1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
309 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
310 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
312 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
316 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
318 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
322 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
323 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
324 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
325 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
326 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
328 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
329 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
331 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
333 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
334 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
336 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
337 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
338 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
339 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
340 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
341 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
343 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
344 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
346 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
347 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
348 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
349 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
350 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
352 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
353 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
355 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
356 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
358 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
359 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
360 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
361 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
367 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
368 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
370 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
371 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
377 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
378 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
380 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
381 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
387 macro_rules! secp_check {
388 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
391 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
396 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
397 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
398 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
399 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
400 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
401 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
402 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
403 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
405 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
407 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
409 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
413 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
415 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
416 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
417 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
419 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
420 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
422 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
423 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
424 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
425 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
426 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
428 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
429 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
433 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
439 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
442 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
443 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
444 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 holding_cell_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
449 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
450 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
451 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
452 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
453 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
454 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
455 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
456 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
457 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
461 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
462 struct HTLCCandidate {
464 origin: HTLCInitiator,
468 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
476 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
478 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
480 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
481 htlc_value_msat: u64,
482 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
487 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
488 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
489 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
490 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
491 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
493 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
494 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
495 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
496 htlc_value_msat: u64,
498 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
499 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
503 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
504 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
505 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
506 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
507 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
508 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
509 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
510 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
511 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
512 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
513 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
516 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
517 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
518 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
519 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
520 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
521 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
522 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
523 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
526 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
527 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
528 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
529 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
532 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
533 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
534 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
535 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
536 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
537 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
538 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
539 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
540 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
541 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
542 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
543 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
544 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
545 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
546 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
549 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
550 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
551 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
553 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
554 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
555 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
556 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
558 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
559 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
560 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
561 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
562 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
564 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
565 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
566 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
567 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
569 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
570 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
571 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
573 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
574 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
575 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
576 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
577 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
579 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
580 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
583 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
584 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
586 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
587 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
588 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
589 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
590 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
592 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
596 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
597 (0, update, required),
598 (2, blocked, required),
601 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
602 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
603 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
605 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
606 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
607 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
608 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
614 channel_id: [u8; 32],
615 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
618 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
619 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
621 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
622 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
623 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
626 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
627 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
628 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
631 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
633 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
635 holder_signer: Signer,
636 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
637 destination_script: Script,
639 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
640 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
641 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
643 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
644 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
645 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
646 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
647 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
648 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
650 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
651 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
652 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
653 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
654 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
655 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
657 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
659 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
660 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
661 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
663 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
664 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
665 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
666 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
667 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
668 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
669 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
671 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
673 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
674 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
675 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
676 // HTLCs with similar state.
677 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
678 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
679 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
680 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
681 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
682 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
683 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
684 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
685 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
688 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
689 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
690 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
692 update_time_counter: u32,
694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
695 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
696 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
699 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
701 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
704 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
705 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
706 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
707 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
709 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
710 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
712 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
714 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
716 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
717 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
718 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
719 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
720 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
721 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
723 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
724 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
725 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
726 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
727 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
729 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
730 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
731 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
732 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
733 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
734 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
735 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
736 channel_creation_height: u32,
738 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
748 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
753 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
755 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
756 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
759 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
761 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
763 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
764 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
766 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
768 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
769 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
770 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
772 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
774 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
775 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
777 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
778 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
779 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
783 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
785 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
786 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
787 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
788 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
790 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
791 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
792 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
794 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
795 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
796 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
798 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
799 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
800 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
801 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
803 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
805 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
808 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
809 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
810 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
811 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
813 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
814 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
816 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
817 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
818 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
819 /// unblock the state machine.
821 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
822 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
823 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
825 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
826 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
827 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
831 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
832 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
833 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
834 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
835 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
836 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
838 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
839 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
841 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
842 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
843 // the channel's funding UTXO.
845 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
846 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
847 // associated channel mapping.
849 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
850 // to store all of them.
851 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
853 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
854 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
855 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
856 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
857 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
859 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
860 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
863 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
865 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
866 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
867 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
869 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
870 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
871 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
872 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
873 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
876 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
877 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
878 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
881 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
882 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
883 self.update_time_counter
886 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
887 self.latest_monitor_update_id
890 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
891 self.config.announced_channel
894 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
895 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
898 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
899 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
900 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
901 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
904 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
905 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
906 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
909 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
910 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
911 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
912 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
913 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
916 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
917 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
918 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
919 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
920 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
925 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
929 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
931 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
932 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
933 self.temporary_channel_id
936 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
940 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
941 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
942 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
946 /// Gets the channel's type
947 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
951 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
953 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
954 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
955 self.short_channel_id
958 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
959 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
960 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
963 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
964 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
965 self.outbound_scid_alias
968 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
969 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
970 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
971 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
972 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
975 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
976 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
977 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
978 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
981 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
982 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
983 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
986 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
987 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
988 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
989 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
993 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
996 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
997 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1000 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1001 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1004 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1005 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1006 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1009 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1010 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1014 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1015 self.counterparty_node_id
1018 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1019 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1020 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1023 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1024 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1025 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1028 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1029 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1031 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1032 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1033 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1034 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1036 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1041 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1042 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1045 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1046 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1050 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1051 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1052 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1054 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1055 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1060 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1061 self.channel_value_satoshis
1064 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1065 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1068 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1069 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1072 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1073 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1076 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1077 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1078 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1081 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1082 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1083 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1086 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1087 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1088 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1091 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1092 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1093 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1096 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1097 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1098 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1101 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1102 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1103 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1106 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1107 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1108 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1109 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1110 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1113 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1115 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1116 self.prev_config = None;
1120 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1121 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1125 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1126 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1127 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1128 let did_channel_update =
1129 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1130 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1131 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1132 if did_channel_update {
1133 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1134 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1135 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1136 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1138 self.config.options = *config;
1142 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1143 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1144 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1147 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1148 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1149 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1150 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1151 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1153 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1154 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1155 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1156 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1157 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1158 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1159 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1161 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1162 where L::Target: Logger
1164 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1165 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1166 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1168 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1169 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1170 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1171 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1173 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1174 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1175 if match update_state {
1176 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1177 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1178 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1179 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1180 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1182 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1186 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1187 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1188 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1189 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1191 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1192 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1193 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1195 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1196 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1197 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1198 transaction_output_index: None
1203 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1204 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1205 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1206 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1207 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1210 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1212 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1213 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1214 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1216 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1217 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1220 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1221 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1224 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1226 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1227 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1228 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1230 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1231 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1237 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1238 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1239 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1240 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1241 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1242 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1243 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1247 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1248 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1250 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1252 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1253 if generated_by_local {
1254 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1255 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1264 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1266 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1267 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1268 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1269 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1270 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1272 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1275 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1276 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1277 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1278 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1282 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1283 preimages.push(preimage);
1287 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1288 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1290 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1292 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1293 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1295 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1296 if !generated_by_local {
1297 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1305 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1306 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1307 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1308 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1309 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1310 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1311 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1312 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1314 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1316 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1317 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1318 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1319 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1321 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1323 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1324 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1325 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1326 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1329 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1330 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1331 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1332 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1334 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1337 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1338 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1339 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1340 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1342 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1345 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1346 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1351 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1352 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1357 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1359 let channel_parameters =
1360 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1361 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1362 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1365 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1370 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1373 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1374 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1375 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1376 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1378 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1379 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1380 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1388 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1389 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1395 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1396 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1397 /// our counterparty!)
1398 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1399 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1400 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1401 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1402 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1403 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1404 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1406 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1410 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1411 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1412 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1413 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1414 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1415 //may see payments to it!
1416 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1417 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1418 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1420 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1423 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1424 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1425 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1426 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1427 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1430 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1431 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1434 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1438 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1439 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1440 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1441 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1442 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1443 // which are near the dust limit.
1444 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1445 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1446 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1447 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1448 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1450 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1451 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1453 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1456 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1457 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1458 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1461 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1462 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1464 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1465 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1466 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1467 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1468 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1469 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1470 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1473 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1476 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1477 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1478 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1480 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1481 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1482 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1483 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1484 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1485 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1487 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1488 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1494 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1495 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1497 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1498 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1499 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1500 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1501 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1502 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1503 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1506 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1509 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1510 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1511 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1513 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1514 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1515 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1516 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1517 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1518 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1521 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1525 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1526 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1527 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1529 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1530 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1531 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1534 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1536 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1543 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1544 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1545 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1546 /// corner case properly.
1547 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1548 let context = &self;
1549 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1550 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1551 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1553 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1554 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1555 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1556 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1559 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1561 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1562 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1564 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1566 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1568 if context.is_outbound() {
1569 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1570 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1572 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1573 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1575 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1576 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1577 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1578 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1581 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1582 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1583 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1584 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1586 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1587 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1588 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1589 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1590 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1591 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1592 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1593 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1594 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1595 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1597 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1600 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1601 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1602 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1603 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1604 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1607 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1608 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1610 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1611 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1612 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1614 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1615 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1616 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1617 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1621 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1623 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1624 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1625 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1626 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1627 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1628 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1630 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1631 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1633 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1634 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1635 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1637 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1638 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1639 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1640 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1641 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1644 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1645 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1646 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1647 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1648 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1649 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1652 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1653 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1654 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1656 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1660 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1661 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1663 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1664 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1668 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1669 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1670 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1671 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1673 outbound_capacity_msat,
1674 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1675 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1680 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1681 let context = &self;
1682 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1685 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1686 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1688 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1689 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1691 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1692 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1694 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1695 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1696 let context = &self;
1697 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1699 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1702 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1703 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1705 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1706 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1708 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1709 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1711 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1712 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1716 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1717 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1723 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1724 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1725 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1728 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1729 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1730 included_htlcs += 1;
1733 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1734 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1738 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1739 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1740 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1741 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1742 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1743 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1748 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1750 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1751 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1756 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1757 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1761 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1762 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1766 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1767 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1769 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1770 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1771 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1773 total_pending_htlcs,
1774 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1775 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1776 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1778 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1779 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1780 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1782 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1784 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1789 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1790 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1792 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1793 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1795 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1796 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1798 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1799 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1800 let context = &self;
1801 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1803 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1806 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1807 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1809 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1810 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1812 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1813 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1815 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1816 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1821 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1827 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1828 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1829 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1830 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1831 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1832 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1835 included_htlcs += 1;
1838 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1839 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1842 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1843 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1845 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1846 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1847 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1852 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1853 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1857 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1858 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1860 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1861 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1863 total_pending_htlcs,
1864 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1865 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1866 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1868 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1869 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1870 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1872 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1874 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1879 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1880 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1881 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1882 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1888 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1889 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1890 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1891 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1892 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1893 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1894 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1895 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1896 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1897 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1898 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1900 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1901 // return them to fail the payment.
1902 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1903 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1904 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1906 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1907 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1912 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1913 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1914 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1915 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1916 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1917 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1918 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1919 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1920 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1921 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1922 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1923 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1924 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1929 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1930 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1931 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1935 // Internal utility functions for channels
1937 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1938 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1939 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1941 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1943 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1944 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1945 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1947 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1950 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1952 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1955 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1956 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1957 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1959 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1961 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1962 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1963 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1964 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1965 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1968 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1969 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1970 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1971 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1972 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1973 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1974 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1977 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1978 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1980 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1981 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1984 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1985 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1986 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1987 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1988 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1989 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1992 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1993 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1994 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1997 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1998 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1999 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2000 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2003 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2004 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2006 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2007 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2008 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2012 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2013 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2014 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2015 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2017 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2018 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2019 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2020 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2021 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2022 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2023 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2026 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2027 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2028 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2029 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2030 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2031 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2032 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2033 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2035 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2036 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2046 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2047 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2048 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2049 // outside of those situations will fail.
2050 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2054 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2059 1 + // script length (0)
2063 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2064 2 + // witness marker and flag
2065 1 + // witness element count
2066 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2067 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2068 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2069 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2070 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2071 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2073 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2074 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2075 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2081 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2082 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2083 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2084 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2086 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2087 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2088 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2090 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2091 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2092 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2093 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2094 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2095 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2098 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2099 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2102 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2103 value_to_holder = 0;
2106 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2107 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2108 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2109 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2111 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2112 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2115 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2116 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2119 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2122 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2123 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2125 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2127 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2128 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2129 where L::Target: Logger {
2130 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2131 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2132 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2133 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2134 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2135 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2136 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2137 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2141 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2142 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2143 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2144 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2146 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2147 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2149 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2151 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2153 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2154 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2155 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2157 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2158 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2159 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2160 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2161 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2163 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2164 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2165 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2167 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2168 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2170 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2173 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2174 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2178 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2182 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2183 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2184 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2185 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2186 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2187 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2190 // Now update local state:
2192 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2193 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2194 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2195 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2196 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2197 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2198 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2202 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2203 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2204 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2205 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2206 // do not not get into this branch.
2207 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2208 match pending_update {
2209 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2210 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2211 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2212 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2213 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2214 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2215 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2218 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2219 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2220 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2221 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2222 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2223 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2224 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2230 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2231 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2232 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2234 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2235 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2236 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2238 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2239 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2242 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2243 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2245 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2246 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2248 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2249 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2252 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2255 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2256 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2257 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2258 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2263 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2264 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2265 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2266 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2267 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2268 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2269 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2270 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2271 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2272 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2273 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2274 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2275 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2276 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2277 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2278 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2279 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2281 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2283 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2284 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2285 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2286 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2287 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2288 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2289 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2291 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2292 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2295 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2296 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2297 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2298 update, blocked: true,
2303 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2304 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2305 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2306 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2310 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2314 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2315 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2316 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2317 /// before we fail backwards.
2319 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2320 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2321 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2322 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2323 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2324 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2325 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2328 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2329 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2330 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2331 /// before we fail backwards.
2333 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2334 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2335 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2336 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2337 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2338 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2339 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2341 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2343 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2344 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2345 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2347 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2348 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2349 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2351 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2352 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2353 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2355 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2360 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2361 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2367 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2368 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2369 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2370 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2371 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2375 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2376 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2377 force_holding_cell = true;
2380 // Now update local state:
2381 if force_holding_cell {
2382 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2383 match pending_update {
2384 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2385 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2386 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2387 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2391 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2392 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2393 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2394 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2400 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2401 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2402 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2408 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2410 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2411 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2414 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2415 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2416 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2421 // Message handlers:
2423 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2424 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2425 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2426 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2427 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2429 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2432 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2435 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2438 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2439 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2440 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2441 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2444 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2446 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2447 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2448 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2449 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2451 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2452 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2454 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2455 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2457 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2458 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2459 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2460 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2461 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2462 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2466 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2467 initial_commitment_tx,
2470 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2471 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2474 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2475 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2478 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2479 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2480 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2481 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2482 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2483 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2484 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2485 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2486 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2487 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2488 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2489 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2491 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2493 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2495 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2496 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2497 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2498 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2500 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2502 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2503 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2507 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2508 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2510 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2511 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2512 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2513 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2515 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2518 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2519 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2520 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2523 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2524 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2525 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2526 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2527 // when routing outbound payments.
2528 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2532 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2534 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2535 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2536 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2537 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2538 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2539 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2540 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2541 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2542 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2544 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2545 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2546 let expected_point =
2547 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2548 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2550 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2551 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2552 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2553 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2554 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2555 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2557 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2558 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2559 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2560 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2561 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2563 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2571 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2572 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2574 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2576 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2579 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2580 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2581 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2582 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2583 if local_sent_shutdown {
2584 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2586 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2587 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2588 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2591 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2594 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2597 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2600 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2604 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2605 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2606 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2607 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2609 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2612 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2613 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2614 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2615 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2616 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2617 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2618 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2619 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2620 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2621 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2622 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2624 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2625 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2626 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2627 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2628 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2629 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2633 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2636 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2637 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2638 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2640 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2641 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2642 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2643 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2644 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2645 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2646 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2650 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2651 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2652 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2653 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2654 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2655 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2656 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2660 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2661 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2662 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2663 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2664 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2668 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2669 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2670 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2671 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2672 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2674 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2678 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2682 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2683 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2684 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2685 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2686 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2687 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2688 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2689 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2690 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2691 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2692 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2693 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2694 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2695 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2696 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2697 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2700 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2701 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2702 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2703 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2704 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2707 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2710 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2714 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2715 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2716 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2720 // Now update local state:
2721 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2722 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2723 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2724 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2725 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2726 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2727 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2732 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2734 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2735 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2736 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2737 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2738 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2739 None => fail_reason.into(),
2740 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2741 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2742 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2743 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2745 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2749 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2751 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2752 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2754 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2760 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2763 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2764 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2767 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2771 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2774 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2775 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2778 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2782 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2786 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2787 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2790 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2794 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2798 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2799 where L::Target: Logger
2801 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2804 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2807 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2811 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2813 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2815 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2816 let commitment_txid = {
2817 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2818 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2819 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2821 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2822 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2823 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2824 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2825 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2830 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2832 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2833 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2834 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2835 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2838 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2839 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2840 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2844 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2846 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2847 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2848 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2849 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2850 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2851 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2852 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2853 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2854 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2855 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2856 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2862 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2866 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2867 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2868 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2869 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2870 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2871 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2872 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2873 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2874 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2875 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2876 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2877 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2878 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2881 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2882 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2883 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2884 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2885 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2886 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
2887 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2889 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2890 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2891 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2892 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2893 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2894 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2895 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2898 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2899 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2902 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2904 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2905 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2906 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2909 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2912 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2913 commitment_stats.tx,
2915 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2916 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2917 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2920 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2921 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2923 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2924 let mut need_commitment = false;
2925 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2926 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2927 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2928 need_commitment = true;
2932 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2933 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2934 Some(forward_info.clone())
2936 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2937 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2938 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2939 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2940 need_commitment = true;
2943 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2944 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2945 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2946 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2947 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2948 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2949 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2950 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2951 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2952 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2953 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2954 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2955 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2956 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2958 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2960 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2961 need_commitment = true;
2965 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2966 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2967 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2968 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2969 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2970 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2972 nondust_htlc_sources,
2976 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2977 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2978 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2979 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2981 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2982 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2983 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2984 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2985 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2986 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2987 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2988 // includes the right HTLCs.
2989 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2990 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2991 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2992 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2993 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2994 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2996 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2997 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2998 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3001 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3002 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3003 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3004 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3005 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3006 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3007 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3008 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3009 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3013 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3014 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3015 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3016 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3019 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3020 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3021 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3022 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3023 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3024 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3025 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3026 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3029 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3030 /// for our counterparty.
3031 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3032 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3033 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3034 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3035 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3037 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3038 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3039 updates: Vec::new(),
3042 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3043 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3044 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3045 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3046 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3047 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3048 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3049 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3050 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3051 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3052 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3053 // to rebalance channels.
3054 match &htlc_update {
3055 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3056 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3057 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3060 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3061 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3062 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3063 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3064 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3065 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3066 // into the holding cell without ever being
3067 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3068 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3069 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3072 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3078 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3079 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3080 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3081 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3082 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3083 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3084 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3085 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3086 (msg, monitor_update)
3087 } else { unreachable!() };
3088 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3089 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3091 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3092 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3093 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3094 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3095 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3096 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3097 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3098 // for a full revocation before failing.
3099 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3102 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3104 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3111 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3112 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3114 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3115 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3120 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3121 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3122 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3123 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3124 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3126 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3127 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3128 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3130 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3131 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3137 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3138 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3139 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3140 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3141 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3142 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3143 where L::Target: Logger,
3145 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3146 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3148 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3151 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3155 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3157 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3158 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3163 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3164 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3165 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3166 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3167 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3168 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3169 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3170 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3174 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3176 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3177 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3180 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3181 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3183 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3185 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3186 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3187 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3188 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3189 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3190 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3191 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3192 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3196 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3197 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3198 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3199 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3200 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3201 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3202 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3203 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3204 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3206 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3207 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3210 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3211 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3212 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3213 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3214 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3215 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3216 let mut require_commitment = false;
3217 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3220 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3221 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3222 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3224 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3225 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3226 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3227 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3228 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3229 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3234 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3235 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3236 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3237 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3238 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3240 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3241 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3242 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3247 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3248 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3250 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3254 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3255 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3257 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3258 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3259 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3260 require_commitment = true;
3261 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3262 match forward_info {
3263 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3264 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3265 require_commitment = true;
3267 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3268 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3269 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3271 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3272 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3273 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3277 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3278 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3279 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3280 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3286 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3287 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3288 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3289 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3291 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3292 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3293 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3294 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3295 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3296 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3297 require_commitment = true;
3301 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3303 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3304 match update_state {
3305 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3306 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3307 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3308 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3309 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3311 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3312 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3313 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3314 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3315 require_commitment = true;
3316 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3317 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3322 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3323 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3324 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3325 if require_commitment {
3326 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3327 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3328 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3329 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3330 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3331 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3332 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3333 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3334 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3336 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3337 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3338 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3339 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3340 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3343 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3344 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3345 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3346 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3347 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3348 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3349 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3352 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3354 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3355 if require_commitment {
3356 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3358 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3359 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3360 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3361 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3363 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3364 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3365 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3366 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3368 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3369 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3370 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3376 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3377 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3378 /// commitment update.
3379 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3380 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3381 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3384 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3385 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3386 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3387 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3389 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3390 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3391 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3392 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3393 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3395 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3396 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3398 if !self.context.is_live() {
3399 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3402 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3403 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3404 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3405 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3406 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3407 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3408 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3409 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3410 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3411 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3415 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3416 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3417 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3418 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3419 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3422 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3423 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3427 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3428 force_holding_cell = true;
3431 if force_holding_cell {
3432 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3436 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3437 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3439 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3440 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3445 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3446 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3448 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3450 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3451 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3452 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3453 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3457 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3458 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3459 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3463 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3464 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3467 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3468 // will be retransmitted.
3469 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3470 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3471 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3473 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3474 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3476 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3477 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3478 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3479 // this HTLC accordingly
3480 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3483 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3484 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3485 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3486 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3489 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3490 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3491 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3492 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3493 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3494 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3499 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3501 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3502 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3503 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3504 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3508 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3509 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3510 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3511 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3512 // the update upon reconnection.
3513 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3517 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3519 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3520 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3523 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3524 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3525 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3526 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3527 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3528 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3529 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3531 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3532 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3533 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3534 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3535 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3536 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3537 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3539 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3540 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3541 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3542 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3543 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3544 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3545 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3548 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3549 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3550 /// to the remote side.
3551 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3552 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3553 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3554 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3557 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3559 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3560 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3561 let mut found_blocked = false;
3562 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3563 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3564 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3568 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3569 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3570 // first received the funding_signed.
3571 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3572 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3573 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3575 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3576 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3577 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3578 funding_broadcastable = None;
3581 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3582 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3583 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3584 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3585 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3586 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3587 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3588 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3589 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3590 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3591 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3592 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3593 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3594 next_per_commitment_point,
3595 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3599 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3601 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3602 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3603 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3604 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3605 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3606 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3608 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3609 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3610 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3611 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3612 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3613 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3617 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3618 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3620 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3621 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3622 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3625 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3626 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3627 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3628 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3629 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3630 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3631 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3632 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3633 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3637 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3638 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3640 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3643 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3646 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3647 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3649 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3650 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3651 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3652 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3653 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3654 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3655 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3656 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3657 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3658 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3659 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3661 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3663 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3665 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3671 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3672 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3673 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3674 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3675 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3676 per_commitment_secret,
3677 next_per_commitment_point,
3679 next_local_nonce: None,
3683 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3684 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3685 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3686 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3687 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3689 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3690 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3691 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3692 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3693 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3694 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3695 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3696 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3697 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3702 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3703 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3705 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3706 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3707 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3708 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3709 reason: err_packet.clone()
3712 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3713 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3714 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3715 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3716 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3717 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3720 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3721 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3722 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3723 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3724 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3731 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3732 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3733 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3734 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3738 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3739 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3740 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3741 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3742 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3743 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3747 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3748 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3750 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3751 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3752 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3753 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3754 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3755 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3756 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3757 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3760 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3762 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3763 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3764 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3765 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3769 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3770 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3774 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3775 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3776 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3777 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3778 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3781 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3782 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3783 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3784 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3785 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3788 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3789 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3790 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3791 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3792 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3793 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3794 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3795 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3799 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3800 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3801 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3802 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3804 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3808 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3809 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3810 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3811 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3813 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3814 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3815 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3816 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3817 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3821 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3823 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3824 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3825 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3826 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3827 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3830 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3831 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3832 channel_ready: None,
3833 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3834 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3835 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3839 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3840 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3841 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3842 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3843 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3844 next_per_commitment_point,
3845 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3847 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3848 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3849 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3853 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3854 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3855 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3857 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3858 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3859 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3862 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3868 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3869 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3870 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3871 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3872 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3873 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3874 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3876 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3878 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3879 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3880 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3881 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3882 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3883 next_per_commitment_point,
3884 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3888 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3889 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3890 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3892 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3895 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3896 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3897 raa: required_revoke,
3898 commitment_update: None,
3899 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3901 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3902 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3903 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3905 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3908 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3909 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3910 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3911 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3912 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3913 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3916 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3917 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3918 raa: required_revoke,
3919 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3920 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3924 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3928 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3929 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3930 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3931 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3933 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3935 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3937 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3938 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3939 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3940 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3941 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3942 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3944 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3945 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3946 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3947 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3948 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3950 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3951 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3952 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3953 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3956 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3957 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3958 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3959 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3960 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3961 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3962 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3963 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3964 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3965 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3966 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3967 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3968 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3969 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3970 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3972 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3975 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3976 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3979 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3980 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3981 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3982 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3983 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3984 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3985 self.context.channel_state &
3986 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3987 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3988 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3989 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3992 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3993 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3994 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3995 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3996 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3997 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
3998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4000 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4006 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4007 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4008 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4009 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4011 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4012 return Ok((None, None));
4015 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4016 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4017 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4019 return Ok((None, None));
4022 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4024 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4025 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4026 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4027 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4029 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4030 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4031 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4033 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4034 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4035 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4036 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4038 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4039 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4040 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4045 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4046 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4048 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4049 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4052 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4053 /// within our expected timeframe.
4055 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4056 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4057 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4060 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4063 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4064 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4067 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4068 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4069 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4070 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4072 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4075 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4076 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4077 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4078 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4081 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4082 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4086 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4088 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4089 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4092 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4093 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4094 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4097 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4100 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4101 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4102 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4103 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4105 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4108 assert!(send_shutdown);
4109 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4110 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4111 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4113 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4116 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4121 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4123 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4124 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4126 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4127 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4128 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4129 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4130 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4131 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4134 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4135 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4136 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4139 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4140 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4141 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4142 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4146 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4147 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4148 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4149 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4150 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4151 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4153 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4154 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4161 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4162 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4164 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4167 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4168 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4170 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4172 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4173 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4174 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4175 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4176 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4177 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4178 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4179 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4180 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4182 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4183 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4186 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4190 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4191 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4192 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4193 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4195 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4198 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4201 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4202 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4204 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4208 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4212 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4213 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4214 return Ok((None, None));
4217 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4218 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4219 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4222 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4224 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4227 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4228 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4229 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4230 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4231 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4235 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4236 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4241 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4242 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4243 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4244 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4245 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4246 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4247 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4251 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4253 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4254 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4255 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4256 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4258 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4261 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4262 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4263 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4265 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4266 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4267 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4268 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4272 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4273 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4274 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4275 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4277 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4278 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4279 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4285 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4286 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4289 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4290 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4292 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4296 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4297 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4298 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4299 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4300 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4302 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4304 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4306 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4307 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4310 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4311 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4312 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4313 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4314 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4315 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4316 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4317 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4322 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4323 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4324 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4325 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4327 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4331 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4332 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4333 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4334 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4336 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4342 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4343 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4344 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4345 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4346 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4347 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4348 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4350 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4351 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4354 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4356 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4357 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4363 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4364 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4365 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4366 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4367 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4368 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4369 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4371 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4372 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4379 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4380 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4383 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4384 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4387 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4388 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4392 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4393 &self.context.holder_signer
4397 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4399 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4400 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4401 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4402 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4403 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4404 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4406 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4408 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4416 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4417 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4421 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4423 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4424 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4427 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4428 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4429 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4432 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4433 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4434 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4435 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4436 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4437 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4438 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4439 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4445 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
4446 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
4447 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
4448 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4449 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4450 update, blocked: !release_monitor
4455 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
4456 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
4458 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4459 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4460 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
4461 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
4464 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4465 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4468 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4469 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4470 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4471 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4477 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4478 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4481 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4482 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4483 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4484 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4487 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4488 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4489 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4491 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4492 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4493 if self.context.channel_state &
4494 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4495 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4496 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4497 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4498 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4501 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4502 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4503 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4504 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4505 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4506 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4508 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4509 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4510 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4512 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4513 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4514 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4515 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4516 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4517 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4523 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4524 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4525 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4528 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4529 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4530 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4533 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4534 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4535 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4538 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4539 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4540 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4541 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4542 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4543 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4548 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4549 self.context.channel_update_status
4552 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4553 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4554 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4557 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4559 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4560 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4561 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4565 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4566 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4567 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4570 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4574 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4575 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4576 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4578 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4579 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4580 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4582 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4583 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4586 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4587 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4588 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4589 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4590 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4591 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4592 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4593 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4594 self.context.channel_state);
4596 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4600 if need_commitment_update {
4601 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4602 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4603 let next_per_commitment_point =
4604 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4605 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4606 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4607 next_per_commitment_point,
4608 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4612 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4618 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4619 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4620 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4621 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4622 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4623 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4624 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4626 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4629 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4630 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4631 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4632 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4633 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4634 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4635 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4636 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4637 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4638 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4639 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4640 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4641 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4642 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4643 // channel and move on.
4644 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4645 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4647 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4648 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4649 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4651 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4652 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4653 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4654 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4655 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4656 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4657 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4661 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4662 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4663 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4664 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4665 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4669 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4670 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4671 // may have already happened for this block).
4672 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4673 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4674 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4675 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4678 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4679 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4680 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4681 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4689 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4690 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4691 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4692 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4694 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4695 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4698 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4700 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4701 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4702 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4703 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4705 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4708 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4711 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4712 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4713 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4714 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4716 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4719 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4720 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4721 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4723 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4724 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4726 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4727 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4728 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4736 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4738 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4739 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4740 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4742 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4743 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4746 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4747 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4748 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4749 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4750 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4751 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4752 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4753 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4754 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4757 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4758 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4759 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4760 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4762 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4763 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4764 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4766 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4767 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4768 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4769 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4771 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4772 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4773 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4774 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4775 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4776 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4777 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4780 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4781 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4783 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4786 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4787 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4788 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4789 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4790 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4791 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4792 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4793 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4794 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4795 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4796 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4797 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4798 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4799 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4800 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4801 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4802 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4808 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4813 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4814 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4816 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4817 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4818 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4819 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4821 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4824 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4825 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4826 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4827 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4828 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4829 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4831 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4832 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4835 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4836 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4837 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4838 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4839 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4840 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4842 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4843 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4846 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4847 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4848 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4849 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4850 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4856 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4857 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4858 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4859 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4861 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4864 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4868 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4872 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4873 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4877 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4881 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4882 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4885 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4889 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4891 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4896 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4898 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4903 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4905 None => return None,
4908 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4910 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4911 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4913 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4914 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4918 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4920 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4921 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4922 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4923 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4924 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4925 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4926 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4928 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4929 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4930 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4931 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4932 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4933 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4934 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4935 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4936 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4937 contents: announcement,
4940 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4944 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4945 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4946 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4947 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4948 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4949 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4950 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4951 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4953 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4955 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4956 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4957 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4958 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4960 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4962 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4963 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4966 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4967 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4968 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4969 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4972 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4975 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4976 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4977 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4978 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4979 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4980 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4983 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4985 Err(_) => return None,
4987 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4988 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4993 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4994 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4995 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4996 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4997 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4998 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4999 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5000 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5001 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5002 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5003 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5004 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5005 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5006 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5007 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5008 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5011 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5014 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5015 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5016 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5017 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5018 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5019 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5020 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5021 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5022 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5024 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5025 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5026 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5027 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5028 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5029 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5030 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5031 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5032 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5034 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5035 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5036 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5037 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5038 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5039 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5040 next_funding_txid: None,
5045 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5047 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5048 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5049 /// commitment update.
5051 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5052 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5053 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5054 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5056 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5057 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5059 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5060 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5065 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5066 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5068 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5070 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5071 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5073 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5074 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5075 /// regenerate them.
5077 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5078 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5080 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5081 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5082 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5083 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5084 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5085 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5087 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5088 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5089 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5092 if amount_msat == 0 {
5093 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5096 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5097 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5098 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5099 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5102 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5103 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5104 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5107 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5108 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5109 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5110 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5111 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5112 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5113 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5114 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5117 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5118 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5119 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5120 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5121 else { "to peer" });
5123 if need_holding_cell {
5124 force_holding_cell = true;
5127 // Now update local state:
5128 if force_holding_cell {
5129 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5134 onion_routing_packet,
5139 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5140 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5142 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5144 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5148 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5149 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5150 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5154 onion_routing_packet,
5156 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5161 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5162 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5163 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5164 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5166 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5167 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5168 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5170 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5171 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5175 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5176 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5177 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5178 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5179 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5180 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5181 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5184 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5185 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5186 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5187 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5188 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5189 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5192 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5194 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5195 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5196 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5198 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5199 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5202 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5203 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5204 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5205 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5206 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5207 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5208 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5209 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5212 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5216 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5217 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5218 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5219 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5221 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5223 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5224 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5225 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5226 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5227 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5228 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5229 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5230 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5231 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5232 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5233 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5239 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5242 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5243 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5244 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5245 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5246 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5247 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5249 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5250 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5251 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5252 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5255 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5256 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5260 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5261 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5263 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5265 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5266 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5267 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5268 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5270 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5271 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5272 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5273 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5274 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5275 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5279 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5280 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5284 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5285 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5288 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5289 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5291 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5292 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5293 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5294 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5295 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5298 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5299 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5300 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5306 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5307 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5310 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5311 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5312 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5313 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5319 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5320 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5322 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5323 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5324 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5325 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5326 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5327 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5328 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5329 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5330 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5333 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5334 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5335 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5337 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5338 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5341 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5342 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5344 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5345 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5346 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5349 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5350 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5351 let mut chan_closed = false;
5352 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5356 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5358 None if !chan_closed => {
5359 // use override shutdown script if provided
5360 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5361 Some(script) => script,
5363 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5364 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5365 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5366 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5370 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5371 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5373 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5379 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5380 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5381 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5382 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5384 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5386 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5388 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5389 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5390 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5391 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5392 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5393 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5396 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5397 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
5398 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
5401 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5402 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5403 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5406 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5407 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5408 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5409 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5410 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5412 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5413 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5420 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5421 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5423 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5426 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5427 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5428 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5430 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5431 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5435 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5439 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5440 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5441 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5444 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5445 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5446 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5447 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5448 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5449 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5450 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5451 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5454 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5455 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5456 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5457 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5459 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5462 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5463 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5465 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5466 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5467 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5469 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5472 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5473 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5474 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5475 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5476 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5479 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5480 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5482 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5484 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5485 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5486 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5487 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5490 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5491 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5493 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5494 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5495 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5496 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5500 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5501 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5502 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5506 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5507 Ok(script) => script,
5508 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5511 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5514 context: ChannelContext {
5517 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5518 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5519 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5520 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5525 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5527 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5528 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5529 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5530 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5532 channel_value_satoshis,
5534 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5537 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5547 pending_update_fee: None,
5548 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5549 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5550 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5551 update_time_counter: 1,
5553 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5555 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5556 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5557 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5558 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5559 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5560 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5562 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5563 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5564 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5565 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5567 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5568 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5569 closing_fee_limits: None,
5570 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5572 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5574 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5575 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5576 short_channel_id: None,
5577 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5579 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5580 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5581 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5582 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5583 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5584 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5585 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5586 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5587 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5588 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5589 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5590 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5592 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5594 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5595 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5596 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5597 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5598 counterparty_parameters: None,
5599 funding_outpoint: None,
5600 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
5601 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
5603 funding_transaction: None,
5605 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5606 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5607 counterparty_node_id,
5609 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5611 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5613 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5614 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5616 announcement_sigs: None,
5618 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5619 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5620 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5621 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5623 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5624 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5626 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5627 outbound_scid_alias,
5629 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5630 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5632 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5633 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5638 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5643 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5644 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5645 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5646 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5647 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5648 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5651 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5652 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5653 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5654 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5655 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5656 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5657 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5658 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5659 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5660 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5661 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5663 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5664 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5666 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5667 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5668 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5669 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5672 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5673 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5675 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5678 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5679 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5680 return Err((self, e));
5684 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5686 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5688 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5689 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5690 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5692 let channel = Channel {
5693 context: self.context,
5696 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5697 temporary_channel_id,
5698 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5699 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5702 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5704 next_local_nonce: None,
5708 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5709 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5710 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5711 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5712 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5713 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5714 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5715 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5716 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5717 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5720 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5721 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5722 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5724 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5725 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5726 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5727 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5734 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5735 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5736 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5737 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5738 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5739 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5740 // We've exhausted our options
5743 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5744 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5747 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5748 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5749 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5750 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5752 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5753 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5754 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
5755 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
5756 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5757 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5759 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5761 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5764 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5765 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5766 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5768 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5769 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5772 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5773 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5776 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5777 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5781 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5782 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5783 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5784 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5785 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5786 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5787 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5788 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5789 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5790 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5791 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5792 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5793 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5794 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5795 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5796 first_per_commitment_point,
5797 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5798 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5799 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5800 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5802 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5807 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5808 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5810 // Check sanity of message fields:
5811 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5814 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5817 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5818 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5820 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5823 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5826 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5827 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5828 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5830 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5831 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5834 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5835 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5838 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5841 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5845 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5846 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5849 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5850 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5852 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5853 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5855 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5856 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5858 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5859 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5861 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5864 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5868 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5869 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5872 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5873 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5875 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5876 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5879 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
5882 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5883 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5884 &Some(ref script) => {
5885 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5886 if script.len() == 0 {
5889 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5892 Some(script.clone())
5895 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5902 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5903 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5904 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5905 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5906 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5908 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5909 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5911 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5914 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5915 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5916 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5917 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5918 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5919 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5922 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5923 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5924 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5927 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5928 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5930 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5931 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5937 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5938 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5939 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5942 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5943 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5944 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5945 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5946 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5947 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5948 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5949 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5950 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5951 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5952 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5953 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5956 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5958 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5959 // support this channel type.
5960 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5961 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5965 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5966 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5967 // `static_remote_key`.
5968 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5971 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5972 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5975 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5976 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5978 channel_type.clone()
5980 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5981 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5986 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5988 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5989 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5990 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5991 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5992 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5993 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5994 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5995 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5996 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5999 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6003 // Check sanity of message fields:
6004 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6007 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6010 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6013 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6014 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6017 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6020 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6023 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6025 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6026 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6029 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6032 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6036 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6037 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6040 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6043 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6046 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6047 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6049 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6052 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6055 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6059 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6061 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6062 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6067 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6068 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6069 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6070 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6073 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6076 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6077 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6078 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6080 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6084 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6085 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6086 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6087 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6088 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6092 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6093 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6094 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6095 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6099 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6100 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6101 &Some(ref script) => {
6102 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6103 if script.len() == 0 {
6106 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6107 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6109 Some(script.clone())
6112 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6119 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6120 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6121 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6122 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6126 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6127 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6132 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6133 Ok(script) => script,
6134 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6137 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6138 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6141 context: ChannelContext {
6144 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6145 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6147 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6152 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6154 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6155 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6156 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6157 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6160 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6163 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6166 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6167 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6168 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6170 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6171 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6172 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6173 pending_update_fee: None,
6174 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6175 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6176 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6177 update_time_counter: 1,
6179 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6181 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6182 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6183 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6184 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6185 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6186 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6188 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6189 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6190 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6191 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6193 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6194 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6195 closing_fee_limits: None,
6196 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6198 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6200 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6201 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6202 short_channel_id: None,
6203 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6205 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6206 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6207 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6208 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6209 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6210 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6211 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6212 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6213 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6214 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6215 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6216 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6217 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6219 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6221 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6222 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6223 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6224 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6225 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6226 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6227 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6229 funding_outpoint: None,
6230 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6231 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6233 funding_transaction: None,
6235 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6236 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6237 counterparty_node_id,
6239 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6241 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6243 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6244 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6246 announcement_sigs: None,
6248 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6249 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6250 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6251 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6253 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6254 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6256 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6257 outbound_scid_alias,
6259 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6260 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6262 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6263 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6268 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6275 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6276 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6279 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6280 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6281 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6282 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6285 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6286 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6288 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6289 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6290 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6291 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6293 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6294 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6296 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6297 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6299 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6300 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6303 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6304 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6306 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6309 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6310 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6311 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6313 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6314 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6315 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6316 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6318 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6319 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6320 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6321 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6322 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6323 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6324 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6325 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6326 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6327 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6328 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6329 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6330 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6331 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6332 first_per_commitment_point,
6333 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6334 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6335 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6337 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6339 next_local_nonce: None,
6343 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6344 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6346 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6348 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6349 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6352 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6353 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6355 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6356 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6358 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6359 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6360 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6361 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6362 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6363 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6364 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6365 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6366 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6369 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6370 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6372 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6373 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6374 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6375 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6377 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6378 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6380 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6381 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6384 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6385 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6386 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6388 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6391 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6392 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6394 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6395 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6396 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6398 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6400 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6401 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6403 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6404 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6405 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6406 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6409 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6410 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6411 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6412 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6413 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6415 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6417 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6418 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6419 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6422 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6423 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6424 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6428 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6429 initial_commitment_tx,
6432 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6433 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6436 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6437 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6440 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6442 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6443 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6444 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6445 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6446 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6447 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6448 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6449 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6450 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6451 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6452 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6454 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6456 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6458 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6459 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6460 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6461 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6463 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6465 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6466 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6467 let mut channel = Channel {
6468 context: self.context,
6470 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6471 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6472 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6474 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6478 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6479 }, channel_monitor))
6483 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6484 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6486 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6492 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6493 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6494 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6495 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6496 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6498 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6499 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6500 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6501 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6507 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6508 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6509 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6510 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6511 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6512 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6517 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6518 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6519 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6520 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6522 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6523 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6524 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6525 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6530 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6531 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6532 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6533 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6534 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6535 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6540 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6541 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6542 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6545 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6547 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6548 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6549 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6550 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6551 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6553 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6554 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6555 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6556 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6558 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6559 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6560 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6562 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6564 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6565 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6566 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6567 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6568 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6569 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6571 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6572 // deserialized from that format.
6573 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6574 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6575 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6577 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6579 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6580 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6581 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6583 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6584 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6585 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6586 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6589 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6590 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6591 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6594 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6595 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6596 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6597 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6599 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6600 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6602 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6604 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6606 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6608 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6611 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6613 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6618 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6620 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6621 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6622 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6623 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6624 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6625 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6626 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6628 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6630 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6632 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6635 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6636 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6637 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6640 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6642 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6643 preimages.push(preimage);
6645 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6646 reason.write(writer)?;
6648 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6650 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6651 preimages.push(preimage);
6653 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6654 reason.write(writer)?;
6659 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6660 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6662 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6664 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6665 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6666 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6667 source.write(writer)?;
6668 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6670 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6672 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6673 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6675 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6677 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6678 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6683 match self.context.resend_order {
6684 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6685 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6688 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6689 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6690 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6692 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6693 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6694 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6695 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6698 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6699 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6700 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6701 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6702 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6705 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6706 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6707 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6708 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6710 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6711 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6712 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6714 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6716 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6717 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6718 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6719 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6721 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6722 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6723 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6724 // consider the stale state on reload.
6727 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6728 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6729 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6731 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6732 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6733 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6735 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6736 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6738 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6739 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6740 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6742 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6743 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6745 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6748 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6749 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6750 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6752 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6755 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6756 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6758 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6759 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6760 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6762 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6764 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6766 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6768 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6769 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6770 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6771 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6772 htlc.write(writer)?;
6775 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6776 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6777 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6779 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6780 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6782 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6783 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6784 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6785 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6786 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6787 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6788 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6790 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6791 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6792 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6793 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6794 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6796 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6797 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6799 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6800 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6801 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6802 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6804 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6806 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6807 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6808 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6809 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6810 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6811 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6812 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6814 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6815 (2, chan_type, option),
6816 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6817 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6818 (5, self.context.config, required),
6819 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6820 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6821 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6822 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6823 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6824 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6825 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6826 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6827 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6828 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6829 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6830 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6831 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6832 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6833 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6834 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6841 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6842 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6844 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6845 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6847 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6848 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6849 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6851 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6852 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6853 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6854 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6858 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6859 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6860 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6861 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6862 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6865 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let mut keys_data = None;
6876 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6877 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6878 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6880 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6881 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6882 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6883 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6884 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6885 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6889 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6890 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6891 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6894 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6896 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6900 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6902 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6903 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6904 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6905 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6906 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6907 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6908 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6909 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6910 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6911 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6912 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6913 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6914 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6919 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6921 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6922 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6923 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6924 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6925 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6926 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6927 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6928 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6929 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6930 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6932 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6936 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6940 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6943 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6948 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6949 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6950 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6951 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6952 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6953 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6954 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6955 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6956 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6957 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6959 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6960 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6961 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6963 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6964 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6965 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6967 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6971 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6972 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6973 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6974 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6977 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6978 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6979 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6981 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6983 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6984 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6987 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6989 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6990 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6993 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6997 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6998 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6999 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7000 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7002 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7003 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7004 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7005 // consider the stale state on reload.
7006 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7009 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7016 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7020 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7025 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7026 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7028 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7029 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7037 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7038 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7040 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7041 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7046 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7047 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7048 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7049 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7051 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7054 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7063 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7065 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7068 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7069 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7071 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7073 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7077 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7078 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7079 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7081 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7087 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7088 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7089 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7090 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7091 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7092 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7093 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7094 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7095 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7096 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7098 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7099 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7100 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7101 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7102 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7103 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7104 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7106 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7107 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7108 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7109 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7111 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7113 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7114 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7115 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7116 (2, channel_type, option),
7117 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7118 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7119 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7120 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7121 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7122 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7123 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7124 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7125 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7126 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7127 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7128 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7129 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7130 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7131 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7132 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7133 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7134 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7135 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7138 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7139 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7140 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7141 // required channel parameters.
7142 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7143 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7144 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7146 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7148 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7149 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7150 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7151 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7154 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7155 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7156 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7158 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7159 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7161 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7162 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7167 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7168 if iter.next().is_some() {
7169 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7173 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7174 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7175 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7176 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7177 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7180 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7181 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7183 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7184 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7185 // separate u64 values.
7186 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7188 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7191 context: ChannelContext {
7194 config: config.unwrap(),
7198 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7199 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7200 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7203 temporary_channel_id,
7205 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7207 channel_value_satoshis,
7209 latest_monitor_update_id,
7212 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7215 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7216 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7219 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7220 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7221 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7222 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7226 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7227 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7228 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7229 monitor_pending_forwards,
7230 monitor_pending_failures,
7231 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7234 holding_cell_update_fee,
7235 next_holder_htlc_id,
7236 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7237 update_time_counter,
7240 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7241 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7242 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7243 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7245 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7246 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7247 closing_fee_limits: None,
7248 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7250 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7252 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7253 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7255 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7257 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7258 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7259 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7260 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7261 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7262 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7263 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7264 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7265 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7268 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7270 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7271 funding_transaction,
7273 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7274 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7275 counterparty_node_id,
7277 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7281 channel_update_status,
7282 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7286 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7287 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7288 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7289 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7291 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7292 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7294 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7295 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7296 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7298 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7299 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7301 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7302 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7304 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7307 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7316 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7317 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7318 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7319 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7320 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7322 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7323 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7325 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7326 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7327 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7328 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7329 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7330 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7331 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7332 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7333 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7334 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7335 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7336 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7337 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7338 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7339 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7340 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7341 use crate::util::test_utils;
7342 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7343 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7344 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7345 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7346 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7347 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7348 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7349 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7350 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7351 use crate::prelude::*;
7353 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7356 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7357 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7363 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7364 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7365 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7366 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7370 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7371 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7372 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7373 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7374 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7375 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7376 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7380 signer: InMemorySigner,
7383 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7384 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7387 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7388 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7390 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7391 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7394 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7398 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7400 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7401 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7402 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7403 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7404 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7407 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7408 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7409 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7410 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7414 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7415 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7416 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7420 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7421 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7422 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7423 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7425 let seed = [42; 32];
7426 let network = Network::Testnet;
7427 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7428 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7429 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7432 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7433 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7434 let config = UserConfig::default();
7435 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7436 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7437 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7439 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7440 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7444 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7445 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7447 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7448 let original_fee = 253;
7449 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7450 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7451 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7452 let seed = [42; 32];
7453 let network = Network::Testnet;
7454 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7456 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7457 let config = UserConfig::default();
7458 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7460 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7461 // same as the old fee.
7462 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7463 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7464 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7468 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7469 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7470 // dust limits are used.
7471 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7472 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7473 let seed = [42; 32];
7474 let network = Network::Testnet;
7475 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7476 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7477 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7479 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7480 // they have different dust limits.
7482 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7483 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7484 let config = UserConfig::default();
7485 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7487 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7488 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7489 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7490 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7491 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7493 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7494 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7495 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7496 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7497 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7499 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7500 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7501 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7502 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7504 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7505 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7506 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7508 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7509 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7511 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7512 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7513 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7515 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7516 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7517 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7518 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7521 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7523 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7524 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7525 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7526 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7527 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7528 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7529 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7530 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7531 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7535 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7536 // the dust limit check.
7537 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7538 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7539 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7540 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7542 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7543 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7544 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7545 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7546 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7547 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7548 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7552 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7553 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7554 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7555 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7556 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7557 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7558 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7559 let seed = [42; 32];
7560 let network = Network::Testnet;
7561 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7563 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7564 let config = UserConfig::default();
7565 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7567 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7568 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7570 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7571 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7572 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7573 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7574 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7575 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7577 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7578 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7579 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7580 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7581 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7583 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7585 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7586 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7587 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7588 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7589 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7591 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7592 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7593 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7594 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7595 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7599 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7600 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7601 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7602 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7603 let seed = [42; 32];
7604 let network = Network::Testnet;
7605 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7606 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7607 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7609 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7611 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7612 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7613 let config = UserConfig::default();
7614 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7616 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7617 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7618 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7619 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7621 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7622 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7623 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7625 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7626 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7627 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7628 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7630 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7631 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7632 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7634 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7635 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7637 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7638 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7639 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7640 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7641 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7642 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7643 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7645 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7647 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7648 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7649 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7650 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7651 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7655 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7656 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7657 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7658 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7659 let seed = [42; 32];
7660 let network = Network::Testnet;
7661 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7662 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7663 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7665 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7666 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7667 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7668 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7669 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7670 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7671 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7672 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7674 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7675 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7676 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7677 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7678 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7679 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7681 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7682 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7683 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7684 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7686 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7688 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7689 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7690 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7691 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7692 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7693 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7695 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7696 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7697 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7698 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7700 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7701 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7702 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7703 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7704 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7706 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7707 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7709 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7710 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7711 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7713 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7714 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7715 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7716 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7717 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7719 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7720 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7722 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7723 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7724 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7728 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7730 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7731 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7732 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7734 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7735 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7736 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7737 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7739 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7740 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7741 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7743 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7745 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7746 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7749 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7750 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7751 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7752 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7753 let seed = [42; 32];
7754 let network = Network::Testnet;
7755 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7756 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7757 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7760 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7761 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7762 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7764 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7765 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7767 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7768 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7769 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7771 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7772 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7774 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7776 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7777 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7779 // Channel Negotiations failed
7780 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7781 assert!(result.is_err());
7786 fn channel_update() {
7787 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7788 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7790 let seed = [42; 32];
7791 let network = Network::Testnet;
7792 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7793 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7796 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7797 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7798 let config = UserConfig::default();
7799 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7801 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7802 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7803 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7804 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7805 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7807 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7808 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7809 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7810 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7811 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7813 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7814 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7815 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7816 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7818 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7819 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7820 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7822 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7823 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7825 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7826 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7827 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7829 short_channel_id: 0,
7832 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7833 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7834 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7836 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7837 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7839 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7841 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7843 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7844 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7845 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7846 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7848 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7849 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7850 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7852 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7856 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7858 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7859 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7860 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7861 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7862 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7863 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7864 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7865 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7866 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7867 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7868 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7869 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7870 use crate::sync::Arc;
7872 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7873 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7874 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7875 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7877 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7879 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7880 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7881 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7882 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7883 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7885 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7886 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7892 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7893 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7894 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7896 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7897 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7898 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7899 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7900 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7901 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7903 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7905 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7906 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7907 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7908 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7909 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7910 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7912 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7913 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7914 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7915 selected_contest_delay: 144
7917 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7918 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7920 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7921 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7923 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7924 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7926 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7927 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7929 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7930 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7931 // build_commitment_transaction.
7932 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7933 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7934 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7935 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7936 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7938 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7939 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7940 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7941 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7945 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7946 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7947 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7948 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7952 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7953 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7954 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7956 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7957 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7959 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7960 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7962 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7964 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7965 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7966 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7967 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7968 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7969 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7970 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7972 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7973 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7974 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7975 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7977 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7978 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7979 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7981 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7983 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7984 commitment_tx.clone(),
7985 counterparty_signature,
7986 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7987 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7988 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7990 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7991 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7993 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7994 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7995 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7997 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7998 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8001 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8002 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8004 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8005 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8006 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8007 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8008 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8009 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8010 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8011 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8013 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8016 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8017 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8018 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8022 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8025 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8026 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
8027 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8029 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8030 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8031 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8032 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8033 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8034 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8035 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8036 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8038 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8042 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8043 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8044 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8045 "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", {});
8047 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8048 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8050 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8051 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8052 "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", {});
8054 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8055 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8056 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8057 "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", {});
8059 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8060 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8062 amount_msat: 1000000,
8064 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8065 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8067 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8070 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8071 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8073 amount_msat: 2000000,
8075 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8076 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8078 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8081 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8082 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8084 amount_msat: 2000000,
8086 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8087 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8088 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8090 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8093 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8094 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8096 amount_msat: 3000000,
8098 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8099 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8100 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8102 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8105 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8106 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8108 amount_msat: 4000000,
8110 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8111 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8113 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8117 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8118 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8119 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8121 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8122 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8123 "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", {
8126 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8127 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8128 "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" },
8131 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8132 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8133 "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" },
8136 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8137 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8138 "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" },
8141 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8142 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8143 "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" },
8146 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8147 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8148 "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" }
8151 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8152 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8153 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8155 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8156 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8157 "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", {
8160 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8161 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8162 "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" },
8165 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8166 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8167 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8170 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8171 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8172 "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" },
8175 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8176 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8177 "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" },
8180 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8181 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8182 "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" }
8185 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8186 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8187 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8189 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8190 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8191 "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", {
8194 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8195 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8196 "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" },
8199 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8200 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8201 "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" },
8204 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8205 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8206 "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" },
8209 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8210 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8211 "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" }
8214 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8215 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8216 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8217 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8219 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8220 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8221 "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", {
8224 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8225 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8226 "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" },
8229 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8230 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8231 "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" },
8234 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8235 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8236 "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" },
8239 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8240 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8241 "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" }
8244 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8245 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8246 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8247 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8249 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8250 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8251 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8254 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8255 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8256 "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" },
8259 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8260 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8261 "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" },
8264 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8265 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8266 "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" },
8269 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8270 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8271 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8274 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8275 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8276 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8278 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8279 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8280 "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", {
8283 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8284 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8285 "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" },
8288 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8289 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8290 "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" },
8293 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8294 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8295 "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" }
8298 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8299 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8300 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8302 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8303 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8304 "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", {
8307 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8308 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8309 "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" },
8312 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8313 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8314 "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" },
8317 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8318 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8319 "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" }
8322 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8323 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8324 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8326 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8327 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8328 "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", {
8331 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8332 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8333 "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" },
8336 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8337 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8338 "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" }
8341 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8342 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8343 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8344 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8346 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8347 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8348 "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", {
8351 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8352 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8353 "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" },
8356 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8357 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8358 "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" }
8361 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8362 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8363 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8364 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8366 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8367 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8368 "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", {
8371 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8372 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8373 "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" },
8376 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8377 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8378 "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" }
8381 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8382 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8383 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8385 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8386 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8387 "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", {
8390 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8391 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8392 "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" }
8395 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8396 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8397 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8398 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8400 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8401 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8402 "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", {
8405 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8406 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8407 "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" }
8410 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8411 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8412 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8413 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8415 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8416 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8417 "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", {
8420 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8421 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8422 "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" }
8425 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8426 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8427 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8428 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8430 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8431 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8432 "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", {});
8434 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8435 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8436 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8437 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8439 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8440 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8441 "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", {});
8443 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8444 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8445 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8446 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8448 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8449 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8450 "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", {});
8452 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8453 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8454 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8456 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8457 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8458 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8460 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8461 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8462 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8463 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8465 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8466 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8467 "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", {});
8469 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8470 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8471 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8472 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8474 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8475 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8476 "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", {});
8478 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8479 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8480 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8481 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8482 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8483 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8485 amount_msat: 2000000,
8487 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8488 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8490 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8493 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8494 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8495 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8497 amount_msat: 5000001,
8499 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8500 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8501 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8503 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8506 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8507 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8509 amount_msat: 5000000,
8511 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8512 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8513 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8515 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8519 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8520 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8521 "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", {
8524 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8525 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8526 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce501473044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8528 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8529 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8530 "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" },
8532 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8533 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8534 "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" }
8537 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8538 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8539 "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", {
8542 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8543 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8544 "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" },
8546 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8547 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8548 "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" },
8550 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8551 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8552 "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" }
8557 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8558 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8560 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8561 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8562 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8563 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8565 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8566 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8567 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8569 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8570 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8572 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8573 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8575 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8576 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8577 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8581 fn test_key_derivation() {
8582 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8583 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8585 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8586 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8588 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8589 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8591 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8592 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8594 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8595 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8597 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8598 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8600 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8601 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8603 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8604 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8608 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8609 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8610 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8611 let seed = [42; 32];
8612 let network = Network::Testnet;
8613 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8614 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8616 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8617 let config = UserConfig::default();
8618 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8619 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8621 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8622 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8624 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8625 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8626 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8627 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8628 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8629 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8630 assert!(res.is_ok());
8635 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8636 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8637 // resulting `channel_type`.
8638 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8639 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8640 let network = Network::Testnet;
8641 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8642 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8644 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8645 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8647 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8648 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8650 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8651 // need to signal it.
8652 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8653 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8654 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8657 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8659 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8660 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8661 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8663 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8664 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8665 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8668 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8669 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8670 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8671 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8672 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8675 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8676 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8681 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8682 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8683 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8684 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8685 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8686 let network = Network::Testnet;
8687 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8688 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8690 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8691 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8693 let config = UserConfig::default();
8695 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8696 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8697 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8698 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8699 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8701 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8702 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8703 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8706 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8707 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8708 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8710 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8711 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8712 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8713 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8714 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8715 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8717 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8722 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8723 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8725 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8726 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8727 let network = Network::Testnet;
8728 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8729 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8731 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8732 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8734 let config = UserConfig::default();
8736 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8737 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8738 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8739 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8740 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8741 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8742 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8743 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8745 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8746 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8747 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8748 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8749 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8750 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8753 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8754 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8756 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8757 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8758 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8759 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8761 assert!(res.is_err());
8763 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8764 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8765 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8767 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8768 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8769 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8772 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8774 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8775 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8776 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8777 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8780 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8781 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8783 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8784 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8786 assert!(res.is_err());