1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
108 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
109 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
110 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
112 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
113 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
115 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
117 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
118 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
119 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
121 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
125 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
127 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
130 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
134 enum InboundHTLCState {
135 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
136 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
137 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
139 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
140 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
141 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
142 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
143 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
144 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
145 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
146 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
147 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
148 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
149 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
151 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
152 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
153 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
154 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
155 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
156 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
157 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
158 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
159 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
160 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
161 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
162 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
163 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
164 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
166 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
167 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
168 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
169 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
170 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
171 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
172 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
173 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
175 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
176 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
178 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
179 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
180 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
181 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
182 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
183 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
184 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
185 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
188 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
190 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
191 /// through the following states in the state machine:
192 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
193 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
194 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
195 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
196 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
197 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
198 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
200 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
201 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
202 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
203 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
204 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
205 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
206 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
207 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
208 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
210 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
211 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
212 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
213 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
215 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
216 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
217 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
218 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
219 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
220 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
221 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
222 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
224 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
227 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
228 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
230 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
232 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
233 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
234 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
235 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
236 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
238 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
240 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
241 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
242 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
247 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
248 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
249 (2, Committed) => {},
250 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
251 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
254 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
258 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
259 state: InboundHTLCState,
262 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
264 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
266 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
267 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
268 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
270 /// The amount in msat.
271 pub amount_msat: u64,
272 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
273 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
274 /// The payment hash.
275 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
276 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
278 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
279 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
281 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
283 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
284 /// states may result in `None` here.
285 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
286 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
287 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
288 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
289 /// transactions as well.
291 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
292 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
295 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
296 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
300 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
301 (0, htlc_id, required),
302 (2, amount_msat, required),
303 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
304 (6, payment_hash, required),
305 (7, state, upgradable_option),
306 (8, is_dust, required),
309 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
310 enum OutboundHTLCState {
311 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
312 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
313 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
314 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
315 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
316 /// money back (though we won't), and,
317 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
318 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
319 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
320 /// we'll never get out of sync).
321 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
322 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
323 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
325 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
326 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
327 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
328 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
329 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
330 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
331 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
332 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
333 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
334 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
335 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
336 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
337 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
338 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
339 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
342 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
344 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
345 /// through the following states in the state machine:
346 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
347 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
348 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
349 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
350 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
351 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
352 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
354 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
356 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
357 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
358 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
359 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
360 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
361 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
363 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
364 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
366 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
367 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
368 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
369 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
370 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
371 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
372 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
373 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
374 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
375 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
378 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
379 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
381 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
382 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
383 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
384 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
385 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
388 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
390 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
391 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
392 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
393 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
394 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
396 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
401 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
402 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
403 (2, Committed) => {},
404 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
405 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
409 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
410 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
411 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
412 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
413 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
416 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
417 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
419 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
420 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
425 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
426 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
428 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
429 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
434 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
435 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
440 state: OutboundHTLCState,
442 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
443 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
448 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
450 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
451 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
452 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
454 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
455 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
456 /// The amount in msat.
457 pub amount_msat: u64,
458 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
459 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
460 /// The payment hash.
461 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
462 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
464 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
465 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
467 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
469 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
470 /// states may result in `None` here.
471 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
472 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
473 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
475 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
476 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
477 /// transactions as well.
479 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
480 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
483 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
484 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
489 (0, htlc_id, required),
490 (2, amount_msat, required),
491 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
492 (6, payment_hash, required),
493 (7, state, upgradable_option),
494 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
495 (10, is_dust, required),
498 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
499 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
500 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
501 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
507 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
508 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
509 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
510 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
513 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
518 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
527 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
528 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
529 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
530 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
531 struct $flag_type(u32);
536 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
539 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
541 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
544 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
547 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
548 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
551 Ok($flag_type(flags))
556 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
558 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
560 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
562 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
566 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
569 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
571 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
573 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
574 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
576 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
578 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
580 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
581 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
584 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
585 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
587 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
590 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
592 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
594 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
597 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
598 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
600 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
601 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
602 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
603 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
604 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
605 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
606 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
607 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
609 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
611 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
613 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
614 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
616 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
618 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
620 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
621 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
623 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
624 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
626 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
627 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
632 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
635 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
636 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
637 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
638 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
639 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
640 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
641 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
642 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
643 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
644 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
645 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
646 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
647 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
648 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
652 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
654 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
655 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
656 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
657 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
658 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
659 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
660 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
661 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
662 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
663 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
664 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
665 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
666 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
667 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
672 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
673 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
674 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
675 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
676 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
677 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
682 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
683 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
684 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
685 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
686 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
687 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
688 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
689 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
690 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
691 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
692 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
693 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
694 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
695 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
700 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
701 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
702 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
703 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
704 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
705 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
706 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
707 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
711 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
712 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
713 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
715 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
716 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
717 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
718 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
719 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
721 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
722 /// funding transaction to confirm.
723 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
724 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
726 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
727 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
728 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
732 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
733 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
735 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
738 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
747 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
749 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
753 fn $clear(&mut self) {
756 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
758 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
762 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
763 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
765 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
766 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
771 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
773 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
774 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
776 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
777 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
778 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
779 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
780 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
781 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
782 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
783 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
791 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
793 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
794 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
795 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
796 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
797 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
801 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
802 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
805 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
806 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
809 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
811 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
812 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
813 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
817 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
819 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
820 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
821 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
822 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
824 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
830 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
831 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
832 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
833 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
834 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
835 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
836 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
837 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
840 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
842 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
844 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
845 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
846 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
847 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
851 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
853 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
855 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
857 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
858 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
859 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
860 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
861 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
863 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
864 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
866 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
868 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
869 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
871 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
872 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
873 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
874 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
875 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
876 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
878 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
879 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
881 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
882 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
883 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
884 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
885 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
887 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
888 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
890 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
891 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
893 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
894 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
895 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
896 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
902 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
903 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
905 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
906 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
907 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
912 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
913 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
915 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
916 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
917 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
922 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
924 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
925 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
926 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
929 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
930 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
931 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
932 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
933 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
934 self.logger.log(record)
938 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
939 where L::Target: Logger {
940 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
941 where S::Target: SignerProvider
945 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
946 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
952 macro_rules! secp_check {
953 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
956 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
961 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
962 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
963 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
964 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
965 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
966 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
967 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
968 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
970 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
972 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
974 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
978 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
980 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
981 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
982 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
984 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
985 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
987 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
988 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
989 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
990 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
991 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
993 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
994 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
998 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
1004 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
1006 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
1007 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
1008 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1009 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1010 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1011 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1012 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
1013 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
1016 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
1017 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
1018 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
1019 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
1020 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
1021 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
1022 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
1023 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1024 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1025 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
1026 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
1029 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
1030 struct HTLCCandidate {
1032 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1035 impl HTLCCandidate {
1036 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1044 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1046 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1048 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1049 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1050 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1055 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1056 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1057 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1058 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1059 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1061 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1062 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1063 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1064 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1066 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1067 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1071 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1072 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1073 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1074 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1075 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1076 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1077 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1078 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1079 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1080 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1081 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1082 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1085 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1087 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1088 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1089 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1090 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1093 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1094 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1095 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1096 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1097 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1098 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1099 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1100 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1103 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1105 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1106 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1107 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1108 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1109 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1110 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1111 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1112 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1113 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1114 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1115 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1116 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1117 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1118 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1119 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1122 /// Tracks the transaction number, along with current and next commitment points.
1123 /// This consolidates the logic to advance our commitment number and request new
1124 /// commitment points from our signer.
1125 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
1126 enum HolderCommitmentPoint {
1127 // TODO: add a variant for before our first commitment point is retrieved
1128 /// We've advanced our commitment number and are waiting on the next commitment point.
1129 /// Until the `get_per_commitment_point` signer method becomes async, this variant
1130 /// will not be used.
1131 PendingNext { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey },
1132 /// Our current commitment point is ready, we've cached our next point,
1133 /// and we are not pending a new one.
1134 Available { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey, next: PublicKey },
1137 impl HolderCommitmentPoint {
1138 pub fn new<SP: Deref>(signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self
1139 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
1141 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
1142 transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1143 current: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, secp_ctx),
1144 next: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, secp_ctx),
1148 pub fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
1149 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { .. } = self { true } else { false }
1152 pub fn transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
1154 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
1155 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
1159 pub fn current_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
1161 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { current, .. } => *current,
1162 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { current, .. } => *current,
1166 pub fn next_point(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1168 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { .. } => None,
1169 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { next, .. } => Some(*next),
1173 pub fn advance<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, logger: &L)
1174 where SP::Target: SignerProvider, L::Target: Logger
1176 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, next, .. } = self {
1177 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext {
1178 transaction_number: *transaction_number - 1,
1183 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, current } = self {
1184 let next = signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(*transaction_number - 1, secp_ctx);
1185 log_trace!(logger, "Retrieved next per-commitment point {}", *transaction_number - 1);
1186 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number: *transaction_number, current: *current, next };
1191 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1192 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1193 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1194 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1195 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1196 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1197 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1198 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1199 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1200 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1201 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1202 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1203 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1204 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1205 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1207 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1208 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1209 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1210 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1212 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1213 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1214 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1215 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1217 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1218 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1219 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1220 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1221 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1223 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1224 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1225 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1226 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1228 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1229 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1230 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1232 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1233 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1234 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1235 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1236 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1238 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1239 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1242 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1243 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1245 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1246 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1247 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1248 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1250 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1251 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1253 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1254 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1257 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1258 (0, update, required),
1261 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1262 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1263 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1264 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1265 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1266 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1267 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1268 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1269 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1270 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1273 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1274 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1275 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1277 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1279 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1280 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1281 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1282 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1283 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1284 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1285 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1289 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1291 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1292 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1293 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1294 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1295 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1296 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1297 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1302 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1303 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1304 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1305 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1306 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1308 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1309 /// in a timely manner.
1310 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1313 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1314 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1315 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1317 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1318 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1319 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1320 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1324 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1325 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1326 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1328 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1329 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1330 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1331 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1333 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1337 /// The current channel ID.
1338 channel_id: ChannelId,
1339 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1340 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1341 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1342 channel_state: ChannelState,
1344 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1345 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1347 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1348 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1349 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1351 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1352 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1353 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1356 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1357 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1359 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1361 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1362 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1363 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1365 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1366 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1367 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1369 holder_commitment_point: HolderCommitmentPoint,
1370 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1371 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1372 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1373 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1374 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1376 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1377 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1378 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1379 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1380 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1381 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1383 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1385 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1386 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1387 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1389 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1390 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1391 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1392 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1393 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1394 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1395 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1396 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1398 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1399 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1400 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1402 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1403 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1404 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1405 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1406 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1407 /// outbound or inbound.
1408 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1410 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1412 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1413 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1414 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1415 // HTLCs with similar state.
1416 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1417 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1418 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1419 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1420 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1421 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1422 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1423 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1424 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1425 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1427 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1428 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1429 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1431 update_time_counter: u32,
1433 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1434 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1435 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1436 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1437 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1438 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1440 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1441 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1443 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1444 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1445 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1446 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1448 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1449 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1451 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1453 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1455 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1456 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1457 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1458 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1459 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1461 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1462 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1464 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1465 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1466 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1468 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1469 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1470 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1471 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1472 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1473 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1474 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1475 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1477 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1480 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1482 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1485 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1487 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1490 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1492 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1494 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1495 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1498 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1500 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1502 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1503 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1505 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1507 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1508 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1509 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1511 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1513 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1514 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1515 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1517 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1518 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1519 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1521 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1523 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1525 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1526 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1527 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1528 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1530 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1531 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1532 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1534 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1535 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1536 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1538 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1539 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1540 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1541 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1542 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1543 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1544 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1545 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1547 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1548 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1549 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1550 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1551 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1553 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1554 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1556 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1557 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1558 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1559 /// unblock the state machine.
1561 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1562 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1563 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1565 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1566 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1567 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1569 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1570 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1571 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1572 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1573 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1574 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1575 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1576 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1578 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1579 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1581 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1582 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1583 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1585 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1586 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1587 // associated channel mapping.
1589 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1590 // to store all of them.
1591 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1593 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1594 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1595 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1596 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1597 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1599 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1600 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1602 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1603 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1605 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1606 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1608 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1609 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1611 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1613 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1615 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1616 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1617 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1620 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1621 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1622 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1623 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1624 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1625 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1626 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1628 config: &'a UserConfig,
1629 current_chain_height: u32,
1632 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1633 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1634 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1635 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1636 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1638 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1639 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1641 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1642 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1644 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1646 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1647 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1649 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1651 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1652 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1653 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1655 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1659 // Check sanity of message fields:
1660 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1662 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1663 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1664 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1666 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1669 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1670 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1672 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1673 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1674 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1676 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1677 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1679 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1682 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1684 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1685 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1686 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1688 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1691 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1695 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1696 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1699 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1700 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1702 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1703 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1705 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1706 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1708 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1709 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1711 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1712 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1714 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1715 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1718 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1720 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1721 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1726 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1727 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1728 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1729 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1731 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1732 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1734 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1735 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1736 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1738 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1742 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1743 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1744 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1745 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1749 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1750 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1751 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1752 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1755 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1756 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1757 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1758 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1762 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1763 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1764 &Some(ref script) => {
1765 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1766 if script.len() == 0 {
1769 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1772 Some(script.clone())
1775 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1777 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1782 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1783 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1784 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1785 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1789 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1790 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1795 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1796 Ok(script) => script,
1797 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1800 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1801 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1803 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1806 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1809 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1811 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1812 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1814 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1816 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1819 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1820 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1822 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1827 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1829 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1830 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1831 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1832 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1834 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1837 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1840 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1843 holder_commitment_point,
1844 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1847 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1848 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1849 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1850 pending_update_fee: None,
1851 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1852 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1853 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1854 update_time_counter: 1,
1856 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1858 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1859 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1860 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1861 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1862 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1863 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1864 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1866 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1867 signer_pending_funding: false,
1870 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1871 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1872 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1873 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1875 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1876 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1877 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1878 closing_fee_limits: None,
1879 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1881 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1882 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1883 short_channel_id: None,
1884 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1886 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1887 channel_value_satoshis,
1888 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1889 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1890 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1891 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1892 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1893 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1894 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1895 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1896 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1897 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1900 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1902 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1903 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1904 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1905 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1906 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1907 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1908 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1910 funding_outpoint: None,
1911 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1913 funding_transaction: None,
1914 is_batch_funding: None,
1916 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1917 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1918 counterparty_node_id,
1920 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1922 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1924 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1925 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1927 announcement_sigs: None,
1929 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1930 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1931 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1932 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1934 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1935 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1937 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1938 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1940 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1941 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1944 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1949 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1951 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1957 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1958 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1959 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1960 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1961 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1962 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1963 funding_satoshis: u64,
1966 config: &'a UserConfig,
1967 current_chain_height: u32,
1968 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1969 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1970 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1971 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1972 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1973 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1974 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1976 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1977 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1978 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1980 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1981 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1983 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1985 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1988 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1989 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1991 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1992 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1993 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1995 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1999 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
2000 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
2002 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2003 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
2005 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
2007 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
2009 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
2010 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
2011 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
2012 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
2015 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2016 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2018 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
2019 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
2020 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
2021 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
2025 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2026 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
2027 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
2031 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
2032 Ok(script) => script,
2033 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
2036 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
2038 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
2039 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
2044 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
2045 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
2046 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
2047 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
2052 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
2054 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
2055 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
2056 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
2057 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
2059 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2060 channel_value_satoshis,
2062 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
2065 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
2068 holder_commitment_point,
2069 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2072 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2073 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2074 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
2075 pending_update_fee: None,
2076 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
2077 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2078 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2079 update_time_counter: 1,
2081 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2083 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2084 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2085 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2086 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2087 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2088 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2089 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
2091 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
2092 signer_pending_funding: false,
2094 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
2095 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2096 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2097 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2098 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2099 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2101 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2102 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2103 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
2104 closing_fee_limits: None,
2105 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2107 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2108 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2109 short_channel_id: None,
2110 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2112 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
2113 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2114 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2115 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2116 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
2117 // receive `accept_channel2`.
2118 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2120 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2121 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2122 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2123 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2124 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2125 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2127 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2129 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2130 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2131 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2132 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2133 counterparty_parameters: None,
2134 funding_outpoint: None,
2135 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2137 funding_transaction: None,
2138 is_batch_funding: None,
2140 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2141 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2142 counterparty_node_id,
2144 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2146 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2148 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2149 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2151 announcement_sigs: None,
2153 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2154 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2155 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2156 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2158 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2159 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2161 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2162 outbound_scid_alias,
2164 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2165 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2167 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2168 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2173 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2174 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2178 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2179 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2180 self.update_time_counter
2183 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2184 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2187 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2188 self.config.announced_channel
2191 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2192 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2195 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2196 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2197 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2198 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2201 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2202 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2203 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2206 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2207 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2208 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2209 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2210 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2211 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2212 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2215 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2216 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2217 match self.channel_state {
2218 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2219 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2220 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2221 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2222 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2223 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2224 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2226 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2228 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2229 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2233 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2234 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2235 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2236 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2237 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2238 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2241 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2242 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2243 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2247 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2248 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2249 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2250 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2251 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2254 // Public utilities:
2256 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2260 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2262 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2263 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2264 self.temporary_channel_id
2267 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2271 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2272 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2273 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2277 /// Gets the channel's type
2278 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2282 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2284 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2285 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2286 self.short_channel_id
2289 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2290 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2291 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2294 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2295 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2296 self.outbound_scid_alias
2299 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2301 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2302 return &self.holder_signer
2305 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2306 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2307 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2308 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2309 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2310 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2313 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2314 /// get_funding_created.
2315 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2316 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2319 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2320 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2321 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2322 if conf_height > 0 {
2329 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2330 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2331 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2334 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2335 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2336 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2337 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2341 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2344 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2345 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2348 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2349 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2352 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2353 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2354 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2357 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2358 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2361 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2362 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2363 self.counterparty_node_id
2366 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2367 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2368 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2371 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2372 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2373 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2376 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2377 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2379 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2380 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2381 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2382 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2384 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2388 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2389 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2390 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2393 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2394 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2395 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2398 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2399 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2400 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2402 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2403 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2408 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2409 self.channel_value_satoshis
2412 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2413 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2416 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2417 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2420 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2421 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2422 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2423 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2426 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2427 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2428 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2429 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2431 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2435 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2436 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2437 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2440 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2441 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2442 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2445 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2446 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2447 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2450 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2451 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2452 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2455 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2456 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2457 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2460 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2461 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2462 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2465 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2466 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2467 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2468 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2469 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2472 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2474 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2475 self.prev_config = None;
2479 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2480 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2484 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2485 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2486 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2487 let did_channel_update =
2488 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2489 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2490 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2491 if did_channel_update {
2492 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2493 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2494 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2495 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2497 self.config.options = *config;
2501 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2502 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2503 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2504 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2505 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2508 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2509 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2510 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2511 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2512 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2514 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2515 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2516 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2517 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2518 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2519 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2520 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2522 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2523 where L::Target: Logger
2525 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2526 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2527 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2529 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2530 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2531 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2532 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2534 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2535 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2536 if match update_state {
2537 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2538 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2539 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2540 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2541 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2543 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2547 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2548 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2549 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2551 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2553 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2554 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2555 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2557 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2558 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2559 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2560 transaction_output_index: None
2565 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2566 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2567 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2568 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2569 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2572 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2574 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2575 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2576 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2578 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2579 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2582 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2583 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2586 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2588 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2589 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2590 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2592 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2593 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2599 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2601 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2602 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2603 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2604 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2605 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2606 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2607 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2611 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2612 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2614 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2616 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2617 if generated_by_local {
2618 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2619 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2620 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2630 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2632 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2633 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2634 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2635 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2636 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2637 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2638 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2641 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2642 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2643 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2644 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2648 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2649 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2653 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2654 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2656 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2658 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2659 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2661 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2662 if !generated_by_local {
2663 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2671 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2672 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2673 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2674 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2675 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2676 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2677 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2678 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2680 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2682 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2683 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2684 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2685 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2687 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2691 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2692 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2695 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2696 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2697 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2700 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2703 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2704 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2705 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2706 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2708 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2711 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2712 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2717 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2718 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2723 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2725 let channel_parameters =
2726 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2727 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2728 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2735 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2738 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2739 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2740 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2741 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2749 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2750 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2751 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2752 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2757 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2758 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2759 /// our counterparty!)
2760 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2761 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2762 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2763 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2764 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2765 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2766 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2768 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2772 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2773 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2774 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2775 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2776 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2777 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2778 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2780 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2783 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2784 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2785 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2786 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2787 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2790 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2791 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2794 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2798 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2799 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2800 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2801 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2802 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2803 // which are near the dust limit.
2804 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2805 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2806 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2807 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2808 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2810 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2811 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2813 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2814 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2817 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2818 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2819 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2822 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2823 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2825 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2827 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2828 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2831 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2832 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2835 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2836 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2838 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2839 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2841 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2844 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2845 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2846 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2847 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2848 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2849 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2851 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2853 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2854 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2859 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2860 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2861 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2862 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2864 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2865 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2866 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2867 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2868 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2869 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2871 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2873 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2874 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2878 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2879 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2880 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2881 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2882 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2883 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2884 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2886 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2888 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2889 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2891 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2897 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2898 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2899 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2900 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2901 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2902 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2903 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2904 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2905 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2906 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2907 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2908 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2909 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2910 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2911 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2912 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2913 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2918 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2919 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2920 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2921 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2922 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2923 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2924 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2925 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2929 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2930 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2931 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2932 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2933 match holding_cell_update {
2934 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2935 holding_cell_states.insert(
2937 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2940 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2941 holding_cell_states.insert(
2943 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2946 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2947 holding_cell_states.insert(
2949 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2953 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2956 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2957 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2960 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2961 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2963 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2964 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2965 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2966 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2967 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2968 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2969 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2970 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2971 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2972 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2979 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2980 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2981 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2982 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2985 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2986 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2988 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2989 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2990 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2991 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2992 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2993 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2994 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2995 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2996 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2997 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
3000 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3001 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3007 } = *holding_cell_update {
3008 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
3010 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3011 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3012 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3013 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3014 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
3015 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
3022 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
3023 /// Doesn't bother handling the
3024 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
3025 /// corner case properly.
3026 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3027 -> AvailableBalances
3028 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3030 let context = &self;
3031 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
3034 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
3035 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3037 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
3038 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3039 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
3040 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3043 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
3045 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
3046 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
3048 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
3050 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
3052 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3053 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3057 if context.is_outbound() {
3058 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
3059 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
3061 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
3062 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
3064 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
3065 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3066 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3067 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3070 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3071 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
3072 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3073 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
3074 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3075 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3076 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3079 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
3080 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
3081 // match the value to right-below-dust.
3082 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
3083 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
3084 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
3085 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
3086 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
3087 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
3088 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
3089 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
3091 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
3094 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
3095 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
3096 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3097 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3098 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3101 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3102 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
3104 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3105 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
3106 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3108 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3109 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3110 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3111 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3115 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3117 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3118 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3119 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3120 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3121 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3122 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3123 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3125 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3126 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3128 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3129 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3130 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3133 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3134 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
3135 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
3136 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
3137 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
3138 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
3139 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3140 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
3141 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
3142 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3146 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
3147 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
3148 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
3149 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3150 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
3151 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3154 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3155 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3156 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3157 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
3158 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3161 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3162 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3163 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3165 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3169 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3170 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3172 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
3173 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3177 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3178 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3179 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3180 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3182 outbound_capacity_msat,
3183 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3184 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3189 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3190 let context = &self;
3191 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3194 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3195 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3197 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3198 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3200 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3201 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3203 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3204 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3205 let context = &self;
3206 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3208 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3211 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3212 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3214 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3215 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3217 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3218 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3220 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3221 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3225 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3226 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3232 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3233 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3234 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3237 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3238 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3239 included_htlcs += 1;
3242 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3243 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3247 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3248 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3249 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3250 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3251 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3252 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3257 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3259 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3260 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3265 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3266 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3270 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3271 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3272 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3275 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3276 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3278 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3279 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3280 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3282 total_pending_htlcs,
3283 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3284 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3285 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3287 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3288 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3289 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3291 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3293 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3298 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3299 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3301 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3302 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3304 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3305 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3307 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3308 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3309 let context = &self;
3310 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3312 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3315 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3316 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3318 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3319 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3321 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3322 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3324 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3325 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3329 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3330 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3336 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3337 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3338 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3339 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3340 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3341 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3344 included_htlcs += 1;
3347 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3348 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3351 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3352 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3354 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3355 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3356 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3361 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3362 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3363 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3366 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3367 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3369 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3370 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3372 total_pending_htlcs,
3373 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3374 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3375 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3377 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3378 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3379 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3381 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3383 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3388 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3389 match self.channel_state {
3390 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3391 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3392 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3393 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3403 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3405 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3406 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3409 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3411 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3412 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3413 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3417 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3418 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3419 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3422 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3424 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3425 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3428 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3429 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3430 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3431 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3432 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3433 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3434 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3435 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3436 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3437 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3438 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3440 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3441 // return them to fail the payment.
3442 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3443 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3444 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3446 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3447 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3452 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3453 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3454 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3455 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3456 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3457 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3458 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3459 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3460 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3461 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3462 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3463 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3464 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3465 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3466 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3470 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3471 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3478 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3479 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3480 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3481 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3482 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3483 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3484 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3485 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3489 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3490 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3491 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3492 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3494 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3495 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3496 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3497 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3499 match &self.holder_signer {
3500 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3501 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3502 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3503 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3504 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3507 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3511 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3512 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3513 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3515 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3516 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3517 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3519 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3520 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3521 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3524 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3525 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3527 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3533 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3534 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3535 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3536 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3537 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3540 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3542 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3544 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3545 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3550 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3551 // We've exhausted our options
3554 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3555 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3558 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3559 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3560 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3561 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3563 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3564 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3565 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3566 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3567 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3568 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3570 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3572 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3577 // Internal utility functions for channels
3579 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3580 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3581 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3583 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3585 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3586 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3587 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3589 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3592 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3594 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3597 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3598 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3599 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3601 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3603 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3604 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3605 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3606 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3607 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3610 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3611 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3612 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3613 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3614 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3615 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3616 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3619 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3620 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3622 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3624 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3625 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3626 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3627 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3628 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3629 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3630 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3633 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3634 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3636 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3637 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3640 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3641 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3642 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3643 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3644 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3645 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3648 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3649 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3650 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3651 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3652 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3653 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3659 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3660 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3661 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3662 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3663 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3664 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3665 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3666 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3667 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3668 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3669 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3670 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3673 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3674 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3675 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3676 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3677 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3678 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3681 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3682 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3684 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3685 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3686 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3690 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3691 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3692 trait FailHTLCContents {
3693 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3694 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3695 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3696 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3698 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3699 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3700 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3701 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3703 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3704 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3706 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3707 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3710 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3711 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3712 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3713 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3716 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3717 failure_code: self.1
3720 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3721 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3723 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3724 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3726 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3727 failure_code: self.1
3732 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3733 fn name() -> &'static str;
3735 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3736 fn name() -> &'static str {
3740 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3741 fn name() -> &'static str {
3742 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3746 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3747 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3748 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3750 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3751 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3752 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3753 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3755 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3756 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3758 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3760 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3761 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3762 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3763 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3765 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3766 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3776 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3777 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3778 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3779 // outside of those situations will fail.
3780 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3784 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3789 1 + // script length (0)
3793 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3794 2 + // witness marker and flag
3795 1 + // witness element count
3796 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3797 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3798 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3799 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3800 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3801 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3803 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3804 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3805 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3811 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3812 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3813 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3814 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3816 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3817 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3818 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3820 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3821 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3822 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3823 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3824 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3825 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3828 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3829 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3832 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3833 value_to_holder = 0;
3836 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3837 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3838 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3839 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3841 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3842 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3845 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3846 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3849 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3852 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3853 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3855 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3857 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3858 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3859 where L::Target: Logger {
3860 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3861 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3862 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3863 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3864 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3865 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3866 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3867 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3871 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3872 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3873 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3874 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3876 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3877 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3880 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3881 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3882 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3884 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3885 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3886 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3887 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3888 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3889 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3890 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3892 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3893 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3894 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3896 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3897 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3899 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3902 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3903 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3907 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3911 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3913 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3914 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3915 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3916 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3919 // Now update local state:
3921 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3922 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3923 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3924 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3925 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3926 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3928 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3930 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3933 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3934 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3935 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3936 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3937 // do not not get into this branch.
3938 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3939 match pending_update {
3940 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3941 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3942 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3943 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3945 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3946 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3949 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3950 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3952 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3953 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3954 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3955 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3956 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3957 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3963 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3964 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3965 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3968 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3969 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3971 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3972 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3975 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3976 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3978 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3979 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3981 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3982 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3985 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3988 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3989 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3990 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3991 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3996 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3997 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3998 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3999 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
4000 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
4001 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
4002 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
4003 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
4004 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
4005 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
4006 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4007 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
4008 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4009 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4010 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4012 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
4013 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
4014 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
4015 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
4016 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
4019 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
4020 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4021 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4027 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4028 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
4030 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
4034 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
4035 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
4036 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
4037 /// before we fail backwards.
4039 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
4040 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
4041 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4042 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
4043 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4044 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
4045 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
4048 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
4049 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
4051 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
4052 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
4053 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
4054 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4055 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
4056 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
4059 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
4060 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
4061 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
4062 /// before we fail backwards.
4064 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
4065 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
4066 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4067 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
4068 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4070 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4071 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4072 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
4075 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
4076 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
4077 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
4079 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
4080 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
4081 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
4083 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
4084 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
4085 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4087 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4092 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
4093 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
4099 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
4100 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4101 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
4102 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
4103 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4107 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4108 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
4109 force_holding_cell = true;
4112 // Now update local state:
4113 if force_holding_cell {
4114 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4115 match pending_update {
4116 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
4117 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4118 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4119 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4123 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
4124 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
4126 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4127 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4128 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
4134 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
4135 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4139 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4140 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4142 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4143 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4146 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4149 // Message handlers:
4150 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4151 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4152 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4153 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4154 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4155 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4156 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4159 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4161 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4163 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4164 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4165 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4166 debug_assert!(matches!(
4167 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4169 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4170 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4173 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4174 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4176 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4177 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4178 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4179 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4181 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4184 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4185 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4189 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4190 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4191 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4192 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4193 // when routing outbound payments.
4194 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4198 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4199 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4200 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4201 match &self.context.channel_state {
4202 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4203 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4204 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4205 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4206 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4207 check_reconnection = true;
4208 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4209 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4210 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4211 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4212 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4214 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4215 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4218 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4219 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4220 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4222 if check_reconnection {
4223 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4224 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4225 let expected_point =
4226 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4227 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4229 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4230 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4231 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4232 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4233 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4234 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4236 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4237 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4238 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4239 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4240 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4242 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4248 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4249 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4251 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4253 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4256 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4257 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4258 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4259 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4260 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4263 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4264 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4267 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4270 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4273 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4276 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4280 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4281 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4282 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4285 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4289 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4290 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4291 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4292 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4293 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4294 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4295 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4296 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4297 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4298 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4299 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4301 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4302 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4303 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4304 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4305 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4306 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4310 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4311 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4312 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4313 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4314 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4318 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4319 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4321 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4322 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4323 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4325 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4326 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4330 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4333 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4338 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4339 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4343 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4344 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4345 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4346 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4347 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4351 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4352 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4354 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4358 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4359 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4360 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4364 // Now update local state:
4365 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4366 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4367 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4368 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4369 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4370 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4371 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4372 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4378 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4380 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4381 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4382 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4383 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4384 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4385 None => fail_reason.into(),
4386 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4387 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4388 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4389 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4391 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4395 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4397 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4398 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4400 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4406 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4409 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4410 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4413 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4417 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4420 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4421 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4424 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4428 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4432 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4433 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4436 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4440 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4444 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4445 where L::Target: Logger
4447 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4450 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4453 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4457 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4459 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number());
4461 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger);
4462 let commitment_txid = {
4463 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4464 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4465 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4467 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4468 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4469 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4470 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4471 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4472 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4476 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4478 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4479 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4480 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4481 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4484 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4485 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4486 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4490 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4492 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4493 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4494 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4495 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4496 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4497 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4498 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4499 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4500 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4501 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4502 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4508 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4512 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4513 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4514 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4515 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4516 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4517 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4518 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4519 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4520 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4521 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4522 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4523 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4524 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4527 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4528 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4529 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4530 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4531 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4532 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4533 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4535 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4536 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4537 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4538 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4539 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4540 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4541 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4542 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4544 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4545 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4548 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4550 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4551 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4552 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4555 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4558 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4559 commitment_stats.tx,
4561 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4562 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4563 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4566 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4567 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4569 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4570 let mut need_commitment = false;
4571 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4572 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4573 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4574 need_commitment = true;
4578 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4579 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4580 Some(resolution.clone())
4582 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4583 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4584 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4585 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4586 need_commitment = true;
4589 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4590 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4591 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4592 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4593 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4594 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4595 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4596 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4597 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4598 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4599 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4600 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4601 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4602 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4604 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4606 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4607 need_commitment = true;
4611 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4612 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4613 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4614 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4615 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4616 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4617 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4619 nondust_htlc_sources,
4621 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4624 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
4625 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4626 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4627 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4628 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4630 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4631 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4632 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4633 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4634 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4635 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4636 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4637 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4638 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4639 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4640 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4641 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4642 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4643 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4645 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4646 &self.context.channel_id);
4647 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4650 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4651 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4652 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4653 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4654 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4655 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4656 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4657 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4658 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4662 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4663 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4664 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4665 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4668 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4669 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4670 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4671 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4672 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4673 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4674 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4676 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4677 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4678 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4681 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4682 /// for our counterparty.
4683 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4684 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4685 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4686 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4688 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4689 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4690 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4691 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4693 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4694 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4695 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4696 updates: Vec::new(),
4697 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4700 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4701 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4702 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4703 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4704 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4705 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4706 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4707 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4708 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4709 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4710 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4711 // to rebalance channels.
4712 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4713 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4714 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4715 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4717 match self.send_htlc(
4718 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4719 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4721 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4724 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4725 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4726 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4727 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4728 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4729 // into the holding cell without ever being
4730 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4731 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4732 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4735 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4742 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4743 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4744 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4745 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4746 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4747 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4748 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4749 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4750 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4751 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4752 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4753 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4756 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4757 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4758 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4760 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4761 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4762 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4765 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4767 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4768 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4769 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4770 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4771 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4772 // for a full revocation before failing.
4773 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4774 update_fail_count += 1;
4776 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4778 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4783 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4784 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4786 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4787 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4792 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4793 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4794 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4795 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4796 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4798 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4799 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4800 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4802 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4803 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4809 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4810 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4811 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4812 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4813 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4814 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4815 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4816 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4817 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4819 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4822 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4825 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4829 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4831 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4832 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4837 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4838 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4839 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4840 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4841 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4842 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4843 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4844 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4848 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4850 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4851 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4854 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4855 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4856 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4857 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4859 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4861 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4866 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4867 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4868 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4869 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4870 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4871 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4872 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4873 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4874 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4876 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4879 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4880 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4881 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4882 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4883 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4884 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4885 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4886 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4887 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4889 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4890 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4893 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4894 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4895 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4896 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4897 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4898 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4899 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4900 let mut require_commitment = false;
4901 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4904 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4905 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4906 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4907 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4909 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4910 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4911 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4912 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4913 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4914 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4916 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4920 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4921 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4922 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4923 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4924 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4926 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4927 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4928 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4933 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4934 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4936 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4940 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4941 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4943 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4944 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4945 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4946 require_commitment = true;
4947 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4949 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4950 match pending_htlc_status {
4951 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4952 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4953 require_commitment = true;
4955 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4956 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4957 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4959 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4960 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4961 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4965 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4966 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4967 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4968 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4971 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4972 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4973 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4974 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4980 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4981 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4982 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4983 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4984 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4986 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4987 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4988 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4989 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4990 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4991 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4992 require_commitment = true;
4996 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4998 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4999 match update_state {
5000 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
5001 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
5002 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5003 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5004 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5005 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
5007 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
5008 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
5009 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5010 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5011 require_commitment = true;
5012 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5013 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5018 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
5019 let release_state_str =
5020 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
5021 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
5022 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
5023 if !release_monitor {
5024 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5025 update: monitor_update,
5027 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
5029 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
5034 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
5036 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5037 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
5038 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
5039 if require_commitment {
5040 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5041 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
5042 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
5043 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
5045 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5046 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5047 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5048 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5049 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5051 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
5052 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
5053 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5054 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
5055 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
5058 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
5059 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
5060 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
5061 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5062 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5063 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5065 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
5066 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5068 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5069 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5071 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
5072 if require_commitment {
5073 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5075 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5076 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5077 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5078 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5080 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
5081 &self.context.channel_id(),
5082 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
5085 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5086 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5088 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
5089 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5091 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5092 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5098 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5099 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5100 /// commitment update.
5101 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
5102 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5103 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5105 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
5106 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
5109 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
5110 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
5111 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
5112 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
5114 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
5115 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5116 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5117 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5118 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5119 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
5120 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5122 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5123 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
5125 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5126 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
5128 if !self.context.is_live() {
5129 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
5132 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
5133 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5134 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5135 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number());
5136 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, true, logger);
5137 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5138 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
5139 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5140 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5141 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5145 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5146 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5147 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5148 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5151 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5152 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5156 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5157 force_holding_cell = true;
5160 if force_holding_cell {
5161 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5165 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5166 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5168 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5169 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5174 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5175 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5177 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5179 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5180 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5181 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5182 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5186 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5187 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5188 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5192 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5193 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5196 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5197 // will be retransmitted.
5198 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5199 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5200 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5202 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5203 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5205 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5206 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5207 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5208 // this HTLC accordingly
5209 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5212 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5213 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5214 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5215 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5218 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5219 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5220 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5221 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5222 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5223 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5228 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5230 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5231 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5232 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5233 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5237 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5238 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5239 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5240 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5241 // the update upon reconnection.
5242 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5246 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5248 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5249 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5253 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5254 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5255 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5256 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5257 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5258 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5259 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5261 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5262 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5263 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5264 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5265 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5266 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5267 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5269 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5270 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5271 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5272 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5273 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5274 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5275 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5278 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5279 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5280 /// to the remote side.
5281 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5282 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5283 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5284 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5287 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5289 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5290 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5292 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5293 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5294 // first received the funding_signed.
5295 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5296 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5297 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5298 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5300 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5302 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5303 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5304 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5305 funding_broadcastable = None;
5308 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5309 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5310 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5311 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5312 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5313 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5314 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5315 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5316 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5317 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5318 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5321 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5323 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5324 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5325 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5326 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5327 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5328 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5329 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5330 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5332 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5333 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5334 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5335 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5336 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5337 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5338 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5342 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5343 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5345 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5346 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5348 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5349 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5352 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5353 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5354 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5355 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5356 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5357 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5358 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5359 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5360 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5361 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5365 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5366 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5368 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5371 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5374 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5376 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5377 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5378 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5379 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5380 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5381 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5382 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5383 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5384 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5386 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5387 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5388 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5393 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5395 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5396 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5397 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5398 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5400 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5401 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5403 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5404 self.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger)
5407 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5408 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5409 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5410 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5412 SignerResumeUpdates {
5419 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5420 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
5421 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 2);
5422 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5423 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5424 per_commitment_secret,
5425 next_per_commitment_point,
5427 next_local_nonce: None,
5431 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5432 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5433 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5434 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5435 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5436 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5438 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5439 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5440 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5441 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5442 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5443 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5444 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5445 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5446 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5447 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5448 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5453 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5454 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5456 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5457 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5458 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5459 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5460 reason: err_packet.clone()
5463 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5464 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5465 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5466 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5467 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5468 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5471 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5472 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5473 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5474 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5475 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5482 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5483 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5484 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5485 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5489 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5490 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5491 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5492 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5493 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5494 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5495 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5499 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5500 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5502 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5503 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5504 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5505 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5510 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5511 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5516 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5517 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5518 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5519 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5520 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5521 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5522 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5527 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5528 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5530 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5531 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5532 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5533 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5534 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5535 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5536 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5537 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5540 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5542 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5543 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5544 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5545 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5549 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5550 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5554 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1;
5555 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5556 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5557 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5558 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5559 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5562 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5563 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5564 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5565 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5566 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5569 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5570 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5571 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5572 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5573 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5574 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5575 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5576 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5580 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5581 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5582 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5583 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5584 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5585 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5586 our_commitment_transaction
5590 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5591 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5592 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5593 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5595 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5597 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5599 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5600 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5601 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5602 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5603 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5606 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5607 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5608 channel_ready: None,
5609 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5610 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5611 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5615 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5616 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5617 channel_ready: Some(self.get_channel_ready()),
5618 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5619 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5620 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5624 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5625 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5626 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5628 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5629 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5630 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5633 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5636 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5638 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5639 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5640 our_commitment_transaction
5644 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5645 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5646 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5647 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5648 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5649 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5650 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5652 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5654 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == 1 {
5655 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5656 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
5659 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5660 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5661 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5663 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5666 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5667 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5668 raa: required_revoke,
5669 commitment_update: None,
5670 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5672 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5673 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5674 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5676 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5679 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5680 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5681 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5682 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5683 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5684 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5687 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5688 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5689 raa: required_revoke,
5690 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5691 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5694 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5695 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5696 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5697 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5698 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5701 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5702 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5703 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5704 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5709 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5710 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5711 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5712 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5714 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5716 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5718 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5719 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5720 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5721 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5722 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5723 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5724 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5725 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5727 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5728 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5729 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5730 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5731 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5733 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5734 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5735 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5736 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5739 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5740 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5741 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5742 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5743 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5744 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5745 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5746 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5747 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5748 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5749 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5750 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5751 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5752 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5753 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5755 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5758 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5759 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5762 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5763 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5764 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5765 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5766 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5767 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5770 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5771 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5772 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5773 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5774 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5775 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5778 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5784 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5785 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5786 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5787 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5789 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5790 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5791 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5792 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5793 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5794 return Ok((None, None, None));
5797 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5798 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5799 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5801 return Ok((None, None, None));
5804 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5805 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5806 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5807 return Ok((None, None, None));
5810 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5812 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5813 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5814 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5815 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5817 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5818 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5820 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5821 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5823 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5824 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5825 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5826 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5828 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5829 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5830 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5834 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5840 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5841 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5843 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5844 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5847 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5848 /// within our expected timeframe.
5850 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5851 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5852 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5855 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5858 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5859 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5863 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5864 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5866 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5869 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5870 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5871 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5872 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5875 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5876 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5880 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5882 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5883 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5886 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5887 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5888 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5891 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5894 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5895 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5896 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5897 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5899 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5902 assert!(send_shutdown);
5903 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5904 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5905 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5907 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5908 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5910 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5915 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5917 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5918 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5920 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5921 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5922 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5923 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5924 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5925 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5926 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5928 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5930 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5931 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5933 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5934 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5935 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5936 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5940 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5941 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5942 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5943 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5944 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5945 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5947 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5948 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5955 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5956 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5958 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5961 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5962 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5964 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5966 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5967 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5968 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5969 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5970 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5971 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5972 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5973 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5974 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5976 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5977 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5980 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5984 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5985 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5986 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5987 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5989 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5992 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5995 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5998 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
6002 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
6006 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6007 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
6008 return Ok((None, None, None));
6011 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6012 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
6013 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
6014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
6016 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6018 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6021 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
6022 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
6023 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
6024 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6025 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
6029 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
6030 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6031 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
6035 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
6036 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
6038 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
6041 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
6042 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6043 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6044 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6046 monitor_update: None,
6047 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6048 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6049 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6050 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6051 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6052 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6053 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6054 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6056 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6057 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6058 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6059 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
6063 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
6065 macro_rules! propose_fee {
6066 ($new_fee: expr) => {
6067 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6068 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
6070 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
6073 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
6074 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6076 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6077 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
6078 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6079 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6081 monitor_update: None,
6082 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6083 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6084 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6085 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6086 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6087 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6088 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6089 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6091 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6092 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6093 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6094 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
6099 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
6100 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
6101 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6102 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
6104 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
6105 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
6106 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
6108 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
6110 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6117 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
6118 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
6119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
6121 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6124 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6125 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6128 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6129 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6130 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6131 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6132 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6134 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6136 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6138 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6139 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6142 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6143 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6144 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6145 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6146 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6147 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6148 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6149 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6154 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6155 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6156 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6157 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6163 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6164 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6165 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6166 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6168 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6174 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6175 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6176 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6177 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6178 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6179 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6180 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6182 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6183 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6186 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6188 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6189 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6195 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6196 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6197 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6198 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6199 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6200 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6201 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6203 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6204 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6211 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6212 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6213 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6218 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6219 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6222 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6223 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6224 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6225 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6228 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6229 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6230 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6232 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6233 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6234 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6235 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6236 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6237 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6238 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6241 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6242 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6243 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6244 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6245 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6246 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6247 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6248 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6252 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6253 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6254 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6255 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6256 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6257 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6258 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6262 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6263 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6268 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6269 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6270 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6271 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6272 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6273 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6277 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6278 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6279 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6280 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6282 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6283 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6284 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6285 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6286 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6287 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6288 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6289 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6290 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6292 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6293 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6294 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6301 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6302 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() + 1
6305 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6306 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6309 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6310 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6314 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6315 &self.context.holder_signer
6319 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6321 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6322 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6323 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6324 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6325 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6326 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6328 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6330 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6338 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6339 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6343 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6344 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6345 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6346 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6349 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6350 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6351 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6352 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6355 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6356 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6357 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6358 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6359 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6360 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6363 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6364 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6365 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6366 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6367 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6368 if !release_monitor {
6369 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6378 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6379 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6380 /// here after logging them.
6381 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6382 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6383 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6384 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6387 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6388 update.update.update_id,
6398 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6399 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6402 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6403 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6404 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6406 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6407 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6409 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6410 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6412 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6413 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6414 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6417 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6418 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6419 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6420 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6421 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6422 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6424 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6425 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6426 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6428 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6429 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6430 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6431 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6432 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6433 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6439 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6440 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6441 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6442 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6445 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6446 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6447 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6450 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6451 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6452 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6455 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6456 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6457 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6460 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6461 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6462 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6463 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6464 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6467 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6468 self.context.channel_update_status
6471 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6472 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6473 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6476 fn check_get_channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady>
6477 where L::Target: Logger
6480 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6481 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6482 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6486 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6487 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6488 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6491 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6495 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6496 // channel_ready yet.
6497 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6498 // TODO: set signer_pending_channel_ready
6499 log_debug!(logger, "Can't produce channel_ready: the signer is pending funding.");
6503 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6504 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6505 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6506 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6508 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6509 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6510 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6512 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6513 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6516 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6517 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6519 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6520 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6521 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6522 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6523 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6524 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6525 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6526 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6528 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6532 if !need_commitment_update {
6533 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: we do not need a commitment update");
6537 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6538 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: a monitor update is in progress. Setting monitor_pending_channel_ready.");
6539 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6543 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6544 log_debug!(logger, "Not producing channel_ready: the peer is disconnected.");
6548 // TODO: when get_per_commiment_point becomes async, check if the point is
6549 // available, if not, set signer_pending_channel_ready and return None
6551 Some(self.get_channel_ready())
6554 fn get_channel_ready(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReady {
6555 debug_assert!(self.context.holder_commitment_point.is_available());
6556 msgs::ChannelReady {
6557 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6558 next_per_commitment_point: self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point(),
6559 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6563 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6564 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6565 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6566 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6567 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6568 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6569 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6571 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6574 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6575 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6576 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6577 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6578 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6579 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6580 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6581 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6582 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6583 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6584 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6585 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6586 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6587 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6588 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6589 // channel and move on.
6590 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6591 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6593 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6594 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6595 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6597 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6598 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6599 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6600 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6601 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6602 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6603 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6604 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6609 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6610 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6611 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6612 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6613 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6616 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6617 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6618 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6619 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6620 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6621 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6624 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6625 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6626 // may have already happened for this block).
6627 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6628 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6629 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6630 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6633 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6634 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6635 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6636 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6644 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6645 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6646 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6647 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6649 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6650 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6653 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6655 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6656 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6657 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6658 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6660 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6663 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6666 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6667 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6668 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6669 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6671 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6674 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6675 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6676 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6678 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6679 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6681 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6682 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6683 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6691 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6693 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height, logger) {
6694 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6695 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6697 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6698 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6701 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6702 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6703 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6704 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6705 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6706 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6707 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6708 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6711 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6712 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6713 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6714 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6716 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6717 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6718 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6720 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6721 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6722 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6723 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6725 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6726 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6727 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6728 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6729 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6730 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6731 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6734 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6735 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6737 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6740 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6741 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6742 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6743 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6744 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6745 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6746 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6747 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6748 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6749 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6750 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6751 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6752 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6753 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6754 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6755 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6756 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6762 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6767 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6768 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6770 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6771 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6772 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6773 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6775 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6778 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6780 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6781 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6782 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6783 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6784 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6785 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6787 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6788 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6791 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6792 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6793 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6794 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6795 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6796 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6798 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6799 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6802 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6803 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6804 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6805 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6806 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6812 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6813 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6814 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6815 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6817 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6820 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6824 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6828 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6829 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6833 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6837 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6838 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6841 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6845 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6847 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6852 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6853 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6854 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6856 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6861 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6863 None => return None,
6866 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6868 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6869 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6871 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6872 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6875 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6881 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6883 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6884 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6885 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6886 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6887 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6888 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6889 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6891 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6892 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6893 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6894 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6895 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6896 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6897 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6898 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6899 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6900 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6901 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6902 contents: announcement,
6905 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6910 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6914 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6915 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6916 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6917 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6918 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6919 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6920 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6921 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6923 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6925 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6926 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6927 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6928 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6930 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6932 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6933 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6936 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6937 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6938 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6939 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6942 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6945 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6946 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6947 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6948 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6949 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6950 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6953 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6955 Err(_) => return None,
6957 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6958 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6963 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6964 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6965 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6966 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6967 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6968 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6969 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6970 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6971 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6972 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6973 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6974 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6975 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6976 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6977 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6978 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6981 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6984 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6985 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6986 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6987 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6988 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6989 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6990 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6991 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6992 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6994 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6995 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6996 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
6997 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6998 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6999 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
7000 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
7001 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
7002 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
7004 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
7005 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
7006 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
7007 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
7008 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
7009 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
7010 next_funding_txid: None,
7015 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
7017 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
7018 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
7019 /// commitment update.
7021 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
7022 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7023 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
7024 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7025 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7026 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
7027 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7030 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
7031 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
7032 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
7034 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
7035 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
7040 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
7041 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
7043 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
7045 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
7046 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
7048 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
7049 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
7050 /// regenerate them.
7052 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
7053 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
7055 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
7056 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7057 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
7058 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
7059 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
7060 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7061 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
7062 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7064 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
7065 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
7066 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
7068 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
7070 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7071 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
7072 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
7075 if amount_msat == 0 {
7076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
7079 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
7080 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
7081 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
7082 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7085 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
7086 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
7087 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
7090 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
7091 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
7092 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
7093 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
7094 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
7095 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
7096 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
7097 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
7100 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
7101 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
7102 payment_hash, amount_msat,
7103 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
7104 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
7105 else { "to peer" });
7107 if need_holding_cell {
7108 force_holding_cell = true;
7111 // Now update local state:
7112 if force_holding_cell {
7113 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7118 onion_routing_packet,
7125 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7126 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7128 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
7130 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
7136 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
7137 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7138 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7142 onion_routing_packet,
7146 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
7151 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7152 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7153 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7154 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7156 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7157 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7158 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7160 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7161 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7165 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7166 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7167 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7168 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7169 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7170 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7171 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7174 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7175 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7176 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7177 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7178 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7179 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7182 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7184 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7185 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7186 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7187 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7188 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7190 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7191 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7194 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7195 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7196 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7197 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7198 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7199 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7200 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7201 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7202 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7203 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7204 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7205 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7207 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7209 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7213 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7214 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7215 where L::Target: Logger
7217 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7218 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7219 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7221 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7223 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7224 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7225 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7226 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7227 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7228 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7229 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7230 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7231 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7232 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7233 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7239 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7242 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7243 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7244 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7245 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7246 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7247 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7249 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7250 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7251 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7253 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7254 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7255 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7258 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7259 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7263 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7264 &commitment_stats.tx,
7265 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7266 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7267 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7268 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7270 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7272 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7273 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7274 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7275 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7277 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7278 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7279 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7280 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7281 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7282 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7286 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7287 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7291 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7292 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7294 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7300 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7301 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7303 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7304 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7305 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7306 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7307 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7308 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7309 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7310 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7312 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7313 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7314 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7317 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7318 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7319 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7325 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7327 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7328 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7329 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7330 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7331 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7333 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7335 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7341 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7342 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7343 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7344 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7345 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7347 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7348 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7349 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7352 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7353 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7355 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7356 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7358 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7359 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7361 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7362 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7363 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7366 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7369 // use override shutdown script if provided
7370 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7371 Some(script) => script,
7373 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7374 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7375 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7376 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7380 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7381 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7383 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7388 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7389 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7390 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7391 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7392 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7394 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7395 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7396 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7397 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7398 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7399 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7400 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7402 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7404 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7405 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7407 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7408 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7409 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7412 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7413 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7414 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7415 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7416 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7418 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7419 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7426 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7427 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7429 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7432 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7433 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7434 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7436 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7437 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7441 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7445 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7446 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7447 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7448 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7451 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7452 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7453 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7454 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7455 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7456 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7457 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7458 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7460 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7461 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7462 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7463 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7464 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7465 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7468 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7469 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7470 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7473 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7477 counterparty_node_id,
7479 channel_value_satoshis,
7483 current_chain_height,
7484 outbound_scid_alias,
7485 temporary_channel_id,
7486 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7491 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7496 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7497 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7498 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7499 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7500 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7501 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7502 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7503 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7504 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7506 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7511 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7512 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7513 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7516 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7517 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7518 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7519 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7522 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7524 next_local_nonce: None,
7528 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7529 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7530 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7531 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7532 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7533 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7534 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7535 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7536 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7537 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7538 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7541 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7542 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7544 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7546 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7547 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7548 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7549 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7552 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7553 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7555 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7557 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7558 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7560 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7561 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7562 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7563 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7564 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7565 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7568 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7569 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7571 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7572 if funding_created.is_none() {
7573 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7574 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7576 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7577 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7578 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7579 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7587 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7588 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7589 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7590 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7591 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7592 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7594 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7596 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7597 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7600 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7601 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7602 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7603 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7606 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7607 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7608 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7610 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7611 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7614 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7615 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7618 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
7619 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7622 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7624 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7625 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7626 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7627 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7628 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7629 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7630 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7631 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7632 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7633 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7634 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7635 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7636 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7637 first_per_commitment_point,
7638 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7639 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7640 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7641 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7643 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7645 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7646 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7651 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7652 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7654 // Check sanity of message fields:
7655 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7658 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7661 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7662 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7664 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7667 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7670 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7672 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7674 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7675 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7678 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7679 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7682 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7683 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7685 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7686 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7689 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7690 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7693 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7694 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7696 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7699 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7700 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7702 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7703 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7705 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7706 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7708 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7709 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7712 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7713 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7714 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7716 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7717 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7719 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7720 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7723 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7724 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7727 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7728 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7729 &Some(ref script) => {
7730 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7731 if script.len() == 0 {
7734 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7735 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7737 Some(script.clone())
7740 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7747 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7748 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7749 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7750 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7751 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7753 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7754 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7756 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7759 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7760 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7761 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7762 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7763 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7764 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7767 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7768 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7769 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7772 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7773 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7775 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7776 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7778 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7783 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7784 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7785 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7786 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7787 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7791 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7792 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7794 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7795 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7797 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7798 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7799 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7800 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7803 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7805 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7806 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7807 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7808 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7810 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7811 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7813 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number());
7814 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7816 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7817 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7818 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7819 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7820 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7821 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7825 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7826 initial_commitment_tx,
7829 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7830 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7834 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7835 if validated.is_err() {
7836 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7839 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7840 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7841 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7842 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7843 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7844 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7845 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7846 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7847 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7848 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7849 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7850 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7852 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7853 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7854 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7855 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7856 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7857 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7858 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7859 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7861 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7862 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7863 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7865 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7867 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
7868 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7870 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7872 let mut channel = Channel {
7873 context: self.context,
7874 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7875 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7878 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
7879 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7880 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7883 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7885 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7886 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7887 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7888 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7889 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7894 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7895 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7896 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7897 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7900 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7901 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7902 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7903 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7904 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7905 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7906 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7907 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7908 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7911 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7912 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7913 // `static_remote_key`.
7914 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7917 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7918 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7921 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7922 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7925 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7927 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7928 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7935 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7936 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7937 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7938 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7939 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7940 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7941 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7942 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7943 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7944 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7945 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7948 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7950 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7951 // support this channel type.
7952 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7954 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7955 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7956 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7957 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7958 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7959 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7960 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7964 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7968 counterparty_node_id,
7972 current_chain_height,
7977 counterparty_pubkeys,
7979 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7980 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7982 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7984 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7989 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7990 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7992 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7993 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7994 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7995 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7998 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7999 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8001 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
8003 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8004 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
8007 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
8010 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8011 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8012 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8014 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
8015 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
8016 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
8017 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8019 msgs::AcceptChannel {
8020 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8021 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
8022 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8023 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8024 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8025 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8026 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8027 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8028 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8029 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8030 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8031 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8032 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8033 first_per_commitment_point,
8034 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8035 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8036 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8038 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8040 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8042 next_local_nonce: None,
8046 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8047 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8049 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
8051 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
8052 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
8055 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
8056 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8058 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number());
8059 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
8060 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
8061 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8062 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8063 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
8064 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
8065 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
8066 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
8067 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
8068 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
8070 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
8073 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
8074 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
8075 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
8079 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8080 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
8083 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8084 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8086 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
8087 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
8089 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
8091 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
8092 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
8093 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8094 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
8097 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
8098 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
8099 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
8100 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
8101 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8103 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
8105 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
8106 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
8107 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
8110 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
8111 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
8112 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
8116 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8117 initial_commitment_tx,
8120 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8121 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8124 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
8125 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
8128 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
8130 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
8131 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
8132 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
8133 self.context.holder_commitment_point.advance(&self.context.holder_signer, &self.context.secp_ctx, logger);
8135 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
8137 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8138 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
8139 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
8140 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
8141 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
8142 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8143 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
8144 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8145 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
8146 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
8147 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8149 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8150 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8151 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8152 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8153 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8154 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8155 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8157 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8158 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8160 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8161 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8162 let mut channel = Channel {
8163 context: self.context,
8164 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8165 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8167 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0, logger).is_some();
8168 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8170 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8174 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8175 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8176 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8177 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8178 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8179 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8180 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8183 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8184 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8185 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8186 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8187 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8188 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8189 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8190 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8191 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8192 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8194 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8195 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8196 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8198 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8200 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8201 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8203 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8204 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8207 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8211 counterparty_node_id,
8217 current_chain_height,
8218 outbound_scid_alias,
8219 temporary_channel_id,
8220 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8225 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8226 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8227 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8228 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8229 funding_tx_locktime,
8230 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8236 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8237 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8238 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8239 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8240 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8241 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8243 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8245 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8246 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8249 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8250 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8251 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8254 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8255 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8258 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8259 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(),
8260 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8261 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8262 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1,
8263 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8264 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8266 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8267 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8269 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8270 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8271 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8272 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8273 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8274 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8275 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8276 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8277 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8278 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8279 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8280 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8281 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8282 first_per_commitment_point,
8283 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8284 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8285 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8286 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8288 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8290 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8291 second_per_commitment_point,
8292 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8293 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8298 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8299 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8300 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8301 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8302 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8303 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8306 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8307 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8308 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8309 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8310 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8311 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8312 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8313 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8314 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8315 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8316 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8317 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8320 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8321 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8322 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8323 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8324 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8326 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8327 // support this channel type.
8328 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8329 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8330 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8332 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8334 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8335 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8336 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8337 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8338 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8339 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8342 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8346 counterparty_node_id,
8350 current_chain_height,
8356 counterparty_pubkeys,
8358 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8359 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8360 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8361 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8363 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8364 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8365 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8366 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8370 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8371 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8372 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8373 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8374 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8375 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8382 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8383 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8385 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8386 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8387 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8388 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8391 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8392 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8394 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8396 if self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8397 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8400 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8403 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8404 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8405 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8407 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8408 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8409 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8410 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &self.context.secp_ctx);
8411 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8412 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number() - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8413 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8415 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8416 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8417 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8418 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8419 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8420 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8421 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8422 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8423 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8424 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8425 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8426 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8427 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8428 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8429 first_per_commitment_point,
8430 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8431 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8432 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8434 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8436 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8437 second_per_commitment_point,
8438 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8442 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8443 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8445 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8447 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8448 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8452 // Unfunded channel utilities
8454 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8455 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8456 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8457 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8458 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8459 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8460 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8461 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8462 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8463 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8466 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8467 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8468 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8469 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8470 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8471 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8477 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8478 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8480 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8486 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8487 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8488 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8489 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8490 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8492 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8493 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8494 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8495 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8501 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8502 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8503 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8504 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8505 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8506 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8511 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8512 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8513 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8514 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8516 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8517 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8518 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8519 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8524 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8525 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8526 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8527 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8528 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8529 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8534 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8535 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8536 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8539 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8540 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8541 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8542 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8546 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8548 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8550 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8552 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8553 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8554 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8555 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8556 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8558 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8559 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8560 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8561 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8563 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8565 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8566 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8567 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8569 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8571 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8573 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8575 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8577 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8578 // deserialized from that format.
8579 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8580 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8581 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8583 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8585 self.context.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number().write(writer)?;
8586 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8587 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8589 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8590 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8591 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8592 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8595 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8596 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8597 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8600 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8601 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8602 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8603 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8605 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8606 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8608 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8609 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8610 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8615 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8618 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8620 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8621 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8622 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8627 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8630 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8633 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8635 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8640 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8641 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8642 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8644 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8645 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8646 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8647 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8648 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8649 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8650 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8652 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8654 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8656 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8659 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8660 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8661 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8664 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8666 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8667 preimages.push(preimage);
8669 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8670 reason.write(writer)?;
8672 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8674 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8675 preimages.push(preimage);
8677 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8678 reason.write(writer)?;
8681 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8682 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8685 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8686 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8687 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8688 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8689 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8690 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8692 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8693 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8694 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8697 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8698 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8699 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8700 source.write(writer)?;
8701 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8703 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8704 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8706 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8708 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8709 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8711 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8713 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8714 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8716 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8717 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8719 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8720 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8721 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8723 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8725 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8726 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8731 match self.context.resend_order {
8732 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8733 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8736 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8737 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8738 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8740 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8741 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8742 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8743 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8746 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8747 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8748 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8749 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8750 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8753 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8754 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8755 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8756 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8758 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8759 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8760 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8762 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8764 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8765 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8766 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8767 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8769 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8770 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8771 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8772 // consider the stale state on reload.
8775 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8776 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8777 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8779 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8780 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8781 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8783 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8784 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8786 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8787 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8788 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8790 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8791 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8793 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8796 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8797 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8798 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8800 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8803 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8804 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8806 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8807 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8808 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8810 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8812 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8814 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8817 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8818 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8819 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8820 htlc.write(writer)?;
8823 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8824 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8825 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8827 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8828 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8830 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8831 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8832 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8833 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8834 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8835 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8836 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8838 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8839 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8840 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8841 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8842 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8844 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8845 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8847 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8848 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8849 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8850 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8852 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8854 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8855 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8856 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8859 // `current_point` will become optional when async signing is implemented.
8860 let cur_holder_commitment_point = Some(self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point());
8861 let next_holder_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.next_point();
8863 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8864 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8865 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8866 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8867 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8868 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8869 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8871 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8872 (2, chan_type, option),
8873 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8874 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8875 (5, self.context.config, required),
8876 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8877 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8878 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8879 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8880 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8881 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8882 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8883 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8884 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8885 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8886 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8887 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8888 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8889 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8890 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8891 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8892 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8893 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8894 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8895 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8896 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8897 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8898 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8899 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point, option),
8900 (47, next_holder_commitment_point, option),
8901 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8908 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8909 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8911 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8912 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8914 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8915 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8916 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8918 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8919 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8920 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8921 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8923 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8925 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8926 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8927 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8928 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8929 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8931 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8932 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8935 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8936 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8937 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8939 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8941 let mut keys_data = None;
8943 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8944 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8945 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8946 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8947 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8948 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8949 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8950 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8951 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8952 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8956 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8957 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8958 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8961 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8963 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8964 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8965 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8967 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8969 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8970 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8971 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8972 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8973 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8974 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8975 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8976 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8978 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8979 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8981 Readable::read(reader)?
8983 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8986 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8987 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8989 Readable::read(reader)?
8991 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8993 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8994 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8995 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9000 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9001 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9002 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
9003 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9004 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9005 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9006 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
9007 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
9008 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
9009 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9010 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9011 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9013 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9014 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
9017 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9018 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
9021 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9022 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
9024 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9026 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9027 blinding_point: None,
9031 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9032 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
9033 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
9034 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9035 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9036 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9037 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
9038 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
9039 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
9040 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
9041 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9042 blinding_point: None,
9044 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9045 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
9046 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9048 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9049 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9050 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
9052 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9056 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9057 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
9058 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
9059 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9062 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
9063 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
9064 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
9066 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9067 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9068 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
9069 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
9072 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9073 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9074 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
9075 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
9078 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9080 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
9082 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9083 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9084 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
9085 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
9087 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
9088 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
9089 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
9090 // consider the stale state on reload.
9091 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9094 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9095 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9096 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
9098 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9101 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
9102 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
9103 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9105 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9106 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9107 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9108 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
9110 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9111 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9113 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9114 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9116 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9117 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9118 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
9120 let mut minimum_depth = None;
9122 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9123 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9125 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9126 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9129 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9131 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
9132 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9133 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
9134 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
9136 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9139 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
9140 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9142 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9144 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9145 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9147 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9148 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
9150 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9152 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9153 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9154 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9156 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9157 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9158 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9162 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9163 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9164 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9166 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9172 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9173 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9174 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9175 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9176 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9177 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9178 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9179 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9180 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9181 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9183 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9184 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9185 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9186 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9187 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9188 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9189 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9191 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9192 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9193 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9194 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9196 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9198 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9199 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9201 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9203 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9205 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9206 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9208 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9209 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9211 let mut cur_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9212 let mut next_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9214 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9215 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9216 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9217 (2, channel_type, option),
9218 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9219 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9220 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9221 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9222 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9223 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9224 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9225 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9226 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9227 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9228 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9229 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9230 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9231 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9232 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9233 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9234 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9235 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9236 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9237 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9238 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9239 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9240 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9241 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9242 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9243 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9244 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9245 (47, next_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9246 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9249 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9250 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9251 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9252 // required channel parameters.
9253 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9254 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9256 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9258 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9259 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9260 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9261 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9264 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9265 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9266 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9269 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9272 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9277 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9278 if iter.next().is_some() {
9279 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9283 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9284 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9285 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9286 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9287 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9290 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9291 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9292 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9294 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9295 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9297 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9298 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9299 // separate u64 values.
9300 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9302 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9304 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9305 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9306 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9307 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9309 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9310 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9312 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9313 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9314 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9315 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9316 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9319 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9320 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9322 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9323 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9324 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9325 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9327 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9328 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9330 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9331 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9332 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9333 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9334 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9337 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9338 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9341 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9342 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9343 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9344 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9345 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9346 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9349 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9350 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9351 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9353 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9357 // If we're restoring this channel for the first time after an upgrade, then we require that the
9358 // signer be available so that we can immediately populate the current commitment point. Channel
9359 // restoration will fail if this is not possible.
9360 let holder_commitment_point = match (cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, next_holder_commitment_point_opt) {
9361 (Some(current), Some(next)) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9362 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current, next
9364 (Some(current), _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9365 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current,
9366 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9368 (_, _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9369 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9370 current: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &secp_ctx),
9371 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9376 context: ChannelContext {
9379 config: config.unwrap(),
9383 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9384 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9385 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9388 temporary_channel_id,
9390 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9392 channel_value_satoshis,
9394 latest_monitor_update_id,
9396 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9397 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9400 holder_commitment_point,
9401 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9404 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9405 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9406 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9407 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9411 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9412 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9413 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9414 monitor_pending_forwards,
9415 monitor_pending_failures,
9416 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9417 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9419 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9420 signer_pending_funding: false,
9423 holding_cell_update_fee,
9424 next_holder_htlc_id,
9425 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9426 update_time_counter,
9429 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9430 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9431 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9432 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9434 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9435 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9436 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9437 closing_fee_limits: None,
9438 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9440 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9441 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9443 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9445 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9446 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9447 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9448 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9449 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9450 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9451 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9452 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9453 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9456 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9458 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9459 funding_transaction,
9462 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9463 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9464 counterparty_node_id,
9466 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9470 channel_update_status,
9471 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9475 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9476 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9477 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9478 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9480 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9481 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9483 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9484 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9485 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9487 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9488 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9490 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9491 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9493 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9496 local_initiated_shutdown,
9498 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9500 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9501 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9509 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9510 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9511 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9512 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9513 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9514 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9515 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9516 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9517 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9518 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9519 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9520 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9521 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9522 use crate::ln::msgs;
9523 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9524 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9525 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9526 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9527 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9528 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9529 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9530 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9531 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9532 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9533 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9534 use crate::util::test_utils;
9535 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9536 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9537 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9538 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9539 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9540 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9541 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9542 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9543 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9544 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9545 use crate::prelude::*;
9548 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9549 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9550 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9551 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9553 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9554 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9555 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9556 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9559 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9562 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9563 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9569 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9570 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9571 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9572 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9576 signer: InMemorySigner,
9579 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9580 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9583 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9584 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9586 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9588 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9589 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9592 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9596 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9598 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9599 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9600 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9601 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9602 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9605 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9606 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9607 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9608 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9612 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9613 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9614 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9618 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9619 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9620 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9621 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9624 let seed = [42; 32];
9625 let network = Network::Testnet;
9626 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9627 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9628 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9631 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9632 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9633 let config = UserConfig::default();
9634 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9635 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9636 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9638 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9639 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9643 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9644 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9646 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9647 let original_fee = 253;
9648 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9649 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9650 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9651 let seed = [42; 32];
9652 let network = Network::Testnet;
9653 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9655 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9656 let config = UserConfig::default();
9657 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9659 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9660 // same as the old fee.
9661 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9662 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9663 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9667 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9668 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9669 // dust limits are used.
9670 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9671 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9672 let seed = [42; 32];
9673 let network = Network::Testnet;
9674 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9675 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9676 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9678 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9679 // they have different dust limits.
9681 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9682 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9683 let config = UserConfig::default();
9684 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9686 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9687 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9688 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9689 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9690 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9692 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9693 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9694 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9695 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9696 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9698 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9699 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9700 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9701 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9703 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9704 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9705 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9707 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9708 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9709 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9711 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9712 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9713 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9715 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9716 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9717 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9718 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9721 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9723 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9724 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9725 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9726 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9727 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9728 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9729 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9730 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9731 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9733 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9734 blinding_point: None,
9737 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9738 // the dust limit check.
9739 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9740 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9741 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9742 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9744 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9745 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9746 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9747 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9748 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9749 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9750 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9754 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9755 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9756 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9757 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9758 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9759 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9760 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9761 let seed = [42; 32];
9762 let network = Network::Testnet;
9763 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9765 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9766 let config = UserConfig::default();
9767 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9769 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9770 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9772 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9773 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9774 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9775 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9776 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9777 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9779 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9780 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9781 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9782 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9783 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9785 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9787 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9788 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9789 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9790 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9791 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9793 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9794 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9795 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9796 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9797 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9801 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9802 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9803 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9804 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9805 let seed = [42; 32];
9806 let network = Network::Testnet;
9807 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9808 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9809 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9811 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9813 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9814 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9815 let config = UserConfig::default();
9816 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9818 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9819 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9820 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9821 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9823 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9824 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9825 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9827 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9828 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9829 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9830 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9832 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9833 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9834 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9836 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9837 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9838 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9840 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9841 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9842 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9843 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9844 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9845 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9846 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9848 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9850 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9851 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9852 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9853 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9854 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9858 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9859 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9860 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9861 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9862 let seed = [42; 32];
9863 let network = Network::Testnet;
9864 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9865 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9866 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9868 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9869 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9870 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9871 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9872 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9873 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9874 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9875 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9877 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9878 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9879 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9880 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9881 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9882 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9884 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9885 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9886 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9887 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9889 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9891 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9892 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9893 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9894 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9895 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9896 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9898 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9899 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9900 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9901 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9903 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9904 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9905 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9906 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9907 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9909 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9910 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9912 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9913 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9914 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9916 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9917 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9918 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9919 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9920 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9922 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9923 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9925 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9926 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9927 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9931 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9933 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9934 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9935 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9937 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9938 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9939 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9940 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9942 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9943 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9944 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9946 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9948 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9949 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9952 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9953 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9954 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9955 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9956 let seed = [42; 32];
9957 let network = Network::Testnet;
9958 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9959 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9960 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9963 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9964 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9965 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9967 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9968 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9970 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9971 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9972 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9974 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9975 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9977 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9979 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9980 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9982 // Channel Negotiations failed
9983 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9984 assert!(result.is_err());
9989 fn channel_update() {
9990 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9991 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9992 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9993 let seed = [42; 32];
9994 let network = Network::Testnet;
9995 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9996 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9997 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9999 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
10000 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10001 let config = UserConfig::default();
10002 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10004 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
10005 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
10006 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10007 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10008 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
10010 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
10011 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10012 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10013 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
10014 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
10016 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
10017 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10018 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10019 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10021 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10022 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10023 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10025 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
10026 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
10027 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10029 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
10030 let update = ChannelUpdate {
10031 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
10033 short_channel_id: 0,
10036 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
10037 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
10038 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
10039 fee_base_msat: 110,
10040 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
10041 excess_data: Vec::new(),
10043 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
10045 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
10047 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
10048 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
10049 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
10050 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
10052 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
10053 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
10054 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
10056 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
10059 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
10063 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
10064 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
10066 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10067 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10068 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10069 let seed = [42; 32];
10070 let network = Network::Testnet;
10071 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10072 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10074 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10075 let config = UserConfig::default();
10076 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
10077 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10078 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10080 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10081 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10082 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
10084 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
10085 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10086 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
10088 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10089 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
10090 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
10091 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
10092 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
10095 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10097 hops: vec![RouteHop {
10098 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
10099 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
10100 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
10104 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
10105 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
10106 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
10108 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
10111 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10113 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10114 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10115 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10116 blinding_point: None,
10118 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
10119 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
10121 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
10124 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
10127 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
10129 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10132 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10133 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10134 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
10136 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
10137 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
10140 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10141 blinding_point: None,
10143 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
10144 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
10147 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
10148 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
10150 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
10151 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
10153 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
10156 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
10157 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
10158 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
10159 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
10160 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
10161 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10162 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
10163 } = &mut dummy_add {
10164 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
10165 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
10166 } else { panic!() }
10167 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
10168 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
10169 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
10171 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10174 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10176 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10177 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10178 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10179 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10180 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10181 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10182 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10183 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10186 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10188 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10189 use bitcoin::sighash;
10190 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10191 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10192 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10193 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10194 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10195 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10196 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10197 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10198 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10199 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10200 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10201 use crate::sync::Arc;
10202 use core::str::FromStr;
10203 use hex::DisplayHex;
10205 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10206 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10207 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10208 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10210 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10212 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10213 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10214 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10215 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10216 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10218 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10219 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10225 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10226 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10227 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10229 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10230 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10231 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10232 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10233 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10234 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10236 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10238 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10239 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10240 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10241 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10242 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10243 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10245 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10246 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10247 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10248 selected_contest_delay: 144
10250 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10251 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10253 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10254 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10256 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10257 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10259 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10260 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10262 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10263 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10264 // build_commitment_transaction.
10265 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10266 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10267 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10268 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10269 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10271 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10272 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10273 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10274 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10278 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10279 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10280 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10281 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10285 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10286 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10287 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10289 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10290 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10292 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10293 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10295 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10297 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10298 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10299 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10300 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10301 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10302 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10303 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10305 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10306 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10307 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10308 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10310 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10311 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10312 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10314 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10316 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10317 commitment_tx.clone(),
10318 counterparty_signature,
10319 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10320 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10321 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10323 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10324 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10326 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10327 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10328 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10330 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10331 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10334 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10335 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10337 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10338 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10339 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10340 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10341 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10342 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10343 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10344 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10346 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10349 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10350 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10351 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10355 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10358 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10359 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10360 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10361 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10362 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10363 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10365 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10366 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10367 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10368 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10369 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10370 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10371 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10372 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10373 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10374 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10376 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10377 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10378 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10379 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10380 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10381 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10383 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10387 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10388 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10389 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10390 "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", {});
10392 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10393 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10395 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10396 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10397 "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", {});
10399 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10400 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10401 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10402 "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", {});
10404 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10405 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10407 amount_msat: 1000000,
10409 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10410 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10412 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10415 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10416 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10418 amount_msat: 2000000,
10420 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10421 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10423 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10426 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10427 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10429 amount_msat: 2000000,
10431 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10432 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10433 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10434 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10435 blinding_point: None,
10437 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10440 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10441 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10443 amount_msat: 3000000,
10445 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10446 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10447 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10448 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10449 blinding_point: None,
10451 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10454 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10455 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10457 amount_msat: 4000000,
10459 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10460 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10462 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10466 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10467 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10468 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10470 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10471 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10472 "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", {
10475 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10476 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10477 "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" },
10480 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10481 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10482 "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" },
10485 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10486 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10487 "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" },
10490 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10491 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10492 "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" },
10495 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10496 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10497 "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" }
10500 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10501 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10502 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10504 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10505 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10506 "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", {
10509 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10510 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10511 "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" },
10514 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10515 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10516 "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" },
10519 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10520 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10521 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
10524 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10525 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10526 "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" },
10529 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10530 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10531 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10534 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10535 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10536 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10538 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10539 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10540 "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", {
10543 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10544 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10545 "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" },
10548 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10549 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10550 "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" },
10553 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10554 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10555 "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" },
10558 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10559 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10560 "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" }
10563 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10564 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10565 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10566 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10568 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10569 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10570 "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", {
10573 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10574 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10575 "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" },
10578 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10579 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10580 "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" },
10583 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10584 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10585 "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" },
10588 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10589 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10590 "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" }
10593 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10594 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10595 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10596 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10598 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10599 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10600 "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", {
10603 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10604 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10605 "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" },
10608 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10609 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10610 "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" },
10613 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10614 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10615 "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" },
10618 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10619 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10620 "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" }
10623 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10624 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10625 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10627 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10628 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10629 "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", {
10632 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10633 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10634 "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" },
10637 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10638 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10639 "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" },
10642 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10643 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10644 "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" }
10647 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10648 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10649 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10651 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10652 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10653 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10656 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10657 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10658 "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" },
10661 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10662 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10663 "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" },
10666 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10667 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10668 "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" }
10671 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10672 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10673 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10675 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10676 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10677 "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", {
10680 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10681 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10682 "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" },
10685 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10686 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10687 "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" }
10690 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10691 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10692 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10693 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10694 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10695 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10697 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10698 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10699 "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", {
10702 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10703 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10704 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
10707 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10708 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10709 "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" }
10712 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10713 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10714 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10715 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10716 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10718 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10719 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10720 "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", {
10723 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10724 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10725 "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" },
10728 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10729 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10730 "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" }
10733 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10734 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10735 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10737 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10738 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10739 "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", {
10742 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10743 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10744 "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" }
10747 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10748 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10749 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10750 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10751 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10753 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10754 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10755 "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", {
10758 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10759 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10760 "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" }
10763 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10764 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10765 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10766 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10767 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10769 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10770 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10771 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10774 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10775 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10776 "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" }
10779 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10780 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10781 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10782 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10784 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10785 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10786 "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", {});
10788 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10789 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10790 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10791 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10792 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10794 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10795 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10796 "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", {});
10798 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10799 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10800 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10801 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10802 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10804 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10805 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10806 "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", {});
10808 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10809 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10810 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10812 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10813 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10814 "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", {});
10816 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10817 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10818 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10819 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10820 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10822 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10823 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10824 "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", {});
10826 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10827 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10828 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10829 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10830 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10832 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10833 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10834 "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", {});
10836 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10837 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10838 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10839 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10840 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10841 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10843 amount_msat: 2000000,
10845 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10846 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10848 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10851 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10852 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10853 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10855 amount_msat: 5000001,
10857 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10858 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10859 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10860 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10861 blinding_point: None,
10863 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10866 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10867 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10869 amount_msat: 5000000,
10871 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10872 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10873 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10874 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10875 blinding_point: None,
10877 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10881 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10882 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10883 "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", {
10886 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10887 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10888 "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" },
10890 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10891 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10892 "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" },
10894 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10895 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10896 "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" }
10899 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10900 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10901 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10902 "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", {
10905 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10906 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10907 "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" },
10909 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10910 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10911 "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" },
10913 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10914 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10915 "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" }
10920 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10921 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10923 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10924 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10925 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10926 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10928 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10929 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10930 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10932 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10933 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10935 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10936 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10938 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10939 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10940 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10944 fn test_key_derivation() {
10945 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10946 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10948 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10949 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10951 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10952 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10954 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10955 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10957 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10958 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10960 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10961 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10963 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10964 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10968 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10969 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10970 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10971 let seed = [42; 32];
10972 let network = Network::Testnet;
10973 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10974 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10976 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10977 let config = UserConfig::default();
10978 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10979 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10981 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10982 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10984 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10985 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10986 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10987 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10988 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10989 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10990 assert!(res.is_ok());
10994 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10995 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10996 // resulting `channel_type`.
10997 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10998 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10999 let network = Network::Testnet;
11000 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11001 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11003 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11004 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11006 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11007 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11009 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
11010 // need to signal it.
11011 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11012 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11013 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
11014 &config, 0, 42, None
11016 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11018 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
11019 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
11020 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
11022 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11023 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11024 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11028 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11029 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11030 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11031 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11032 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11035 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
11036 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
11040 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
11041 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
11042 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
11043 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11044 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11045 let network = Network::Testnet;
11046 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11047 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11049 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11050 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11052 let config = UserConfig::default();
11054 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
11055 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
11056 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
11057 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
11058 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11060 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11061 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11062 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11066 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
11067 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11068 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
11070 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
11071 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
11072 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11073 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11074 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
11075 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11077 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
11081 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
11082 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
11084 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11085 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11086 let network = Network::Testnet;
11087 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11088 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11090 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11091 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11093 let config = UserConfig::default();
11095 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
11096 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
11097 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
11098 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
11099 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11100 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11101 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
11102 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
11104 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
11105 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
11106 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
11107 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11108 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11109 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11113 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11114 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11116 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11117 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11118 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
11119 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11121 assert!(res.is_err());
11123 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
11124 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
11125 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
11127 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11128 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
11129 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
11132 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11134 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11135 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11136 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11137 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11140 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
11141 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11143 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
11144 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
11146 assert!(res.is_err());
11150 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
11151 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11152 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11153 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11154 let seed = [42; 32];
11155 let network = Network::Testnet;
11156 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
11157 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
11158 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
11160 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11161 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
11162 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
11163 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
11165 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
11166 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11167 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11172 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11182 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11183 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11184 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11189 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11190 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11196 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11199 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11200 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11201 &accept_channel_msg,
11202 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11203 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11206 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11207 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11208 let tx = Transaction {
11210 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11214 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11217 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11220 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11221 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11222 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11223 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11224 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11225 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11229 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11230 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11238 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11239 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11240 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11241 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11243 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11244 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11251 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11252 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11253 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11254 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11255 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11257 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11258 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11259 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11267 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11268 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11271 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11272 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11273 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11274 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0, &&logger).is_some());