig::default();
7452 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7453 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7454 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7456 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7457 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7461 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7462 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7464 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7465 let original_fee = 253;
7466 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7467 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7468 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7469 let seed = [42; 32];
7470 let network = Network::Testnet;
7471 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7473 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7474 let config = UserConfig::default();
7475 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7477 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7478 // same as the old fee.
7479 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7480 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7481 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7485 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7486 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7487 // dust limits are used.
7488 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7489 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7490 let seed = [42; 32];
7491 let network = Network::Testnet;
7492 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7493 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7494 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7496 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7497 // they have different dust limits.
7499 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7500 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7501 let config = UserConfig::default();
7502 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7504 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7505 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7506 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7507 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7508 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7510 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7511 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7512 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7513 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7514 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7516 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7517 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7518 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7519 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7521 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7522 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7523 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7525 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7526 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7528 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7529 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7530 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7532 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7533 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7534 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7535 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7538 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7540 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7541 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7542 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7543 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7544 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7545 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7546 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7547 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7548 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7550 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7553 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7554 // the dust limit check.
7555 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7556 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7557 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7558 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7560 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7561 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7562 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7563 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7564 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7565 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7566 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7570 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7571 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7572 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7573 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7574 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7575 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7576 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7577 let seed = [42; 32];
7578 let network = Network::Testnet;
7579 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7581 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7582 let config = UserConfig::default();
7583 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7585 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7586 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7588 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7589 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7590 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7591 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7592 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7593 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7595 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7596 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7597 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7598 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7599 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7601 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7603 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7604 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7605 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7606 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7607 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7609 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7610 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7611 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7612 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7613 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7617 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7618 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7619 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7620 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7621 let seed = [42; 32];
7622 let network = Network::Testnet;
7623 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7624 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7625 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7627 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7629 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7630 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7631 let config = UserConfig::default();
7632 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7634 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7635 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7636 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7637 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7639 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7640 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7641 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7643 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7644 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7645 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7646 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7648 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7649 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7650 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7652 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7653 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7655 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7656 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7657 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7658 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7659 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7660 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7661 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7663 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7665 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7666 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7667 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7668 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7669 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7673 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7674 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7675 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7676 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7677 let seed = [42; 32];
7678 let network = Network::Testnet;
7679 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7680 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7681 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7683 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7684 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7685 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7686 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7687 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7688 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7689 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7690 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7692 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7693 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7694 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7695 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7696 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7697 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7699 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7700 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7701 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7702 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7704 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7706 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7707 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7708 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7709 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7710 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7711 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7713 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7714 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7715 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7716 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7718 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7719 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7720 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7721 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7722 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7724 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7725 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7727 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7728 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7729 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7731 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7732 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7733 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7734 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7735 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7737 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7738 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7740 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7741 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7742 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7746 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7748 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7749 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7750 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7752 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7753 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7754 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7755 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7757 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7758 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7759 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7761 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7763 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7764 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7767 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7768 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7769 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7770 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7771 let seed = [42; 32];
7772 let network = Network::Testnet;
7773 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7774 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7775 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7778 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7779 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7780 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7782 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7783 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7785 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7786 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7787 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7789 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7790 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7792 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7794 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7795 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7797 // Channel Negotiations failed
7798 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7799 assert!(result.is_err());
7804 fn channel_update() {
7805 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7806 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7807 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7808 let seed = [42; 32];
7809 let network = Network::Testnet;
7810 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7811 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7812 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7814 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7815 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7816 let config = UserConfig::default();
7817 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7819 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7820 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7821 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7822 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7823 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7825 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7826 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7827 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7828 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7829 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7831 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7832 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7833 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7834 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7836 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7837 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7838 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7840 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7841 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7843 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7844 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7845 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7847 short_channel_id: 0,
7850 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7851 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7852 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7854 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7855 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7857 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7859 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7861 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7862 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7863 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7864 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7866 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7867 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7868 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7870 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7874 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7876 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7877 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7878 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7879 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7880 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7881 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7882 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7883 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7884 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7885 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7886 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7887 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7888 use crate::sync::Arc;
7890 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7891 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7892 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7893 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7895 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7897 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7898 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7899 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7900 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7901 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7903 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7904 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7910 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7911 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7912 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7914 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7915 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7916 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7917 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7918 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7919 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7921 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7923 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7924 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7925 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7926 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7927 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7928 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7930 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7931 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7932 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7933 selected_contest_delay: 144
7935 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7936 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7938 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7939 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7941 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7942 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7944 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7945 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7947 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7948 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7949 // build_commitment_transaction.
7950 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7951 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7952 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7953 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7954 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7956 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7957 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7958 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7959 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
7963 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7964 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7965 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
7966 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
7970 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7971 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7972 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7974 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7975 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7977 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7978 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7980 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7982 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7983 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7984 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7985 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7986 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7987 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7988 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7990 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7991 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7992 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7993 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7995 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7996 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7997 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7999 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8001 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8002 commitment_tx.clone(),
8003 counterparty_signature,
8004 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8005 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8006 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8008 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8009 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8011 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8012 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8013 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8015 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8016 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8019 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8020 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8022 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8023 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8024 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8025 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8026 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8027 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8028 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8029 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8031 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8034 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8035 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8036 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8040 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8043 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8044 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8045 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8047 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8048 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8049 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8050 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8051 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8052 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8053 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8054 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8056 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8060 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8061 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8062 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8063 "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", {});
8065 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8066 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8068 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8069 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8070 "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", {});
8072 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8073 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8074 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8075 "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", {});
8077 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8078 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8080 amount_msat: 1000000,
8082 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8083 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8085 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8088 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8089 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8091 amount_msat: 2000000,
8093 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8094 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8096 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8099 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8100 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8102 amount_msat: 2000000,
8104 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8105 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8106 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8107 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8109 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8112 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8113 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8115 amount_msat: 3000000,
8117 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8118 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8119 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8120 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8122 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8125 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8126 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8128 amount_msat: 4000000,
8130 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8131 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8133 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8137 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8138 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8139 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8141 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8142 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8143 "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", {
8146 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8147 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8148 "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" },
8151 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8152 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8153 "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" },
8156 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8157 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8158 "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" },
8161 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8162 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8163 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8166 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8167 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8168 "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" }
8171 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8172 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8173 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8175 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8176 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8177 "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", {
8180 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8181 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8182 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8185 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8186 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8187 "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" },
8190 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8191 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8192 "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" },
8195 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8196 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8197 "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" },
8200 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8201 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8202 "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" }
8205 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8206 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8207 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8209 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8210 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8211 "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", {
8214 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8215 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8216 "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" },
8219 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8220 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8221 "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" },
8224 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8225 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8226 "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" },
8229 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8230 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8231 "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" }
8234 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8235 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8236 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8237 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8239 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8240 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8241 "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", {
8244 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8245 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8246 "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" },
8249 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8250 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8251 "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" },
8254 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8255 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8256 "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" },
8259 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8260 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8261 "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" }
8264 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8265 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8266 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8267 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8269 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8270 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8271 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8274 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8275 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8276 "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" },
8279 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8280 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8281 "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" },
8284 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8285 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8286 "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" },
8289 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8290 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8291 "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" }
8294 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8295 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8296 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8298 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8299 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8300 "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", {
8303 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8304 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8305 "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" },
8308 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8309 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8310 "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" },
8313 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8314 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8315 "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" }
8318 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8319 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8320 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8322 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8323 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8324 "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", {
8327 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8328 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8329 "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" },
8332 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8333 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8334 "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" },
8337 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8338 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8339 "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" }
8342 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8343 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8344 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8346 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8347 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8348 "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", {
8351 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8352 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8353 "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" },
8356 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8357 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8358 "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" }
8361 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8362 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8363 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8364 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8365 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8366 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8368 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8369 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8370 "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", {
8373 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8374 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8375 "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" },
8378 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8379 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8380 "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" }
8383 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8384 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8385 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8386 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8387 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8389 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8390 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8391 "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", {
8394 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8395 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8396 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8399 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8400 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8401 "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" }
8404 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8405 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8406 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8408 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8409 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8410 "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", {
8413 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8414 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8415 "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" }
8418 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8419 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8420 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8421 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8422 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8424 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8425 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8426 "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", {
8429 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8430 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8431 "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" }
8434 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8435 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8436 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8437 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8438 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8440 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8441 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8442 "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", {
8445 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8446 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8447 "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" }
8450 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8451 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8452 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8453 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8455 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8456 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8457 "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", {});
8459 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8460 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8461 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8462 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8463 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8465 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8466 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8467 "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", {});
8469 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8470 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8471 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8472 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8473 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8475 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8476 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8477 "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", {});
8479 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8480 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8481 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8483 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8484 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8485 "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", {});
8487 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8488 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8489 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8490 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8491 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8493 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8494 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8495 "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", {});
8497 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8498 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8499 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8500 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8501 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8503 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8504 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8505 "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", {});
8507 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8508 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8509 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8510 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8511 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8512 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8514 amount_msat: 2000000,
8516 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8517 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8519 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8522 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8523 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8524 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8526 amount_msat: 5000001,
8528 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8529 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8530 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8531 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8533 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8536 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8537 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8539 amount_msat: 5000000,
8541 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8542 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8543 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8544 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8546 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8550 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8551 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8552 "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", {
8555 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8556 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8557 "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" },
8559 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8560 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8561 "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" },
8563 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8564 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8565 "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" }
8568 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8569 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8570 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8571 "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", {
8574 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8575 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8576 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8578 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8579 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8580 "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" },
8582 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8583 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8584 "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" }
8589 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8590 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8592 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8593 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8594 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8595 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8597 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8598 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8599 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8601 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8602 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8604 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8605 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8607 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8608 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8609 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8613 fn test_key_derivation() {
8614 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8615 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8617 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8618 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8620 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8621 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8623 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8624 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8626 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8627 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8629 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8630 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8632 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8633 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8635 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8636 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8640 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8641 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8643 let seed = [42; 32];
8644 let network = Network::Testnet;
8645 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8646 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8648 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8649 let config = UserConfig::default();
8650 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8651 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8653 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8654 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8656 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8657 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8658 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8659 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8660 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8661 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8662 assert!(res.is_ok());
8666 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8667 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8668 // resulting `channel_type`.
8669 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8670 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8671 let network = Network::Testnet;
8672 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8673 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8675 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8676 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8678 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8679 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8681 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8682 // need to signal it.
8683 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8684 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8685 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8688 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8690 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8691 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8692 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8694 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8695 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8696 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8699 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8700 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8701 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8702 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8703 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8706 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8707 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8711 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8712 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8713 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8714 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8715 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8716 let network = Network::Testnet;
8717 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8718 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8720 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8721 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8723 let config = UserConfig::default();
8725 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8726 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8727 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8728 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8729 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8731 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8732 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8733 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8736 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8737 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8738 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8740 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8741 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8742 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8743 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8744 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8745 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8747 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8751 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8752 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8754 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8755 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8756 let network = Network::Testnet;
8757 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8758 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8760 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8761 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8763 let config = UserConfig::default();
8765 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8766 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8767 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8768 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8769 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8770 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8771 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8772 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8774 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8775 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8776 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8777 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8778 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8779 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8782 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8783 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8785 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8786 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8787 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8788 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8790 assert!(res.is_err());
8792 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8793 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8794 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8796 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8797 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8798 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8801 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8803 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8804 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8805 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8806 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8809 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8810 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8812 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8813 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8815 assert!(res.is_err());