1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
443 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
446 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
447 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
448 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
449 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
450 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
451 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
452 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
453 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
454 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
455 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
456 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
457 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
458 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
460 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
462 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
463 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
464 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
465 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
467 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
468 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
469 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
470 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
472 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
473 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
474 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
475 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
476 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
478 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
479 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
480 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
481 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
483 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
484 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
485 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
487 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
488 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
489 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
490 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
491 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
493 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
494 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
495 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
498 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
499 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
500 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
501 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
503 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
504 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
505 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
506 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
508 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
512 channel_id: [u8; 32],
515 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
516 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
518 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
519 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
520 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
523 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
524 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
525 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
527 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
528 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
530 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
532 holder_signer: Signer,
533 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
534 destination_script: Script,
536 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
537 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
538 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
543 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
544 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
545 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
547 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
548 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
549 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
550 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
551 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
552 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
554 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
556 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
557 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
558 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
559 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
560 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
561 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
563 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
565 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
566 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
567 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
568 // HTLCs with similar state.
569 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
570 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
571 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
572 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
573 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
574 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
575 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
576 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
577 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
580 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
581 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
582 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
584 update_time_counter: u32,
586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
587 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
588 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
589 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
590 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
591 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
593 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
594 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
596 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
597 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
598 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
599 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
601 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
602 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
604 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
606 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
609 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
610 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
611 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
612 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
613 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
615 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
616 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
617 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
618 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
619 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
621 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
622 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
623 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
624 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
625 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
626 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
627 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
628 channel_creation_height: u32,
630 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
638 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
648 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
651 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
653 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
656 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
660 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
664 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
666 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
667 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
669 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
670 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
675 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
677 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
678 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
679 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
680 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
682 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
683 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
684 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
686 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
687 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
688 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
690 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
691 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
692 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
693 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
695 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
699 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
700 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
701 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
702 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
703 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
705 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
706 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
710 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
711 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
712 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
713 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
714 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
715 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
717 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
718 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
720 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
721 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
722 // the channel's funding UTXO.
724 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
725 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
726 // associated channel mapping.
728 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
729 // to store all of them.
730 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
732 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
733 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
734 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
735 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
736 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
738 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
739 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
743 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
745 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
746 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
747 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
751 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
753 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
755 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
756 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
762 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
764 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
766 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
767 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
768 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
769 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
770 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
772 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
773 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
775 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
777 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
778 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
780 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
781 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
782 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
783 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
784 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
785 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
787 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
788 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
790 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
791 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
792 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
793 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
794 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
796 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
797 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
799 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
800 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
802 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
803 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
804 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
805 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
811 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
812 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
814 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
815 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
816 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
821 macro_rules! secp_check {
822 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
825 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
830 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
831 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
832 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
833 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
835 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
838 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
839 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
841 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
844 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
846 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
849 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
850 /// required by us according to the configured or default
851 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
853 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
855 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
856 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
857 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
858 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
859 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
862 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
863 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
864 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
865 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
866 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
867 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
868 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
871 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
872 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
875 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
876 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
877 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
878 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
879 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
880 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
881 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
882 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
887 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
888 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
889 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
890 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
891 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
892 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
893 // We've exhausted our options
896 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
897 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
901 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
902 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
903 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
904 outbound_scid_alias: u64
905 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
906 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
909 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
911 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
912 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
913 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
915 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
916 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
918 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
921 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
922 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
925 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
928 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
929 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
930 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
931 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
935 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
937 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
938 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
939 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
943 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
944 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
946 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
947 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
950 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
951 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
952 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
959 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
960 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
961 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
962 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
967 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
969 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
970 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
971 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
973 channel_value_satoshis,
975 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
978 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
979 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
981 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
982 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
985 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
986 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
987 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
988 pending_update_fee: None,
989 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
990 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
991 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
992 update_time_counter: 1,
994 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
996 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
997 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
998 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
999 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1000 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1001 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1003 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1004 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1005 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1006 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1008 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1009 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1010 closing_fee_limits: None,
1011 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1013 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1015 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1016 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1017 short_channel_id: None,
1018 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1020 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1021 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1022 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1023 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1024 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1025 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1026 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1027 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1028 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1029 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1030 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1032 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1034 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1035 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1036 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1037 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1038 counterparty_parameters: None,
1039 funding_outpoint: None,
1040 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1041 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1043 funding_transaction: None,
1045 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1046 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1047 counterparty_node_id,
1049 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1051 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1053 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1054 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1056 announcement_sigs: None,
1058 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1059 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1060 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1061 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1063 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1065 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1066 outbound_scid_alias,
1068 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1070 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1071 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1073 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1077 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1078 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1079 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1081 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1082 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1083 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1084 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1085 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1086 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1087 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1090 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1091 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1092 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1093 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1094 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1095 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1096 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1097 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1099 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1100 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1109 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1110 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1111 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1112 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1113 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1114 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1115 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1116 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1117 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1120 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1121 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1123 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1124 // support this channel type.
1125 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1126 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1130 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1134 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1135 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1136 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1137 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1138 // publicly announced.
1139 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1140 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1144 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1148 channel_type.clone()
1150 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1152 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1156 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1157 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1158 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1159 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1160 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1161 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1162 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1163 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1166 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1170 // Check sanity of message fields:
1171 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1174 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1177 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1180 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1181 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1184 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1187 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1190 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1192 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1193 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1196 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1199 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1203 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1204 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1205 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1207 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1210 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1213 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1216 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1219 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1222 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1226 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1228 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1229 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1234 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1235 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1236 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1237 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1238 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1240 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1243 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1244 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1245 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1247 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1251 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1252 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1253 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1254 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1255 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1259 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1260 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1261 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1262 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1266 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1267 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1268 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1269 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1270 if script.len() == 0 {
1273 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1276 Some(script.clone())
1279 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1280 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1286 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1287 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1290 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1291 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1296 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1297 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1299 let chan = Channel {
1302 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1303 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1305 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1310 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1312 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1313 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1314 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1317 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1320 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1321 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1323 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1324 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1325 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1327 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1328 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1329 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1330 pending_update_fee: None,
1331 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1332 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1333 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1334 update_time_counter: 1,
1336 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1338 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1339 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1340 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1341 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1342 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1343 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1345 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1346 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1347 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1348 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1350 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1351 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1352 closing_fee_limits: None,
1353 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1355 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1357 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1358 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1359 short_channel_id: None,
1360 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1362 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1363 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1364 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1365 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1366 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1367 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1368 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1369 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1370 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1371 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1372 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1373 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1375 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1377 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1378 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1379 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1380 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1381 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1382 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1383 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1385 funding_outpoint: None,
1386 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1387 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1389 funding_transaction: None,
1391 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1392 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1393 counterparty_node_id,
1395 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1397 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1399 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1400 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1402 announcement_sigs: None,
1404 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1405 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1406 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1407 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1409 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1411 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1412 outbound_scid_alias,
1414 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1416 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1417 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1425 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1426 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1427 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1428 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1429 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1431 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1432 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1433 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1434 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1435 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1436 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1437 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1439 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1440 where L::Target: Logger
1442 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1443 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1444 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1446 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1447 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1448 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1449 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1451 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1452 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1453 if match update_state {
1454 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1455 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1456 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1457 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1458 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1460 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1464 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1465 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1466 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1467 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1469 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1470 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1471 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1473 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1474 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1475 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1476 transaction_output_index: None
1481 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1482 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1483 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1484 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1485 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1488 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1490 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1491 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1492 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1494 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1495 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1498 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1499 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1502 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1504 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1505 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1506 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1508 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1509 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1515 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1516 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1517 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1518 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1519 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1520 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1521 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1525 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1526 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1530 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1531 if generated_by_local {
1532 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1533 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1542 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1544 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1545 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1546 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1547 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1548 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1549 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1550 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1553 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1554 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1555 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1556 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1560 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1561 preimages.push(preimage);
1565 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1566 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1568 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1570 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1571 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1573 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1574 if !generated_by_local {
1575 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1583 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1584 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1585 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1586 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1587 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1588 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1589 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1590 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1592 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1594 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1595 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1596 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1597 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1599 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1601 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1602 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1603 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1604 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1607 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1608 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1609 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1610 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1612 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1615 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1616 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1617 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1618 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1620 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1623 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1624 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1629 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1630 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1635 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1637 let channel_parameters =
1638 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1639 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1640 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1643 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1648 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1651 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1652 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1653 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1654 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1656 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1657 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1658 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1666 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1667 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1673 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1674 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1675 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1676 // outside of those situations will fail.
1677 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1681 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1686 1 + // script length (0)
1690 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1691 2 + // witness marker and flag
1692 1 + // witness element count
1693 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1694 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1695 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1696 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1697 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1698 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1700 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1701 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1702 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1708 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1709 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1710 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1711 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1713 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1714 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1715 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1717 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1718 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1719 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1720 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1721 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1722 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1725 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1726 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1729 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1730 value_to_holder = 0;
1733 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1734 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1735 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1736 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1738 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1739 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1742 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1743 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1747 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1748 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1749 /// our counterparty!)
1750 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1751 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1752 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1753 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1754 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1755 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1756 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1758 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1762 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1763 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1764 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1765 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1766 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1767 //may see payments to it!
1768 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1769 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1770 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1772 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1775 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1776 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1777 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1778 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1779 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1782 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1785 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1786 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1788 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1790 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1791 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1792 where L::Target: Logger {
1793 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1794 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1795 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1796 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1797 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1798 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1799 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1800 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1804 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1805 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1806 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1807 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1809 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1810 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1812 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1814 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1816 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1817 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1818 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1820 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1821 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1822 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1823 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1824 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1826 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1827 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1828 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1830 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1831 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1833 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1836 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1837 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1841 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1845 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1846 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1847 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1848 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1849 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1850 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1853 // Now update local state:
1855 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1856 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1857 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1858 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1859 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1860 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1861 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1865 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1866 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1867 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1868 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1869 // do not not get into this branch.
1870 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1871 match pending_update {
1872 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1873 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1874 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1875 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1876 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1877 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1878 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1881 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1882 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1883 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1884 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1885 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1886 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1887 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1893 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1894 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1895 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1897 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1898 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1899 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1902 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1905 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1906 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1908 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1909 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1911 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1912 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1915 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1918 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1919 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1920 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1921 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1926 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1927 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1928 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1929 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1930 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1933 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1934 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1935 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1936 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1937 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1939 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1940 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1941 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1945 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1946 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1947 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1948 /// before we fail backwards.
1949 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1950 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1951 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1952 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1953 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1955 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1957 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1958 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1959 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1961 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1962 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1963 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1965 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1966 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1967 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1969 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1974 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1975 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1981 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1982 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1983 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1984 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1985 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1989 // Now update local state:
1990 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1991 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1992 match pending_update {
1993 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1994 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1995 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1996 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2000 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2001 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2002 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2003 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2009 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2010 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2011 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2017 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2019 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2020 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2023 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2024 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2025 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2030 // Message handlers:
2032 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2033 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2035 // Check sanity of message fields:
2036 if !self.is_outbound() {
2037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2039 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2042 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2045 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2048 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2051 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2052 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2053 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2055 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2056 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2059 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2060 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2063 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2066 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2070 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2071 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2074 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2077 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2080 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2083 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2086 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2089 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2093 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2094 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2097 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2098 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2100 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2103 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2104 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2105 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2106 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2107 if script.len() == 0 {
2110 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2113 Some(script.clone())
2116 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2117 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2123 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2124 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2125 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2126 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2127 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2129 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2130 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2132 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2135 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2136 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2137 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2138 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2139 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2140 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2143 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2144 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2145 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2148 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2149 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2151 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2152 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2157 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2158 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2160 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2161 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2163 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2164 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2165 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2166 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2167 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2168 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2169 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2170 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2171 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2174 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2175 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2177 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2178 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2179 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2180 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2182 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2183 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2185 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2186 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2189 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2190 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2193 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2194 if self.is_outbound() {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2197 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2198 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2199 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2203 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2206 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2207 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2208 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2209 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2212 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2213 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2214 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2215 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2216 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2218 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2220 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2221 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2225 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2226 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2227 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2231 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2232 initial_commitment_tx,
2235 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2236 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2239 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2240 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2242 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2244 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2245 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2246 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2247 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2248 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2249 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2250 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2251 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2252 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2254 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2256 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2258 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2259 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2260 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2261 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2263 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2265 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2266 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2268 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2271 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2272 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2273 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2274 if !self.is_outbound() {
2275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2277 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2280 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2281 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2282 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2283 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2286 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2288 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2289 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2290 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2291 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2293 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2294 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2296 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2297 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2299 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2300 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2301 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2302 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2303 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2308 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2309 initial_commitment_tx,
2312 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2313 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2316 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2317 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2320 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2321 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2322 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2323 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2324 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2325 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2326 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2327 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2328 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2329 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2331 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2333 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2335 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2336 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2337 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2338 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2340 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2342 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2345 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2346 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2348 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2349 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2350 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2354 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2355 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2356 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2357 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2358 // when routing outbound payments.
2359 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2363 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2365 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2366 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2367 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2368 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2369 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2370 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2371 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2372 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2373 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2375 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2376 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2377 let expected_point =
2378 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2379 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2381 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2383 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2384 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2385 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2386 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2387 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2389 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2397 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2398 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2400 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2402 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2405 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2406 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2407 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2408 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2414 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2415 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2416 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2417 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2418 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2419 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2420 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2421 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2422 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2425 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2428 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2429 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2430 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2432 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2433 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2434 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2435 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2436 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2437 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2439 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2440 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2446 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2447 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2448 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2449 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2450 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2451 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2452 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2453 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2454 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2457 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2460 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2461 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2462 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2464 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2465 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2466 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2467 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2468 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2469 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2471 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2472 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2476 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2477 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2478 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2479 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2480 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2481 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2482 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2484 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2485 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2487 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2494 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2495 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2496 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2497 /// corner case properly.
2498 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2499 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2500 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2502 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2503 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2504 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2505 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2508 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2510 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2511 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2512 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2515 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2516 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2517 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2518 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2520 outbound_capacity_msat,
2521 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2522 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2523 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2529 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2530 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2533 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2534 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2535 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2536 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2537 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2538 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2541 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2542 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2544 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2545 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2548 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2549 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2550 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2552 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2553 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2555 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2558 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2559 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2561 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2562 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2564 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2565 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2567 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2568 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2572 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2573 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2579 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2580 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2581 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2584 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2585 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2586 included_htlcs += 1;
2589 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2590 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2594 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2595 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2596 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2597 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2598 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2599 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2604 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2606 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2607 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2612 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2613 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2617 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2618 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2619 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2622 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2623 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2625 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2626 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2627 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2629 total_pending_htlcs,
2630 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2631 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2632 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2634 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2635 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2636 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2638 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2640 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2645 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2646 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2647 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2649 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2650 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2652 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2655 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2656 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2658 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2659 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2661 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2662 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2664 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2665 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2669 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2670 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2676 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2677 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2678 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2679 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2680 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2681 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2684 included_htlcs += 1;
2687 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2688 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2691 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2692 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2694 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2695 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2696 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2701 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2702 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2703 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2706 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2707 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2709 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2710 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2712 total_pending_htlcs,
2713 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2714 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2715 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2717 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2718 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2719 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2721 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2723 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2728 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2729 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2730 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2731 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2732 if local_sent_shutdown {
2733 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2735 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2736 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2737 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2740 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2743 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2746 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2749 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2753 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2754 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2755 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2756 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2758 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2759 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2761 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2762 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2763 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2764 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2765 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2766 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2767 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2768 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2769 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2770 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2771 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2773 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2774 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2775 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2776 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2777 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2778 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2782 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2785 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2786 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2787 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2789 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2790 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2791 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2792 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2793 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2794 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2795 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2799 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2800 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2801 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2802 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2803 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2804 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2805 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2809 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2810 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2811 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2812 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2813 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2817 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2818 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2819 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2820 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2821 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2823 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2827 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2831 if !self.is_outbound() {
2832 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2833 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2834 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2835 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2836 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2837 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2838 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2839 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2840 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2841 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2842 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2843 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2844 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2845 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2846 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2849 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2850 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2851 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2852 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2856 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2859 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2863 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2864 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2865 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2869 // Now update local state:
2870 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2871 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2872 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2873 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2874 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2875 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2876 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2881 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2883 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2884 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2885 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2886 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2887 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2888 None => fail_reason.into(),
2889 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2890 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2891 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2892 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2894 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2898 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2900 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2901 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2903 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2909 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2912 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2913 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2916 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2920 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2923 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2924 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2931 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2935 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2936 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2939 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2943 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2947 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2948 where L::Target: Logger
2950 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2951 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2953 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2954 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2956 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2957 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2960 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2962 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2964 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2965 let commitment_txid = {
2966 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2967 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2968 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2970 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2971 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2972 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2973 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2974 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2975 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2979 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2981 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2982 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2983 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2984 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2987 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2988 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2989 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2990 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2995 if self.is_outbound() {
2996 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2997 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2998 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2999 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3000 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3001 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3002 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3003 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3004 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3005 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3011 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3012 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3015 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3016 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3017 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3018 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3019 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3020 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3021 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3023 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3024 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3025 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3026 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3027 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3028 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3029 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3030 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3032 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3034 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3038 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3039 commitment_stats.tx,
3041 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3042 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3043 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3046 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3047 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3048 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3049 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3051 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3052 let mut need_commitment = false;
3053 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3054 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3055 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3056 need_commitment = true;
3060 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3061 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3062 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3063 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3064 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3065 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3069 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3070 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3071 Some(forward_info.clone())
3073 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3074 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3075 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3076 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3077 need_commitment = true;
3080 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3081 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3082 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3083 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3084 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3085 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3086 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3087 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3088 need_commitment = true;
3092 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3093 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3094 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3095 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3097 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3098 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3099 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3100 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3101 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3102 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3103 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3104 // includes the right HTLCs.
3105 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3106 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3107 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3108 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3109 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3110 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3112 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3113 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3114 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3117 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3118 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3119 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3120 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3121 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3122 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3123 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3124 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3125 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3129 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3130 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3132 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3133 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3134 per_commitment_secret,
3135 next_per_commitment_point,
3136 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3139 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3140 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3141 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3142 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3143 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3144 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3145 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3146 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3149 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3150 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3151 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3152 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3153 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3154 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3155 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3157 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3158 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3159 updates: Vec::new(),
3162 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3163 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3164 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3165 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3166 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3167 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3168 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3169 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3170 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3171 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3172 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3173 // to rebalance channels.
3174 match &htlc_update {
3175 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3176 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3177 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3180 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3181 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3182 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3183 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3184 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3185 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3186 // into the holding cell without ever being
3187 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3188 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3189 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3192 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3198 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3199 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3200 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3201 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3202 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3203 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3204 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3205 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3206 (msg, monitor_update)
3207 } else { unreachable!() };
3208 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3209 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3211 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3212 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3213 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3214 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3215 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3216 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3217 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3218 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3219 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3222 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3224 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3231 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3232 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3234 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3235 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3240 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3241 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3242 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3243 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3244 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3246 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3247 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3248 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3250 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3252 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3254 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3257 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3259 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3263 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3264 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3265 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3266 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3267 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3268 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3269 where L::Target: Logger,
3271 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3274 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3277 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3281 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3283 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3284 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3289 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3290 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3291 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3292 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3293 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3294 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3295 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3296 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3300 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3302 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3303 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3306 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3307 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3309 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3311 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3312 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3313 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3314 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3315 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3316 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3317 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3318 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3322 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3323 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3324 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3325 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3326 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3327 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3328 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3329 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3331 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3332 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3335 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3336 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3337 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3338 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3339 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3340 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3341 let mut require_commitment = false;
3342 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3345 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3346 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3347 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3349 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3350 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3351 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3352 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3353 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3354 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3359 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3360 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3361 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3362 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3363 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3365 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3366 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3367 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3372 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3373 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3375 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3379 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3380 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3382 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3383 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3384 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3385 require_commitment = true;
3386 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3387 match forward_info {
3388 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3389 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3390 require_commitment = true;
3392 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3393 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3394 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3396 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3397 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3398 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3402 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3403 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3404 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3405 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3411 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3412 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3413 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3414 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3416 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3417 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3418 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3419 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3420 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3421 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3422 require_commitment = true;
3426 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3428 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3429 match update_state {
3430 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3431 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3432 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3433 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3434 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3436 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3437 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3438 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3439 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3440 require_commitment = true;
3441 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3442 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3447 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3448 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3449 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3450 if require_commitment {
3451 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3452 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3453 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3454 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3455 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3456 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3457 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3458 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3459 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3461 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3462 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3463 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3464 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3465 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3466 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3467 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3469 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3473 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3474 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3475 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3476 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3477 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3479 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3480 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3481 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3484 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3485 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3486 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3487 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3490 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3491 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3492 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3493 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3495 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3498 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3499 if require_commitment {
3500 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3502 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3503 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3504 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3505 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3507 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3508 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3510 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3511 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3512 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3514 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3518 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3519 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3520 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3523 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3525 commitment_update: None,
3526 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3527 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3528 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3535 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3536 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3537 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3538 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3539 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3540 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3541 if !self.is_outbound() {
3542 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3544 if !self.is_usable() {
3545 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3547 if !self.is_live() {
3548 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3551 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3552 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3553 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3554 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3555 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3556 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3557 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3558 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3559 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3560 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3564 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3565 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3566 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3567 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3568 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3571 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3572 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3576 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3577 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3581 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3582 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3584 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3585 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3590 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3591 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3592 Some(update_fee) => {
3593 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3594 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3600 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3601 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3603 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3605 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3606 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3607 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3608 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3612 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3613 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3614 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3618 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3619 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3622 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3623 // will be retransmitted.
3624 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3625 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3626 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3628 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3629 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3631 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3632 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3633 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3634 // this HTLC accordingly
3635 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3638 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3639 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3640 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3641 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3644 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3645 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3646 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3647 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3648 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3649 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3654 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3656 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3657 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3658 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3659 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3663 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3664 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3665 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3666 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3667 // the update upon reconnection.
3668 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3672 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3673 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3676 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3677 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3678 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3679 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3680 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3681 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3683 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3684 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3685 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3686 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3687 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3688 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3690 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3691 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3692 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3693 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3694 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3695 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3696 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3699 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3700 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3701 /// to the remote side.
3702 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3703 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3704 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3706 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3707 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3708 // first received the funding_signed.
3709 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3710 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3711 self.funding_transaction.take()
3713 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3714 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3715 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3716 funding_broadcastable = None;
3719 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3720 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3721 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3722 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3723 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3724 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3725 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3726 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3727 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3728 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3729 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3730 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3731 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3732 next_per_commitment_point,
3733 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3737 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3739 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3740 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3741 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3742 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3743 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3744 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3746 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3747 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3748 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3749 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3750 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3751 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3755 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3756 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3758 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3759 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3762 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3763 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3764 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3765 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3766 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3767 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3768 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3769 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3770 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3774 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3775 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3777 if self.is_outbound() {
3778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3780 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3783 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3784 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3786 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3787 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3788 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3789 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3790 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3791 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3792 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3793 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3794 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3795 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3796 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3798 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3800 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3802 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3808 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3809 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3810 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3811 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3812 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3813 per_commitment_secret,
3814 next_per_commitment_point,
3818 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3819 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3820 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3821 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3822 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3824 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3825 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3826 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3827 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3828 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3829 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3830 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3831 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3832 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3837 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3838 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3840 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3841 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3842 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3843 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3844 reason: err_packet.clone()
3847 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3848 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3849 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3850 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3851 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3852 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3855 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3856 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3857 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3858 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3859 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3866 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3867 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3868 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3869 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3873 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3874 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3875 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3876 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3877 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3878 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3882 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3883 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3885 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3886 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3887 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3888 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3889 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3890 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3891 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3892 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3893 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3894 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3895 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3899 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3900 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3904 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3905 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3906 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3907 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3908 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3909 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3910 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3911 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3913 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3914 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3915 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3916 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3917 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3920 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3921 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3922 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3923 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3924 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3925 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3926 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3927 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3930 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3934 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3935 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3936 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3937 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3939 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3943 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3944 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3945 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3947 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3948 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3949 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3950 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3951 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3955 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3957 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3958 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3960 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3961 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3964 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3965 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3966 channel_ready: None,
3967 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3968 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3969 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3973 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3974 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3975 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3976 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3977 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3978 next_per_commitment_point,
3979 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3981 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3982 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3983 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3987 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3988 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3989 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3991 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3992 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3993 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3996 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4002 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4003 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4004 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4005 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4006 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4008 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4009 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4010 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4011 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4012 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4013 next_per_commitment_point,
4014 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4018 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4019 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4020 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4022 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4025 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4026 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4027 raa: required_revoke,
4028 commitment_update: None,
4029 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4031 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4032 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4033 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4035 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4038 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4039 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4040 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4041 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4042 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4043 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4046 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4047 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4048 raa: required_revoke,
4049 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4050 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4054 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4058 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4059 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4060 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4061 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4063 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4065 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4067 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4068 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4069 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4070 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4071 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4072 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4074 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4075 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4076 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4077 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4078 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4080 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4081 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4082 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4083 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4086 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4087 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4088 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4089 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4090 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4091 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4092 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4093 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4094 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4095 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4096 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4097 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4098 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4099 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4100 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4102 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4105 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4106 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4109 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4110 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4111 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4112 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4113 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4114 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4115 self.channel_state &
4116 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4117 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4118 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4119 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4122 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4123 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4124 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4125 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4126 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4127 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4130 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4136 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4137 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4138 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4139 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4141 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4142 return Ok((None, None));
4145 if !self.is_outbound() {
4146 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4147 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4149 return Ok((None, None));
4152 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4154 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4155 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4156 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4157 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4159 let sig = self.holder_signer
4160 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4161 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4163 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4164 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4165 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4166 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4168 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4169 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4170 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4175 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4176 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4177 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4178 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4180 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4181 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4183 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4184 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4185 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4186 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4187 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4189 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4190 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4194 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4196 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4197 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4200 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4201 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4202 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4205 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4208 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4209 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4210 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4211 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4213 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4216 assert!(send_shutdown);
4217 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4218 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4221 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4226 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4228 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4229 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4231 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4232 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4233 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4234 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4235 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4236 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4240 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4241 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4242 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4243 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4247 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4248 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4249 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4250 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4251 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4252 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4254 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4255 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4262 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4263 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4265 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4268 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4269 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4271 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4273 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4274 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4275 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4276 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4277 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4278 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4279 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4280 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4281 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4283 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4284 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4287 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4291 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4292 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4293 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4294 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4296 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4299 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4302 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4305 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4309 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4313 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4314 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4315 return Ok((None, None));
4318 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4319 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4320 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4323 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4325 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4328 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4329 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4330 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4331 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4332 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4336 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4337 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4342 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4343 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4344 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4345 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4346 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4347 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4348 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4352 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4354 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4355 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4356 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4357 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4359 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4362 let sig = self.holder_signer
4363 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4366 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4367 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4368 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4369 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4373 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4374 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4375 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4376 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4378 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4379 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4380 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4386 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4387 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4388 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4390 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4393 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4394 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4397 if !self.is_outbound() {
4398 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4399 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4400 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4401 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4403 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4404 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4405 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4407 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4408 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4411 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4412 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4413 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4414 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4415 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4416 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4417 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4418 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4423 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4424 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4425 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4426 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4432 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4433 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4434 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4435 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4437 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4443 // Public utilities:
4445 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4449 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4453 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4454 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4455 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4459 /// Gets the channel's type
4460 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4464 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4465 /// is_usable() returns true).
4466 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4467 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4468 self.short_channel_id
4471 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4472 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4473 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4476 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4477 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4478 self.outbound_scid_alias
4480 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4481 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4482 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4483 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4484 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4487 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4488 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4489 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4490 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4493 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4494 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4495 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4498 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4499 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4502 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4503 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4506 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4507 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4508 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4511 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4512 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4515 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4516 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4517 self.counterparty_node_id
4520 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4521 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4522 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4525 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4526 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4527 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4530 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4531 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4533 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4534 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4535 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4536 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4538 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4542 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4543 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4544 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4547 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4548 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4549 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4552 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4553 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4554 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4556 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4557 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4562 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4563 self.channel_value_satoshis
4566 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4567 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4570 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4571 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4574 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4575 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4578 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4579 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4580 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4583 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4584 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4585 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4588 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4589 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4590 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4593 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4594 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4595 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4596 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4597 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4600 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4602 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4603 self.prev_config = None;
4607 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4608 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4612 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4613 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4614 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4615 let did_channel_update =
4616 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4617 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4618 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4619 if did_channel_update {
4620 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4621 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4622 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4623 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4625 self.config.options = *config;
4629 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4630 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4631 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4632 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4633 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4634 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4635 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4637 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4638 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4641 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4643 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4644 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4650 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4651 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4652 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4653 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4654 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4655 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4656 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4658 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4659 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4666 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4670 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4671 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4672 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4673 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4674 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4675 // which are near the dust limit.
4676 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4677 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4678 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4679 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4680 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4682 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4683 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4685 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4688 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4689 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4692 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4693 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4696 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4697 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4701 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4706 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4708 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4709 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4710 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4711 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4712 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4713 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4715 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4717 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4725 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4726 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4730 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4731 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4732 self.update_time_counter
4735 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4736 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4739 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4740 self.config.announced_channel
4743 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4744 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4747 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4748 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4749 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4750 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4753 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4754 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4755 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4758 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4759 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4760 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4761 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4762 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4765 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4766 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4767 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4768 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4769 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4772 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4773 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4774 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4775 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4778 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4779 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4780 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4783 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4784 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4785 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4787 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4788 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4789 if self.channel_state &
4790 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4791 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4792 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4793 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4794 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4797 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4798 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4799 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4800 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4801 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4802 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4804 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4805 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4806 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4808 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4809 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4810 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4811 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4812 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4813 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4819 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4820 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4821 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4824 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4825 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4826 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4829 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4830 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4831 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4834 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4835 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4836 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4837 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4838 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4839 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4844 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4845 self.channel_update_status
4848 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4849 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4850 self.channel_update_status = status;
4853 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4855 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4856 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4857 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4861 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4862 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4863 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4866 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4870 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4871 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4872 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4874 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4875 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4876 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4878 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4879 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4882 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4883 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4884 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4885 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4886 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4887 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4888 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4889 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4890 self.channel_state);
4892 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4896 if need_commitment_update {
4897 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4898 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4899 let next_per_commitment_point =
4900 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4901 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4902 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4903 next_per_commitment_point,
4904 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4908 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4914 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4915 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4916 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4917 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4918 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4919 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4920 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4921 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4922 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4923 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4924 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4925 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4926 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4927 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4928 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4929 if self.is_outbound() {
4930 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4931 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4932 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4933 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4934 // channel and move on.
4935 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4936 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4938 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4939 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4940 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4942 if self.is_outbound() {
4943 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4944 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4945 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4946 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4947 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4948 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4952 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4953 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4954 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4955 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4956 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4960 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4961 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4962 // may have already happened for this block).
4963 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4964 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4965 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4966 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4969 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4970 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4971 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4972 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4980 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4981 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4982 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4983 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4985 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4986 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4989 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4991 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4992 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4993 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
4996 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
4997 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4998 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4999 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5000 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5002 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5003 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5005 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5006 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5007 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5015 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5017 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5018 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5019 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5021 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5022 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5025 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5026 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5027 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5028 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5029 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5030 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5031 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5032 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5033 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5036 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5037 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5038 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5039 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5041 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5042 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5043 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5045 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5046 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5047 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5048 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5050 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5051 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5052 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5053 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5054 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5055 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5056 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5059 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5060 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5062 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5065 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5066 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5067 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5068 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5069 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5070 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5071 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5072 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5073 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5074 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5075 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5076 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5077 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5078 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5079 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5080 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5081 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5087 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5092 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5093 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5095 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5096 if !self.is_outbound() {
5097 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5099 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5100 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5103 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5104 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5107 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5108 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5112 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5113 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5114 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5115 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5116 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5117 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5118 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5119 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5120 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5121 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5122 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5123 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5124 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5125 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5126 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5127 first_per_commitment_point,
5128 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5129 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5130 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5131 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5133 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5137 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5138 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5141 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5142 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5143 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5144 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5147 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5148 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5150 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5151 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5152 if self.is_outbound() {
5153 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5155 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5156 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5158 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5159 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5161 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5162 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5165 self.user_id = user_id;
5166 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5168 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5171 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5172 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5173 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5175 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5176 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5177 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5178 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5180 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5181 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5182 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5183 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5184 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5185 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5186 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5187 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5188 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5189 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5190 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5191 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5192 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5193 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5194 first_per_commitment_point,
5195 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5196 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5197 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5199 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5203 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5204 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5206 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5208 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5209 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5212 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5213 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5214 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5215 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5216 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5217 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5220 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5221 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5222 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5223 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5224 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5225 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5226 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5227 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5228 if !self.is_outbound() {
5229 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5231 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5232 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5234 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5235 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5236 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5237 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5240 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5241 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5243 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5246 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5247 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5252 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5254 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5256 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5257 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5258 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5260 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5261 temporary_channel_id,
5262 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5263 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5268 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5269 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5270 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5271 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5273 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5276 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5277 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5278 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5279 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5281 if !self.is_usable() {
5282 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5285 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5287 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5288 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5290 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5291 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5292 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5293 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5294 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5295 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5301 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5302 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5303 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5307 if !self.is_usable() {
5311 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5312 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5316 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5320 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5321 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5324 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5328 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5330 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5335 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5337 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5338 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5339 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5340 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5341 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5345 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5347 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5348 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5349 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5351 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5352 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5353 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5354 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5355 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5356 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5357 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5358 contents: announcement,
5361 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5365 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5366 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5367 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5368 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5369 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5371 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5373 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5375 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5376 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5378 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5380 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5381 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5384 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5385 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5386 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5387 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5390 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5393 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5394 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5395 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5396 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5399 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5401 Err(_) => return None,
5403 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5404 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5409 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5410 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5411 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5412 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5413 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5414 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5415 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5416 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5417 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5418 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5419 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5420 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5421 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5422 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5423 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5424 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5425 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5426 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5427 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5430 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5431 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5432 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5433 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5436 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5437 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5438 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5439 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5440 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5441 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5442 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5443 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5445 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5446 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5447 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5448 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5449 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5450 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5451 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5452 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5453 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5455 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5461 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5463 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5464 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5466 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5468 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5469 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5471 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5472 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5473 /// regenerate them.
5475 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5477 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5478 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5479 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5480 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5482 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5483 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5484 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5487 if amount_msat == 0 {
5488 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5491 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5492 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5495 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5496 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5497 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5498 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5499 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5500 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5501 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5502 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5505 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5506 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5507 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5508 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5510 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5511 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5512 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5515 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5516 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5517 if !self.is_outbound() {
5518 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5519 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5520 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5521 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5522 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5527 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5530 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5531 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5532 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5534 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5535 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5536 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5537 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5538 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5539 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5543 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5544 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5545 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5546 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5547 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5548 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5552 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5553 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5554 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5557 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5558 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5559 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5560 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5562 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5566 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5567 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5568 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5569 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5570 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5573 // Now update local state:
5574 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5575 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5580 onion_routing_packet,
5585 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5586 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5588 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5590 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5594 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5595 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5596 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5600 onion_routing_packet,
5602 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5607 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5608 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5609 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5610 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5611 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5612 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5613 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5615 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5616 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5618 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5619 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5621 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5622 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5624 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5625 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5626 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5627 have_updates = true;
5629 if have_updates { break; }
5631 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5632 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5633 have_updates = true;
5635 if have_updates { break; }
5638 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5640 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5642 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5643 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5644 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5645 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5646 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5648 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5649 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5650 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5652 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5653 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5657 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5658 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5659 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5660 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5661 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5662 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5663 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5666 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5667 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5668 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5669 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5670 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5671 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5674 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5676 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5677 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5678 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5679 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5680 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5681 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5683 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5686 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5687 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5690 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5691 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5692 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5693 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5694 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5695 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5696 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5697 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5700 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5701 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5704 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5705 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5706 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5707 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5708 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5709 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5710 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5712 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5714 if !self.is_outbound() {
5715 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5716 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5717 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5718 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5719 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5720 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5721 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5722 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5723 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5724 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5731 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5732 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5736 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5737 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5739 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5741 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5742 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5743 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5744 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5746 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5747 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5748 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5749 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5750 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5751 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5755 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5756 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5759 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5762 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5763 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5764 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5766 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5767 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5768 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5769 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5770 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5776 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5777 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5778 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5781 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5782 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5785 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5786 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5787 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5788 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5794 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5795 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5796 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5797 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5798 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5799 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5800 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5801 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5804 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5805 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5806 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5808 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5809 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5812 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5813 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5814 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5817 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5820 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5821 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5822 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5824 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5829 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5830 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5831 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5832 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5834 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5836 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5838 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5839 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5840 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5841 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5842 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5843 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5847 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5848 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5849 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5852 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5853 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5854 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5855 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5856 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5858 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5859 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5866 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5869 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5870 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5871 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5872 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5873 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5874 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5875 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5876 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5877 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5878 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5879 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5881 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5882 // return them to fail the payment.
5883 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5884 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5885 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5887 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5888 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5893 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5894 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5895 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5896 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5897 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5898 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5899 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5900 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5901 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5902 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5903 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5904 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5905 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5910 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5911 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5912 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5915 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&HTLCSource> {
5916 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5917 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5919 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, .. } => { Some(source) }
5923 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| &htlc.source))
5927 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5928 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5930 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5936 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5937 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5938 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5939 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5940 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5942 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5943 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5944 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5945 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5951 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5952 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5953 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5954 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5955 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5956 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5961 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5962 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5963 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5964 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5966 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5967 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5968 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5969 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5974 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5975 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5976 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5977 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5978 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5979 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5984 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5985 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5986 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5989 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5991 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
5992 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
5993 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
5994 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
5995 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
5997 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
5998 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
5999 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6000 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6002 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6003 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6004 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6006 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6008 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6009 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6010 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6011 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6012 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6013 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6015 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6016 // deserialized from that format.
6017 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6018 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6019 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6021 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6023 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6024 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6025 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6027 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6028 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6029 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6030 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6033 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6034 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6035 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6038 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6039 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6040 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6041 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6043 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6044 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6046 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6048 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6050 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6052 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6055 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6057 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6062 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6064 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6065 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6066 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6067 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6068 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6069 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6070 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6072 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6074 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6076 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6079 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6080 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6081 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6084 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6086 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6087 preimages.push(preimage);
6089 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6090 reason.write(writer)?;
6092 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6094 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6095 preimages.push(preimage);
6097 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6098 reason.write(writer)?;
6103 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6104 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6106 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6108 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6109 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6110 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6111 source.write(writer)?;
6112 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6114 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6116 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6117 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6121 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6122 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6127 match self.resend_order {
6128 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6129 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6132 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6133 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6134 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6136 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6137 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6138 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6139 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6142 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6143 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6144 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6145 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6146 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6149 if self.is_outbound() {
6150 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6151 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6152 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6154 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6155 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6156 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6158 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6160 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6161 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6162 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6163 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6165 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6166 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6167 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6168 // consider the stale state on reload.
6171 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6172 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6173 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6175 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6176 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6177 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6179 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6180 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6182 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6183 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6184 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6186 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6187 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6189 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6192 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6193 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6194 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6196 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6199 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6200 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6202 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6203 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6204 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6206 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6208 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6210 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6212 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6213 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6214 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6215 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6216 htlc.write(writer)?;
6219 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6220 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6221 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6223 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6224 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6226 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6227 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6228 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6229 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6230 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6231 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6232 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6234 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6235 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6236 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6237 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6238 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6240 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6242 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6243 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6244 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6245 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6247 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6248 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6249 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6250 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6251 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6252 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6253 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6255 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6256 (2, chan_type, option),
6257 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6258 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6259 (5, self.config, required),
6260 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6261 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6262 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6263 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6264 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6265 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6266 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6267 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6268 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6269 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6270 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6277 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6278 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6279 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6280 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6281 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6282 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6284 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6285 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6286 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6287 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6289 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6291 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6292 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6293 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6294 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6295 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6297 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6298 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6301 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6302 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6303 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6305 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6307 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6309 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6310 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6311 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6312 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6313 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6314 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6316 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6318 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6319 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6320 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6323 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6325 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6326 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6327 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6329 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6330 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6331 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6332 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6333 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6334 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6335 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6336 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6337 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6338 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6339 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6340 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6341 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6342 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6347 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6349 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6350 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6351 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6352 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6353 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6354 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6355 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6356 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6357 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6358 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6360 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6361 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6364 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6365 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6368 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6369 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6371 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6376 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6377 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6378 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6379 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6380 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6381 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6382 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6383 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6384 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6385 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6387 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6388 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6389 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6391 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6392 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6393 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6395 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6399 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6400 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6401 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6402 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6405 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6406 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6407 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6409 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6410 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6411 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6412 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6415 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6416 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6417 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6418 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6421 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6423 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6426 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6427 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6430 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6431 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6432 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6433 // consider the stale state on reload.
6434 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6437 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6438 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6439 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6441 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6444 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6445 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6448 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6453 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6454 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6456 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6457 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6463 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6465 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6466 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6468 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6469 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6474 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6475 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6476 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6477 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6479 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6482 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6495 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6496 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6497 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6499 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6501 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6505 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6506 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6507 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6509 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6515 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6516 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6517 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6518 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6519 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6520 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6521 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6522 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6523 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6524 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6526 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6527 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6528 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6529 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6530 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6531 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6533 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6535 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6536 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6537 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6538 (2, channel_type, option),
6539 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6540 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6541 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6542 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6543 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6544 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6545 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6546 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6547 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6548 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6549 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6550 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6551 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6552 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6555 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6556 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6557 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6559 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6560 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6562 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6563 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6568 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6569 if iter.next().is_some() {
6570 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6574 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6575 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6576 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6577 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6578 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6581 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6582 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6586 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6587 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6589 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6590 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6591 // separate u64 values.
6592 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6597 config: config.unwrap(),
6601 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6602 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6603 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6607 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6609 channel_value_satoshis,
6611 latest_monitor_update_id,
6614 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6617 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6618 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6621 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6622 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6623 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6627 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6628 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6629 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6630 monitor_pending_forwards,
6631 monitor_pending_failures,
6632 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6635 holding_cell_update_fee,
6636 next_holder_htlc_id,
6637 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6638 update_time_counter,
6641 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6642 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6643 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6644 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6646 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6647 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6648 closing_fee_limits: None,
6649 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6651 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6653 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6654 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6656 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6658 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6659 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6660 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6661 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6662 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6663 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6664 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6665 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6666 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6669 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6671 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6672 funding_transaction,
6674 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6675 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6676 counterparty_node_id,
6678 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6682 channel_update_status,
6683 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6688 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6690 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6692 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6694 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6695 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6696 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6698 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6700 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6701 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6703 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6711 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6712 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6713 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6714 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6715 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6717 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6718 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6719 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6720 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6721 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6722 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6723 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6724 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6725 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6726 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6727 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6728 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6729 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6730 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6731 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6732 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6733 use crate::util::test_utils;
6734 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6735 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6736 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6737 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6738 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6739 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6740 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6741 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6742 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6743 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6744 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6745 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6746 use crate::prelude::*;
6748 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6751 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6752 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6758 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6759 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6760 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6761 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6765 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6766 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6767 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6768 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6769 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6770 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6771 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6775 signer: InMemorySigner,
6777 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6778 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6780 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6781 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6782 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6783 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6785 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6786 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6787 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6790 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6792 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6793 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6796 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6799 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6800 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6801 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6804 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6805 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6806 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6810 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6811 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6812 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6813 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6815 let seed = [42; 32];
6816 let network = Network::Testnet;
6817 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6818 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6819 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6822 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6823 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6824 let config = UserConfig::default();
6825 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6826 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6827 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6829 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6830 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6834 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6835 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6837 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6838 let original_fee = 253;
6839 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6840 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6841 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6842 let seed = [42; 32];
6843 let network = Network::Testnet;
6844 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6846 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6847 let config = UserConfig::default();
6848 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6850 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6851 // same as the old fee.
6852 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6853 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6854 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6858 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6859 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6860 // dust limits are used.
6861 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6862 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6863 let seed = [42; 32];
6864 let network = Network::Testnet;
6865 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6866 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6868 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6869 // they have different dust limits.
6871 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6872 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6873 let config = UserConfig::default();
6874 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6876 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6877 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6878 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6879 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6880 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6882 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6883 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6884 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6885 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6886 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6888 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6889 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6890 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6892 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6893 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6894 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6895 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6898 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6900 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6901 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6902 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6903 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6904 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6906 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6907 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6908 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6909 payment_secret: None,
6910 payment_params: None,
6914 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6915 // the dust limit check.
6916 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6917 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6918 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6919 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6921 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6922 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6923 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6924 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6925 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6926 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6927 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6931 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6932 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6933 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6934 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6935 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6936 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6937 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6938 let seed = [42; 32];
6939 let network = Network::Testnet;
6940 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6942 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6943 let config = UserConfig::default();
6944 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6946 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6947 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6949 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6950 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6951 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6952 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6953 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6954 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6956 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6957 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6958 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6959 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6960 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6962 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6964 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6965 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6966 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6967 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6968 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6970 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6971 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6972 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6973 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6974 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6978 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6979 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6980 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6981 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6982 let seed = [42; 32];
6983 let network = Network::Testnet;
6984 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6985 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6986 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6988 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6990 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6991 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6992 let config = UserConfig::default();
6993 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6995 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6996 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6997 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6998 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7000 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7001 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7002 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7004 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7005 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7006 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7007 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7009 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7010 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7011 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7013 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7014 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7016 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7017 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7018 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7019 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7020 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7021 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7022 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7023 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7024 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7029 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7031 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7032 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7033 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7034 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7035 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7036 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7037 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7044 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7045 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7046 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7047 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7048 let seed = [42; 32];
7049 let network = Network::Testnet;
7050 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7051 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7052 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7054 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7055 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7056 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7057 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7058 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7059 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7060 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7061 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7063 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7064 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7065 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7066 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7067 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7068 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7070 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7071 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7072 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7073 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7075 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7077 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7078 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7079 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7080 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7081 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7082 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7084 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7085 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7086 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7087 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7089 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7090 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7091 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7092 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7093 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7095 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7096 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7098 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7099 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7100 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7102 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7103 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7104 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7105 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7106 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7108 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7109 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7111 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7112 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7113 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7117 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7119 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7120 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7121 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7123 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7124 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7125 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7126 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7128 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7129 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7130 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7132 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7134 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7135 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7138 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7139 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7140 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7141 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7142 let seed = [42; 32];
7143 let network = Network::Testnet;
7144 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7145 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7146 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7149 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7150 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7151 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7153 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7154 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7156 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7157 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7158 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7160 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7161 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7163 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7165 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7166 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7168 // Channel Negotiations failed
7169 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7170 assert!(result.is_err());
7175 fn channel_update() {
7176 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7177 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7178 let seed = [42; 32];
7179 let network = Network::Testnet;
7180 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7181 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7183 // Create a channel.
7184 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7185 let config = UserConfig::default();
7186 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7187 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7188 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7189 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7191 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7192 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7193 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7195 short_channel_id: 0,
7198 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7199 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7200 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7202 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7203 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7205 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7207 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7209 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7210 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7211 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7212 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7214 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7215 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7216 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7218 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7222 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7224 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7225 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7226 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7227 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7228 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7229 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7230 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7231 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7232 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7233 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7234 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7235 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7236 use crate::sync::Arc;
7238 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7239 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7240 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7241 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7243 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7245 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7246 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7247 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7248 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7249 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7250 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7252 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7253 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7258 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7259 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7260 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7262 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7263 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7264 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7265 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7266 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7267 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7269 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7271 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7272 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7273 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7274 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7275 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7276 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7278 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7279 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7280 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7281 selected_contest_delay: 144
7283 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7284 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7286 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7287 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7289 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7290 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7292 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7293 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7295 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7296 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7297 // build_commitment_transaction.
7298 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7299 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7300 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7301 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7302 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7304 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7305 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7306 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7307 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7311 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7312 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7313 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7314 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7318 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7319 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7320 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7322 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7323 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7325 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7326 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7328 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7330 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7331 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7332 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7333 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7334 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7335 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7336 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7338 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7339 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7340 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7341 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7343 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7344 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7345 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7347 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7349 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7350 commitment_tx.clone(),
7351 counterparty_signature,
7352 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7353 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7354 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7356 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7357 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7359 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7360 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7361 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7363 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7364 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7367 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7368 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7370 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7371 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7372 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7373 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7374 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7375 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7376 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7377 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7379 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7382 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7383 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7384 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7388 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7391 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7392 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7393 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7395 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7396 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7397 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7398 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7399 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7400 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7401 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7402 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7404 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7408 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7409 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7411 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7412 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7413 "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", {});
7415 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7416 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7417 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7418 "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", {});
7420 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7421 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7423 amount_msat: 1000000,
7425 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7426 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7428 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7431 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7432 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7434 amount_msat: 2000000,
7436 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7437 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7439 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7442 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7443 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7445 amount_msat: 2000000,
7447 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7448 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7449 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7451 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7454 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7455 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7457 amount_msat: 3000000,
7459 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7460 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7461 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7463 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7466 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7467 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7469 amount_msat: 4000000,
7471 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7472 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7474 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7478 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7479 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7480 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7482 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7483 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7484 "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", {
7487 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7488 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7489 "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" },
7492 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7493 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7494 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7497 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7498 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7499 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7502 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7503 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7504 "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" },
7507 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7508 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7509 "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" }
7512 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7513 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7514 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7516 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7517 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7518 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7521 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7522 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7523 "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" },
7526 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7527 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7528 "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" },
7531 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7532 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7533 "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" },
7536 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7537 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7538 "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" },
7541 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7542 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7543 "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" }
7546 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7547 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7548 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7550 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7551 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7552 "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", {
7555 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7556 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7557 "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" },
7560 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7561 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7562 "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" },
7565 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7566 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7567 "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" },
7570 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7571 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7572 "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" }
7575 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7576 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7577 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7578 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7580 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7581 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7582 "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", {
7585 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7586 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7587 "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" },
7590 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7591 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7592 "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" },
7595 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7596 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7597 "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" },
7600 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7601 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7602 "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" }
7605 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7606 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7607 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7608 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7610 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7611 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7612 "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", {
7615 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7616 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7617 "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" },
7620 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7621 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7622 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7625 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7626 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7627 "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" },
7630 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7631 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7632 "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" }
7635 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7636 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7637 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7639 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7640 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7641 "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", {
7644 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7645 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7646 "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" },
7649 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7650 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7651 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7654 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7655 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7656 "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" }
7659 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7660 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7661 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7663 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7664 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7665 "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", {
7668 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7669 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7670 "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" },
7673 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7674 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7675 "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" },
7678 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7679 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7680 "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" }
7683 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7684 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7685 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7687 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7688 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7689 "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", {
7692 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7693 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7694 "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" },
7697 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7698 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7699 "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" }
7702 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7703 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7704 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7705 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7707 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7708 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7709 "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", {
7712 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7713 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7714 "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" },
7717 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7718 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7719 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7722 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7723 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7724 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7725 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7727 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7728 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7729 "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", {
7732 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7733 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7734 "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" },
7737 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7738 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7739 "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" }
7742 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7743 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7744 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7746 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7747 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7748 "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", {
7751 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7752 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7753 "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" }
7756 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7757 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7758 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7759 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7761 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7762 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7763 "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", {
7766 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7767 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7768 "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" }
7771 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7772 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7773 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7774 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7776 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7777 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7778 "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", {
7781 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7782 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7783 "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" }
7786 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7787 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7788 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7789 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7791 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7792 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7793 "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", {});
7795 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7796 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7797 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7798 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7800 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7801 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7802 "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", {});
7804 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7805 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7806 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7807 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7809 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7810 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7811 "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", {});
7813 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7814 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7815 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7817 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7818 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7819 "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", {});
7821 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7822 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7823 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7824 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7826 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7827 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7828 "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", {});
7830 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7831 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7832 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7833 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7835 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7836 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7837 "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", {});
7839 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7840 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7841 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7842 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7843 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7844 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7846 amount_msat: 2000000,
7848 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7849 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7851 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7854 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7855 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7856 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7858 amount_msat: 5000000,
7860 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7861 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7862 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7864 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7867 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7868 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7870 amount_msat: 5000000,
7872 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7873 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7874 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7876 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7880 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7881 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7882 "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", {
7885 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7886 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7887 "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" },
7889 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7890 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7891 "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" },
7893 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7894 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7895 "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" }
7898 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7899 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7900 "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", {
7903 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7904 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7905 "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" },
7907 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7908 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7909 "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" },
7911 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7912 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7913 "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" }
7918 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7919 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7921 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7922 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7923 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7924 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7926 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7927 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7928 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7930 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7931 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7933 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7934 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7936 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7937 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7938 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7942 fn test_key_derivation() {
7943 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7944 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7946 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7947 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7949 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7950 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7952 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7953 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7955 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7956 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7958 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7959 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7961 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7962 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7964 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7965 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7969 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7970 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7971 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7972 let seed = [42; 32];
7973 let network = Network::Testnet;
7974 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7975 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7977 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7978 let config = UserConfig::default();
7979 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7980 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7982 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7983 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7985 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7986 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7987 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7988 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7989 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7990 assert!(res.is_ok());