1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
531 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
532 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
533 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
534 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
535 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
536 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
539 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
540 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
541 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
542 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
543 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
544 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
545 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
546 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
547 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
548 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
549 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
550 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
551 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
552 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
553 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
555 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
556 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
557 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
558 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
560 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
561 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
562 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
563 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
565 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
566 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
567 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
568 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
569 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
571 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
572 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
573 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
574 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
576 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
577 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
578 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
580 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
581 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
582 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
583 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
584 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
586 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
587 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
590 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
591 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
593 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
594 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
597 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
598 (0, update, required),
601 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
602 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
603 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
605 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
606 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
607 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
608 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
614 channel_id: [u8; 32],
615 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
618 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
619 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
621 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
622 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
623 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
626 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
627 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
628 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
631 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
633 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
635 holder_signer: Signer,
636 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
637 destination_script: Script,
639 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
640 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
641 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
643 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
644 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
645 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
646 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
647 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
648 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
650 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
651 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
652 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
653 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
654 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
655 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
657 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
659 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
660 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
661 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
663 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
664 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
665 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
666 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
667 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
668 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
669 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
671 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
673 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
674 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
675 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
676 // HTLCs with similar state.
677 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
678 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
679 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
680 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
681 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
682 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
683 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
684 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
685 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
688 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
689 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
690 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
692 update_time_counter: u32,
694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
695 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
696 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
699 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
701 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
704 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
705 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
706 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
707 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
709 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
710 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
712 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
714 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
716 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
717 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
718 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
719 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
720 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
721 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
723 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
724 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
725 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
726 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
727 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
729 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
730 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
731 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
732 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
733 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
734 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
735 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
736 channel_creation_height: u32,
738 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
748 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
753 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
755 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
756 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
759 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
761 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
763 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
764 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
766 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
768 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
769 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
770 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
772 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
774 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
775 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
777 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
778 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
779 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
783 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
785 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
786 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
787 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
788 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
790 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
791 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
792 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
794 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
795 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
796 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
798 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
799 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
800 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
801 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
803 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
805 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
808 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
809 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
810 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
811 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
813 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
814 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
816 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
817 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
818 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
819 /// unblock the state machine.
821 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
822 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
823 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
825 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
826 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
827 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
831 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
832 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
833 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
834 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
835 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
836 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
838 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
839 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
841 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
842 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
843 // the channel's funding UTXO.
845 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
846 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
847 // associated channel mapping.
849 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
850 // to store all of them.
851 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
853 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
854 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
855 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
856 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
857 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
859 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
860 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
863 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
865 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
866 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
867 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
869 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
870 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
871 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
874 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
875 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
876 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
877 self.update_time_counter
880 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
881 self.latest_monitor_update_id
884 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
885 self.config.announced_channel
888 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
889 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
892 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
893 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
894 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
895 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
898 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
899 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
900 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
903 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
904 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
905 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
906 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
907 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
910 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
911 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
912 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
913 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
915 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
916 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
918 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
919 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
921 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
922 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
924 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
927 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
928 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
929 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
930 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
932 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
933 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
934 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
935 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
938 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
939 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
940 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
941 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
942 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
947 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
951 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
953 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
954 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
955 self.temporary_channel_id
958 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
962 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
963 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
964 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
968 /// Gets the channel's type
969 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
973 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
974 /// is_usable() returns true).
975 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
976 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
977 self.short_channel_id
980 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
981 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
982 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
985 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
986 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
987 self.outbound_scid_alias
990 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
991 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
992 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
993 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
994 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
997 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
998 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
999 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1000 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1003 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1004 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1005 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1008 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1009 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1010 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1011 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1015 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1018 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1019 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1022 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1023 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1026 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1027 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1028 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1031 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1032 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1036 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1037 self.counterparty_node_id
1040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1041 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1042 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1045 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1046 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1050 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1051 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1053 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1054 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1055 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1056 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1058 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1062 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1063 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1064 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1067 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1068 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1069 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1072 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1073 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1074 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1076 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1077 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1082 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1083 self.channel_value_satoshis
1086 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1087 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1090 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1091 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1094 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1095 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1096 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1098 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1099 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1100 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1101 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1102 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1104 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1108 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1109 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1110 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1113 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1114 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1115 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1118 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1119 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1120 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1123 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1124 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1125 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1128 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1129 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1130 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1133 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1134 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1135 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1138 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1139 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1140 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1141 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1142 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1145 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1147 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1148 self.prev_config = None;
1152 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1153 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1157 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1158 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1159 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1160 let did_channel_update =
1161 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1162 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1163 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1164 if did_channel_update {
1165 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1166 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1167 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1168 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1170 self.config.options = *config;
1174 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1175 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1176 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1179 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1180 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1181 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1182 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1183 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1185 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1186 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1187 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1188 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1189 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1190 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1191 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1193 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1194 where L::Target: Logger
1196 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1197 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1198 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1200 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1201 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1202 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1203 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1205 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1206 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1207 if match update_state {
1208 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1209 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1210 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1211 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1212 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1214 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1218 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1219 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1220 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1221 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1223 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1224 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1225 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1227 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1228 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1229 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1230 transaction_output_index: None
1235 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1236 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1237 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1238 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1239 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1242 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1244 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1245 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1246 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1248 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1249 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1252 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1253 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1256 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1258 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1259 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1260 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1262 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1263 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1269 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1270 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1271 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1272 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1273 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1274 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1275 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1279 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1280 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1282 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1284 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1285 if generated_by_local {
1286 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1287 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1296 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1298 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1299 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1300 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1301 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1302 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1303 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1304 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1307 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1308 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1309 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1310 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1314 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1315 preimages.push(preimage);
1319 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1320 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1322 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1325 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1327 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1328 if !generated_by_local {
1329 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1337 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1338 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1339 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1340 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1341 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1342 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1343 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1344 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1346 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1348 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1349 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1350 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1351 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1353 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1355 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1356 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1357 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1358 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1361 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1362 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1363 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1364 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1366 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1369 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1370 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1371 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1372 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1374 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1377 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1378 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1383 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1384 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1389 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1391 let channel_parameters =
1392 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1393 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1394 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1401 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1404 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1405 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1406 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1407 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1409 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1410 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1411 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1419 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1420 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1426 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1427 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1428 /// our counterparty!)
1429 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1430 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1431 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1432 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1433 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1434 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1435 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1437 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1441 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1442 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1443 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1444 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1445 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1446 //may see payments to it!
1447 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1448 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1449 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1451 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1454 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1455 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1456 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1457 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1458 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1461 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1462 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1465 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1469 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1470 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1471 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1472 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1473 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1474 // which are near the dust limit.
1475 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1476 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1477 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1478 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1479 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1481 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1482 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1484 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1487 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1488 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1489 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1492 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1493 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1495 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1496 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1497 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1498 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1499 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1500 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1501 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1504 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1507 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1508 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1509 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1511 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1512 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1513 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1514 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1515 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1516 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1518 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1519 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1525 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1526 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1528 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1529 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1530 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1531 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1532 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1533 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1534 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1537 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1540 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1541 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1542 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1544 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1545 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1546 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1547 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1548 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1549 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1551 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1552 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1556 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1557 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1558 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1559 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1560 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1561 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1562 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1564 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1565 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1567 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1574 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1575 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1576 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1577 /// corner case properly.
1578 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1579 -> AvailableBalances
1580 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1582 let context = &self;
1583 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1584 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1585 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1587 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1588 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1589 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1590 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1593 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1595 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1596 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1598 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1600 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1602 if context.is_outbound() {
1603 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1604 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1606 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1607 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1609 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1610 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1611 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1612 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1615 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1616 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1617 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1618 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1620 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1621 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1622 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1623 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1624 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1625 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1626 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1627 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1628 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1629 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1631 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1634 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1635 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1636 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1637 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1638 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1641 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1642 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1644 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1645 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1646 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1648 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1649 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1650 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1651 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1655 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1657 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1658 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1659 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1660 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1661 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1662 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1663 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1665 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1666 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1668 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1669 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1670 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1672 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1673 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1674 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1675 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1676 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1679 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1680 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1681 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1682 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1683 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1684 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1687 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1688 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1689 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1691 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1695 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1696 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1698 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1699 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1703 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1704 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1705 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1706 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1708 outbound_capacity_msat,
1709 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1710 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1715 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1716 let context = &self;
1717 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1720 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1721 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1723 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1724 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1726 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1727 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1729 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1730 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1731 let context = &self;
1732 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1734 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1737 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1738 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1740 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1741 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1743 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1744 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1746 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1747 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1751 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1752 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1758 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1759 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1760 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1763 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1764 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1765 included_htlcs += 1;
1768 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1769 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1773 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1774 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1775 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1776 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1777 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1778 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1783 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1785 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1786 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1791 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1792 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1796 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1797 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1801 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1802 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1804 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1805 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1806 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1808 total_pending_htlcs,
1809 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1810 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1811 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1813 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1814 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1817 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1819 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1824 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1825 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1827 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1828 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1830 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1831 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1833 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1834 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1835 let context = &self;
1836 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1838 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1841 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1842 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1844 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1845 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1847 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1848 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1850 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1851 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1855 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1862 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1863 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1864 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1865 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1866 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1867 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1870 included_htlcs += 1;
1873 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1874 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1877 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1878 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1880 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1881 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1882 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1887 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1888 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1892 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1893 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1895 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1896 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1898 total_pending_htlcs,
1899 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1900 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1901 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1903 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1904 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1905 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1907 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1909 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1914 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1915 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1916 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1917 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1923 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1924 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1925 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1926 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1927 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1928 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1929 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1930 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1931 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1932 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1933 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1935 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1936 // return them to fail the payment.
1937 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1938 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1939 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1941 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1942 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1947 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1948 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1949 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1950 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1951 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1952 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1953 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1954 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1955 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1956 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1957 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1958 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1959 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1964 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1965 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1966 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1970 // Internal utility functions for channels
1972 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1973 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1974 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1976 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1978 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1979 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1980 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1982 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1985 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1987 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1990 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1991 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1992 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1994 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1996 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1997 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1998 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1999 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2000 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2003 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2004 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2005 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2006 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2007 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2008 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2009 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2012 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2013 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2015 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2016 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2019 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2020 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2021 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2022 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2023 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2024 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2027 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2028 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2029 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2032 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2033 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2034 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2035 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2038 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2039 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2041 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2042 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2043 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2047 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2048 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2049 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2050 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2051 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2053 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2054 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2055 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2056 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2057 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2058 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2059 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2060 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2061 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2062 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2067 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2068 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2069 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2070 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2071 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2072 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2074 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2076 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2077 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2078 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2079 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2080 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2081 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2082 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2083 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2085 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2086 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2096 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2097 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2098 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2099 // outside of those situations will fail.
2100 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2104 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2109 1 + // script length (0)
2113 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2114 2 + // witness marker and flag
2115 1 + // witness element count
2116 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2117 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2118 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2119 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2120 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2121 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2123 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2124 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2125 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2131 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2132 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2133 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2134 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2136 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2137 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2138 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2140 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2141 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2142 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2143 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2144 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2145 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2148 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2149 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2152 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2153 value_to_holder = 0;
2156 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2157 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2158 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2159 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2161 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2162 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2165 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2166 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2169 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2172 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2173 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2175 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2177 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2178 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2179 where L::Target: Logger {
2180 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2181 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2182 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2183 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2184 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2185 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2186 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2187 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2191 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2192 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2193 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2194 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2196 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2197 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2199 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2201 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2203 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2204 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2205 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2207 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2208 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2209 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2210 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2211 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2213 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2214 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2215 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2217 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2218 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2220 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2223 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2224 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2228 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2232 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2233 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2234 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2235 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2236 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2237 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2240 // Now update local state:
2242 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2243 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2244 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2245 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2246 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2247 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2248 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2252 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2253 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2254 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2255 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2256 // do not not get into this branch.
2257 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2258 match pending_update {
2259 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2260 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2261 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2262 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2263 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2264 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2265 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2268 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2269 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2270 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2271 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2272 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2273 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2274 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2280 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2281 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2282 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2284 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2285 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2286 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2288 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2289 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2292 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2293 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2295 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2296 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2298 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2299 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2302 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2305 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2306 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2307 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2308 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2313 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2314 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2315 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2316 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2317 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2318 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2319 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2320 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2321 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2322 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2323 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2324 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2325 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2326 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2327 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2329 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2330 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2331 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2332 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2333 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2336 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2337 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2338 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2344 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2345 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2347 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2351 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2352 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2353 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2354 /// before we fail backwards.
2356 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2357 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2358 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2359 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2360 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2361 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2362 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2365 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2366 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2367 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2368 /// before we fail backwards.
2370 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2371 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2372 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2373 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2374 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2375 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2376 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2378 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2380 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2381 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2382 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2384 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2385 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2386 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2388 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2389 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2390 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2392 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2397 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2398 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2404 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2405 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2406 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2407 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2408 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2412 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2413 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2414 force_holding_cell = true;
2417 // Now update local state:
2418 if force_holding_cell {
2419 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2420 match pending_update {
2421 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2422 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2423 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2424 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2428 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2429 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2430 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2431 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2437 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2438 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2439 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2445 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2447 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2448 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2451 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2452 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2453 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2458 // Message handlers:
2460 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2461 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2462 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2463 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2464 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2466 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2469 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2470 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2472 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2475 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2476 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2477 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2478 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2481 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2483 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2484 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2485 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2486 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2488 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2489 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2491 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2492 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2494 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2495 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2496 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2497 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2498 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2503 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2504 initial_commitment_tx,
2507 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2508 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2511 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2512 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2515 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2516 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2517 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2518 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2519 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2520 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2521 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2522 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2523 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2524 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2525 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2526 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2528 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2530 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2532 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2533 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2534 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2535 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2537 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2539 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2540 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2544 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2545 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2547 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2548 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2549 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2550 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2552 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2555 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2556 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2557 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2560 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2561 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2562 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2563 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2564 // when routing outbound payments.
2565 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2569 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2571 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2572 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2573 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2574 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2575 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2576 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2577 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2578 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2579 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2581 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2582 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2583 let expected_point =
2584 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2585 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2587 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2588 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2589 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2590 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2591 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2592 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2594 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2595 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2596 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2597 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2598 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2600 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2608 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2609 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2611 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2613 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2616 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2617 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2618 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2619 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2620 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2621 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2623 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2624 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2625 if local_sent_shutdown {
2626 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2628 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2629 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2630 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2631 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2633 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2636 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2639 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2642 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2646 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2647 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2648 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2649 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2651 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2652 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2654 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2655 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2656 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2657 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2658 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2659 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2660 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2661 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2662 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2663 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2664 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2666 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2667 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2668 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2669 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2670 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2671 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2675 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2676 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2679 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2680 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2681 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2683 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2684 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2685 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2686 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2687 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2688 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2689 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2693 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2694 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2695 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2696 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2697 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2698 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2699 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2703 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2704 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2705 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2706 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2707 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2711 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2712 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2713 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2714 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2715 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2717 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2718 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2721 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2725 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2726 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2727 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2728 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2729 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2730 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2731 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2732 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2733 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2734 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2735 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2736 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2737 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2738 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2739 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2740 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2743 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2744 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2745 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2746 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2750 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2753 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2757 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2758 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2759 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2763 // Now update local state:
2764 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2765 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2766 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2767 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2768 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2769 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2770 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2775 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2777 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2778 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2779 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2780 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2781 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2782 None => fail_reason.into(),
2783 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2784 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2785 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2786 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2788 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2792 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2793 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2794 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2795 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2797 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2798 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2803 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2806 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2807 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2810 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2811 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2814 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2817 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2818 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2819 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2821 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2825 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2829 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2830 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2833 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2837 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2841 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2842 where L::Target: Logger
2844 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2847 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2850 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2854 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2856 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2858 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2859 let commitment_txid = {
2860 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2861 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2862 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2864 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2865 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2866 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2867 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2868 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2873 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2875 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2876 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2877 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2878 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2881 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2882 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2883 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2887 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2889 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2890 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2891 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2892 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2893 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2894 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2895 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2896 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2897 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2898 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2899 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2905 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2906 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2909 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2910 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2911 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2912 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2913 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2914 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2915 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2916 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2917 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2918 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2919 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2920 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2921 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2924 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2925 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2926 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2927 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2928 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2929 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2930 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2932 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2933 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2934 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2935 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2936 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2937 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2938 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2941 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2942 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2945 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2947 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2948 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2949 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2952 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2955 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2956 commitment_stats.tx,
2958 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2959 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2960 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2963 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2964 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2966 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2967 let mut need_commitment = false;
2968 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2969 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2970 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2971 need_commitment = true;
2975 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2976 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2977 Some(forward_info.clone())
2979 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2980 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2981 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2982 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2983 need_commitment = true;
2986 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2987 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2988 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2989 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2990 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2991 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2992 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2993 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2994 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2995 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2996 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2997 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2998 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2999 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3001 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3003 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3004 need_commitment = true;
3008 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3009 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3010 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3011 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3012 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3013 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3015 nondust_htlc_sources,
3019 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3020 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3021 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3022 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3024 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3025 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3026 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3027 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3028 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3029 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3030 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3031 // includes the right HTLCs.
3032 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3033 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3034 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3035 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3036 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3037 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3039 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3040 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3041 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3044 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3045 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3046 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3047 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3048 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3049 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3050 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3051 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3052 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3056 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3057 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3058 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3059 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3062 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3063 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3064 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3065 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3066 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3067 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3068 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3070 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3071 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3072 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3073 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3076 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3077 /// for our counterparty.
3078 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3079 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3080 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3081 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3083 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3084 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3085 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3086 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3088 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3089 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3090 updates: Vec::new(),
3093 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3094 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3095 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3096 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3097 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3098 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3099 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3100 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3101 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3102 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3103 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3104 // to rebalance channels.
3105 match &htlc_update {
3106 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3107 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3108 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3110 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3111 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3113 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3116 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3117 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3118 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3119 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3120 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3121 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3122 // into the holding cell without ever being
3123 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3124 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3125 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3128 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3134 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3135 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3136 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3137 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3138 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3139 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3140 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3141 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3142 (msg, monitor_update)
3143 } else { unreachable!() };
3144 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3145 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3147 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3148 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3149 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3150 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3151 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3152 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3153 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3154 // for a full revocation before failing.
3155 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3158 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3160 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3167 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3168 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3170 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3171 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3176 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3177 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3178 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3179 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3180 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3182 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3183 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3184 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3186 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3187 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3193 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3194 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3195 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3196 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3197 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3198 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3199 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3200 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3201 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3203 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3206 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3209 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3213 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3215 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3216 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3221 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3222 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3223 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3224 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3225 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3226 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3227 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3228 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3229 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3232 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3234 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3235 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3238 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3239 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3241 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3243 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3244 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3245 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3246 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3247 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3248 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3249 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3250 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3254 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3255 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3256 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3257 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3258 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3259 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3260 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3261 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3262 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3264 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3265 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3268 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3269 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3270 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3271 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3272 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3273 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3274 let mut require_commitment = false;
3275 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3278 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3279 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3280 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3282 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3283 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3284 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3285 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3286 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3287 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3292 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3293 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3294 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3295 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3296 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3298 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3299 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3300 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3305 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3306 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3308 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3312 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3313 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3315 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3316 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3317 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3318 require_commitment = true;
3319 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3320 match forward_info {
3321 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3322 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3323 require_commitment = true;
3325 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3326 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3327 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3329 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3330 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3331 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3335 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3336 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3337 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3338 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3344 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3345 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3346 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3347 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3349 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3350 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3351 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3352 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3353 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3354 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3355 require_commitment = true;
3359 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3361 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3362 match update_state {
3363 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3364 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3365 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3366 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3367 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3369 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3370 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3371 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3372 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3373 require_commitment = true;
3374 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3375 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3380 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3381 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3382 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3383 if require_commitment {
3384 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3385 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3386 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3387 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3388 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3389 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3390 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3391 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3392 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3394 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3395 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3396 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3397 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3398 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3401 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3402 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3403 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3404 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3405 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3406 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3408 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3409 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3411 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3412 if require_commitment {
3413 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3415 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3416 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3417 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3418 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3420 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3421 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3422 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3423 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3425 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3426 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3427 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3433 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3434 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3435 /// commitment update.
3436 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3437 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3438 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3440 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3441 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3444 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3445 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3446 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3447 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3449 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3450 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3451 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3452 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3453 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3454 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3455 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3457 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3458 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3460 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3461 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3463 if !self.context.is_live() {
3464 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3467 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3468 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3469 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3470 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3471 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3472 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3473 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3474 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3475 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3476 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3480 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3481 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3482 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3483 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3484 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3485 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3488 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3489 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3493 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3494 force_holding_cell = true;
3497 if force_holding_cell {
3498 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3502 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3503 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3505 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3506 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3511 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3512 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3514 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3516 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3517 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3518 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3519 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3523 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3524 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3525 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3529 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3530 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3533 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3534 // will be retransmitted.
3535 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3536 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3537 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3539 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3540 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3542 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3543 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3544 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3545 // this HTLC accordingly
3546 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3549 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3550 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3551 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3552 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3555 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3556 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3557 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3558 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3559 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3560 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3565 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3567 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3568 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3569 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3570 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3574 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3575 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3576 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3577 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3578 // the update upon reconnection.
3579 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3583 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3585 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3586 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3589 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3590 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3591 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3592 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3593 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3594 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3595 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3597 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3598 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3599 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3600 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3601 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3602 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3603 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3605 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3606 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3607 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3608 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3609 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3610 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3611 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3614 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3615 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3616 /// to the remote side.
3617 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3618 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3619 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3620 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3623 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3625 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3626 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3628 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3629 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3630 // first received the funding_signed.
3631 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3632 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3633 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3635 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3636 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3637 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3638 funding_broadcastable = None;
3641 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3642 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3643 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3644 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3645 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3646 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3647 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3648 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3649 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3650 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3651 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3652 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3653 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3654 next_per_commitment_point,
3655 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3659 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3661 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3662 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3663 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3664 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3665 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3666 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3668 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3669 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3670 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3671 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3672 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3673 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3677 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3678 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3680 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3681 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3682 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3685 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3686 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3687 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3688 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3689 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3690 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3691 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3692 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3693 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3697 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3698 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3700 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3701 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3703 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3704 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3706 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3707 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3709 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3710 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3711 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3712 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3713 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3714 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3715 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3716 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3717 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3718 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3719 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3720 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3721 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3722 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3724 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3725 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3726 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3732 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3733 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3734 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3735 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3736 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3737 per_commitment_secret,
3738 next_per_commitment_point,
3740 next_local_nonce: None,
3744 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3745 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3746 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3747 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3748 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3750 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3751 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3752 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3753 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3754 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3755 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3756 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3757 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3758 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3759 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3764 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3765 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3767 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3768 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3769 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3770 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3771 reason: err_packet.clone()
3774 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3775 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3776 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3777 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3778 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3779 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3782 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3783 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3784 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3785 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3786 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3793 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3794 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3795 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3796 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3800 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3801 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3802 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3803 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3804 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3805 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3809 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3810 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3812 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3813 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3814 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3815 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3816 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3817 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3818 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3819 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3822 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3824 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3825 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3826 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3827 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3831 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3832 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3836 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3837 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3838 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3839 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3840 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3843 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3844 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3845 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3846 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3847 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3850 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3851 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3852 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3853 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3854 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3855 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3856 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3857 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3861 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3862 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3863 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3864 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3866 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3870 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3871 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3872 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3873 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3875 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3876 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3877 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3878 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3879 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3883 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3885 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3886 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3887 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3888 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3889 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3892 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3893 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3894 channel_ready: None,
3895 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3896 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3897 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3901 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3902 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3903 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3904 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3905 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3906 next_per_commitment_point,
3907 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3909 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3910 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3911 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3915 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3916 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3917 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3919 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3920 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3921 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3924 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3930 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3931 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3932 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3933 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3934 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3935 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3936 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3938 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3940 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3941 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3942 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3943 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3944 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3945 next_per_commitment_point,
3946 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3950 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3951 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3952 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3954 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3957 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3958 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3959 raa: required_revoke,
3960 commitment_update: None,
3961 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3963 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3964 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3965 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3967 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3970 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3971 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3972 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3973 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3974 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3975 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3978 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3979 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3980 raa: required_revoke,
3981 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3982 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3986 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3990 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3991 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3992 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3993 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3995 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3997 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3999 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4000 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4001 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4002 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4003 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4004 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4006 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4007 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4008 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4009 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4010 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4012 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4013 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4014 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4015 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4018 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4019 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4020 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4021 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4022 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4023 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4024 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4025 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4026 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4027 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4028 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4029 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4030 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4031 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4032 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4034 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4037 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4038 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4041 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4042 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4043 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4044 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4045 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4046 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4049 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4050 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4051 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4052 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4053 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4054 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4057 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4063 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4064 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4065 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4066 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4068 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4069 return Ok((None, None));
4072 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4073 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4074 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4076 return Ok((None, None));
4079 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4081 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4082 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4083 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4084 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4086 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4087 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4088 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4090 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4091 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4092 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4093 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4095 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4096 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4097 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4102 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4103 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4105 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4106 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4109 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4110 /// within our expected timeframe.
4112 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4113 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4114 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4117 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4120 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4121 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4124 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4125 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4126 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4127 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4129 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4132 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4133 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4134 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4135 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4138 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4139 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4143 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4145 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4146 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4149 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4150 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4154 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4157 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4158 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4159 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4160 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4162 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4165 assert!(send_shutdown);
4166 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4167 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4168 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4170 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4171 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4173 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4178 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4180 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4181 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4183 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4184 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4185 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4186 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4187 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4188 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4191 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4192 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4194 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4195 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4196 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4197 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4201 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4202 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4203 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4204 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4205 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4206 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4208 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4209 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4216 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4217 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4219 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4222 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4223 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4225 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4227 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4228 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4229 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4230 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4231 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4232 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4233 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4234 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4235 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4237 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4238 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4241 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4245 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4246 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4247 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4248 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4250 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4253 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4256 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4259 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4260 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4263 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4267 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4268 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4269 return Ok((None, None));
4272 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4273 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4274 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4277 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4279 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4282 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4283 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4284 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4285 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4286 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4290 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4291 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4296 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4297 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4298 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4299 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4300 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4301 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4302 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4306 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4308 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4309 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4310 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4311 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4313 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4316 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4317 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4318 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4320 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4321 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4322 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4323 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4327 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4328 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4329 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4330 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4332 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4333 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4334 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4340 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4341 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4342 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4344 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4347 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4348 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4351 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4352 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4353 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4354 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4355 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4357 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4358 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4359 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4361 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4362 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4365 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4366 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4367 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4368 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4369 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4370 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4371 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4372 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4377 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4378 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4379 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4380 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4382 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4386 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4387 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4388 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4389 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4391 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4397 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4398 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4399 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4400 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4401 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4402 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4403 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4405 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4406 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4409 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4411 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4412 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4418 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4419 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4420 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4421 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4422 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4423 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4424 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4426 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4427 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4434 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4435 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4438 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4439 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4442 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4443 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4447 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4448 &self.context.holder_signer
4452 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4454 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4455 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4456 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4457 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4458 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4459 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4461 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4463 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4471 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4472 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4476 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4477 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4478 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4479 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4482 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4483 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4484 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4485 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4488 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4489 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4490 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4491 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4492 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4493 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4496 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4497 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4498 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4499 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4500 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4501 if !release_monitor {
4502 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4511 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4512 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4515 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4516 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4517 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4519 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4520 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4521 if self.context.channel_state &
4522 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4523 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4524 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4525 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4526 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4529 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4530 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4531 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4532 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4533 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4534 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4536 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4537 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4538 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4540 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4541 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4542 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4543 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4544 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4545 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4551 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4552 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4553 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4556 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4557 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4558 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4561 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4562 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4563 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4566 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4567 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4568 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4569 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4570 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4571 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4576 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4577 self.context.channel_update_status
4580 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4581 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4582 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4585 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4587 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4588 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4589 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4593 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4594 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4595 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4598 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4602 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4603 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4604 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4606 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4607 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4608 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4610 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4611 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4614 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4615 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4616 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4617 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4618 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4619 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4620 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4621 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4622 self.context.channel_state);
4624 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4628 if need_commitment_update {
4629 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4630 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4631 let next_per_commitment_point =
4632 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4633 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4634 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4635 next_per_commitment_point,
4636 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4640 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4646 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4647 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4648 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4649 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4650 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4651 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4652 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4654 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4657 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4658 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4659 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4660 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4661 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4662 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4663 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4664 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4665 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4666 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4667 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4668 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4669 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4670 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4671 // channel and move on.
4672 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4673 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4675 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4676 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4677 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4679 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4680 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4681 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4682 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4683 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4684 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4685 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4689 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4690 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4691 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4692 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4693 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4697 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4698 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4699 // may have already happened for this block).
4700 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4701 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4702 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4703 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4706 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4707 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4708 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4709 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4717 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4718 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4719 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4720 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4722 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4723 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4726 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4728 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4729 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4730 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4731 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4733 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4736 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4739 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4740 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4741 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4742 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4744 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4747 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4748 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4749 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4751 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4752 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4754 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4755 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4756 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4764 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4766 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4767 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4768 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4770 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4771 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4774 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4775 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4776 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4777 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4778 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4779 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4780 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4781 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4782 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4785 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4786 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4787 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4788 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4790 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4791 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4792 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4794 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4795 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4796 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4797 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4799 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4800 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4801 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4802 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4803 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4804 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4805 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4808 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4809 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4811 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4814 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4815 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4816 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4817 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4818 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4819 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4820 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4821 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4822 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4823 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4824 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4825 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4826 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4827 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4828 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4829 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4830 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4836 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4841 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4842 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4844 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4845 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4846 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4847 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4849 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4852 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4853 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4854 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4855 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4856 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4857 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4859 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4860 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4863 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4864 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4865 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4866 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4868 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4869 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4871 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4872 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4873 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4874 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4875 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4876 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4882 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4883 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4884 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4885 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4887 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4890 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4894 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4898 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4899 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4903 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4907 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4908 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4911 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4915 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4917 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4922 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4924 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4929 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4931 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4932 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4933 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4934 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4935 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4939 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4941 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4942 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4943 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4944 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4945 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4946 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4947 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4949 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4950 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4951 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4952 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4953 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4954 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4955 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4956 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4957 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4958 contents: announcement,
4961 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4965 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4966 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4967 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4968 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4969 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4970 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4971 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4972 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4974 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4976 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4978 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4979 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4981 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4983 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4984 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4987 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4988 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4989 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4990 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4993 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4996 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4997 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4998 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4999 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5000 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5001 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5004 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5006 Err(_) => return None,
5008 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5009 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5014 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5015 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5016 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5017 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5018 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5019 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5020 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5021 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5022 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5023 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5024 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5025 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5026 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5027 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5028 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5029 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5032 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5035 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5036 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5037 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5038 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5039 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5040 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5041 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5042 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5043 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5045 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5046 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5047 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5048 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5049 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5050 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5051 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5052 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5053 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5055 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5056 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5057 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5058 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5059 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5060 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5061 next_funding_txid: None,
5066 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5068 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5069 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5070 /// commitment update.
5072 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5073 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5074 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5075 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5076 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5077 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5078 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5081 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5082 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5083 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5085 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5086 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5091 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5092 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5094 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5096 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5097 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5099 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5100 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5101 /// regenerate them.
5103 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5104 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5106 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5107 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5108 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5109 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5110 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5111 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5112 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5114 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5115 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5117 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5118 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5119 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5122 if amount_msat == 0 {
5123 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5126 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5127 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5128 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5129 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5132 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5133 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5134 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5137 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5138 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5139 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5140 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5141 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5142 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5143 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5144 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5147 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5148 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5149 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5150 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5151 else { "to peer" });
5153 if need_holding_cell {
5154 force_holding_cell = true;
5157 // Now update local state:
5158 if force_holding_cell {
5159 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5164 onion_routing_packet,
5170 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5171 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5173 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5175 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5180 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5181 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5182 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5186 onion_routing_packet,
5189 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5194 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5195 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5196 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5197 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5199 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5200 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5201 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5203 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5204 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5208 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5209 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5210 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5211 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5212 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5213 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5214 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5217 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5218 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5219 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5220 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5221 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5222 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5225 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5227 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5228 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5229 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5231 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5232 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5235 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5236 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5237 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5238 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5239 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5240 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5241 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5242 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5245 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5249 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5250 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5251 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5252 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5254 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5256 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5257 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5258 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5259 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5260 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5261 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5262 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5263 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5264 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5265 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5266 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5272 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5275 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5276 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5277 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5278 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5279 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5280 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5282 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5283 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5284 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5285 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5288 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5289 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5293 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5294 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5296 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5298 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5299 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5300 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5301 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5303 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5304 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5305 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5306 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5307 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5308 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5312 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5313 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5317 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5318 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5321 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5322 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5324 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5325 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5326 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5327 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5328 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5329 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5330 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5331 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5333 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5334 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5335 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5338 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5339 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5340 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5346 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5347 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5350 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5351 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5352 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5353 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5359 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5360 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5362 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5363 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5364 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5365 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5366 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5367 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5368 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5369 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5370 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5373 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5374 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5375 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5377 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5378 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5381 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5382 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5384 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5385 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5386 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5389 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5390 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5391 let mut chan_closed = false;
5392 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5396 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5398 None if !chan_closed => {
5399 // use override shutdown script if provided
5400 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5401 Some(script) => script,
5403 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5404 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5405 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5406 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5410 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5411 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5413 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5419 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5420 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5421 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5422 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5424 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5426 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5428 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5429 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5430 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5431 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5432 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5433 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5436 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5437 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5439 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5440 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5441 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5444 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5445 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5446 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5447 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5448 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5450 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5451 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5458 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5459 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5461 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5464 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5465 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5466 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5468 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5469 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5473 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5477 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5478 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5479 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5482 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5483 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5484 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5485 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5486 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5487 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5488 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5489 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5490 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5492 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5493 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5494 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5495 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5497 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5498 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5500 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5501 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5503 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5504 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5505 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5507 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5508 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5510 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5511 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5512 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5513 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5514 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5517 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5518 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5520 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5521 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5523 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5525 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5527 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5528 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5529 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5530 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5533 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5534 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5536 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5537 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5538 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5539 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5543 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5544 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5545 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5549 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5550 Ok(script) => script,
5551 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5554 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5557 context: ChannelContext {
5560 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5561 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5562 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5563 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5568 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5570 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5571 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5572 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5573 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5575 channel_value_satoshis,
5577 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5580 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5583 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5584 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5587 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5588 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5589 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5590 pending_update_fee: None,
5591 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5592 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5593 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5594 update_time_counter: 1,
5596 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5598 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5599 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5600 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5601 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5602 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5603 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5606 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5607 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5608 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5610 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5611 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5612 closing_fee_limits: None,
5613 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5615 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5617 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5618 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5619 short_channel_id: None,
5620 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5622 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5623 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5624 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5625 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5626 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5627 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5628 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5629 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5630 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5631 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5632 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5633 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5635 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5637 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5638 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5639 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5640 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5641 counterparty_parameters: None,
5642 funding_outpoint: None,
5643 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5645 funding_transaction: None,
5647 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5648 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5649 counterparty_node_id,
5651 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5653 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5655 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5656 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5658 announcement_sigs: None,
5660 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5661 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5662 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5663 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5665 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5666 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5668 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5669 outbound_scid_alias,
5671 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5672 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5674 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5675 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5680 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5685 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5686 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5687 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5688 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5689 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5690 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5693 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5694 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5695 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5696 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5697 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5698 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5699 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5700 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5701 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5702 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5703 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5705 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5706 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5708 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5709 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5710 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5711 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5714 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5715 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5717 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5720 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5721 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5722 return Err((self, e));
5726 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5728 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5730 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5731 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5732 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5734 let channel = Channel {
5735 context: self.context,
5738 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5739 temporary_channel_id,
5740 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5741 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5744 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5746 next_local_nonce: None,
5750 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5751 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5752 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5753 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5754 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5755 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5756 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5757 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5758 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5759 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5762 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5763 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5764 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5765 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5766 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5767 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5773 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5774 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5775 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5776 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5777 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5778 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5780 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5782 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5783 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5784 // We've exhausted our options
5787 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5788 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5791 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5792 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5793 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5794 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5796 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5797 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5798 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5799 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5800 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5801 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5803 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5805 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5806 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5809 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5810 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5811 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5813 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5814 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5817 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5818 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5821 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5822 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5826 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5827 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5828 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5829 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5830 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5831 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5832 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5833 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5834 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5835 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5836 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5837 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5838 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5839 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5840 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5841 first_per_commitment_point,
5842 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5843 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5844 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5845 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5847 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5852 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5853 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5855 // Check sanity of message fields:
5856 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5859 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5862 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5865 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5868 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5871 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5872 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5873 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5875 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5876 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5877 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5879 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5880 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5881 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5883 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5886 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5890 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5891 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5892 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5894 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5897 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5898 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5900 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5903 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5906 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5909 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5910 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5913 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5914 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5917 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5918 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5920 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5921 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5924 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5925 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5928 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5929 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5930 &Some(ref script) => {
5931 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5932 if script.len() == 0 {
5935 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5938 Some(script.clone())
5941 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5948 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5949 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5950 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5951 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5952 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5954 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5955 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5957 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5960 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5961 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5962 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5963 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5964 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5965 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5968 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5969 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5970 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5973 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5974 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5976 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5977 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5983 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5984 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5985 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5988 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5989 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5990 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5991 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5992 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5993 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5994 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5995 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5996 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5997 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5998 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5999 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6002 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6004 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6005 // support this channel type.
6006 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6007 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6011 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6012 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6013 // `static_remote_key`.
6014 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6017 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6018 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6019 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6021 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6024 channel_type.clone()
6026 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6027 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6033 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6034 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6035 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6036 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6037 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6038 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6039 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6040 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6041 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6044 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6048 // Check sanity of message fields:
6049 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6052 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6055 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6058 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6059 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6060 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6062 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6065 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6068 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6070 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6071 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6074 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6077 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6081 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6082 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6085 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6088 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6091 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6094 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6097 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6100 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6101 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6104 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6106 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6107 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6108 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6112 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6113 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6114 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6115 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6118 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6121 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6122 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6123 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6125 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6126 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6129 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6130 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6131 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6132 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6133 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6137 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6138 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6139 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6140 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6144 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6145 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6146 &Some(ref script) => {
6147 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6148 if script.len() == 0 {
6151 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6154 Some(script.clone())
6157 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6164 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6165 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6166 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6167 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6171 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6172 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6177 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6178 Ok(script) => script,
6179 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6182 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6183 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6186 context: ChannelContext {
6189 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6190 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6192 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6197 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6199 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6200 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6201 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6202 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6205 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6208 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6211 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6212 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6213 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6215 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6216 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6217 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6218 pending_update_fee: None,
6219 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6220 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6221 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6222 update_time_counter: 1,
6224 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6226 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6227 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6228 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6229 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6230 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6231 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6233 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6234 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6235 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6236 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6238 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6239 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6240 closing_fee_limits: None,
6241 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6243 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6245 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6246 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6247 short_channel_id: None,
6248 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6250 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6251 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6252 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6253 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6254 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6255 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6256 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6257 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6258 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6259 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6260 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6261 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6262 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6264 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6266 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6267 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6268 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6269 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6270 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6271 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6272 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6274 funding_outpoint: None,
6275 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6277 funding_transaction: None,
6279 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6280 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6281 counterparty_node_id,
6283 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6285 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6287 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6288 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6290 announcement_sigs: None,
6292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6293 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6295 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6297 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6298 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6300 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6301 outbound_scid_alias,
6303 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6304 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6306 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6307 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6312 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6319 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6320 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6323 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6324 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6325 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6326 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6329 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6330 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6332 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6333 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6334 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6335 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6337 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6338 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6340 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6341 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6343 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6344 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6347 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6348 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6350 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6353 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6354 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6355 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6357 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6358 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6359 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6360 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6362 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6363 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6364 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6365 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6366 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6367 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6368 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6369 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6370 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6371 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6372 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6373 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6374 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6375 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6376 first_per_commitment_point,
6377 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6378 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6379 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6381 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6383 next_local_nonce: None,
6387 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6388 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6390 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6392 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6393 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6396 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6397 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6399 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6400 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6402 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6403 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6404 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6405 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6406 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6407 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6408 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6409 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6410 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6413 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6414 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6416 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6417 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6418 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6419 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6421 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6422 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6424 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6425 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6428 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6429 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6430 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6432 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6435 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6436 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6438 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6439 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6440 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6442 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6444 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6445 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6447 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6448 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6449 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6450 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6453 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6454 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6455 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6456 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6457 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6459 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6461 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6462 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6463 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6466 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6467 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6468 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6472 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6473 initial_commitment_tx,
6476 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6477 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6480 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6481 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6484 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6486 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6487 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6488 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6489 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6490 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6491 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6492 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6493 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6494 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6495 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6496 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6498 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6500 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6502 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6503 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6504 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6505 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6507 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6509 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6510 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6511 let mut channel = Channel {
6512 context: self.context,
6514 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6515 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6516 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6518 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6522 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6523 }, channel_monitor))
6527 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6528 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6530 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6536 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6537 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6538 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6539 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6540 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6542 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6543 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6544 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6545 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6551 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6552 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6553 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6554 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6555 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6556 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6561 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6562 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6563 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6564 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6566 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6567 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6568 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6569 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6574 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6575 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6576 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6577 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6578 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6579 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6584 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6585 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6586 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6589 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6591 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6592 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6593 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6594 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6595 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6597 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6598 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6599 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6600 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6602 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6603 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6604 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6606 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6608 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6609 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6610 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6611 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6612 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6613 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6615 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6616 // deserialized from that format.
6617 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6618 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6619 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6621 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6623 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6624 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6625 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6627 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6628 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6629 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6630 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6633 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6634 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6635 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6638 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6639 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6640 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6641 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6643 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6644 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6646 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6648 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6650 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6652 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6655 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6657 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6662 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6663 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6665 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6666 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6667 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6668 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6669 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6670 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6671 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6673 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6675 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6677 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6680 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6681 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6682 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6685 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6687 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6688 preimages.push(preimage);
6690 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6691 reason.write(writer)?;
6693 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6695 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6696 preimages.push(preimage);
6698 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6699 reason.write(writer)?;
6702 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6703 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6704 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6706 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6707 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6708 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6712 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6713 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6714 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6716 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6717 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6721 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6722 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6723 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6724 source.write(writer)?;
6725 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6727 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6728 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6729 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6731 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6732 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6734 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6736 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6737 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6739 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6741 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6742 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6747 match self.context.resend_order {
6748 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6749 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6752 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6753 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6754 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6756 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6757 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6758 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6759 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6762 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6763 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6764 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6765 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6766 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6769 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6770 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6771 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6772 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6774 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6775 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6776 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6778 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6780 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6781 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6782 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6783 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6785 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6786 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6787 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6788 // consider the stale state on reload.
6791 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6792 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6793 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6795 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6796 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6797 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6799 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6800 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6802 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6803 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6804 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6806 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6807 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6809 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6812 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6813 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6814 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6816 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6819 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6820 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6822 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6823 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6824 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6826 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6828 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6830 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6833 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6835 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6836 htlc.write(writer)?;
6839 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6840 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6841 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6843 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6844 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6846 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6847 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6848 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6849 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6850 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6851 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6852 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6854 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6855 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6856 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6857 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6858 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6860 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6861 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6863 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6864 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6865 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6866 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6868 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6870 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6871 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6872 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6873 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6874 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6875 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6876 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6878 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6879 (2, chan_type, option),
6880 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6881 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6882 (5, self.context.config, required),
6883 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6884 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6885 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6886 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6887 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6888 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6889 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6890 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6891 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6892 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6893 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6894 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6895 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6896 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6897 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6898 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6899 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6900 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6907 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6908 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6910 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6911 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6913 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6914 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6915 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6917 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6918 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6919 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6920 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6922 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6924 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6925 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6926 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6927 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6930 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6931 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6940 let mut keys_data = None;
6942 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6943 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6944 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6946 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6947 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6948 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6949 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6950 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6951 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6955 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6956 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6957 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6960 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6962 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6964 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6969 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6970 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6971 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6972 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6973 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6974 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6975 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6976 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6977 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6978 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6979 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6980 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6985 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6987 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6988 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6989 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6990 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6991 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6992 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6993 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6994 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6995 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6996 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6998 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6999 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7002 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7006 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7009 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7011 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7015 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7017 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7018 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7019 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7020 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7021 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7022 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7023 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7024 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7025 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7027 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7028 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7029 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7031 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7032 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7033 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7035 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7039 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7040 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7041 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7042 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7045 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7051 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7052 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7055 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7057 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7058 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7061 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7063 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7065 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7071 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7072 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7073 // consider the stale state on reload.
7074 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7077 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7078 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7079 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7081 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7084 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7085 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7086 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7088 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7089 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7091 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7093 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7094 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7096 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7097 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7099 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7103 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7105 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7106 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7108 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7109 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7112 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7114 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7115 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7116 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7117 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7119 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7122 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7123 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7125 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7127 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7128 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7130 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7133 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7136 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7137 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7139 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7141 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7145 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7146 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7147 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7149 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7155 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7156 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7157 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7158 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7159 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7160 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7161 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7162 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7163 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7164 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7166 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7167 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7168 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7169 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7170 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7171 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7172 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7174 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7175 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7176 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7177 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7179 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7181 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7182 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7184 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7185 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7186 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7187 (2, channel_type, option),
7188 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7189 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7190 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7191 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7192 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7193 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7194 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7195 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7196 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7197 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7198 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7199 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7200 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7201 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7202 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7203 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7204 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7205 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7206 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7207 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7208 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7211 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7212 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7213 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7214 // required channel parameters.
7215 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7216 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7217 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7219 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7221 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7222 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7223 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7224 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7227 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7228 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7229 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7231 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7232 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7234 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7235 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7240 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7241 if iter.next().is_some() {
7242 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7246 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7247 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7248 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7249 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7250 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7253 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7254 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7255 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7257 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7258 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7260 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7261 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7262 // separate u64 values.
7263 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7265 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7267 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7268 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7269 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7270 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7272 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7273 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7275 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7276 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7277 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7278 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7279 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7282 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7283 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7287 context: ChannelContext {
7290 config: config.unwrap(),
7294 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7295 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7296 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7299 temporary_channel_id,
7301 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7303 channel_value_satoshis,
7305 latest_monitor_update_id,
7308 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7311 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7312 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7315 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7316 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7317 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7318 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7322 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7323 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7324 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7325 monitor_pending_forwards,
7326 monitor_pending_failures,
7327 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7330 holding_cell_update_fee,
7331 next_holder_htlc_id,
7332 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7333 update_time_counter,
7336 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7337 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7338 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7339 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7341 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7342 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7343 closing_fee_limits: None,
7344 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7346 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7348 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7349 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7351 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7353 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7354 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7355 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7356 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7357 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7358 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7359 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7360 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7361 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7364 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7366 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7367 funding_transaction,
7369 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7370 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7371 counterparty_node_id,
7373 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7377 channel_update_status,
7378 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7382 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7383 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7384 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7385 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7387 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7388 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7390 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7391 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7392 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7394 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7395 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7397 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7398 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7400 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7403 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7412 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7413 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7414 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7415 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7416 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7418 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7419 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7420 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7421 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7422 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7423 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7424 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7425 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7426 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7427 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7428 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7429 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7430 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7431 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7432 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7433 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7434 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7435 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7436 use crate::util::test_utils;
7437 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7438 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7439 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7440 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7441 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7442 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7443 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7444 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7445 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7446 use crate::prelude::*;
7448 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7451 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7452 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7458 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7459 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7460 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7461 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7465 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7466 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7467 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7468 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7469 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7470 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(
7471 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7472 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7476 signer: InMemorySigner,
7479 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7480 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7483 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7484 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7486 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7487 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7490 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7494 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7496 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7497 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7498 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7499 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7500 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7503 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7504 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7505 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7506 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7510 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7511 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7512 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7516 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7517 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7518 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7519 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7521 let seed = [42; 32];
7522 let network = Network::Testnet;
7523 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7524 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7525 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7528 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7529 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7530 let config = UserConfig::default();
7531 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7532 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7533 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7535 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7536 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7540 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7541 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7543 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7544 let original_fee = 253;
7545 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7546 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7548 let seed = [42; 32];
7549 let network = Network::Testnet;
7550 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7552 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7553 let config = UserConfig::default();
7554 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7556 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7557 // same as the old fee.
7558 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7559 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7560 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7564 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7565 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7566 // dust limits are used.
7567 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7568 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7569 let seed = [42; 32];
7570 let network = Network::Testnet;
7571 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7572 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7573 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7575 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7576 // they have different dust limits.
7578 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7579 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7580 let config = UserConfig::default();
7581 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7583 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7584 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7585 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7586 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7587 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7589 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7590 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7591 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7592 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7593 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7595 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7596 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7597 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7598 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7600 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7601 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7602 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7604 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7605 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7607 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7608 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7609 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7611 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7612 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7613 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7614 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7617 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7619 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7620 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7621 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7622 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7623 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7624 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7625 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7626 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7627 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7629 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7632 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7633 // the dust limit check.
7634 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7635 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7636 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7637 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7639 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7640 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7641 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7642 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7643 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7644 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7645 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7649 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7650 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7651 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7652 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7653 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7654 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7655 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7656 let seed = [42; 32];
7657 let network = Network::Testnet;
7658 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7660 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7661 let config = UserConfig::default();
7662 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7664 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7665 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7667 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7668 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7669 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7670 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7671 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7672 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7674 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7675 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7676 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7677 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7678 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7680 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7682 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7683 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7684 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7685 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7686 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7688 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7689 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7690 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7691 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7692 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7696 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7697 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7698 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7699 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7700 let seed = [42; 32];
7701 let network = Network::Testnet;
7702 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7703 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7704 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7706 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7708 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7709 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7710 let config = UserConfig::default();
7711 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7713 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7714 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7715 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7716 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7718 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7719 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7720 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7722 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7723 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7724 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7725 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7727 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7728 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7729 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7731 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7732 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7734 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7735 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7736 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7737 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7738 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7739 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7740 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7742 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7744 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7745 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7746 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7747 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7748 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7752 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7753 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7754 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7755 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7756 let seed = [42; 32];
7757 let network = Network::Testnet;
7758 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7759 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7760 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7762 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7763 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7764 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7765 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7766 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7767 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7768 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7769 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7771 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7772 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7773 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7774 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7775 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7776 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7778 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7779 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7780 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7781 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7783 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7785 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7786 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7787 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7788 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7789 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7790 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7792 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7793 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7794 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7795 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7797 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7798 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7799 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7800 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7801 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7803 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7804 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7806 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7807 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7808 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7810 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7811 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7812 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7813 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7814 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7816 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7817 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7819 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7820 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7821 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7825 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7827 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7828 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7829 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7831 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7832 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7833 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7834 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7836 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7837 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7838 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7840 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7842 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7843 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7846 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7847 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7848 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7849 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7850 let seed = [42; 32];
7851 let network = Network::Testnet;
7852 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7853 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7854 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7857 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7858 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7859 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7861 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7862 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7864 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7865 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7866 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7868 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7869 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7871 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7873 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7874 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7876 // Channel Negotiations failed
7877 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7878 assert!(result.is_err());
7883 fn channel_update() {
7884 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7885 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7886 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7887 let seed = [42; 32];
7888 let network = Network::Testnet;
7889 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7890 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7891 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7893 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7894 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7895 let config = UserConfig::default();
7896 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7898 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7899 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7900 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7901 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7902 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7904 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7905 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7906 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7907 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7908 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7910 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7911 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7912 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7913 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7915 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7916 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7917 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7919 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7920 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7922 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7923 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7924 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7926 short_channel_id: 0,
7929 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7930 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7931 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7933 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7934 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7936 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7938 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7940 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7941 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7942 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7943 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7945 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7946 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7947 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7949 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7953 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7955 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7956 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7957 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7958 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7959 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7960 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7961 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7962 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7963 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7964 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7965 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7966 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7967 use crate::sync::Arc;
7969 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7970 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7971 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7972 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7974 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7976 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7977 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7978 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7979 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7980 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7982 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7983 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7989 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7990 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7991 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7993 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7994 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7995 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7996 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7997 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7998 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8000 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8002 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8003 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8004 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8005 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8006 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8007 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8009 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8010 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8011 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8012 selected_contest_delay: 144
8014 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8015 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8017 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8018 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8020 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8021 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8023 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8024 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8026 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8027 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8028 // build_commitment_transaction.
8029 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8030 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8031 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8032 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8033 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8035 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8036 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8037 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8038 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8042 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8043 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8044 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8045 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8049 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8050 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8051 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8053 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8054 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8056 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8057 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8059 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8061 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8062 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8063 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8064 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8065 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8066 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8067 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8069 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8070 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8071 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8072 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8074 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8075 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8076 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8078 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8080 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8081 commitment_tx.clone(),
8082 counterparty_signature,
8083 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8084 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8085 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8087 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8088 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8090 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8091 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8092 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8094 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8095 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8098 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8099 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8101 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8102 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8103 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8104 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8105 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8106 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8107 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8108 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8110 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8113 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8114 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8115 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8119 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8122 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8123 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8124 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8126 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8127 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8128 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8129 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8130 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8131 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8132 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8133 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8135 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8139 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8140 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8141 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8142 "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", {});
8144 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8145 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8147 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8148 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8149 "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", {});
8151 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8152 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8153 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8154 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8156 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8157 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8159 amount_msat: 1000000,
8161 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8162 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8164 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8167 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8168 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8170 amount_msat: 2000000,
8172 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8173 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8175 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8178 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8179 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8181 amount_msat: 2000000,
8183 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8184 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8185 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8186 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8188 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8191 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8192 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8194 amount_msat: 3000000,
8196 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8197 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8198 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8199 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8201 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8204 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8205 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8207 amount_msat: 4000000,
8209 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8210 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8212 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8216 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8217 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8218 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8220 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8221 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8222 "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", {
8225 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8226 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8227 "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" },
8230 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8231 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8232 "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" },
8235 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8236 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8237 "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" },
8240 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8241 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8242 "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" },
8245 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8246 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8247 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8250 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8251 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8252 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8254 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8255 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8256 "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", {
8259 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8260 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8261 "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" },
8264 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8265 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8266 "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" },
8269 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8270 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8271 "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" },
8274 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8275 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8276 "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" },
8279 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8280 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8281 "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" }
8284 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8285 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8286 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8288 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8289 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8290 "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", {
8293 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8294 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8295 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8298 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8299 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8300 "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" },
8303 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8304 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8305 "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" },
8308 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8309 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8310 "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" }
8313 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8314 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8315 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8316 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8318 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8319 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8320 "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", {
8323 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8324 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8325 "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" },
8328 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8329 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8330 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8333 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8334 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8335 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8338 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8339 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8340 "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" }
8343 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8344 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8345 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8346 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8348 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8349 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8350 "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", {
8353 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8354 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8355 "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" },
8358 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8359 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8360 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8363 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8364 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8365 "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" },
8368 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8369 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8370 "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" }
8373 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8374 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8375 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8377 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8378 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8379 "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", {
8382 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8383 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8384 "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" },
8387 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8388 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8389 "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" },
8392 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8393 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8394 "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" }
8397 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8398 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8399 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8401 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8402 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8403 "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", {
8406 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8407 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8408 "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" },
8411 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8412 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8413 "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" },
8416 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8417 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8418 "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" }
8421 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8422 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8423 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8425 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8426 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8427 "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", {
8430 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8431 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8432 "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" },
8435 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8436 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8437 "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" }
8440 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8441 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8442 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8443 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8444 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8445 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8447 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8448 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8449 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8452 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8453 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8454 "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" },
8457 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8458 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8459 "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" }
8462 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8463 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8464 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8465 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8466 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8468 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8469 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8470 "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", {
8473 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8474 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8475 "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" },
8478 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8479 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8480 "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" }
8483 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8484 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8485 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8487 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8488 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8489 "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", {
8492 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8493 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8494 "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" }
8497 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8498 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8499 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8500 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8501 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8503 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8504 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8505 "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", {
8508 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8509 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8510 "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" }
8513 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8514 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8515 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8516 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8517 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8519 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8520 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8521 "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", {
8524 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8525 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8526 "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" }
8529 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8530 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8531 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8532 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8534 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8535 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8536 "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", {});
8538 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8539 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8540 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8541 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8542 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8544 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8545 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8546 "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", {});
8548 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8549 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8550 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8551 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8552 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8554 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8555 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8556 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8558 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8559 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8560 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8562 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8563 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8564 "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", {});
8566 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8567 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8568 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8569 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8570 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8572 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8573 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8574 "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", {});
8576 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8577 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8578 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8579 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8580 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8582 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8583 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8584 "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", {});
8586 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8587 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8588 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8589 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8590 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8591 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8593 amount_msat: 2000000,
8595 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8596 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8598 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8601 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8602 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8603 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8605 amount_msat: 5000001,
8607 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8608 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8609 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8610 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8612 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8615 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8616 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8618 amount_msat: 5000000,
8620 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8621 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8622 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8623 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8625 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8629 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8630 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8631 "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", {
8634 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8635 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8636 "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" },
8638 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8639 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8640 "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" },
8642 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8643 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8644 "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" }
8647 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8648 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8649 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8650 "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", {
8653 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8654 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8655 "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" },
8657 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8658 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8659 "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" },
8661 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8662 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8663 "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" }
8668 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8669 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8671 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8672 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8673 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8674 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8676 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8677 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8678 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8680 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8681 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8683 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8684 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8686 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8687 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8688 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8692 fn test_key_derivation() {
8693 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8694 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8696 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8697 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8699 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8700 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8702 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8703 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8705 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8706 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8708 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8709 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8711 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8712 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8714 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8715 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8719 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8720 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8721 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8722 let seed = [42; 32];
8723 let network = Network::Testnet;
8724 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8725 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8727 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8728 let config = UserConfig::default();
8729 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8730 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8732 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8733 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8735 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8736 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8737 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8738 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8739 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8740 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8741 assert!(res.is_ok());
8745 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8746 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8747 // resulting `channel_type`.
8748 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8749 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8750 let network = Network::Testnet;
8751 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8752 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8754 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8755 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8757 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8758 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8760 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8761 // need to signal it.
8762 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8763 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8764 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8767 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8769 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8770 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8771 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8773 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8774 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8775 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8778 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8779 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8780 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8781 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8782 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8785 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8786 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8790 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8791 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8792 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8793 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8794 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8795 let network = Network::Testnet;
8796 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8797 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8799 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8800 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8802 let config = UserConfig::default();
8804 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8805 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8806 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8807 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8808 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8810 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8811 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8812 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8815 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8816 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8817 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8819 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8820 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8821 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8822 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8823 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8824 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8826 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8830 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8831 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8834 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8835 let network = Network::Testnet;
8836 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8837 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8839 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8840 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8842 let config = UserConfig::default();
8844 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8845 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8846 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8847 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8848 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8849 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8850 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8851 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8853 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8854 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8855 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8856 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8857 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8858 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8861 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8862 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8864 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8865 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8866 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8867 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8869 assert!(res.is_err());
8871 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8872 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8873 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8875 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8876 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8877 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8880 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8882 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8883 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8884 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8885 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8888 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8889 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8891 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8892 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8894 assert!(res.is_err());