1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
443 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
446 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
447 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
448 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
449 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
450 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
451 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
452 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
453 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
454 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
455 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
456 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
457 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
458 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
460 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
462 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
463 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
464 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
465 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
467 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
468 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
469 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
470 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
472 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
473 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
474 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
475 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
476 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
478 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
479 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
480 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
481 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
483 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
484 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
485 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
487 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
488 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
489 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
490 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
491 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
493 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
494 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
495 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
498 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
499 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
500 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
501 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
503 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
504 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
505 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
506 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
508 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
512 channel_id: [u8; 32],
515 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
516 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
518 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
519 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
520 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
523 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
524 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
525 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
527 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
528 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
530 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
532 holder_signer: Signer,
533 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
534 destination_script: Script,
536 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
537 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
538 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
543 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
544 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
545 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
547 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
548 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
549 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
550 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
551 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
552 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
554 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
556 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
557 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
558 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
559 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
560 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
561 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
563 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
565 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
566 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
567 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
568 // HTLCs with similar state.
569 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
570 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
571 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
572 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
573 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
574 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
575 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
576 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
577 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
580 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
581 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
582 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
584 update_time_counter: u32,
586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
587 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
588 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
589 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
590 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
591 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
593 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
594 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
596 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
597 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
598 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
599 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
601 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
602 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
604 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
606 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
609 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
610 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
611 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
612 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
613 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
615 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
616 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
617 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
618 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
619 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
621 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
622 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
623 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
624 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
625 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
626 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
627 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
628 channel_creation_height: u32,
630 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
638 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
648 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
651 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
653 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
656 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
660 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
664 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
666 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
667 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
669 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
670 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
675 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
677 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
678 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
679 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
680 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
682 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
683 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
684 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
686 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
687 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
688 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
690 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
691 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
692 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
693 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
695 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
699 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
700 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
701 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
702 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
703 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
705 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
706 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
710 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
711 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
712 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
713 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
714 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
715 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
717 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
718 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
720 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
721 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
722 // the channel's funding UTXO.
724 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
725 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
726 // associated channel mapping.
728 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
729 // to store all of them.
730 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
732 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
733 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
734 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
735 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
736 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
738 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
739 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
741 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
742 /// [`KeysInterface::derive_channel_signer`].
743 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
747 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
749 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
750 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
751 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
755 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
757 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
760 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
764 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
768 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
770 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
771 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
772 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
773 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
774 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
776 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
777 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
779 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
781 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
782 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
784 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
785 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
786 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
787 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
788 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
789 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
791 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
792 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
794 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
795 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
796 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
797 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
798 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
800 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
801 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
803 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
804 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
806 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
807 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
808 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
809 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
815 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
816 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
818 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
825 macro_rules! secp_check {
826 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
829 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
834 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
835 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
836 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
839 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
842 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
843 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
845 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
848 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
850 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
853 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
854 /// required by us according to the configured or default
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
857 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
859 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
860 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
861 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
862 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
863 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
866 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
867 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
868 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
869 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
870 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
871 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
872 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
875 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
876 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
879 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
880 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
881 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
882 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
883 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
884 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
885 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
886 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
891 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
892 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
893 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
894 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
895 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
896 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
897 // We've exhausted our options
900 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
901 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
905 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
906 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
907 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
908 outbound_scid_alias: u64
909 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
910 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
913 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
915 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
916 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
917 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
918 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
920 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
923 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
926 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
927 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
930 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
933 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
934 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
935 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
936 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
937 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
940 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
942 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
943 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
944 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
945 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
948 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
949 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
951 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
952 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
955 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
956 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
957 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
964 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
965 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
966 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
967 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
972 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
974 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
975 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
976 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
978 channel_value_satoshis,
980 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
983 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
984 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
986 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
987 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
990 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
991 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
992 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
993 pending_update_fee: None,
994 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
995 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
996 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
997 update_time_counter: 1,
999 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1001 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1002 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1003 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1004 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1005 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1006 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1008 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1009 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1010 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1011 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1013 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1014 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1015 closing_fee_limits: None,
1016 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1018 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1020 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1021 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1022 short_channel_id: None,
1023 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1025 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1026 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1027 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1028 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1029 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1030 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1031 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1032 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1033 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1034 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1035 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1037 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1039 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1040 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1041 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1042 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1043 counterparty_parameters: None,
1044 funding_outpoint: None,
1045 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1046 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1048 funding_transaction: None,
1050 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1051 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1052 counterparty_node_id,
1054 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1056 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1058 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1059 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1061 announcement_sigs: None,
1063 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1064 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1065 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1066 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1068 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1070 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1071 outbound_scid_alias,
1073 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1076 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1078 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1083 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1084 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1085 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1087 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1088 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1089 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1090 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1091 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1092 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1093 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1096 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1097 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1098 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1099 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1100 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1101 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1102 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1103 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1105 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1106 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1110 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1115 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1116 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1117 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1118 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1119 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1120 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1121 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1122 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1123 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1126 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1127 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1129 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1130 // support this channel type.
1131 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1132 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1136 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1140 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1141 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1142 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1143 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1144 // publicly announced.
1145 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1146 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1150 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1154 channel_type.clone()
1156 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1158 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1162 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1163 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1164 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1165 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1166 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1167 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1168 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1169 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1170 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1173 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1177 // Check sanity of message fields:
1178 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1181 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1184 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1187 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1188 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1191 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1194 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1197 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1199 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1200 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1206 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1210 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1211 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1214 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1217 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1220 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1223 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1226 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1229 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1233 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1235 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1236 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1241 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1242 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1243 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1244 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1247 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1250 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1251 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1252 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1254 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1258 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1259 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1260 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1261 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1262 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1266 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1267 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1268 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1269 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1273 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1274 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1275 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1276 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1277 if script.len() == 0 {
1280 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1283 Some(script.clone())
1286 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1287 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1293 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1294 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1297 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1298 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1303 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1304 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1306 let chan = Channel {
1309 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1310 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1312 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1317 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1319 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1320 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1321 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1324 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1327 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1328 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1330 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1331 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1332 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1334 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1335 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1337 pending_update_fee: None,
1338 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1339 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1340 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1341 update_time_counter: 1,
1343 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1345 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1346 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1347 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1348 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1349 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1350 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1352 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1353 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1354 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1355 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1357 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1358 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1359 closing_fee_limits: None,
1360 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1362 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1364 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1365 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1366 short_channel_id: None,
1367 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1369 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1370 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1371 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1372 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1373 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1374 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1375 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1376 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1377 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1378 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1379 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1380 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1382 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1384 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1385 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1386 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1387 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1388 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1389 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1390 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1392 funding_outpoint: None,
1393 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1394 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1396 funding_transaction: None,
1398 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1399 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1400 counterparty_node_id,
1402 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1404 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1406 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1407 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1409 announcement_sigs: None,
1411 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1412 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1413 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1414 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1416 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1418 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1419 outbound_scid_alias,
1421 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1423 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1424 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1433 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1434 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1435 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1436 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1437 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1439 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1440 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1441 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1442 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1443 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1444 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1445 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1447 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1448 where L::Target: Logger
1450 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1451 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1452 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1454 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1455 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1456 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1457 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1459 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1460 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1461 if match update_state {
1462 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1463 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1464 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1465 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1466 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1468 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1472 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1473 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1474 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1475 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1477 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1478 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1479 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1481 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1482 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1483 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1484 transaction_output_index: None
1489 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1490 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1491 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1492 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1493 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1496 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1498 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1499 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1500 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1502 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1503 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1506 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1507 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1510 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1512 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1513 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1514 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1516 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1517 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1523 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1524 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1525 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1526 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1527 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1528 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1529 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1533 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1534 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1536 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1538 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1539 if generated_by_local {
1540 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1541 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1550 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1552 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1553 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1554 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1555 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1556 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1557 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1558 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1561 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1562 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1563 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1564 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1568 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1569 preimages.push(preimage);
1573 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1574 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1576 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1578 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1579 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1581 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1582 if !generated_by_local {
1583 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1591 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1592 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1593 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1594 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1595 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1596 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1597 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1598 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1600 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1602 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1603 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1604 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1605 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1607 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1609 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1610 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1611 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1612 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1615 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1616 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1617 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1618 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1620 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1623 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1624 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1625 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1626 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1628 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1631 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1632 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1637 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1638 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1643 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1645 let channel_parameters =
1646 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1647 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1648 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1651 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1656 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1659 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1660 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1661 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1662 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1664 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1665 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1666 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1674 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1675 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1681 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1682 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1683 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1684 // outside of those situations will fail.
1685 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1689 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1694 1 + // script length (0)
1698 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1699 2 + // witness marker and flag
1700 1 + // witness element count
1701 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1702 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1703 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1704 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1705 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1706 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1708 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1709 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1710 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1716 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1717 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1718 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1719 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1721 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1722 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1723 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1725 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1726 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1727 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1728 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1729 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1730 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1733 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1734 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1737 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1738 value_to_holder = 0;
1741 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1742 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1743 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1744 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1746 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1747 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1750 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1751 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1755 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1756 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1757 /// our counterparty!)
1758 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1759 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1760 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1761 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1762 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1763 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1764 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1766 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1770 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1771 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1772 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1773 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1774 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1775 //may see payments to it!
1776 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1777 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1778 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1780 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1783 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1784 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1785 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1786 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1787 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1790 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1793 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1794 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1796 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1798 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1799 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1800 where L::Target: Logger {
1801 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1802 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1803 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1804 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1805 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1806 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1807 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1808 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1812 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1813 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1814 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1815 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1817 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1818 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1820 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1822 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1824 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1825 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1826 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1828 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1829 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1830 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1831 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1832 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1834 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1835 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1836 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1838 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1839 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1841 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1844 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1845 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1849 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1853 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1855 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1856 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1857 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1858 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1861 // Now update local state:
1863 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1864 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1865 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1866 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1867 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1868 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1869 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1873 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1874 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1875 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1876 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1877 // do not not get into this branch.
1878 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1879 match pending_update {
1880 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1881 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1882 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1883 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1884 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1885 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1886 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1889 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1890 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1891 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1892 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1893 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1894 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1895 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1901 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1902 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1903 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1906 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1907 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1909 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1910 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1913 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1914 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1916 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1917 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1919 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1920 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1923 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1926 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1927 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1928 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1929 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1934 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1935 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1936 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1937 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1938 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1941 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1942 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1943 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1944 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1945 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1947 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1948 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1949 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1953 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1954 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1955 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1956 /// before we fail backwards.
1957 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1958 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1959 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1960 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1961 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1963 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1965 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1966 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1967 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1969 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1970 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1971 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1973 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1974 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1975 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1977 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1982 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1983 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1989 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1990 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1991 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1992 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1993 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1997 // Now update local state:
1998 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1999 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2000 match pending_update {
2001 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2002 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2003 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2004 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2008 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2009 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2010 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2011 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2017 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2018 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2019 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2025 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2027 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2028 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2031 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2032 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2033 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2038 // Message handlers:
2040 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2041 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2043 // Check sanity of message fields:
2044 if !self.is_outbound() {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2047 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2050 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2053 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2056 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2059 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2060 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2061 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2063 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2064 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2067 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2068 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2071 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2074 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2078 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2079 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2082 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2085 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2088 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2091 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2094 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2097 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2101 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2102 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2105 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2106 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2108 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2111 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2112 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2113 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2114 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2115 if script.len() == 0 {
2118 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2121 Some(script.clone())
2124 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2125 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2131 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2132 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2133 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2134 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2135 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2137 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2138 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2140 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2143 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2144 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2145 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2146 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2147 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2148 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2151 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2152 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2153 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2156 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2157 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2159 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2160 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2165 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2166 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2168 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2169 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2171 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2172 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2173 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2174 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2175 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2176 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2177 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2178 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2179 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2182 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2183 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2185 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2186 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2187 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2188 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2190 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2191 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2193 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2194 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2197 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2198 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2201 pub fn funding_created<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2202 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2203 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2205 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2208 if self.is_outbound() {
2209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2211 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2212 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2213 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2217 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2220 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2221 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2222 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2223 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2226 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2227 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2228 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2229 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2230 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2232 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2234 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2235 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2239 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2240 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2241 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2245 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2246 initial_commitment_tx,
2249 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2250 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2253 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2254 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2256 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2258 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2259 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2260 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2261 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2262 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2263 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2264 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2265 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2266 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2267 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2268 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2270 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2272 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2274 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2275 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2276 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2277 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2279 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2281 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2282 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2284 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2287 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2288 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2289 pub fn funding_signed<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2290 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2291 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2293 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2296 if !self.is_outbound() {
2297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2299 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2300 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2302 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2303 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2304 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2305 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2308 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2310 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2311 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2312 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2313 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2315 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2316 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2318 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2319 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2321 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2322 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2323 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2324 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2325 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2330 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2331 initial_commitment_tx,
2334 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2335 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2338 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2339 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2342 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2343 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2344 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2345 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2346 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2347 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2348 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2349 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2350 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2351 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2352 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2353 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2355 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2357 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2359 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2360 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2361 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2362 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2364 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2366 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2369 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2370 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2372 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2373 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2374 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2375 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2378 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2379 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2380 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2381 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2382 // when routing outbound payments.
2383 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2387 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2389 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2390 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2391 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2392 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2393 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2394 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2395 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2396 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2397 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2399 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2400 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2401 let expected_point =
2402 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2403 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2405 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2407 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2408 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2409 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2410 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2411 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2413 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2421 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2422 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2424 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2426 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2429 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2430 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2431 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2432 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2438 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2439 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2440 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2441 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2442 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2443 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2444 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2445 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2446 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2449 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2452 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2453 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2454 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2456 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2457 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2458 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2459 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2460 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2461 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2463 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2464 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2470 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2471 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2472 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2473 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2474 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2475 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2476 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2477 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2478 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2481 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2484 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2485 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2486 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2488 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2489 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2490 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2491 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2492 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2493 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2495 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2496 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2500 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2501 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2502 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2503 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2504 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2505 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2506 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2508 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2509 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2511 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2518 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2519 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2520 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2521 /// corner case properly.
2522 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2523 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2524 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2526 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2527 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2528 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2529 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2532 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2534 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2535 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2536 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2539 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2540 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2541 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2542 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2544 outbound_capacity_msat,
2545 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2546 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2547 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2553 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2554 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2557 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2558 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2559 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2560 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2561 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2562 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2565 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2566 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2568 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2569 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2572 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2573 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2574 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2576 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2577 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2579 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2582 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2583 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2585 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2586 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2588 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2589 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2591 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2596 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2597 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2603 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2604 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2605 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2608 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2609 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2610 included_htlcs += 1;
2613 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2614 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2618 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2619 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2620 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2621 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2622 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2623 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2628 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2630 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2631 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2636 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2637 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2641 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2642 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2643 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2646 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2647 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2649 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2650 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2651 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2653 total_pending_htlcs,
2654 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2655 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2656 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2658 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2659 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2660 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2662 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2664 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2669 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2670 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2671 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2673 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2674 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2676 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2679 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2680 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2682 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2683 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2685 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2686 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2688 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2689 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2693 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2694 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2700 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2701 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2702 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2703 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2704 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2705 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2708 included_htlcs += 1;
2711 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2712 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2715 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2716 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2718 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2719 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2720 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2725 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2726 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2727 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2730 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2731 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2733 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2734 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2736 total_pending_htlcs,
2737 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2738 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2739 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2741 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2742 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2743 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2745 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2747 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2752 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2753 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2754 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2755 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2756 if local_sent_shutdown {
2757 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2759 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2760 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2761 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2764 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2767 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2770 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2773 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2777 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2778 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2779 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2782 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2785 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2786 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2787 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2788 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2789 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2790 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2791 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2792 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2793 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2794 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2795 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2797 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2798 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2799 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2800 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2801 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2802 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2806 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2809 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2810 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2811 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2813 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2814 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2815 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2816 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2817 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2818 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2819 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2823 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2824 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2825 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2826 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2827 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2828 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2829 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2833 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2834 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2835 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2836 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2837 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2841 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2842 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2843 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2844 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2845 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2847 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2851 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2855 if !self.is_outbound() {
2856 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2857 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2858 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2859 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2860 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2861 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2862 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2863 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2864 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2865 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2866 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2867 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2868 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2869 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2870 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2873 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2874 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2875 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2876 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2880 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2881 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2883 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2887 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2888 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2889 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2893 // Now update local state:
2894 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2895 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2896 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2897 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2898 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2899 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2900 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2905 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2907 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2908 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2909 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2910 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2911 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2912 None => fail_reason.into(),
2913 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2914 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2915 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2918 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2922 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2924 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2925 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2927 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2933 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2936 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2937 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2940 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2944 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2947 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2948 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2951 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2955 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2959 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2960 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2963 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2967 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2971 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2972 where L::Target: Logger
2974 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2975 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2977 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2978 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2980 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2981 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2984 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2986 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2988 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2989 let commitment_txid = {
2990 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2991 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2992 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2994 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2995 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2996 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2997 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2998 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2999 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3003 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3005 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3006 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3007 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3008 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3011 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3012 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3013 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3014 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3017 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3019 if self.is_outbound() {
3020 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3021 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3022 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3023 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3024 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3025 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3026 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3027 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3028 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3029 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3035 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3036 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3039 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3040 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3041 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3042 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3043 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3044 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3045 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3047 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3048 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3049 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3050 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3051 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3052 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3053 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3054 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3056 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3058 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3062 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3063 commitment_stats.tx,
3065 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3066 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3067 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3070 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3071 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3072 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3073 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3075 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3076 let mut need_commitment = false;
3077 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3078 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3079 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3080 need_commitment = true;
3084 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3085 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3086 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3087 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3088 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3089 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3093 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3094 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3095 Some(forward_info.clone())
3097 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3098 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3099 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3100 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3101 need_commitment = true;
3104 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3105 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3106 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3107 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3108 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3109 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3110 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3111 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3112 need_commitment = true;
3116 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3117 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3118 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3119 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3121 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3122 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3123 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3124 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3125 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3126 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3127 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3128 // includes the right HTLCs.
3129 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3130 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3131 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3132 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3133 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3134 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3136 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3137 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3138 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3141 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3142 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3143 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3144 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3145 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3146 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3147 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3148 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3149 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3153 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3154 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3156 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3157 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3158 per_commitment_secret,
3159 next_per_commitment_point,
3160 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3163 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3164 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3165 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3166 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3167 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3168 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3169 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3170 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3173 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3174 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3175 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3176 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3177 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3178 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3179 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3181 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3182 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3183 updates: Vec::new(),
3186 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3187 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3188 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3189 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3190 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3191 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3192 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3193 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3194 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3195 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3196 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3197 // to rebalance channels.
3198 match &htlc_update {
3199 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3200 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3201 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3204 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3205 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3206 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3207 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3208 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3209 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3210 // into the holding cell without ever being
3211 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3212 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3213 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3216 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3222 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3223 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3224 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3225 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3226 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3227 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3228 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3229 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3230 (msg, monitor_update)
3231 } else { unreachable!() };
3232 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3233 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3235 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3236 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3237 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3238 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3239 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3240 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3241 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3242 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3243 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3246 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3248 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3255 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3256 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3258 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3259 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3264 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3265 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3266 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3267 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3268 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3270 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3271 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3272 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3274 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3276 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3278 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3281 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3283 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3287 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3288 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3289 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3290 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3291 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3292 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3293 where L::Target: Logger,
3295 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3298 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3301 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3305 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3307 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3308 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3313 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3314 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3315 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3316 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3317 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3318 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3319 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3320 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3324 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3326 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3327 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3330 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3331 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3333 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3335 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3336 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3337 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3338 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3339 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3340 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3341 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3342 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3346 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3347 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3348 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3349 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3350 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3351 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3352 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3353 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3355 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3356 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3359 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3360 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3361 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3362 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3363 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3364 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3365 let mut require_commitment = false;
3366 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3369 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3370 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3371 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3373 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3374 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3375 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3376 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3377 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3378 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3383 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3384 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3385 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3386 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3387 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3389 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3390 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3391 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3396 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3397 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3399 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3403 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3404 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3406 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3407 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3408 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3409 require_commitment = true;
3410 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3411 match forward_info {
3412 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3413 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3414 require_commitment = true;
3416 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3417 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3418 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3420 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3421 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3422 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3426 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3427 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3428 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3429 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3435 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3436 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3437 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3438 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3440 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3441 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3442 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3443 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3444 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3445 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3446 require_commitment = true;
3450 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3452 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3453 match update_state {
3454 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3455 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3456 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3457 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3458 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3460 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3461 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3462 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3463 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3464 require_commitment = true;
3465 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3466 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3471 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3472 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3473 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3474 if require_commitment {
3475 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3476 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3477 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3478 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3479 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3480 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3481 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3482 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3483 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3485 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3486 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3487 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3488 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3489 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3490 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3491 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3493 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3497 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3498 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3499 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3500 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3501 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3503 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3504 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3505 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3508 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3509 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3510 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3511 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3514 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3515 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3516 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3517 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3519 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3522 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3523 if require_commitment {
3524 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3526 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3527 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3528 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3529 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3531 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3532 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3534 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3535 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3536 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3538 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3542 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3543 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3544 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3547 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3549 commitment_update: None,
3550 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3551 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3552 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3559 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3560 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3561 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3562 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3563 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3564 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3565 if !self.is_outbound() {
3566 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3568 if !self.is_usable() {
3569 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3571 if !self.is_live() {
3572 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3575 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3576 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3577 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3578 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3579 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3580 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3581 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3582 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3583 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3584 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3588 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3589 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3590 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3591 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3592 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3595 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3596 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3600 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3601 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3605 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3606 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3608 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3609 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3614 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3615 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3616 Some(update_fee) => {
3617 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3618 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3624 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3625 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3627 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3629 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3630 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3631 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3632 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3636 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3637 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3638 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3642 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3643 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3646 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3647 // will be retransmitted.
3648 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3649 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3650 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3652 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3653 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3655 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3656 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3657 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3658 // this HTLC accordingly
3659 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3662 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3663 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3664 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3665 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3668 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3669 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3670 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3671 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3672 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3673 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3678 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3680 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3681 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3682 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3683 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3687 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3688 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3689 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3690 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3691 // the update upon reconnection.
3692 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3696 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3697 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3700 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3701 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3703 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3704 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3705 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3707 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3708 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3709 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3710 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3711 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3712 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3714 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3715 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3716 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3717 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3718 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3719 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3720 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3723 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3724 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3725 /// to the remote side.
3726 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3727 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3728 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3730 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3731 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3732 // first received the funding_signed.
3733 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3734 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3735 self.funding_transaction.take()
3737 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3738 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3739 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3740 funding_broadcastable = None;
3743 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3744 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3745 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3746 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3747 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3748 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3749 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3750 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3751 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3752 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3753 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3754 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3755 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3756 next_per_commitment_point,
3757 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3761 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3763 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3764 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3765 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3766 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3767 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3768 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3770 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3771 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3772 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3773 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3774 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3775 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3779 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3780 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3782 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3783 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3786 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3787 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3788 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3789 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3790 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3791 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3792 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3793 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3794 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3798 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3799 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3801 if self.is_outbound() {
3802 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3804 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3807 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3808 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3810 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3811 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3812 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3813 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3814 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3815 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3816 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3817 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3818 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3819 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3820 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3822 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3824 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3825 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3826 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3832 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3833 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3834 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3835 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3836 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3837 per_commitment_secret,
3838 next_per_commitment_point,
3842 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3843 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3844 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3845 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3846 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3848 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3849 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3850 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3851 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3852 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3853 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3854 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3855 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3856 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3861 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3862 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3864 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3865 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3866 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3867 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3868 reason: err_packet.clone()
3871 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3872 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3873 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3874 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3875 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3876 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3879 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3880 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3881 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3882 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3883 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3890 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3891 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3892 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3893 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3897 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3898 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3899 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3900 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3901 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3902 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3906 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3907 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3909 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3910 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3911 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3912 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3913 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3914 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3915 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3916 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3917 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3918 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3919 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3920 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3923 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3924 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3928 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3929 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3930 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3931 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3932 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3933 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3934 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3935 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3937 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3938 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3939 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3940 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3941 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3944 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3945 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3946 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3947 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3948 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3949 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3950 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3951 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3954 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3958 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3959 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3960 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3961 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3963 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3967 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3968 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3969 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3971 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3972 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3973 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3974 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3975 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3979 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3981 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3982 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3983 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3984 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3985 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3986 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3988 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3989 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3990 channel_ready: None,
3991 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3992 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3993 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3997 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3998 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3999 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4000 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4001 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4002 next_per_commitment_point,
4003 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4005 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4006 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4007 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4011 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4012 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4013 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4015 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4016 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4017 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4020 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4026 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4027 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4028 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4029 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4030 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4032 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4033 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4034 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4035 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4036 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4037 next_per_commitment_point,
4038 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4042 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4043 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4044 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4046 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4049 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4050 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4051 raa: required_revoke,
4052 commitment_update: None,
4053 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4055 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4056 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4057 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4059 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4062 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4063 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4064 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4065 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4066 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4067 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4070 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4071 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4072 raa: required_revoke,
4073 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4074 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4078 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4082 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4083 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4084 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4085 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4087 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4089 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4091 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4092 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4093 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4094 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4095 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4096 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4098 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4099 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4100 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4101 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4102 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4104 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4105 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4106 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4107 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4110 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4111 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4112 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4113 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4114 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4115 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4116 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4117 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4118 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4119 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4120 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4121 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4122 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4123 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4124 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4126 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4129 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4130 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4133 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4134 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4135 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4136 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4137 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4138 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4139 self.channel_state &
4140 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4141 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4142 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4143 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4146 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4147 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4148 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4149 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4150 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4151 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4154 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4160 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4161 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4162 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4163 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4165 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4166 return Ok((None, None));
4169 if !self.is_outbound() {
4170 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4171 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4173 return Ok((None, None));
4176 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4178 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4179 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4180 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4181 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4183 let sig = self.holder_signer
4184 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4185 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4187 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4188 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4189 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4190 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4192 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4193 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4194 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4199 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4200 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4201 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4202 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4204 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4207 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4208 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4209 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4210 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4213 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4214 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4218 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4220 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4224 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4225 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4226 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4229 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4232 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4233 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4234 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4235 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4237 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4240 assert!(send_shutdown);
4241 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4242 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4245 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4250 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4252 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4253 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4255 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4256 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4257 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4258 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4259 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4260 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4264 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4265 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4266 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4267 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4271 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4272 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4273 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4274 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4275 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4276 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4278 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4279 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4286 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4287 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4289 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4292 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4293 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4295 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4297 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4298 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4299 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4300 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4301 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4302 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4303 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4304 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4305 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4307 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4308 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4311 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4315 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4316 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4317 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4318 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4320 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4323 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4326 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4329 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4333 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4337 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4338 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4339 return Ok((None, None));
4342 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4343 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4344 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4347 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4349 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4352 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4353 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4354 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4355 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4356 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4360 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4361 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4366 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4367 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4368 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4369 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4370 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4371 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4372 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4376 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4378 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4379 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4380 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4381 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4383 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4386 let sig = self.holder_signer
4387 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4388 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4390 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4391 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4392 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4393 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4397 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4398 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4399 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4400 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4402 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4403 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4404 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4410 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4411 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4414 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4417 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4421 if !self.is_outbound() {
4422 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4423 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4424 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4425 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4427 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4429 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4431 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4432 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4435 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4436 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4437 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4438 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4439 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4440 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4441 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4442 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4447 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4448 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4449 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4450 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4452 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4456 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4457 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4458 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4459 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4461 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4467 // Public utilities:
4469 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4473 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4477 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4478 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4479 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4483 /// Gets the channel's type
4484 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4488 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4489 /// is_usable() returns true).
4490 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4491 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4492 self.short_channel_id
4495 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4496 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4497 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4500 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4501 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4502 self.outbound_scid_alias
4504 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4505 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4506 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4507 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4508 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4511 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4512 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4513 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4514 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4517 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4518 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4519 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4522 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4523 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4524 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4525 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4529 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4532 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4533 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4536 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4537 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4540 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4541 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4542 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4545 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4546 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4549 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4550 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4551 self.counterparty_node_id
4554 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4555 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4556 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4559 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4560 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4561 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4564 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4565 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4567 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4568 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4569 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4570 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4572 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4576 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4577 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4578 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4581 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4582 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4583 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4586 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4587 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4588 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4590 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4591 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4596 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4597 self.channel_value_satoshis
4600 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4601 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4604 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4605 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4608 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4609 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4612 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4613 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4614 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4617 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4618 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4619 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4622 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4623 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4624 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4627 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4628 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4629 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4630 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4631 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4634 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4636 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4637 self.prev_config = None;
4641 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4642 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4646 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4647 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4648 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4649 let did_channel_update =
4650 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4651 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4652 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4653 if did_channel_update {
4654 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4655 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4656 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4657 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4659 self.config.options = *config;
4663 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4664 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4665 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4666 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4667 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4668 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4669 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4671 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4672 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4675 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4677 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4678 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4684 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4685 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4686 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4687 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4688 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4689 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4690 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4692 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4693 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4700 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4704 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4705 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4706 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4707 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4708 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4709 // which are near the dust limit.
4710 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4711 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4712 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4713 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4714 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4716 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4717 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4719 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4722 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4723 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4726 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4727 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4730 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4731 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4735 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4740 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4742 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4743 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4744 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4745 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4746 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4747 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4749 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4751 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4759 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4760 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4764 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4765 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4766 self.update_time_counter
4769 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4770 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4773 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4774 self.config.announced_channel
4777 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4778 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4781 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4782 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4783 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4784 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4787 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4788 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4789 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4792 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4793 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4794 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4795 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4796 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4799 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4800 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4801 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4802 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4803 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4806 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4807 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4808 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4809 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4812 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4813 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4814 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4817 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4818 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4819 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4821 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4822 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4823 if self.channel_state &
4824 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4825 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4826 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4827 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4828 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4831 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4832 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4833 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4834 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4835 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4836 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4838 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4839 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4840 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4842 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4843 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4844 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4845 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4846 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4847 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4853 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4854 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4855 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4858 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4859 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4860 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4863 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4864 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4865 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4868 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4869 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4870 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4871 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4872 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4873 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4878 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4879 self.channel_update_status
4882 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4883 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4884 self.channel_update_status = status;
4887 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4889 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4890 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4891 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4895 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4896 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4897 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4900 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4904 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4905 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4906 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4908 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4909 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4910 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4912 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4913 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4916 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4917 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4918 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4919 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4920 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4921 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4922 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4923 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4924 self.channel_state);
4926 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4930 if need_commitment_update {
4931 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4932 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4933 let next_per_commitment_point =
4934 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4935 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4936 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4937 next_per_commitment_point,
4938 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4942 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4948 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4949 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4950 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4951 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4952 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4953 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4954 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4955 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4956 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4957 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4958 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4959 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4960 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4961 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4962 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4963 if self.is_outbound() {
4964 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4965 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4966 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4967 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4968 // channel and move on.
4969 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4970 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4972 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4973 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4974 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4976 if self.is_outbound() {
4977 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4978 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4979 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4980 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4981 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4982 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4986 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4987 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4988 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4989 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4990 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4994 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4995 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4996 // may have already happened for this block).
4997 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4998 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4999 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
5000 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5003 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5004 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5005 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5006 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5014 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5015 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5016 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5017 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5019 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5020 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5023 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5025 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5026 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5027 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5030 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5031 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5032 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5033 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5034 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5036 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5037 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5039 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5040 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5041 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5049 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5051 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5052 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5053 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5055 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5056 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5059 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5060 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5061 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5062 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5063 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5064 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5065 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5066 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5067 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5070 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5071 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5072 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5073 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5075 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5076 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5077 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5079 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5080 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5081 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5082 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5084 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5085 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5086 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5087 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5088 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5089 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5090 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5093 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5094 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5096 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5099 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5100 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5101 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5102 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5103 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5104 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5105 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5106 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5107 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5108 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5109 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5110 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5111 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5112 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5113 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5114 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5115 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5121 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5126 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5127 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5129 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5130 if !self.is_outbound() {
5131 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5133 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5134 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5137 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5138 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5141 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5142 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5146 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5147 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5148 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5149 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5150 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5151 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5152 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5153 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5154 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5155 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5156 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5157 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5158 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5159 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5160 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5161 first_per_commitment_point,
5162 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5163 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5164 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5165 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5167 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5171 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5172 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5175 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5176 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5177 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5178 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5181 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5182 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5184 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5185 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5186 if self.is_outbound() {
5187 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5189 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5190 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5192 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5193 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5195 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5196 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5199 self.user_id = user_id;
5200 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5202 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5205 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5206 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5207 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5209 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5210 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5211 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5212 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5214 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5215 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5216 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5217 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5218 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5219 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5220 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5221 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5222 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5223 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5224 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5225 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5226 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5227 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5228 first_per_commitment_point,
5229 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5230 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5231 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5233 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5237 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5238 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5240 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5242 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5243 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5246 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5247 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5248 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5249 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5250 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5251 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5254 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5255 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5256 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5257 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5258 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5259 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5260 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5261 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5262 if !self.is_outbound() {
5263 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5265 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5266 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5268 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5269 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5270 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5271 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5274 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5275 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5277 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5280 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5281 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5286 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5288 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5290 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5291 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5292 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5294 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5295 temporary_channel_id,
5296 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5297 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5302 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5303 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5304 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5305 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5307 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5310 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5311 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5312 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5313 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5315 if !self.is_usable() {
5316 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5319 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5321 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5322 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5324 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5325 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5326 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5327 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5328 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5329 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5335 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5336 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5337 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5341 if !self.is_usable() {
5345 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5346 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5350 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5354 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5355 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5358 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5362 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5364 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5369 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5371 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5372 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5373 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5374 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5375 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5379 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5381 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5382 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5383 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5385 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5386 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5387 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5388 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5389 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5390 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5391 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5392 contents: announcement,
5395 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5399 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5400 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5401 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5402 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5403 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5405 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5407 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5408 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5409 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5410 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5412 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5414 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5415 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5418 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5419 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5420 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5421 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5424 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5427 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5428 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5429 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5430 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5433 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5435 Err(_) => return None,
5437 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5438 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5443 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5444 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5445 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5446 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5447 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5448 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5449 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5450 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5451 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5452 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5453 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5454 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5455 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5456 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5457 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5458 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5459 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5460 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5461 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5464 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5465 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5466 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5467 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5470 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5471 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5472 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5473 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5474 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5475 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5476 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5477 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5479 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5480 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5481 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5482 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5483 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5484 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5485 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5486 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5487 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5489 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5495 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5497 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5498 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5500 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5502 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5503 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5505 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5506 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5507 /// regenerate them.
5509 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5511 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5512 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5513 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5514 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5516 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5517 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5518 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5521 if amount_msat == 0 {
5522 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5525 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5526 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5529 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5530 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5531 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5532 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5533 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5534 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5535 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5536 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5539 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5540 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5541 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5542 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5544 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5545 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5546 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5549 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5550 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5551 if !self.is_outbound() {
5552 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5553 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5554 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5555 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5556 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5557 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5561 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5564 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5565 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5566 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5568 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5569 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5570 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5571 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5572 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5573 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5577 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5578 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5579 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5580 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5581 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5582 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5586 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5587 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5588 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5591 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5592 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5593 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5594 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5596 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5597 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5600 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5601 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5602 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5603 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5604 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5607 // Now update local state:
5608 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5609 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5614 onion_routing_packet,
5619 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5620 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5622 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5624 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5628 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5629 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5630 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5634 onion_routing_packet,
5636 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5641 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5642 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5643 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5644 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5645 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5646 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5647 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5649 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5650 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5652 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5653 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5655 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5656 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5658 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5659 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5660 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5661 have_updates = true;
5663 if have_updates { break; }
5665 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5666 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5667 have_updates = true;
5669 if have_updates { break; }
5672 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5674 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5676 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5677 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5678 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5679 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5680 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5682 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5683 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5684 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5686 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5687 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5691 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5692 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5693 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5694 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5695 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5696 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5697 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5700 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5701 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5702 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5703 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5704 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5705 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5708 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5710 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5711 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5712 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5713 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5714 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5715 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5717 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5720 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5721 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5724 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5725 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5726 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5727 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5728 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5729 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5730 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5731 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5734 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5735 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5738 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5739 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5740 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5741 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5742 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5743 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5744 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5748 if !self.is_outbound() {
5749 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5750 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5751 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5752 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5753 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5754 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5755 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5756 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5757 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5758 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5765 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5766 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5770 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5771 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5773 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5775 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5776 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5777 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5778 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5780 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5781 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5782 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5783 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5784 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5785 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5789 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5790 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5793 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5796 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5797 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5798 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5800 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5801 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5802 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5803 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5804 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5810 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5811 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5812 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5815 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5816 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5819 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5820 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5821 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5822 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5828 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5829 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5830 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5831 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5832 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5833 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5834 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5835 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5838 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5839 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5840 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5842 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5843 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5846 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5847 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5848 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5851 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5854 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5855 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5856 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5858 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5863 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5864 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5865 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5866 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5868 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5870 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5872 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5873 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5874 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5875 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5876 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5877 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5881 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5882 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5883 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5886 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5887 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5888 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5889 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5890 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5892 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5893 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5900 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5903 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5904 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5905 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5906 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5907 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5908 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5909 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5910 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5911 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5912 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5913 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5915 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5916 // return them to fail the payment.
5917 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5918 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5919 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5921 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5922 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5927 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5928 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5929 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5930 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5931 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5932 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5933 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5934 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5935 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5936 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5937 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5938 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5939 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5944 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5945 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5946 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5949 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5950 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5951 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5953 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5954 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5958 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5962 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
5963 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5965 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5971 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5972 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5973 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5974 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5975 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5977 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5978 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5979 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5980 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5986 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5987 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5988 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5989 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5990 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5991 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5996 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5997 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5998 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5999 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6001 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6002 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6003 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6004 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6009 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6010 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6011 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6012 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6013 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6014 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6019 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6020 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6021 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6024 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6026 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6027 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6028 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6029 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6030 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6032 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6033 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6034 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6035 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6037 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6038 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6039 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6041 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6043 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6044 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6045 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6046 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6047 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6048 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6050 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6051 // deserialized from that format.
6052 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6053 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6054 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6056 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6058 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6059 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6060 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6062 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6063 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6064 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6065 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6068 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6069 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6070 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6073 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6074 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6075 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6076 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6078 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6079 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6081 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6083 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6085 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6087 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6090 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6092 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6097 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6099 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6100 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6101 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6102 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6103 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6104 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6105 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6107 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6109 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6111 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6114 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6115 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6116 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6119 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6121 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6122 preimages.push(preimage);
6124 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6125 reason.write(writer)?;
6127 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6129 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6130 preimages.push(preimage);
6132 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6133 reason.write(writer)?;
6138 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6139 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6141 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6143 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6144 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6145 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6146 source.write(writer)?;
6147 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6149 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6151 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6152 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6154 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6156 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6157 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6162 match self.resend_order {
6163 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6164 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6167 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6168 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6169 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6171 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6172 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6173 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6174 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6177 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6178 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6179 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6180 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6181 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6184 if self.is_outbound() {
6185 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6186 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6187 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6189 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6190 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6191 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6193 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6195 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6196 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6197 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6198 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6200 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6201 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6202 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6203 // consider the stale state on reload.
6206 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6207 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6208 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6210 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6211 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6212 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6214 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6215 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6217 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6218 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6219 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6221 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6222 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6224 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6227 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6228 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6229 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6231 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6234 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6235 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6237 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6238 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6239 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6241 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6243 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6245 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6247 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6248 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6249 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6250 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6251 htlc.write(writer)?;
6254 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6255 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6256 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6258 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6259 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6261 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6262 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6263 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6264 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6265 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6266 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6267 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6269 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6270 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6271 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6272 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6273 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6275 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6277 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6278 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6279 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6280 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6282 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6283 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6284 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6285 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6286 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6287 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6288 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6290 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6291 (2, chan_type, option),
6292 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6293 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6294 (5, self.config, required),
6295 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6296 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6297 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6298 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6299 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6300 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6301 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6302 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6303 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6304 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6305 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6306 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6313 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6314 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6315 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6316 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6317 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6318 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6320 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6321 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6322 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6323 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6325 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6327 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6328 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6329 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6330 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6331 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6333 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6334 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6337 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6338 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6339 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6341 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6343 let mut keys_data = None;
6345 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6346 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6347 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6349 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6350 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6351 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6352 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6353 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6354 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6358 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6359 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6360 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6363 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6365 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6367 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6369 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6370 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6371 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6372 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6373 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6374 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6375 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6376 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6377 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6378 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6379 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6380 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6381 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6382 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6387 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6389 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6390 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6391 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6392 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6393 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6394 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6395 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6396 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6397 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6398 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6400 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6401 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6404 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6405 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6408 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6409 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6411 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6416 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6417 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6418 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6419 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6420 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6421 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6422 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6423 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6424 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6425 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6427 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6428 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6429 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6431 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6432 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6433 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6435 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6439 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6440 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6441 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6442 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6445 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6451 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6452 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6455 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6456 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6457 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6458 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6461 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6463 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6465 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6466 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6467 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6471 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6472 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6473 // consider the stale state on reload.
6474 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6477 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6478 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6479 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6481 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6484 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6493 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6494 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6496 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6497 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6503 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6505 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6506 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6508 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6509 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6514 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6515 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6516 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6517 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6519 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6522 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6525 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6527 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6528 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6530 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6531 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6533 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6536 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6537 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6539 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6540 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6541 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6545 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6546 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6547 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6549 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6555 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6556 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6557 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6558 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6559 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6560 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6561 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6562 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6563 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6564 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6566 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6567 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6568 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6569 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6570 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6571 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6573 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6574 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6576 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6577 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6578 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6579 (2, channel_type, option),
6580 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6581 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6582 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6583 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6584 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6585 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6586 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6587 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6588 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6589 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6590 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6591 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6592 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6593 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6594 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6597 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6598 let mut holder_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6599 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6600 // required channel parameters.
6601 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6602 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6603 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6605 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6607 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6608 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6609 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6610 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6613 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6614 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6615 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6617 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6618 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6620 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6621 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6626 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6627 if iter.next().is_some() {
6628 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6632 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6633 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6634 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6635 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6636 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6639 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6640 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6641 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6644 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6645 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6647 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6648 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6649 // separate u64 values.
6650 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6655 config: config.unwrap(),
6659 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6660 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6661 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6665 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6667 channel_value_satoshis,
6669 latest_monitor_update_id,
6672 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6675 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6676 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6679 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6680 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6681 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6685 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6686 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6687 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6688 monitor_pending_forwards,
6689 monitor_pending_failures,
6690 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6693 holding_cell_update_fee,
6694 next_holder_htlc_id,
6695 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6696 update_time_counter,
6699 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6700 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6701 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6702 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6704 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6705 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6706 closing_fee_limits: None,
6707 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6709 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6711 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6712 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6714 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6716 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6717 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6718 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6719 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6720 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6721 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6722 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6723 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6724 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6727 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6729 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6730 funding_transaction,
6732 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6733 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6734 counterparty_node_id,
6736 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6740 channel_update_status,
6741 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6746 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6748 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6750 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6752 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6753 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6754 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6756 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6758 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6759 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6761 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6770 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6771 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6772 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6773 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6774 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6776 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6777 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6778 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6779 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6780 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6781 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6782 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6783 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6784 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6785 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6786 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6787 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6788 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6789 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6790 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6791 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6792 use crate::util::test_utils;
6793 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6794 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6795 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6796 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6797 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6798 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6799 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6800 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6801 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6802 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6803 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6804 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6805 use crate::prelude::*;
6807 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6810 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6811 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6817 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6818 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6819 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6820 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6824 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6825 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6826 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6827 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6828 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6829 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6830 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6834 signer: InMemorySigner,
6836 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6837 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6839 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6840 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6841 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6842 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6843 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6844 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6845 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6846 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6849 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6850 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6851 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6852 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6855 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6856 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6858 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6861 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6862 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6863 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6866 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6867 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6868 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6872 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6873 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6874 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6875 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6877 let seed = [42; 32];
6878 let network = Network::Testnet;
6879 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6880 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6881 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6884 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6885 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6886 let config = UserConfig::default();
6887 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6888 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6889 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6891 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6892 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6896 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6897 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6899 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6900 let original_fee = 253;
6901 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6902 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6903 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6904 let seed = [42; 32];
6905 let network = Network::Testnet;
6906 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6908 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6909 let config = UserConfig::default();
6910 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6912 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6913 // same as the old fee.
6914 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6915 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6916 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6920 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6921 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6922 // dust limits are used.
6923 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6924 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6925 let seed = [42; 32];
6926 let network = Network::Testnet;
6927 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6928 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6930 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6931 // they have different dust limits.
6933 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6934 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6935 let config = UserConfig::default();
6936 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6938 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6939 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6940 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6941 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6942 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6944 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6945 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6946 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6947 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6948 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6950 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6951 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6952 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6954 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6955 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6956 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6957 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6960 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6962 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6963 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6964 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6965 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6966 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6968 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6969 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6970 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6971 payment_secret: None,
6972 payment_params: None,
6976 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6977 // the dust limit check.
6978 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6979 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6980 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6981 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6983 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6984 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6985 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6986 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6987 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6988 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6989 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6993 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6994 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6995 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6996 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6997 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6998 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6999 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7000 let seed = [42; 32];
7001 let network = Network::Testnet;
7002 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7004 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7005 let config = UserConfig::default();
7006 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7008 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7009 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7011 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7012 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7013 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7014 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7015 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7016 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7018 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7019 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7020 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7021 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7022 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7024 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7026 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7027 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7028 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7029 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7030 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7032 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7033 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7034 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7035 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7036 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7040 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7041 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7042 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7043 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7044 let seed = [42; 32];
7045 let network = Network::Testnet;
7046 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7047 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7048 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7050 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7052 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7053 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7054 let config = UserConfig::default();
7055 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7057 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7058 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7059 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7060 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7062 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7063 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7064 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7066 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7067 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7068 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7069 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7071 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7072 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7073 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7075 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7076 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7078 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7079 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7080 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7081 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7082 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7083 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7084 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7085 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7086 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7091 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7093 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7094 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7095 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7096 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7097 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7098 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7099 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7106 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7107 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7108 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7109 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7110 let seed = [42; 32];
7111 let network = Network::Testnet;
7112 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7113 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7114 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7116 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7117 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7118 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7119 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7120 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7121 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7122 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7123 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7125 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7126 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7127 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7128 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7129 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7130 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7132 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7133 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7134 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7135 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7137 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7139 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7140 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7141 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7142 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7143 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7144 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7146 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7147 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7148 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7149 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7151 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7152 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7153 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7154 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7155 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7157 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7158 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7160 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7161 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7162 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7164 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7165 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7166 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7167 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7168 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7170 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7171 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7173 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7174 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7175 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7179 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7181 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7182 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7183 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7185 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7186 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7187 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7188 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7190 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7191 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7192 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7194 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7196 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7197 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7200 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7201 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7202 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7203 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7204 let seed = [42; 32];
7205 let network = Network::Testnet;
7206 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7207 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7208 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7211 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7212 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7213 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7215 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7216 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7218 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7219 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7220 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7222 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7223 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7225 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7227 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7228 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7230 // Channel Negotiations failed
7231 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7232 assert!(result.is_err());
7237 fn channel_update() {
7238 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7239 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7240 let seed = [42; 32];
7241 let network = Network::Testnet;
7242 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7243 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7245 // Create a channel.
7246 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7247 let config = UserConfig::default();
7248 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7249 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7250 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7251 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7253 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7254 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7255 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7257 short_channel_id: 0,
7260 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7261 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7262 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7264 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7265 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7267 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7269 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7271 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7272 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7273 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7274 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7276 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7277 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7278 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7280 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7284 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7286 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7287 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7288 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7289 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7290 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7291 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7292 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7293 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7294 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7295 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7296 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7297 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7298 use crate::sync::Arc;
7300 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7301 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7302 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7303 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7305 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7307 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7308 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7309 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7310 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7311 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7312 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7314 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7315 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7320 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7321 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7322 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7324 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7325 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7326 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7327 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7328 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7329 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7331 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7333 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7334 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7335 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7336 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7337 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7338 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7340 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7341 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7342 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7343 selected_contest_delay: 144
7345 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7346 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7348 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7349 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7351 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7352 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7354 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7355 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7357 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7358 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7359 // build_commitment_transaction.
7360 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7361 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7362 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7363 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7364 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7366 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7367 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7368 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7369 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7373 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7374 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7375 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7376 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7380 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7381 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7382 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7384 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7385 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7387 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7388 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7390 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7392 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7393 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7394 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7395 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7396 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7397 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7398 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7400 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7401 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7402 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7403 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7405 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7406 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7407 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7409 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7411 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7412 commitment_tx.clone(),
7413 counterparty_signature,
7414 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7415 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7416 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7418 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7419 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7421 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7422 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7423 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7425 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7426 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7429 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7430 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7432 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7433 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7434 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7435 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7436 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7437 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7438 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7439 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7441 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7444 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7445 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7446 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7450 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7453 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7454 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7455 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7457 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7458 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7459 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7460 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7461 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7462 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7463 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7464 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7466 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7470 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7471 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7473 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7474 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7475 "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", {});
7477 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7478 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7479 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7480 "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", {});
7482 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7483 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7485 amount_msat: 1000000,
7487 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7488 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7490 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7493 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7494 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7496 amount_msat: 2000000,
7498 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7499 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7501 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7504 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7505 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7507 amount_msat: 2000000,
7509 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7510 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7511 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7513 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7516 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7517 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7519 amount_msat: 3000000,
7521 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7522 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7523 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7525 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7528 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7529 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7531 amount_msat: 4000000,
7533 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7534 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7536 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7540 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7541 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7542 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7544 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7545 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7546 "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", {
7549 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7550 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7551 "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" },
7554 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7555 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7556 "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" },
7559 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7560 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7561 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7564 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7565 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7566 "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" },
7569 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7570 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7571 "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" }
7574 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7575 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7576 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7578 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7579 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7580 "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", {
7583 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7584 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7585 "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" },
7588 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7589 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7590 "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" },
7593 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7594 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7595 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7598 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7599 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7600 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7603 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7604 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7605 "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" }
7608 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7609 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7610 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7612 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7613 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7614 "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", {
7617 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7618 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7619 "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" },
7622 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7623 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7624 "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" },
7627 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7628 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7629 "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" },
7632 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7633 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7634 "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" }
7637 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7638 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7639 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7640 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7642 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7643 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7644 "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", {
7647 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7648 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7649 "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" },
7652 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7653 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7654 "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" },
7657 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7658 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7659 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
7662 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7663 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7664 "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" }
7667 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7668 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7669 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7670 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7672 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7673 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7674 "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", {
7677 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7678 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7679 "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" },
7682 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7683 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7684 "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" },
7687 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7688 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7689 "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" },
7692 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7693 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7694 "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" }
7697 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7698 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7699 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7701 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7702 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7703 "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", {
7706 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7707 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7708 "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" },
7711 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7712 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7713 "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" },
7716 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7717 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7718 "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" }
7721 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7722 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7723 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7725 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7726 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7727 "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", {
7730 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7731 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7732 "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" },
7735 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7736 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7737 "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" },
7740 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7741 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7742 "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" }
7745 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7746 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7747 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7749 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7750 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7751 "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", {
7754 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7755 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7756 "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" },
7759 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7760 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7761 "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" }
7764 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7765 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7766 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7767 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7769 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7770 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7771 "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", {
7774 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7775 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7776 "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" },
7779 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7780 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7781 "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" }
7784 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7785 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7786 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7787 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7789 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7790 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7791 "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", {
7794 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7795 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7796 "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" },
7799 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7800 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7801 "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" }
7804 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7805 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7806 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7808 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7809 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7810 "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", {
7813 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7814 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7815 "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" }
7818 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7819 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7820 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7821 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7823 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7824 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7825 "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", {
7828 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7829 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7830 "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" }
7833 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7834 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7835 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7836 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7838 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7839 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7840 "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", {
7843 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7844 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7845 "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" }
7848 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7849 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7850 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7851 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7853 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7854 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7855 "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", {});
7857 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7858 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7859 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7860 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7862 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7863 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7864 "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", {});
7866 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7867 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7868 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7869 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7871 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7872 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7873 "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", {});
7875 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7876 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7877 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7879 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7880 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7881 "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", {});
7883 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7884 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7885 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7886 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7888 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7889 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7890 "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", {});
7892 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7893 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7894 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7895 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7897 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7898 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7899 "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", {});
7901 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7902 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7903 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7904 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7905 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7906 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7908 amount_msat: 2000000,
7910 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7911 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7913 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7916 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7917 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7918 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7920 amount_msat: 5000000,
7922 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7923 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7924 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7926 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7929 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7930 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7932 amount_msat: 5000000,
7934 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7935 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7936 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7938 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7942 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7943 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7944 "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", {
7947 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7948 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7949 "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" },
7951 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7952 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7953 "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" },
7955 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7956 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7957 "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" }
7960 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7961 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7962 "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", {
7965 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7966 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7967 "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" },
7969 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7970 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7971 "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" },
7973 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7974 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7975 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe290400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e83473044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced401008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
7980 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7981 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7983 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7984 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7985 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7986 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7988 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7989 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7990 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7992 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7993 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7995 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7996 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7998 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7999 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8000 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8004 fn test_key_derivation() {
8005 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8006 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8008 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8009 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8011 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8012 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8014 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8015 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8017 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8018 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8020 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8021 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8023 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8024 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8026 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8027 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8031 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8032 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8033 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8034 let seed = [42; 32];
8035 let network = Network::Testnet;
8036 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8037 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8039 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8040 let config = UserConfig::default();
8041 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8042 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8044 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8045 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8047 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8048 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8049 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8050 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8051 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8052 assert!(res.is_ok());