1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
308 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
309 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
310 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
311 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
314 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
316 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
318 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
320 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
324 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
326 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
327 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
328 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
330 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
331 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
333 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
334 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
335 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
336 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
337 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
339 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
340 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
344 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
350 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
353 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
354 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
356 holding_cell_msat: u64,
357 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
360 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
361 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
362 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
363 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
364 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
365 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
366 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
367 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
368 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
369 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
372 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
373 struct HTLCCandidate {
375 origin: HTLCInitiator,
379 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
387 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
389 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
391 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
392 htlc_value_msat: u64,
393 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
398 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
399 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
400 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
401 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
402 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
404 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
405 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
406 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
407 htlc_value_msat: u64,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
415 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
416 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
419 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
420 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
421 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
422 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
423 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
424 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
427 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
428 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
429 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
430 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
431 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
432 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
434 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
437 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
438 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
439 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
440 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
443 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
444 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
445 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
446 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
447 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
448 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
449 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
450 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
451 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
452 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
453 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
454 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
455 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
456 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
457 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
460 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
461 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
462 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
464 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
465 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
466 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
467 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
469 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
470 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
471 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
472 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
473 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
475 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
476 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
477 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
478 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
480 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
481 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
482 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
484 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
485 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
486 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
487 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
488 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
490 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
491 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
494 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
495 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
497 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
498 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
499 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
500 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
501 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
503 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
507 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
508 (0, update, required),
509 (2, blocked, required),
512 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
513 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
514 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
516 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
517 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
518 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
519 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
521 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
525 channel_id: [u8; 32],
526 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
529 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
530 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
532 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
533 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
534 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
536 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
537 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
538 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
539 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
541 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
542 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
544 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
546 holder_signer: Signer,
547 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
548 destination_script: Script,
550 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
551 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
552 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
554 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
555 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
556 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
557 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
558 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
559 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
561 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
562 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
563 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
564 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
565 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
566 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
568 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
570 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
571 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
572 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
574 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
575 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
576 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
577 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
578 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
579 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
580 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
582 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
584 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
585 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
586 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
587 // HTLCs with similar state.
588 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
589 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
590 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
591 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
592 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
593 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
594 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
595 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
596 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
599 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
600 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
601 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
603 update_time_counter: u32,
605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
606 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
607 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
608 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
609 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
610 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
612 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
613 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
615 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
616 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
617 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
618 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
620 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
621 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
623 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
625 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
627 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
628 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
629 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
630 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
631 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
632 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
634 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
635 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
636 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
637 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
638 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
640 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
641 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
642 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
643 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
644 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
645 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
646 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
647 channel_creation_height: u32,
649 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
652 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
657 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
662 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
664 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
666 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
667 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
670 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
672 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
674 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
675 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
677 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
679 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
680 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
681 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
683 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
685 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
686 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
688 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
689 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
690 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
692 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
694 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
696 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
697 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
698 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
699 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
701 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
702 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
703 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
705 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
706 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
707 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
709 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
710 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
711 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
712 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
713 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
714 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
715 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
716 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
718 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
719 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
720 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
721 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
722 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
724 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
725 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
727 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
728 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
729 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
730 /// unblock the state machine.
732 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
733 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
734 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
736 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
737 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
738 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
740 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
741 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
742 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
743 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
744 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
745 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
746 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
747 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
749 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
750 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
752 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
753 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
754 // the channel's funding UTXO.
756 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
757 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
758 // associated channel mapping.
760 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
761 // to store all of them.
762 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
764 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
765 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
766 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
767 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
768 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
770 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
771 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
773 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
774 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
776 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
777 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
778 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
780 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
781 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
782 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
783 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
784 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
787 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
788 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
789 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
792 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
793 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
794 self.update_time_counter
797 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
798 self.latest_monitor_update_id
801 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
802 self.config.announced_channel
805 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
806 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
809 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
810 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
811 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
812 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
815 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
816 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
817 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
820 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
821 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
822 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
823 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
824 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
827 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
828 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
829 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
830 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
831 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
836 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
840 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
842 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
843 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
844 self.temporary_channel_id
847 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
851 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
852 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
853 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
857 /// Gets the channel's type
858 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
862 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
863 /// is_usable() returns true).
864 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
865 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
866 self.short_channel_id
869 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
870 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
871 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
874 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
875 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
876 self.outbound_scid_alias
879 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
880 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
881 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
882 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
883 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
886 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
887 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
888 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
889 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
892 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
893 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
894 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
897 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
898 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
899 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
900 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
904 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
907 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
908 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
911 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
912 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
915 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
916 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
917 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
920 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
921 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
924 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
925 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
926 self.counterparty_node_id
929 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
930 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
931 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
934 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
935 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
936 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
939 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
940 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
942 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
943 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
944 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
945 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
947 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
951 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
952 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
953 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
956 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
957 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
958 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
961 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
962 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
963 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
965 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
966 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
971 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
972 self.channel_value_satoshis
975 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
976 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
979 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
980 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
983 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
984 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
987 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
988 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
989 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
992 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
993 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
994 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
997 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
998 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
999 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1002 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1003 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1004 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1007 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1008 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1009 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1012 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1013 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1014 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1017 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1018 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1019 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1020 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1021 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1024 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1026 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1027 self.prev_config = None;
1031 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1032 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1036 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1037 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1038 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1039 let did_channel_update =
1040 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1041 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1042 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1043 if did_channel_update {
1044 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1045 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1046 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1047 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1049 self.config.options = *config;
1053 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1054 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1055 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1059 // Internal utility functions for channels
1061 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1062 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1063 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1065 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1067 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1068 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1069 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1071 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1074 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1076 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1079 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1080 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1081 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1083 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1085 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1086 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1087 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1088 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1089 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1092 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1093 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1094 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1095 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1096 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1097 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1098 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1101 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1102 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1103 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1106 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1107 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1108 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1109 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
1112 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1113 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1115 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
1116 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1117 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1121 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
1123 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1124 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
1125 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
1126 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
1130 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
1132 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
1134 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
1136 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
1137 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
1138 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
1139 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
1140 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
1142 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
1143 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
1145 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
1147 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
1148 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
1150 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
1151 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
1152 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
1153 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
1154 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
1155 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
1157 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
1158 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
1160 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
1161 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
1162 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
1163 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
1164 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
1166 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
1167 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
1169 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
1170 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
1172 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
1173 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
1174 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
1175 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
1181 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
1182 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1184 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
1185 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
1186 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
1191 macro_rules! secp_check {
1192 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
1195 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
1200 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
1201 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
1202 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
1203 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
1204 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
1205 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
1206 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1207 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
1208 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
1209 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
1210 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
1213 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
1214 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
1215 // `only_static_remotekey`.
1217 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
1218 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
1219 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1220 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
1227 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
1228 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
1229 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
1230 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
1231 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
1232 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1233 // We've exhausted our options
1236 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
1237 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
1240 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
1241 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
1242 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
1243 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
1245 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1246 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1247 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
1248 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
1249 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
1250 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
1252 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1254 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
1258 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1259 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1260 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
1261 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1262 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
1263 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1264 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1265 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1267 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1268 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1269 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1270 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1272 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1273 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1275 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1276 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1278 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1279 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1280 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1282 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1283 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1285 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
1286 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1287 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1288 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1289 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
1292 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1293 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1295 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
1297 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1298 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1299 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
1300 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1303 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1304 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1306 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1307 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1308 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1309 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1313 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1314 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1315 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1319 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1320 Ok(script) => script,
1321 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1324 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1327 context: ChannelContext {
1330 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1331 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1332 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1333 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1338 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1340 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1341 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1342 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1343 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1345 channel_value_satoshis,
1347 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1350 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1353 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1354 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1357 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1358 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1359 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1360 pending_update_fee: None,
1361 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1362 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1363 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1364 update_time_counter: 1,
1366 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1368 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1369 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1370 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1371 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1372 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1373 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1375 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1376 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1377 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1378 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1380 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1381 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1382 closing_fee_limits: None,
1383 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1385 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1387 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1388 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1389 short_channel_id: None,
1390 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1392 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1393 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1394 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1395 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1396 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1397 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1398 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1399 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1400 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1401 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1402 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1403 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1405 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1407 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1408 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1409 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1410 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1411 counterparty_parameters: None,
1412 funding_outpoint: None,
1413 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1414 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1416 funding_transaction: None,
1418 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1419 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1420 counterparty_node_id,
1422 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1424 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1426 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1427 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1429 announcement_sigs: None,
1431 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1432 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1433 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1434 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1436 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1437 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1439 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1440 outbound_scid_alias,
1442 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1443 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1446 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1451 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1456 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1457 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1458 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1460 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1461 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1462 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1463 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1464 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1465 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1466 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1467 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1469 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1470 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1471 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1472 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1473 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1474 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1475 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1476 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1478 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1479 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1483 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1488 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1489 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1490 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1491 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1492 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1493 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1494 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1495 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1496 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1497 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1498 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1501 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1503 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1504 // support this channel type.
1505 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1506 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1507 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1510 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1511 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1512 // `static_remote_key`.
1513 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1514 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1516 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1517 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1518 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1520 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1521 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1523 channel_type.clone()
1525 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1526 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1527 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1531 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1533 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1534 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1535 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1536 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1537 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1538 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1539 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1540 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1541 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1544 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1545 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1548 // Check sanity of message fields:
1549 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1550 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1552 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1555 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1556 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1558 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1559 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1560 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1562 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1563 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1565 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1566 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1568 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1570 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1571 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1572 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1574 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1577 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1578 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1581 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1582 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1585 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1586 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1588 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1589 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1591 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1592 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1594 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1595 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1597 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1600 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1604 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1606 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1607 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1612 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1613 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1614 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1615 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1616 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1618 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1619 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1621 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1622 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1623 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1625 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1629 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1630 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1631 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1632 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1633 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1637 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1638 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1639 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1640 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1644 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1645 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1646 &Some(ref script) => {
1647 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1648 if script.len() == 0 {
1651 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1652 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1654 Some(script.clone())
1657 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1664 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1665 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1666 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1667 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1671 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1672 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1673 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1677 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1678 Ok(script) => script,
1679 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1682 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1683 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1685 let chan = Channel {
1686 context: ChannelContext {
1689 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1690 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1692 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1697 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1699 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1700 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1701 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1702 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1705 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1708 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1711 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1712 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1713 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1715 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1716 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1717 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1718 pending_update_fee: None,
1719 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1720 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1721 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1722 update_time_counter: 1,
1724 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1726 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1727 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1728 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1729 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1730 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1731 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1733 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1734 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1735 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1736 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1738 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1739 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1740 closing_fee_limits: None,
1741 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1743 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1745 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1746 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1747 short_channel_id: None,
1748 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1750 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1751 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1752 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1753 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1754 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1755 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1756 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1757 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1758 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1759 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1760 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1761 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1762 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1764 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1766 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1767 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1768 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1769 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1770 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1771 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1772 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1774 funding_outpoint: None,
1775 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1776 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1778 funding_transaction: None,
1780 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1781 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1782 counterparty_node_id,
1784 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1786 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1788 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1789 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1791 announcement_sigs: None,
1793 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1794 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1795 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1796 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1798 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1799 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1801 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1802 outbound_scid_alias,
1804 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1805 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1808 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1813 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1820 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1821 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1822 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1823 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1824 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1826 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1827 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1828 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1829 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1830 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1831 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1832 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1834 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1835 where L::Target: Logger
1837 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1838 let num_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1839 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1841 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1842 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1843 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1844 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1846 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.context.feerate_per_kw;
1847 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
1848 if match update_state {
1849 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1850 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1851 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1852 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1853 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.context.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1855 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1859 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1860 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1861 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound()),
1862 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1864 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1865 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1866 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1868 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1869 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1870 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1871 transaction_output_index: None
1876 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1877 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1878 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1879 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1880 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
1883 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1885 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1886 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1887 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1889 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1890 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1893 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1894 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
1897 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1899 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1900 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1901 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1903 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1904 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1910 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1911 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1912 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1913 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1914 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1915 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1916 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1920 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1921 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1923 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1925 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1926 if generated_by_local {
1927 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1928 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1937 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1939 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1940 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1941 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1942 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1943 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1944 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1945 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1948 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1949 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1950 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1951 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1955 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1956 preimages.push(preimage);
1960 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1961 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1963 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1965 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1966 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1968 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1969 if !generated_by_local {
1970 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1978 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1979 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1980 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1981 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1982 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1983 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1984 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1985 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1987 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1989 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1990 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1991 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1992 self.context.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1994 self.context.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1996 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1997 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1998 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1999 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2002 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2003 let anchors_val = if self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2004 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.context.is_outbound() {
2005 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2007 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2010 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2011 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2012 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2013 (self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2015 (self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2018 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2019 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2024 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2025 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2030 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2032 let channel_parameters =
2033 if local { self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2034 else { self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2035 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2038 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
2043 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2046 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2047 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2048 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2049 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2051 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
2052 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
2053 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
2061 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2062 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2068 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2069 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2070 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2071 // outside of those situations will fail.
2072 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2076 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2081 1 + // script length (0)
2085 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2086 2 + // witness marker and flag
2087 1 + // witness element count
2088 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2089 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2090 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2091 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2092 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2093 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2095 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2096 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2097 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2103 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2104 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2105 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2106 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2108 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2109 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2110 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2112 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2113 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2114 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2115 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2116 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2117 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2120 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2121 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2124 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2125 value_to_holder = 0;
2128 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2129 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2130 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2131 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2133 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2134 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2137 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2138 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2142 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2143 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2144 /// our counterparty!)
2145 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2146 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2147 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2148 let per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
2149 let delayed_payment_base = &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2150 let htlc_basepoint = &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2151 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2153 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.context.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2157 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2158 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2159 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
2160 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2161 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
2162 //may see payments to it!
2163 let revocation_basepoint = &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2164 let htlc_basepoint = &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2165 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2167 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.context.secp_ctx, &self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2170 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2171 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2172 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
2173 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
2174 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2177 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2180 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2181 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2183 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2185 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2186 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2187 where L::Target: Logger {
2188 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2189 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2190 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2191 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2192 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2193 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2194 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2195 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2199 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2200 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2201 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2202 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2204 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2205 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2207 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2209 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2211 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2212 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2213 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2215 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2216 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2217 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2218 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2219 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2221 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2222 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2223 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2225 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2228 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2231 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2232 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2236 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2240 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2243 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2244 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2245 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2248 // Now update local state:
2250 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2251 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2252 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2253 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2254 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2255 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2256 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2260 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2261 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2262 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2263 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2264 // do not not get into this branch.
2265 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2266 match pending_update {
2267 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2268 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2269 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2270 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2271 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2272 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2273 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2276 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2277 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2278 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2279 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2280 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2281 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2282 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2288 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2289 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2290 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2293 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2294 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2300 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2301 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2303 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2304 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2306 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2307 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2310 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2313 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2315 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2316 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2321 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2322 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2323 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2324 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2325 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2326 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2327 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2328 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2329 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2330 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2331 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2332 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2333 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2334 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2335 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2336 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2337 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2339 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2341 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2342 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2343 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2344 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2345 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2346 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2347 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2349 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2350 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2353 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2354 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2355 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2356 update, blocked: true,
2361 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2362 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2363 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2364 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2368 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2372 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2373 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2374 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2375 /// before we fail backwards.
2377 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2378 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2379 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2380 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2381 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2382 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2383 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2386 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2387 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2388 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2389 /// before we fail backwards.
2391 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2392 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2393 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2394 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2395 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2396 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2397 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2399 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2401 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2402 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2403 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2405 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2406 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2407 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2409 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2410 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2411 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2413 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2418 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2419 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2425 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2426 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2427 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2428 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2429 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2433 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2434 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2435 force_holding_cell = true;
2438 // Now update local state:
2439 if force_holding_cell {
2440 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2441 match pending_update {
2442 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2443 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2445 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2449 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2450 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2451 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2452 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2458 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2459 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2460 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2466 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2468 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2469 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2472 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2473 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2474 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2479 // Message handlers:
2481 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2482 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2484 // Check sanity of message fields:
2485 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2488 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2491 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2494 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
2497 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2498 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2500 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2501 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2502 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2504 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2505 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2508 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2509 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2512 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2513 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2515 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2519 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2520 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2523 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2526 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2529 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2530 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2532 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2535 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2538 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2542 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2543 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
2544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2546 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2547 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2549 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2550 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2553 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
2556 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2557 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2558 &Some(ref script) => {
2559 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2560 if script.len() == 0 {
2563 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2564 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2566 Some(script.clone())
2569 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2576 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2577 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2578 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2579 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2580 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2582 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2583 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2585 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2588 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2589 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2590 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2591 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2592 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2593 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2596 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2597 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2598 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2601 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2602 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2604 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2605 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2610 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2611 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2613 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2614 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2616 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2617 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2618 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2619 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2620 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2621 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2622 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2623 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2624 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2627 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2628 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2630 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2631 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2632 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2633 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2635 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
2636 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2638 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2639 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2642 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2643 &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2646 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2647 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2648 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2650 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2653 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2656 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2657 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2658 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2662 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2665 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2666 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2667 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2668 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2671 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2672 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2673 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2674 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2675 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2677 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2679 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2680 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2684 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2685 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2686 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2690 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2691 initial_commitment_tx,
2694 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2695 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2698 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2699 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2701 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2703 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2704 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2705 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2706 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2707 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2708 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2709 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2710 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2711 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2712 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2713 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2715 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2717 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2719 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2720 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2721 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2722 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2724 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2726 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2727 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2729 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2730 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
2733 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2734 }, channel_monitor))
2737 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2738 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2739 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2740 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2741 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2743 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2746 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2749 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2752 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2753 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2754 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2755 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2758 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2760 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2761 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2762 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2763 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2765 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2766 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2768 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2769 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2771 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2772 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2773 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2774 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2775 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2780 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2781 initial_commitment_tx,
2784 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2785 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2788 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2789 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2792 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2793 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2794 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2795 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2796 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2797 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2798 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2799 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2800 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2801 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2802 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2803 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2805 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2807 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2809 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2810 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2811 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2812 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2814 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2816 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2817 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2821 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2822 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2824 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2825 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2826 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2827 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2829 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2832 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2833 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2837 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2838 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2839 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2840 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2841 // when routing outbound payments.
2842 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2846 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2848 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2849 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2850 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2851 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2852 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2853 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2854 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2855 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2856 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2858 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2859 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2860 let expected_point =
2861 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2862 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2864 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2865 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2866 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2867 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2868 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2869 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2871 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2872 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2873 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2874 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2875 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2877 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2885 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2886 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2888 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2890 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2893 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2894 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2895 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2896 self.context.funding_transaction.clone()
2902 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2903 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2904 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2905 pending_htlcs: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2906 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2907 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2908 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2909 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2910 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2913 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2916 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2917 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2918 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2920 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2921 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2922 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2923 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2924 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2925 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2927 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2928 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2934 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2935 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2936 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2937 pending_htlcs: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2938 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2939 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2940 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2941 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2942 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2945 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2948 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2949 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2950 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2952 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2953 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2954 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2955 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2956 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2959 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2964 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2965 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2966 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2967 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2968 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2969 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2970 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2972 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2973 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2975 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2982 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2983 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2984 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2985 /// corner case properly.
2986 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2987 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2988 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2989 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2991 let mut balance_msat = self.context.value_to_self_msat;
2992 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2993 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2994 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2997 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2999 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.context.value_to_self_msat
3000 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
3002 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
3004 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
3006 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3007 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
3008 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
3010 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
3011 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
3013 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
3014 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3015 if !self.context.opt_anchors() {
3016 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
3019 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3020 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
3021 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3022 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
3024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
3025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
3026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
3027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
3028 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
3029 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
3030 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
3031 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
3032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
3033 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
3035 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
3038 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
3039 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
3040 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3041 if !self.context.opt_anchors() {
3042 real_dust_limit_success_sat += self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
3045 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3046 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
3048 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3049 let remote_balance_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat)
3050 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
3052 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
3053 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3054 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3055 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3059 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3061 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3062 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3063 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3064 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3065 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3066 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3068 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
3069 (self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3071 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3072 (self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3073 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3075 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3076 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
3077 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3078 Some(self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
3079 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3082 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3083 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
3084 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3085 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3086 self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
3087 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3090 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3091 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3092 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3094 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3098 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3099 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
3101 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3102 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3106 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3107 - self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3108 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3109 - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3111 outbound_capacity_msat,
3112 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3113 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3118 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3119 (self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3122 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3123 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3124 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
3125 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3126 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3127 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3130 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3131 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3133 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
3134 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3137 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3138 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3140 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3141 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3143 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3144 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3146 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3147 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3148 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3150 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
3153 (self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3154 self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3156 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3157 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3159 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3160 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3162 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3163 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3167 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3168 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3174 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3175 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3176 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3179 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3180 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3181 included_htlcs += 1;
3184 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3185 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3189 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3190 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3191 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3192 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3193 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3194 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3199 for htlc in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3201 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3202 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3207 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3208 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3212 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3213 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
3214 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3217 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3218 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.context.opt_anchors());
3220 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3221 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3222 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3224 total_pending_htlcs,
3225 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3226 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3227 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3229 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3230 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3231 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3233 feerate: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
3235 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3240 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3241 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3243 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3244 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3246 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3247 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3249 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3250 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3251 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3253 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
3256 (self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3257 self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3259 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3260 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3262 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3263 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3265 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3266 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3270 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3271 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3277 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3278 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3279 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3280 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3281 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3282 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3285 included_htlcs += 1;
3288 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3289 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3292 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3293 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3295 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3296 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3297 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3302 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3303 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
3304 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3307 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3308 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.context.opt_anchors());
3310 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3311 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3313 total_pending_htlcs,
3314 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3315 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3316 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3318 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3319 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3320 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3322 feerate: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
3324 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3329 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3330 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
3331 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3332 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3333 if local_sent_shutdown {
3334 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3336 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3337 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3338 if remote_sent_shutdown {
3339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3341 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3344 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3347 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3350 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3354 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3355 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3356 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3357 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3359 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3360 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3362 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3363 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3364 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3365 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3366 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3367 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3368 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3369 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3370 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3371 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3372 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3374 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3375 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3376 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3377 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3378 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3379 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3383 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
3386 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3387 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3388 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3390 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3391 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3392 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3393 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3394 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3395 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3396 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3400 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3401 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3402 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3403 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3404 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3405 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3406 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3410 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3411 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3412 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3413 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3414 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3418 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3419 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3420 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3421 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3422 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3424 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3428 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3432 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3433 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3434 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3435 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3436 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3437 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3438 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3439 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3440 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3441 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3442 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3443 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3444 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3445 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3446 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3447 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3450 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3451 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3452 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3453 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3457 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3460 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3464 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3465 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3466 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3470 // Now update local state:
3471 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3472 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3473 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3474 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3475 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3476 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3477 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3482 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3484 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3485 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3486 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3487 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3488 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3489 None => fail_reason.into(),
3490 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3491 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3492 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3493 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3495 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3499 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3501 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3502 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3504 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3505 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3510 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3513 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3514 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3517 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3518 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3521 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3524 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3525 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3526 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3528 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3529 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3532 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3536 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3537 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3538 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3540 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3541 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3544 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3548 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3549 where L::Target: Logger
3551 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3554 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3557 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3561 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3563 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3565 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3566 let commitment_txid = {
3567 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3568 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3569 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3571 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3572 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3573 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3574 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3575 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3580 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3582 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3583 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3584 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3585 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3588 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3589 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3590 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3594 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3596 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3597 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3598 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3599 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3600 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3601 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3602 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3603 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3604 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3605 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3606 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3612 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3613 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3616 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3617 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3618 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3619 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3620 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3621 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3622 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3623 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3624 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3625 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3626 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3627 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3628 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3631 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3632 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3633 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3634 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3635 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3636 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
3637 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3639 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3640 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3641 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3642 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3643 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3644 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3645 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3648 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3649 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3652 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3654 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3655 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3656 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3659 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3662 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3663 commitment_stats.tx,
3665 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3666 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3667 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3670 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3671 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3673 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3674 let mut need_commitment = false;
3675 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3676 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3677 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3678 need_commitment = true;
3682 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3683 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3684 Some(forward_info.clone())
3686 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3687 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3688 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3689 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3690 need_commitment = true;
3693 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3694 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3695 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3696 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3697 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3698 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3699 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3700 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3701 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3702 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3703 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3704 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3705 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3706 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3708 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3710 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3711 need_commitment = true;
3715 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3716 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3717 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3718 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3719 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3720 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3722 nondust_htlc_sources,
3726 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3727 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3728 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3729 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3731 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3732 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3733 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3734 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3735 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3736 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3737 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3738 // includes the right HTLCs.
3739 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3740 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3741 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3742 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3743 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3744 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3746 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3747 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3748 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3751 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3752 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3753 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3754 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3755 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3756 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3757 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3758 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3759 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3763 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3764 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3765 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3766 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3769 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3770 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3771 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3772 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3773 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3774 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3775 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3776 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3779 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3780 /// for our counterparty.
3781 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3782 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3783 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3784 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3785 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3787 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3788 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3789 updates: Vec::new(),
3792 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3793 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3794 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3795 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3796 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3797 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3798 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3799 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3800 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3801 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3802 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3803 // to rebalance channels.
3804 match &htlc_update {
3805 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3806 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3807 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3810 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3811 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3812 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3813 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3814 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3815 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3816 // into the holding cell without ever being
3817 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3818 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3819 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3822 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3828 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3829 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3830 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3831 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3832 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3833 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3834 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3835 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3836 (msg, monitor_update)
3837 } else { unreachable!() };
3838 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3839 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3841 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3842 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3843 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3844 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3845 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3846 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3847 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3848 // for a full revocation before failing.
3849 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3852 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3854 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3861 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3862 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3864 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3865 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3870 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3871 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3872 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3873 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3874 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3876 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3877 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3878 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3880 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3881 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3887 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3888 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3889 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3890 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3891 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3892 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3893 where L::Target: Logger,
3895 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3898 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3901 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3905 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3907 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3908 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3913 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3914 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3915 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3916 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3917 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3918 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3919 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3920 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3924 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3926 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3927 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3930 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3931 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3933 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3935 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3936 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3937 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3938 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3939 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3940 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3941 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3942 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3946 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3947 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3948 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3949 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3950 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3951 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3952 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3953 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3954 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3956 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3957 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3960 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3961 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3962 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3963 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3964 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3965 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3966 let mut require_commitment = false;
3967 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3970 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3971 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3972 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3974 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3975 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3976 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3977 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3978 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3979 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3984 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3985 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3986 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3987 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3988 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3990 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3991 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3992 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3997 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3998 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4000 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4004 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4005 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4007 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
4008 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4009 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
4010 require_commitment = true;
4011 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
4012 match forward_info {
4013 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4014 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4015 require_commitment = true;
4017 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4018 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4019 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4021 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4022 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4023 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4027 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4028 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4029 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4030 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4036 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4037 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4038 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4039 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4041 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4042 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4043 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4044 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4045 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4046 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4047 require_commitment = true;
4051 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4053 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4054 match update_state {
4055 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4056 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4057 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4058 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4059 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4061 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4062 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4063 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4064 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4065 require_commitment = true;
4066 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4067 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4072 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
4073 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4074 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4075 if require_commitment {
4076 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4077 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
4078 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
4079 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
4080 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4081 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4082 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4083 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4084 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4086 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4087 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4088 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4089 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4090 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
4093 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
4094 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4095 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
4096 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4097 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4098 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4099 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4101 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4102 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
4104 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4105 if require_commitment {
4106 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4108 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4109 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4110 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4111 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4113 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
4114 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4115 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4116 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
4118 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4119 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4120 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
4126 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4127 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4128 /// commitment update.
4129 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
4130 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
4131 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4134 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4135 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4136 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4137 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4139 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4140 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4141 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
4142 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4143 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4145 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4146 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4148 if !self.context.is_live() {
4149 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4152 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4153 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4154 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4155 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4156 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4157 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
4158 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4159 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4160 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4161 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4165 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4166 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4167 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4168 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4169 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4172 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4173 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4177 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
4178 force_holding_cell = true;
4181 if force_holding_cell {
4182 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4186 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4187 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4189 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4190 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4195 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4196 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4198 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4200 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
4201 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4202 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4203 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4207 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4208 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4209 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4213 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4214 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4217 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4218 // will be retransmitted.
4219 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4220 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4221 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4223 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4224 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4226 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4227 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4228 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4229 // this HTLC accordingly
4230 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4233 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4234 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4235 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4236 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4239 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4240 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4241 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4242 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4243 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4244 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4249 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4251 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4252 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4253 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4254 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4258 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4259 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4260 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4261 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4262 // the update upon reconnection.
4263 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4267 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4269 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
4270 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4273 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4274 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4275 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4276 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4277 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4278 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4279 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4281 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4282 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4283 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4284 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4285 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4286 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4287 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4289 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4290 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4291 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4292 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4293 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4294 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4295 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
4298 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4299 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4300 /// to the remote side.
4301 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4302 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4303 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4304 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4307 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4309 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4310 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4311 let mut found_blocked = false;
4312 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4313 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
4314 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
4318 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
4319 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4320 // first received the funding_signed.
4321 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4322 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4323 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4325 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4326 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4327 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4328 funding_broadcastable = None;
4331 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4332 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4333 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4334 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4335 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4336 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4337 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4338 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4339 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4340 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4341 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4342 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4343 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4344 next_per_commitment_point,
4345 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4349 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4351 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4352 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4353 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4354 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4355 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4356 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4358 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
4359 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4360 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4361 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4362 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4363 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4367 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4368 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4370 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4371 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4372 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4375 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4376 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4377 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4378 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4379 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4380 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4381 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4382 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4383 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4387 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4388 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4390 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4393 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4396 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4397 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4399 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4400 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4401 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4402 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4403 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4404 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4405 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4406 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4407 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4408 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4409 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4410 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4411 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4413 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4415 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4421 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4422 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4423 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4424 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4425 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4426 per_commitment_secret,
4427 next_per_commitment_point,
4429 next_local_nonce: None,
4433 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4434 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4435 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4436 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4437 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4439 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4440 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4441 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4442 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4443 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4444 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4445 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4446 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4447 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4452 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4453 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4455 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4456 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4457 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4458 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4459 reason: err_packet.clone()
4462 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4463 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4464 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4465 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4466 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4467 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4470 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4471 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4472 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4473 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4474 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4481 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4482 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4483 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4484 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4488 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4489 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4490 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4491 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4492 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4493 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4497 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4498 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4500 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4501 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4502 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4503 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4504 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4505 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4506 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4507 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4510 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4512 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4513 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4514 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4515 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4519 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4520 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4521 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4524 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4525 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4526 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4527 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4528 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4529 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4531 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4532 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4533 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4534 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4535 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4538 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4539 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4540 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4541 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4542 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4543 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4544 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4545 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4549 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4550 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4551 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4552 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4554 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4558 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4559 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4560 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4561 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4563 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4564 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4565 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4566 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4567 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4571 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4573 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4574 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4575 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4576 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4577 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4580 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4581 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4582 channel_ready: None,
4583 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4584 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4585 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4589 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4590 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4591 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4592 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4593 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4594 next_per_commitment_point,
4595 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4597 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4598 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4599 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4603 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4604 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4605 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4607 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4608 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4609 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4612 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4618 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4619 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4620 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4621 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4622 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4623 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4624 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4626 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4628 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4629 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4630 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4631 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4632 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4633 next_per_commitment_point,
4634 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4638 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4639 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4640 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4642 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4645 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4646 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4647 raa: required_revoke,
4648 commitment_update: None,
4649 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4651 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4652 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4653 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4655 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4658 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4659 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4660 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4661 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4662 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4663 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4666 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4667 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4668 raa: required_revoke,
4669 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4670 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4674 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4678 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4679 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4680 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4681 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4683 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4685 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4687 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4688 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4689 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4690 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4691 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4692 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4694 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4695 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4696 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4697 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4698 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4700 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4701 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4702 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4703 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4706 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4707 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4708 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4709 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4710 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4711 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4712 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4713 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4714 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4715 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4716 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4717 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4718 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4719 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4720 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4722 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4725 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4726 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4729 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4730 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4731 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4732 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4733 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4734 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4735 self.context.channel_state &
4736 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4737 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4738 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4739 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4742 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4743 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4744 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4745 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4746 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4747 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4750 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4756 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4757 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4758 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4759 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4761 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4762 return Ok((None, None));
4765 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4766 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4767 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4769 return Ok((None, None));
4772 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4774 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4775 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4776 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4777 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4779 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4780 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4781 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4783 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4784 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4785 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4786 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4788 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4789 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4790 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4795 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4796 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4798 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4799 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4802 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4803 /// within our expected timeframe.
4805 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4806 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4807 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4810 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4813 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4814 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4817 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4818 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4819 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4820 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4822 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4825 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4826 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4827 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4828 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4831 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4832 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4836 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4838 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4839 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4842 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4843 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4844 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4847 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4850 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4851 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4852 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4853 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4855 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4858 assert!(send_shutdown);
4859 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4860 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4861 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4863 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4866 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4871 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4873 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4874 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4876 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4877 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4878 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4879 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4880 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4881 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4884 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4885 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4886 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4889 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4890 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4891 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4892 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4896 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4897 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4898 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4899 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4900 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4901 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4903 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4904 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4911 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4912 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4914 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4917 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4918 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4920 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4922 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4923 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4924 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4925 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4926 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4927 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4928 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4929 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4930 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4932 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4933 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4936 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4940 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4941 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4942 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4943 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4945 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4948 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4951 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4954 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4958 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4962 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4963 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4964 return Ok((None, None));
4967 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4968 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4969 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4972 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4974 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4977 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4978 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4979 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4980 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4981 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4985 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4986 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4991 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4992 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4993 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4994 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4995 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4996 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4997 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
5001 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5003 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5004 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5005 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5006 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5008 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5011 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
5012 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5013 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5015 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5016 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5017 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5018 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5022 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5023 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5024 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5025 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5027 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5028 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5029 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5035 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5036 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5039 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5040 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5042 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5043 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5046 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5047 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5048 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5049 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5050 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5052 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5054 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5056 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5057 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5060 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5061 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5062 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5063 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5064 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5065 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5066 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5067 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5072 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5073 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5074 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5075 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5081 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5082 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5083 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5084 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5086 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5092 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5093 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5094 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5095 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5096 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5097 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5098 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5100 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5101 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5104 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5106 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5107 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5113 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5114 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5115 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5116 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5117 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5118 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5119 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5121 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5122 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5129 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
5130 self.context.feerate_per_kw
5133 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
5134 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
5135 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
5136 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
5137 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
5138 // which are near the dust limit.
5139 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.context.feerate_per_kw;
5140 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
5141 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
5142 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5143 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5145 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
5146 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5148 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
5151 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5152 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5155 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5156 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
5159 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5160 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5164 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
5165 &self.context.holder_signer
5169 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5171 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5172 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5173 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5174 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5175 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5176 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5178 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5180 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5188 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5189 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5193 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5194 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5195 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5196 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5199 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5200 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5201 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5204 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5205 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5206 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5207 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5208 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5209 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5210 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5211 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5217 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5218 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5219 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5220 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5221 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5222 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5227 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5228 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5230 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5231 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5232 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5233 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5236 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5237 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5240 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5241 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
5242 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
5243 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
5249 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5250 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5253 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
5254 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5255 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
5256 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
5259 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5260 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5261 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5263 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5264 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5265 if self.context.channel_state &
5266 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5267 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5268 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5269 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5270 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5273 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5274 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5275 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5276 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5277 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5278 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5280 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5281 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5282 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5284 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5285 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5286 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5287 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5288 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5289 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5295 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5296 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5297 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5300 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5301 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5302 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5305 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5306 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5307 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5310 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5311 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5312 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5313 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5314 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5315 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5320 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5321 self.context.channel_update_status
5324 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5325 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5326 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5329 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5331 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5332 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5333 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5337 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5338 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5339 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5342 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5346 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5347 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5348 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5350 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5351 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5352 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5354 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5355 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5358 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5359 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5360 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5361 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5362 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5363 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5364 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5365 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5366 self.context.channel_state);
5368 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5372 if need_commitment_update {
5373 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5374 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5375 let next_per_commitment_point =
5376 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5377 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5378 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5379 next_per_commitment_point,
5380 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5384 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5390 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5391 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5392 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5393 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5394 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5395 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5396 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5398 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5401 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5402 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5403 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5404 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5405 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5406 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5407 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5408 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5409 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5410 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5411 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5412 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5413 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5414 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5415 // channel and move on.
5416 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5417 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5419 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5420 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5421 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5423 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5424 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5425 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5426 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5427 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5428 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5429 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5433 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5434 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5435 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5436 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5437 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5441 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5442 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5443 // may have already happened for this block).
5444 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5445 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5446 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5447 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5450 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5451 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5452 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5453 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5461 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5462 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5463 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5464 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5466 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5467 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5470 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5472 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5473 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5474 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5475 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5477 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5480 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5483 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5484 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5485 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5486 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5488 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5491 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5492 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5493 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5495 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5496 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5498 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5499 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5500 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5508 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5510 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5511 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5512 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5514 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5515 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5518 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5519 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5520 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5521 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5522 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5523 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5524 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5525 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5526 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5529 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5530 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5531 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5532 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5534 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5535 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5536 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5538 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5539 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5540 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5541 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5543 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5544 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5545 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5546 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5547 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5548 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5549 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5552 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5553 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5555 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5558 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5559 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5560 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5561 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5562 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5563 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5564 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5565 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5566 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5567 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5568 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5569 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5570 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5571 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5572 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5573 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5574 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5580 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5585 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5586 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5588 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5589 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5590 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5592 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5593 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5596 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5597 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5600 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5601 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5605 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5606 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5607 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5608 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5609 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5610 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5611 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5612 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5613 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5614 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5615 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5616 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5617 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5618 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5619 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5620 first_per_commitment_point,
5621 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5622 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5623 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5624 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5626 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5630 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5631 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
5634 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5635 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5636 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5637 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5640 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5641 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5643 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5644 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5645 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5646 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5648 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5649 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5651 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5652 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5654 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5655 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5658 self.context.user_id = user_id;
5659 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5661 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5664 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5665 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5666 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5668 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5669 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5670 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5671 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5673 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5674 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5675 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5676 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5677 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5678 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5679 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5680 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5681 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5682 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5683 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5684 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5685 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5686 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5687 first_per_commitment_point,
5688 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5689 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5690 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5692 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5694 next_local_nonce: None,
5698 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5699 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5701 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5703 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5704 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5707 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5708 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5709 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5710 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5711 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5712 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5715 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5716 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5717 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5718 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5719 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5720 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5721 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5722 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5723 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5724 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5726 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5727 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5729 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5730 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5731 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5732 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5735 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5736 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5738 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5741 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5742 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5747 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5749 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5751 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5752 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5753 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5755 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5756 temporary_channel_id,
5757 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5758 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5761 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5763 next_local_nonce: None,
5767 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5768 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5769 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5770 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5772 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5775 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5776 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5777 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5778 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5779 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5780 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5782 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5783 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5786 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5787 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5788 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5789 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5791 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5792 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5794 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5795 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5796 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5797 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5798 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5799 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5805 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5806 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5807 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5808 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5810 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5813 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5817 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5821 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5822 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5826 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5830 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5831 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5834 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5838 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5840 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5845 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5847 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5852 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5854 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5855 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5856 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5857 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5858 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5862 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5864 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5865 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5866 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5867 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5868 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5869 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5870 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5872 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5873 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5874 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5875 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5876 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5877 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5878 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5879 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5880 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5881 contents: announcement,
5884 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5888 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5889 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5890 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5891 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5892 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5893 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5894 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5895 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5897 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5899 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5901 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5902 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5904 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5906 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5907 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5910 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5911 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5912 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5913 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5916 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5919 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5920 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5921 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5922 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5923 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5924 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5927 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5929 Err(_) => return None,
5931 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5932 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5937 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5938 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5939 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5940 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5941 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5942 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5943 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5944 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5945 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5946 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5947 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5948 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5949 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5950 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5951 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5952 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5955 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5958 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5959 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5960 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5961 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5962 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5963 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5964 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5965 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5966 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5968 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5969 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5970 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5971 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5972 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5973 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5974 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5975 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5976 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5978 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5979 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5980 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5981 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5982 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5983 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5984 next_funding_txid: None,
5989 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5991 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5992 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5993 /// commitment update.
5995 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5996 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5997 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5998 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6000 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
6001 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6003 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6004 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6009 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6010 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6012 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6014 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6015 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6017 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6018 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6019 /// regenerate them.
6021 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6022 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6024 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6025 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6026 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
6027 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6028 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
6029 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6031 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6032 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6036 if amount_msat == 0 {
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6040 let available_balances = self.get_available_balances();
6041 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6043 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6046 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6047 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6048 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6051 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
6052 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6053 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6054 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6055 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6056 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6057 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6058 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6061 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
6062 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
6063 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6064 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6065 else { "to peer" });
6067 if need_holding_cell {
6068 force_holding_cell = true;
6071 // Now update local state:
6072 if force_holding_cell {
6073 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6078 onion_routing_packet,
6083 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6084 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6086 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6088 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6092 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6093 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6094 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6098 onion_routing_packet,
6100 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6105 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6106 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6107 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6108 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6110 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6111 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6112 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6114 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6115 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6119 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6120 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6121 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6122 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6123 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6124 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6125 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6128 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6129 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6130 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6131 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6132 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6133 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6136 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6138 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6139 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6140 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6142 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6143 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6146 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6147 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6148 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6149 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6150 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6151 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6152 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6153 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6156 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6160 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6161 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6162 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6163 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6165 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6167 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6168 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6169 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6170 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6171 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6172 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6173 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6174 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6175 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6176 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
6177 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6183 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6186 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6187 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6188 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6189 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6190 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6191 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6193 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6194 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6195 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6196 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6199 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6200 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6204 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6205 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6207 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6209 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6210 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6211 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6212 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6214 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6215 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6216 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6217 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6218 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6219 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6223 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6224 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6228 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6229 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6232 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6233 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6235 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6236 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6237 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6238 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6239 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6242 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6243 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6244 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6250 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6251 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6252 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6255 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6256 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6259 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6260 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6261 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6262 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6268 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6269 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6271 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6272 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6273 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6274 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6275 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6276 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6277 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6278 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6279 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6282 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6283 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6284 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6286 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6287 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6290 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6291 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6293 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6294 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6295 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6298 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6299 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6300 let mut chan_closed = false;
6301 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6305 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6307 None if !chan_closed => {
6308 // use override shutdown script if provided
6309 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6310 Some(script) => script,
6312 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6313 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6314 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6315 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6319 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6320 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6322 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6328 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6329 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6330 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6331 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6333 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6335 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6337 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6338 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6339 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6340 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6341 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6342 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6345 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6346 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6347 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6350 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6351 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6352 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6355 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6356 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6357 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6358 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6359 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6361 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6362 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6369 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6370 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6372 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6375 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6376 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6377 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6378 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6379 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6380 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
6381 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6382 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6383 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6384 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6385 assert!(self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6387 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6388 // return them to fail the payment.
6389 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6390 let counterparty_node_id = self.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6391 for htlc_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6393 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6394 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id));
6399 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6400 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6401 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6402 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6403 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6404 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6405 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6406 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6407 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6408 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6409 Some((self.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6410 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6411 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6416 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6417 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6418 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6421 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6422 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6423 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6425 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6426 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6430 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6434 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6435 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6437 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6443 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6444 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6445 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6446 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6447 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6449 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6450 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6451 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6452 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6458 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6459 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6460 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6461 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6462 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6463 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6468 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6469 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6470 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6471 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6473 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6474 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6475 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6476 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6481 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6482 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6483 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6484 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6485 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6486 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6491 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6492 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6493 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6496 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6498 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6499 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6500 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6501 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6502 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6504 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6505 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6506 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6507 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6509 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6510 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6511 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6513 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6515 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6516 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6517 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6518 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6519 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6520 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6522 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6523 // deserialized from that format.
6524 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6525 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6526 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6528 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6530 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6531 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6532 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6534 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6535 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6536 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6537 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6540 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6541 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6542 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6545 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6546 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6547 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6548 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6550 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6551 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6553 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6555 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6557 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6559 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6562 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6564 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6569 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6571 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6572 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6573 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6574 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6575 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6576 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6577 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6579 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6581 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6583 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6586 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6587 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6588 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6591 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6593 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6594 preimages.push(preimage);
6596 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6597 reason.write(writer)?;
6599 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6601 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6602 preimages.push(preimage);
6604 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6605 reason.write(writer)?;
6610 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6611 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6613 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6615 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6616 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6617 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6618 source.write(writer)?;
6619 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6621 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6623 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6624 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6626 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6628 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6629 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6634 match self.context.resend_order {
6635 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6636 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6639 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6640 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6641 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6643 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6644 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6645 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6646 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6649 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6650 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6651 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6652 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6653 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6656 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6657 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6658 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6659 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6661 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6662 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6663 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6665 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6667 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6668 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6669 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6670 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6672 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6673 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6674 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6675 // consider the stale state on reload.
6678 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6679 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6680 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6682 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6683 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6684 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6686 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6687 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6689 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6690 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6691 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6693 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6694 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6696 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6699 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6700 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6701 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6703 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6706 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6707 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6709 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6710 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6711 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6713 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6715 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6717 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6719 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6720 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6721 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6722 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6723 htlc.write(writer)?;
6726 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6727 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6728 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6730 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6731 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6733 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6734 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6735 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6736 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6737 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6738 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6739 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6741 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6742 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6743 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6744 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6745 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6747 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6748 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6750 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6751 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6752 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6753 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6755 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6757 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6758 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6759 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6760 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6761 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6762 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6763 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6765 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6766 (2, chan_type, option),
6767 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6768 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6769 (5, self.context.config, required),
6770 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6771 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6772 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6773 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6774 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6775 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6776 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6777 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6778 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6779 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6780 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6781 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6782 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6783 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6784 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6785 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6792 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6793 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6795 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6796 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6798 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6799 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6800 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6802 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6803 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6804 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6805 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6807 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6809 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6810 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6812 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6815 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6816 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6821 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6823 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let mut keys_data = None;
6827 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6828 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6829 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6830 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6831 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6832 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6833 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6834 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6835 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6836 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6840 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6841 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6842 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6845 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6847 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6849 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6851 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6853 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6854 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6855 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6856 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6857 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6858 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6859 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6860 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6861 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6862 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6863 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6864 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6865 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6870 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6872 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6873 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6874 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6875 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6876 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6877 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6878 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6879 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6880 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6881 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6883 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6887 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6891 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6894 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6899 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6900 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6901 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6902 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6903 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6904 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6905 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6906 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6907 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6908 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6910 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6911 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6912 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6914 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6915 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6916 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6918 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6922 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6923 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6924 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6925 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6928 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6930 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6934 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6935 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6938 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6939 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6940 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6941 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6944 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6948 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6949 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6950 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6951 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6953 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6954 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6955 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6956 // consider the stale state on reload.
6957 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6960 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6961 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6962 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6964 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6967 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6971 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6974 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6976 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6977 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6979 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6980 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6983 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6984 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6988 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6989 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6991 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6992 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6997 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6998 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6999 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7000 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7002 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7005 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7014 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7019 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7020 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7022 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7024 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7028 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7029 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7030 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7032 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7038 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7039 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7040 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7041 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7042 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7043 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7044 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7045 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7046 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7047 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7049 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7050 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7051 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7052 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7053 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7054 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7055 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7057 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7058 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7059 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7060 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7062 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7064 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7065 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7066 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7067 (2, channel_type, option),
7068 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7069 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7070 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7071 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7072 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7073 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7074 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7075 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7076 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7077 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7078 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7079 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7080 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7081 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7082 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7083 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7084 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7085 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7086 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7089 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7090 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7091 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7092 // required channel parameters.
7093 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7094 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7095 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7097 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7099 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7100 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7101 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7102 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7105 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7106 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7107 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7109 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7110 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7112 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7113 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7118 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7119 if iter.next().is_some() {
7120 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7124 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7125 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7126 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7127 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7128 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7131 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7132 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7134 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7135 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7136 // separate u64 values.
7137 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7139 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7142 context: ChannelContext {
7145 config: config.unwrap(),
7149 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7150 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7151 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7154 temporary_channel_id,
7156 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7158 channel_value_satoshis,
7160 latest_monitor_update_id,
7163 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7166 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7167 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7170 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7171 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7172 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7173 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7177 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7178 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7179 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7180 monitor_pending_forwards,
7181 monitor_pending_failures,
7182 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7185 holding_cell_update_fee,
7186 next_holder_htlc_id,
7187 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7188 update_time_counter,
7191 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7192 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7193 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7194 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7196 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7197 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7198 closing_fee_limits: None,
7199 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7201 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7203 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7204 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7206 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7208 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7209 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7210 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7211 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7212 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7213 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7214 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7215 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7216 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7219 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7221 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7222 funding_transaction,
7224 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7225 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7226 counterparty_node_id,
7228 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7232 channel_update_status,
7233 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7238 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7239 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7240 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7242 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7243 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7245 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7246 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7247 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7249 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7250 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7252 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7253 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7255 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7258 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7267 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7268 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7269 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7270 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7271 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7273 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7274 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7276 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7277 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7278 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7279 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7280 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7281 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7282 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7283 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7284 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7285 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7286 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7287 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7288 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7289 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7290 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7291 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7292 use crate::util::test_utils;
7293 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7294 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7295 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7296 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7297 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7298 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7299 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7300 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7301 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7302 use crate::prelude::*;
7304 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7307 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7308 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7314 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7315 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7316 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7317 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7321 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7322 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7323 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7324 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7325 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7326 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7327 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7331 signer: InMemorySigner,
7334 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7335 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7338 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7339 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7341 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7342 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7345 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7349 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7351 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7352 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7353 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7354 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7355 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7358 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7359 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7360 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7361 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7365 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7366 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7367 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7371 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7372 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7373 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7374 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7376 let seed = [42; 32];
7377 let network = Network::Testnet;
7378 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7379 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7380 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7383 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7384 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7385 let config = UserConfig::default();
7386 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7387 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7388 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7390 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7391 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7395 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7396 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7398 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7399 let original_fee = 253;
7400 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7401 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7402 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7403 let seed = [42; 32];
7404 let network = Network::Testnet;
7405 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7407 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7408 let config = UserConfig::default();
7409 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7411 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7412 // same as the old fee.
7413 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7414 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7415 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7419 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7420 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7421 // dust limits are used.
7422 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7423 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7424 let seed = [42; 32];
7425 let network = Network::Testnet;
7426 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7427 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7429 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7430 // they have different dust limits.
7432 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7433 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7434 let config = UserConfig::default();
7435 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7437 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7438 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7439 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7440 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7441 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7443 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7444 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7445 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7446 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7447 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7449 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7450 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7451 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7453 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7454 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7455 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7456 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7459 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7461 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7462 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7463 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7464 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7465 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7466 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7467 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7468 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7469 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7473 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7474 // the dust limit check.
7475 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7476 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7477 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7478 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7480 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7481 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7482 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7483 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7484 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7485 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7486 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7490 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7491 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7492 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7493 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7494 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7495 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7496 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7497 let seed = [42; 32];
7498 let network = Network::Testnet;
7499 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7501 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7502 let config = UserConfig::default();
7503 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7505 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7506 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7508 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7509 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7510 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7511 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7512 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7513 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7515 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7516 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7517 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7518 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7519 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7521 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7523 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7524 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7525 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7526 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7527 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7529 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7530 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7531 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7532 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7533 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7537 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7538 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7539 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7540 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7541 let seed = [42; 32];
7542 let network = Network::Testnet;
7543 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7544 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7545 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7547 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7549 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7550 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7551 let config = UserConfig::default();
7552 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7554 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7555 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7556 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7557 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7559 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7560 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7561 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7563 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7564 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7565 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7566 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7568 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7569 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7570 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7572 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7573 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7575 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7576 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7577 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7578 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7579 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7580 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7581 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7583 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7585 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7586 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7587 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7588 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7589 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7593 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7594 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7595 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7596 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7597 let seed = [42; 32];
7598 let network = Network::Testnet;
7599 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7600 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7601 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7603 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7604 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7605 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7606 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7607 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7608 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7609 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7610 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7612 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7613 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7614 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7615 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7616 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7617 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7619 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7620 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7621 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7622 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7624 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7626 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7627 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7628 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7629 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7630 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7631 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7633 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7634 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7635 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7636 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7638 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7639 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7640 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7641 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7642 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7644 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7645 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7647 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7648 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7649 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7651 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7652 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7653 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7654 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7655 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7657 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7658 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7660 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7661 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7662 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7666 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7668 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7669 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7670 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7672 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7673 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7674 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7675 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7677 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7678 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7679 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7681 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7683 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7684 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7687 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7688 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7689 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7691 let seed = [42; 32];
7692 let network = Network::Testnet;
7693 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7694 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7695 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7698 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7699 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7700 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7702 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7703 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7705 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7706 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7707 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7709 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7710 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7712 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7714 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7715 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7717 // Channel Negotiations failed
7718 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7719 assert!(result.is_err());
7724 fn channel_update() {
7725 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7726 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7727 let seed = [42; 32];
7728 let network = Network::Testnet;
7729 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7730 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7732 // Create a channel.
7733 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7734 let config = UserConfig::default();
7735 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7736 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7737 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7738 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7740 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7741 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7742 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7744 short_channel_id: 0,
7747 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7748 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7749 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7751 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7752 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7754 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7756 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7758 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7759 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7760 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7761 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7763 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7764 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7765 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7767 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7771 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7773 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7774 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7775 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7776 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7777 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7778 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7779 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7780 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7781 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7782 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7783 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7784 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7785 use crate::sync::Arc;
7787 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7788 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7789 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7790 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7792 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7794 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7795 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7796 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7797 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7798 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7800 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7801 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7807 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7808 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7809 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7811 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7812 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7813 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7814 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7815 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7816 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7818 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7820 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7821 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7822 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7823 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7824 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7825 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7827 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7828 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7829 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7830 selected_contest_delay: 144
7832 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7833 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7835 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7836 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7838 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7839 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7841 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7842 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7844 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7845 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7846 // build_commitment_transaction.
7847 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7848 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7849 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7850 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7851 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7853 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7854 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7855 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7856 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7860 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7861 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7862 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7863 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7867 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7868 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7869 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7871 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7872 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7874 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7875 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7877 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7879 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7880 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7881 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7882 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7883 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7884 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7885 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7887 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7888 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7889 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7890 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7892 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7893 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7894 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7896 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7898 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7899 commitment_tx.clone(),
7900 counterparty_signature,
7901 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7902 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7903 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7905 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7906 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7908 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7909 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7910 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7912 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7913 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7916 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7917 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7919 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7920 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
7921 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7922 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7923 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7924 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7925 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7926 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7928 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7931 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7932 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7933 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7937 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7940 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7941 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7942 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7944 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7945 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7946 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7947 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7948 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7949 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7950 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7951 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7953 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7957 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7958 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7959 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7960 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7962 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7963 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7965 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7966 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7967 "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", {});
7969 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7970 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7971 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7972 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7974 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7975 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7977 amount_msat: 1000000,
7979 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7980 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7982 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7985 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7986 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7988 amount_msat: 2000000,
7990 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7991 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7993 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7996 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7997 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7999 amount_msat: 2000000,
8001 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8002 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8003 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8005 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8008 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8009 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8011 amount_msat: 3000000,
8013 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8014 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8015 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8017 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8020 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8021 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8023 amount_msat: 4000000,
8025 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8026 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8028 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8032 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8033 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8034 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8036 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8037 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8038 "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", {
8041 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8042 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8043 "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" },
8046 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8047 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8048 "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" },
8051 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8052 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8053 "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" },
8056 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8057 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8058 "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" },
8061 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8062 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8063 "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" }
8066 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8067 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8068 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8070 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8071 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8072 "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", {
8075 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8076 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8077 "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" },
8080 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8081 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8082 "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" },
8085 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8086 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8087 "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" },
8090 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8091 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8092 "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" },
8095 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8096 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8097 "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" }
8100 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8101 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8102 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8104 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8105 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8106 "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", {
8109 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8110 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8111 "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" },
8114 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8115 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8116 "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" },
8119 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8120 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8121 "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" },
8124 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8125 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8126 "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" }
8129 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8130 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8131 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8132 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8134 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8135 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8136 "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", {
8139 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8140 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8141 "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" },
8144 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8145 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8146 "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" },
8149 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8150 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8151 "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" },
8154 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8155 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8156 "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" }
8159 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8160 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8161 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8162 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8164 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8165 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8166 "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", {
8169 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8170 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8171 "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" },
8174 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8175 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8176 "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" },
8179 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8180 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8181 "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" },
8184 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8185 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8186 "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" }
8189 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8190 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8191 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8193 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8194 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8195 "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", {
8198 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8199 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8200 "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" },
8203 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8204 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8205 "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" },
8208 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8209 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8210 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8213 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8214 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8215 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8217 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8218 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8219 "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", {
8222 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8223 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8224 "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" },
8227 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8228 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8229 "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" },
8232 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8233 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8234 "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" }
8237 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8238 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8239 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8241 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8242 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8243 "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", {
8246 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8247 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8248 "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" },
8251 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8252 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8253 "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" }
8256 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8257 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8258 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8259 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8261 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8262 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8263 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8266 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8267 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8268 "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" },
8271 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8272 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8273 "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" }
8276 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8277 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8278 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8279 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8281 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8282 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8283 "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", {
8286 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8287 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8288 "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" },
8291 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8292 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8293 "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" }
8296 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8297 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8298 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8300 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8301 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8302 "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", {
8305 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8306 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8307 "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" }
8310 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8311 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8312 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8313 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8315 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8316 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8317 "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", {
8320 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8321 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8322 "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" }
8325 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8326 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8327 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8328 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8330 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8331 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8332 "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", {
8335 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8336 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8337 "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" }
8340 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8341 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8342 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8343 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8345 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8346 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8347 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8349 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8350 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8351 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8352 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8354 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8355 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8356 "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", {});
8358 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8359 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8360 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8361 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8363 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8364 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8365 "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", {});
8367 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8368 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8369 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8371 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8372 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8373 "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", {});
8375 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8376 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8377 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8378 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8380 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8381 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8382 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8384 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8385 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8386 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8387 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8389 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8390 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8391 "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", {});
8393 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8394 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8395 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8396 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8397 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8398 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8400 amount_msat: 2000000,
8402 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8403 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8405 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8408 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8409 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8410 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8412 amount_msat: 5000001,
8414 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8415 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8416 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8418 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8421 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8422 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8424 amount_msat: 5000000,
8426 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8427 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8428 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8430 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8434 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8435 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8436 "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", {
8439 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8440 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8441 "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" },
8443 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8444 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8445 "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" },
8447 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8448 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8449 "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" }
8452 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8453 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8454 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8457 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8458 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8459 "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" },
8461 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8462 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8463 "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" },
8465 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8466 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8467 "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" }
8472 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8473 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8475 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8476 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8477 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8478 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8480 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8481 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8482 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8484 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8485 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8487 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8488 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8490 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8491 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8492 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8496 fn test_key_derivation() {
8497 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8498 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8500 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8501 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8503 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8504 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8506 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8507 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8509 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8510 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8512 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8513 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8515 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8516 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8518 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8519 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8523 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8524 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8525 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8526 let seed = [42; 32];
8527 let network = Network::Testnet;
8528 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8529 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8531 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8532 let config = UserConfig::default();
8533 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8534 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8536 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8537 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8539 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8540 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8541 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8542 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8543 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8544 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8545 assert!(res.is_ok());
8550 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8551 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8552 // resulting `channel_type`.
8553 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8554 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8555 let network = Network::Testnet;
8556 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8557 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8559 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8560 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8562 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8563 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8565 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8566 // need to signal it.
8567 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8568 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8569 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8572 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8574 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8575 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8576 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8578 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8579 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8580 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8583 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8584 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8585 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8586 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8587 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8590 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8591 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8596 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8597 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8598 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8599 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8600 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8601 let network = Network::Testnet;
8602 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8603 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8605 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8606 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8608 let config = UserConfig::default();
8610 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8611 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8612 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8613 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8614 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8616 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8617 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8618 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8621 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8622 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8623 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8625 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8626 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8627 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8628 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8629 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8630 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8632 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8637 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8638 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8640 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8641 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8642 let network = Network::Testnet;
8643 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8644 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8646 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8647 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8649 let config = UserConfig::default();
8651 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8652 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8653 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8654 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8655 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8656 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8657 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8658 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8660 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8661 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8662 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8663 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8664 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8665 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8668 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8669 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8671 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8672 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8673 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8674 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8676 assert!(res.is_err());
8678 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8679 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8680 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8682 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8683 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8684 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8687 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8689 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8690 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8691 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8692 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8695 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8696 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8698 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8699 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8701 assert!(res.is_err());