1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
15 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
16 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
33 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
34 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
35 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
36 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
38 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
43 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
44 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
46 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
47 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
48 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
49 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
50 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
56 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
57 use crate::sync::Mutex;
58 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
60 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
63 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
64 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
66 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
70 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
71 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
74 pub struct AvailableBalances {
75 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
76 pub balance_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
78 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
80 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
81 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
83 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
84 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
87 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
89 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
91 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
92 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
93 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
94 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
95 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
96 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
98 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
102 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
103 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
104 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
105 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
108 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
110 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
111 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
112 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
114 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
115 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
117 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
119 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
120 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
121 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
123 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
129 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
132 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
136 enum InboundHTLCState {
137 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
138 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
139 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
141 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
142 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
143 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
144 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
145 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
146 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
147 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
148 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
149 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
150 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
151 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
153 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
154 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
156 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
157 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
158 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
159 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
160 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
161 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
162 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
163 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
164 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
165 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
166 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
169 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
170 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
171 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
172 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
173 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
174 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
177 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
178 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
180 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
181 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
182 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
183 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
184 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
185 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
186 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
187 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
190 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
191 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
193 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
194 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
195 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
196 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
197 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
198 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
199 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
200 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
201 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
202 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
203 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
204 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
210 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 state: InboundHTLCState,
218 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
219 enum OutboundHTLCState {
220 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
221 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
222 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
223 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
224 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
225 /// money back (though we won't), and,
226 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
227 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
228 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
229 /// we'll never get out of sync).
230 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
231 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
232 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
234 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
235 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
236 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
237 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
238 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
239 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
240 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
241 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
242 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
243 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
244 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
245 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
246 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
247 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
248 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
251 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
252 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
255 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
257 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
258 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
261 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
263 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
265 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
267 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
269 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
275 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
276 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
277 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
278 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
279 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
282 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
283 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
285 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
286 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
291 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
292 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
294 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
295 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
306 state: OutboundHTLCState,
308 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
309 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
312 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
315 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
321 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
322 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
323 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
324 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
327 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
332 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
337 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
341 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
342 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
343 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
344 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
345 struct $flag_type(u32);
350 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
353 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
355 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
358 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
361 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
362 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
365 Ok($flag_type(flags))
370 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
372 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
374 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
376 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
380 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
383 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
385 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
387 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
388 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
390 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
392 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
394 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
395 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
398 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
399 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
401 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
404 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
406 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
408 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
411 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
412 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
414 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
415 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
416 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
417 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
418 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
419 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
420 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
421 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
423 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
425 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
427 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
428 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
430 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
432 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
434 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
435 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
437 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
438 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
440 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
441 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
446 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
449 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
450 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
451 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
452 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
453 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
454 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
455 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
456 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
457 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
458 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
459 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
460 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
461 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
462 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
466 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
468 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
469 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
470 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
471 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
472 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
473 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
474 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
475 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
476 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
477 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
478 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
479 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
480 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
481 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
486 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
487 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
488 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
489 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
490 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
491 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
496 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
497 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
498 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
499 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
500 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
501 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
502 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
503 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
504 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
505 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
506 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
507 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
508 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
509 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
514 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
515 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
516 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
517 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
518 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
519 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
520 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
521 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
525 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
526 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
527 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
529 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
530 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
531 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
532 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
533 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
535 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
536 /// funding transaction to confirm.
537 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
538 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
540 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
541 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
542 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
546 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
547 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
549 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
552 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
561 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
563 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
567 fn $clear(&mut self) {
570 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
572 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
576 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
577 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
579 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
580 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
585 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
587 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
588 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
590 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
591 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
592 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
593 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
594 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
595 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
596 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
597 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
605 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
607 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
608 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
609 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
610 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
611 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
615 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
616 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
619 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
620 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
623 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
625 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
626 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
627 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
631 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
633 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
634 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
635 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
636 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
638 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
644 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
645 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
646 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
647 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
648 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
649 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
650 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
651 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
654 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
656 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
658 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
659 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
660 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
661 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
665 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
667 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
669 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
671 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
672 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
673 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
674 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
675 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
677 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
678 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
680 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
682 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
683 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
685 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
686 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
687 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
688 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
689 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
690 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
692 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
693 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
695 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
696 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
697 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
698 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
699 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
701 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
702 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
704 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
705 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
707 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
708 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
709 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
710 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
713 Close((String, ClosureReason)),
716 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
719 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
720 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
721 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
726 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
729 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
730 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
731 &ChannelError::Close((ref e, _)) => write!(f, "{}", e),
737 pub(super) fn close(err: String) -> Self {
738 ChannelError::Close((err.clone(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err }))
742 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
744 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
745 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
746 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
749 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
750 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
751 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
752 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
753 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
754 self.logger.log(record)
758 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
759 where L::Target: Logger {
760 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
761 where S::Target: SignerProvider
765 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
766 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
772 macro_rules! secp_check {
773 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
776 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close($err)),
781 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
782 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
783 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
784 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
785 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
786 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
787 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
788 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
790 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
792 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
794 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
798 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
800 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
801 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
802 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
804 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
805 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
807 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
808 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
809 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
810 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
811 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
813 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
814 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
818 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
824 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
826 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
827 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
828 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
829 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
830 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
831 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
832 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
833 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
836 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
837 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
838 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
839 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
840 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
841 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
842 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
843 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
844 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
845 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
846 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
849 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
850 struct HTLCCandidate {
852 origin: HTLCInitiator,
856 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
864 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
866 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
868 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
869 htlc_value_msat: u64,
870 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
875 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
876 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
877 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
878 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
879 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
881 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
882 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
883 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
884 htlc_value_msat: u64,
886 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
887 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
891 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
892 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
893 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
894 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
895 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
896 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
897 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
898 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
899 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
900 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
901 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
902 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
905 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
907 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
908 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
909 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
910 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
913 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
914 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
915 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
916 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
917 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
918 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
919 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
920 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
923 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
925 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
926 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
927 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
928 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
929 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
930 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
931 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
932 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
933 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
934 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
935 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
936 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
937 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
938 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
939 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
942 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
943 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
944 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
945 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
946 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
947 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
948 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
949 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
950 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
951 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
952 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
953 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
954 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
955 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
956 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
958 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
959 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
960 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
961 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
963 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
964 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
965 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
966 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
968 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
969 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
970 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
971 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
972 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
974 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
975 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
976 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
977 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
979 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
980 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
981 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
983 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
984 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
985 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
986 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
987 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
989 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
990 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
993 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
994 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
996 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
997 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
998 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
999 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1001 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1002 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1004 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1005 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1008 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1009 (0, update, required),
1012 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1013 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1014 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1015 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1016 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1017 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1018 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1019 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1020 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1021 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1024 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1025 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1026 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1028 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1030 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1031 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1032 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1033 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1034 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1035 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1036 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1040 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1042 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1043 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1044 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1045 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1046 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1047 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1048 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1053 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1054 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1055 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1056 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1057 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1059 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1060 /// in a timely manner.
1061 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1064 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1065 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1066 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1068 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1069 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1070 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1071 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1075 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1076 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1077 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1079 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1080 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1081 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1082 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1084 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1088 /// The current channel ID.
1089 channel_id: ChannelId,
1090 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1091 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1092 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1093 channel_state: ChannelState,
1095 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1096 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1098 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1099 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1100 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1102 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1103 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1104 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1105 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1107 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1108 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1110 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1112 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1113 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1114 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1116 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1117 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1118 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1120 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1121 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1122 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1123 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1124 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1125 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1127 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1128 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1129 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1130 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1131 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1132 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1134 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1136 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1137 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1138 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1140 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1141 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1142 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1143 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1144 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1145 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1146 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1147 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1149 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1150 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1151 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1153 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1154 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1155 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1156 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1157 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1158 /// outbound or inbound.
1159 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1161 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1163 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1164 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1165 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1166 // HTLCs with similar state.
1167 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1168 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1169 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1170 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1171 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1172 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1173 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1174 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1175 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1176 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1178 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1179 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1180 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1182 update_time_counter: u32,
1184 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1185 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1186 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1187 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1188 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1189 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1191 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1192 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1194 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1195 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1196 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1197 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1199 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1200 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1202 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1204 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1206 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1207 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1208 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1209 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1210 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1212 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1213 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1215 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1216 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1217 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1219 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1220 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1221 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1222 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1223 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1224 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1225 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1226 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1228 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1231 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1233 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1236 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1238 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1241 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1243 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1245 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1246 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1249 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1251 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1253 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1254 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1256 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1258 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1259 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1260 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1262 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1264 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1265 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1266 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1268 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1269 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1270 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1272 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1274 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1276 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1277 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1278 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1279 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1281 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1282 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1283 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1285 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1286 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1287 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1289 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1290 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1291 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1292 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1293 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1294 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1295 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1296 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1298 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1299 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1300 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1301 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1302 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1304 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1305 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1307 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1308 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1309 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1310 /// unblock the state machine.
1312 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1313 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1314 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1316 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1317 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1318 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1320 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1321 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1322 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1323 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1324 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1325 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1326 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1327 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1329 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1330 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1332 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1333 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1334 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1336 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1337 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1338 // associated channel mapping.
1340 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1341 // to store all of them.
1342 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1344 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1345 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1346 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1347 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1348 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1350 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1351 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1353 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1354 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1356 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1357 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1359 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1360 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1362 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1364 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1366 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1367 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1368 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1371 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1372 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1373 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1374 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1375 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1376 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1377 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1379 config: &'a UserConfig,
1380 current_chain_height: u32,
1383 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1384 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1385 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1386 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1387 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1389 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1390 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1392 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1393 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1395 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1397 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1398 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1400 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1402 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1403 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1404 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1406 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1407 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1410 // Check sanity of message fields:
1411 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1412 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
1413 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1414 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1415 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1417 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1418 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1420 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1421 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1423 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1424 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1425 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1427 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1428 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1430 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1431 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1433 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1435 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1436 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1437 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1439 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1440 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1442 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1443 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1446 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1447 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1448 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1450 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1451 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1453 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1454 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1456 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1457 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1459 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1460 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1462 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1463 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1465 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1466 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1469 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1471 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1472 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1473 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1477 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1478 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1479 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1480 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1482 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1483 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1485 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1486 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1487 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1489 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1490 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1493 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1494 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1495 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1496 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1500 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1501 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1502 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1503 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1506 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1507 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1508 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1509 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1510 return Err(ChannelError::close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1513 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1514 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1515 &Some(ref script) => {
1516 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1517 if script.len() == 0 {
1520 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1521 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1523 Some(script.clone())
1526 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1528 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1533 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1534 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1535 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1536 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1540 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1541 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1542 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1546 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1547 Ok(script) => script,
1548 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1551 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1552 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1554 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1557 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1560 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1562 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1564 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1567 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1568 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1570 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1575 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1577 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1578 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1579 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1580 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1582 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1585 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1587 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1588 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1591 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1592 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1595 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1596 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1597 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1598 pending_update_fee: None,
1599 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1600 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1601 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1602 update_time_counter: 1,
1604 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1606 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1607 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1608 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1609 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1610 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1611 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1612 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1614 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1615 signer_pending_funding: false,
1618 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1619 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1620 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1621 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1623 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1624 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1625 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1626 closing_fee_limits: None,
1627 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1629 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1630 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1631 short_channel_id: None,
1632 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1634 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1635 channel_value_satoshis,
1636 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1638 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1640 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1641 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1642 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1643 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1644 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1645 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1648 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1650 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1651 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1652 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1653 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1654 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1655 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1656 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1658 funding_outpoint: None,
1659 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1661 funding_transaction: None,
1662 is_batch_funding: None,
1664 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1665 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1666 counterparty_node_id,
1668 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1670 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1672 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1673 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1675 announcement_sigs: None,
1677 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1678 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1679 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1680 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1682 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1683 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1685 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1686 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1688 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1689 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1691 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1692 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1697 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1699 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1705 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1706 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1707 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1708 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1709 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1710 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1711 funding_satoshis: u64,
1714 config: &'a UserConfig,
1715 current_chain_height: u32,
1716 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1717 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1718 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1719 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1720 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1721 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1722 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1724 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1725 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1726 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1728 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1729 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1731 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1733 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1734 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1736 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1737 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1739 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1740 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1741 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1743 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1744 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1747 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1748 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1750 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1751 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1753 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1755 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1757 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1758 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1759 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1763 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1764 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1766 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1767 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1768 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1769 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1773 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1774 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1775 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1779 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1780 Ok(script) => script,
1781 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1784 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1789 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1790 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1791 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1792 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1797 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1799 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1800 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1801 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1802 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1804 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1805 channel_value_satoshis,
1807 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1809 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1810 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1813 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1814 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1817 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1818 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1819 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1820 pending_update_fee: None,
1821 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1822 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1823 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1824 update_time_counter: 1,
1826 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1828 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1829 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1830 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1831 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1832 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1833 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1834 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1836 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1837 signer_pending_funding: false,
1839 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1840 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1841 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1842 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1843 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1844 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1846 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1847 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1848 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1849 closing_fee_limits: None,
1850 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1852 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1853 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1854 short_channel_id: None,
1855 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1857 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1858 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1859 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1860 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1861 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1862 // receive `accept_channel2`.
1863 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1864 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1865 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1866 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1867 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1868 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1869 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1870 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1872 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1874 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1875 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1876 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1877 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1878 counterparty_parameters: None,
1879 funding_outpoint: None,
1880 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1882 funding_transaction: None,
1883 is_batch_funding: None,
1885 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1886 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1887 counterparty_node_id,
1889 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1891 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1893 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1894 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1896 announcement_sigs: None,
1898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1899 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1900 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1901 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1903 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1904 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1906 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1907 outbound_scid_alias,
1909 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1910 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1913 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1918 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1919 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1923 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1924 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1925 self.update_time_counter
1928 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1929 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1932 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1933 self.config.announced_channel
1936 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1937 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1940 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1941 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1942 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1943 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1946 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1947 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1948 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1951 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1953 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1954 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1955 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1956 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1957 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1960 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1961 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1962 match self.channel_state {
1963 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1964 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1965 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1966 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1967 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1968 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1969 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1971 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1973 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1974 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1978 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1979 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1980 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1981 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1982 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1983 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1986 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1987 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1988 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1992 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1993 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1994 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1995 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1996 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1999 // Public utilities:
2001 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2005 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2007 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2008 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2009 self.temporary_channel_id
2012 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2016 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2017 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2018 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2022 /// Gets the channel's type
2023 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2027 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2029 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2030 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2031 self.short_channel_id
2034 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2035 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2036 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2039 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2040 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2041 self.outbound_scid_alias
2044 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2046 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2047 return &self.holder_signer
2050 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2051 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2052 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2053 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2054 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2055 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2058 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2059 /// get_funding_created.
2060 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2061 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2064 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2065 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2066 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2067 if conf_height > 0 {
2074 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2075 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2076 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2079 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2080 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2082 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2086 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2089 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2090 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2093 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2094 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2097 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2098 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2099 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2102 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2103 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2106 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2107 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2108 self.counterparty_node_id
2111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2112 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2113 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2117 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2118 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2121 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2122 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2124 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2125 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2126 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2127 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2129 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2133 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2134 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2135 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2139 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2140 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2143 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2144 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2145 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2147 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2148 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2153 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2154 self.channel_value_satoshis
2157 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2158 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2161 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2162 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2165 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2167 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2168 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2171 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2172 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2173 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2174 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2176 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2180 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2181 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2182 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2185 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2186 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2187 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2190 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2191 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2192 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2195 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2196 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2197 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2200 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2201 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2202 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2205 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2206 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2207 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2210 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2211 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2212 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2213 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2214 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2217 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2219 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2220 self.prev_config = None;
2224 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2225 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2229 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2230 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2231 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2232 let did_channel_update =
2233 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2234 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2235 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2236 if did_channel_update {
2237 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2238 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2239 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2240 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2242 self.config.options = *config;
2246 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2247 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2248 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2249 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2250 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2253 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2254 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2255 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2256 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2257 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2259 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2260 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2261 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2262 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2263 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2264 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2265 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2267 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2268 where L::Target: Logger
2270 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2271 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2272 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2274 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2275 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2276 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2277 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2279 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2280 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2281 if match update_state {
2282 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2283 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2284 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2285 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2286 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2288 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2292 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2293 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2294 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2296 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2298 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2299 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2300 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2302 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2303 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2304 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2305 transaction_output_index: None
2310 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2311 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2312 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2313 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2314 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2317 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2319 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2320 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2321 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2323 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2324 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2327 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2328 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2331 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2333 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2334 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2335 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2337 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2338 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2344 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2346 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2347 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2348 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2349 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2350 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2351 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2352 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2356 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2357 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2359 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2361 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2362 if generated_by_local {
2363 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2364 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2365 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2375 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2377 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2378 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2379 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2380 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2381 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2386 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2388 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2393 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2394 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2398 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2399 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2401 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2403 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2404 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2406 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2407 if !generated_by_local {
2408 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2416 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2417 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2418 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2419 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2420 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2421 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2422 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2423 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2425 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2427 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2428 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2429 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2430 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2432 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2434 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2435 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2436 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2437 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2440 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2441 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2442 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2443 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2445 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2448 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2449 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2450 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2451 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2453 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2456 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2462 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2463 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2468 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2470 let channel_parameters =
2471 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2472 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2473 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2480 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2483 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2484 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2485 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2486 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2494 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2495 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2496 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2497 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2502 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2503 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2504 /// our counterparty!)
2505 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2506 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2507 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2508 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2509 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2510 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2511 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2513 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2517 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2518 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2519 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2520 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2521 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2522 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2523 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2525 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2528 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2529 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2530 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2531 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2532 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2535 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2536 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2539 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2543 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2544 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2545 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2546 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2547 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2548 // which are near the dust limit.
2549 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2550 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2551 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2552 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2555 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2556 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2558 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2559 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2562 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2563 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2564 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2567 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2568 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2570 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2572 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2573 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2576 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2577 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2580 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2581 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2583 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2584 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2586 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2589 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2590 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2591 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2592 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2593 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2594 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2596 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2598 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2599 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2604 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2605 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2606 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2607 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2609 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2610 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2611 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2612 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2613 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2614 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2616 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2619 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2623 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2624 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2625 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2626 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2627 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2628 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2629 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2631 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2633 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2634 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2636 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2642 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2643 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2644 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2645 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2646 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2647 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2648 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2649 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2650 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2651 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2652 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2653 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2654 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2655 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2656 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2657 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2658 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2663 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2664 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2665 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2666 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2667 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2668 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2669 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2670 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2674 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2675 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2676 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2677 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2678 match holding_cell_update {
2679 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2680 holding_cell_states.insert(
2682 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2685 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2686 holding_cell_states.insert(
2688 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2691 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2692 holding_cell_states.insert(
2694 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2698 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2701 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2702 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2705 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2706 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2708 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2709 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2710 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2711 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2712 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2713 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2714 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2715 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2716 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2717 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2724 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2725 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2726 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2727 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2730 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2731 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2733 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2734 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2735 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2736 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2737 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2738 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2739 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2740 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2741 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2742 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2745 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2746 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2752 } = *holding_cell_update {
2753 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2755 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2756 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2757 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2758 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2759 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2760 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2767 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2768 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2769 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2770 /// corner case properly.
2771 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2772 -> AvailableBalances
2773 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2775 let context = &self;
2776 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2779 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2780 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2782 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2783 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2784 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2785 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2788 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2790 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2791 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2793 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2795 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2797 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2798 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2802 if context.is_outbound() {
2803 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2804 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2806 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2807 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2809 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2810 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2811 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2812 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2815 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2816 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2817 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2818 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2819 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2820 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2821 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2824 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2825 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2826 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2827 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2828 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2829 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2830 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2831 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2832 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2833 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2834 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2836 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2839 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2840 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2841 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2842 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2843 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2846 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2847 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2849 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2850 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2851 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2853 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2854 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2855 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2856 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2860 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2862 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2863 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2864 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2865 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2866 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2867 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2868 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2870 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2871 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2873 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2874 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2875 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2878 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2879 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2880 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
2881 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
2882 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
2883 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
2884 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2885 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
2886 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
2887 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2891 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
2892 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
2893 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
2894 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2895 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
2896 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2899 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2900 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2901 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2902 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
2903 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2906 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2907 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2908 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2910 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2914 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2915 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2917 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
2918 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2922 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2923 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2924 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2925 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2927 outbound_capacity_msat,
2928 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2929 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2934 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2935 let context = &self;
2936 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2939 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2940 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2942 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2943 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2945 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2946 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2948 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2949 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2950 let context = &self;
2951 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2953 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2956 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2957 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2959 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2960 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2962 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2963 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2965 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2966 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2970 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2971 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2977 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2978 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2979 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2982 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2983 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2984 included_htlcs += 1;
2987 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2988 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2992 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2993 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2994 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2995 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2996 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2997 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3002 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3004 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3005 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3010 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3011 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3015 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3016 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3017 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3020 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3021 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3023 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3024 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3025 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3027 total_pending_htlcs,
3028 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3029 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3030 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3032 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3033 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3034 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3036 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3038 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3043 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3044 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3046 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3047 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3049 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3050 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3052 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3053 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3054 let context = &self;
3055 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3057 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3060 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3061 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3063 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3064 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3066 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3067 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3069 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3070 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3074 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3075 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3081 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3082 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3083 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3084 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3085 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3086 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3089 included_htlcs += 1;
3092 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3093 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3096 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3097 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3099 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3100 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3101 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3106 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3107 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3111 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3112 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3114 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3115 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3117 total_pending_htlcs,
3118 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3119 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3120 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3122 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3123 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3124 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3126 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3128 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3133 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3134 match self.channel_state {
3135 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3136 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3137 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3138 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3148 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3150 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3151 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3154 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3156 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3157 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3158 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3162 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3163 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3164 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3167 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3169 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3170 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3173 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3174 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3175 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3176 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3177 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3178 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3179 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3180 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3181 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3182 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3183 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3185 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3186 // return them to fail the payment.
3187 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3188 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3189 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3191 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3192 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3197 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3198 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3199 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3200 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3201 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3202 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3203 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3204 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3205 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3206 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3207 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3208 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3209 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3210 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3211 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3215 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3216 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3218 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3219 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3223 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3224 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3225 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3226 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3227 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3228 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3229 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3230 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3234 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3235 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3236 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3237 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3239 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3240 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3241 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3242 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3244 match &self.holder_signer {
3245 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3246 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3247 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3248 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3249 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3252 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3256 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3257 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3258 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3260 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3261 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3262 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3264 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3265 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3266 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3269 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3270 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3272 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3278 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3279 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3280 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3281 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3282 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3285 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3287 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3289 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3290 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3295 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3296 // We've exhausted our options
3299 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3300 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3303 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3304 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3305 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3306 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3308 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3309 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3310 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3311 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3312 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3313 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3315 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3317 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3322 // Internal utility functions for channels
3324 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3325 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3326 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3328 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3330 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3331 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3332 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3334 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3337 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3339 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3342 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3343 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3344 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3346 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3348 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3349 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3350 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3351 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3352 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3355 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3356 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3357 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3358 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3359 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3360 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3361 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3364 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3365 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3367 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3369 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3370 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3371 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3372 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3373 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3374 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3375 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3378 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3379 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3381 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3382 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3385 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3386 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3387 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3388 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3389 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3390 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3393 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3394 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3395 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3396 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3397 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3398 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3404 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3405 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3406 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3407 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3408 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3409 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3410 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3411 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3412 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3413 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3414 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3415 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3418 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3419 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3420 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3421 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3422 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3423 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3426 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3427 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3429 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3430 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3431 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3435 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3436 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3437 trait FailHTLCContents {
3438 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3439 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3440 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3441 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3443 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3444 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3445 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3446 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3448 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3449 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3451 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3452 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3455 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3456 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3457 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3458 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3461 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3462 failure_code: self.1
3465 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3466 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3468 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3469 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3471 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3472 failure_code: self.1
3477 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3478 fn name() -> &'static str;
3480 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3481 fn name() -> &'static str {
3485 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3486 fn name() -> &'static str {
3487 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3491 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3492 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3493 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3495 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3496 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3497 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3498 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3500 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3501 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3503 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3505 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3506 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3507 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3508 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3510 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3511 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3515 return Err(ChannelError::Close((format!(
3516 "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit
3517 ), ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
3518 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: feerate_per_kw,
3519 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: lower_limit,
3526 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3527 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3528 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3529 // outside of those situations will fail.
3530 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3534 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3539 1 + // script length (0)
3543 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3544 2 + // witness marker and flag
3545 1 + // witness element count
3546 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3547 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3548 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3549 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3550 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3551 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3553 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3554 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3555 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3561 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3562 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3563 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3564 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3566 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3567 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3568 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3570 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3571 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3572 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3573 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3574 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3575 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3578 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3579 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3582 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3583 value_to_holder = 0;
3586 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3587 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3588 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3589 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3591 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3592 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3595 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3596 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3599 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3602 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3603 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3605 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3607 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3608 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3609 where L::Target: Logger {
3610 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3611 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3612 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3613 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3614 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3615 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3616 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3617 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3621 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3622 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3623 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3624 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3626 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3627 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3630 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3631 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3632 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3634 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3635 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3636 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3637 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3638 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3639 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3640 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3642 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3643 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3644 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3646 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3647 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3649 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3652 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3653 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3657 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3661 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3662 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3663 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3664 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3665 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3666 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3669 // Now update local state:
3671 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3672 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3673 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3674 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3675 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3676 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3677 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3678 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3680 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3683 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3684 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3685 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3686 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3687 // do not not get into this branch.
3688 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3689 match pending_update {
3690 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3691 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3692 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3693 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3695 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3696 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3699 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3700 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3702 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3703 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3704 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3705 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3706 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3707 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3713 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3714 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3715 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3717 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3718 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3719 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3721 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3722 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3725 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3726 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3728 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3729 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3731 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3732 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3735 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3738 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3739 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3740 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3741 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3746 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3747 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3748 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3749 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3750 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3751 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3752 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3753 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3754 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3755 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3756 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3757 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3758 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3759 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3760 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3762 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3763 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3764 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3765 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3766 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3769 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3770 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3771 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3777 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3778 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3780 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3784 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3785 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3786 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3787 /// before we fail backwards.
3789 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3790 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3791 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3792 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3793 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3794 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3795 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3798 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3799 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3801 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3802 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3803 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3804 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3805 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3806 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3809 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3810 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3811 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3812 /// before we fail backwards.
3814 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3815 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3816 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3817 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3818 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3820 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3821 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3822 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3825 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3826 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3827 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3829 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3830 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3831 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3833 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3834 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3835 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3837 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3842 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3843 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3849 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3850 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3851 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3852 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3853 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3857 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3858 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3859 force_holding_cell = true;
3862 // Now update local state:
3863 if force_holding_cell {
3864 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3865 match pending_update {
3866 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3867 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3868 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3869 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3873 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3874 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3876 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3877 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3878 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3884 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3885 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3889 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3890 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3892 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3893 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3896 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3899 // Message handlers:
3900 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3901 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3902 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3903 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3904 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3905 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3906 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3909 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3911 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3913 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3914 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3915 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3916 debug_assert!(matches!(
3917 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3919 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3920 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3923 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3924 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3926 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3927 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3928 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3929 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3931 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3934 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3935 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3936 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3939 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3940 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3941 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3942 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3943 // when routing outbound payments.
3944 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3948 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3949 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3950 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3951 match &self.context.channel_state {
3952 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3953 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3954 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3955 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3956 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3957 check_reconnection = true;
3958 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3959 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3960 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3961 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3962 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3964 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3965 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3968 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3969 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3970 _ => return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3972 if check_reconnection {
3973 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3974 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3975 let expected_point =
3976 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3977 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3979 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3980 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3981 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3982 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3983 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3984 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3986 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3987 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3988 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3989 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3990 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3992 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3993 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3998 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3999 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4001 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4003 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4006 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4007 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4008 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4009 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4010 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4011 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4013 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4014 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4015 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4017 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4018 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4020 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4021 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4023 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4024 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4026 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4027 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4030 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4031 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4032 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4033 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4035 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4036 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4039 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4040 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4041 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4042 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4043 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4044 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4045 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4046 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4047 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4048 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4049 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4051 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4052 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4053 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4054 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4055 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4056 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4060 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4061 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4062 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4063 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4064 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4065 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4068 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4069 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4071 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4072 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4073 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4075 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4076 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4080 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4081 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4083 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4088 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4089 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4093 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4094 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4095 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4096 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4097 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4101 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4102 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4104 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4105 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4108 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4109 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4110 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4114 // Now update local state:
4115 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4116 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4117 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4118 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4119 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4120 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4121 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4122 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4128 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4130 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4131 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4132 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4133 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4134 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4135 None => fail_reason.into(),
4136 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4137 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4138 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4139 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4141 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4145 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4146 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4147 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4148 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4150 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4151 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4156 Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4159 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4160 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4161 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4163 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4164 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4167 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4170 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4171 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4172 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4174 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4175 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4178 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4182 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4183 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4186 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4187 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4190 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4194 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4195 where L::Target: Logger
4197 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4198 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4200 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4201 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4203 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4207 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4209 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4211 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4212 let commitment_txid = {
4213 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4214 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4215 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4217 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4218 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4219 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4220 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4221 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4222 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4226 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4228 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4229 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4230 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4231 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4234 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4235 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4236 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4237 return Err(ChannelError::close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4240 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4242 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4243 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4244 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4245 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4246 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4247 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4248 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4249 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4250 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4251 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4252 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4258 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4262 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4263 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4264 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4265 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4266 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4267 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4268 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4269 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4270 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4271 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4272 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4273 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4274 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4277 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4278 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4279 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4280 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4281 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4282 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4283 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4285 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4286 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4287 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4288 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4289 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4290 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4291 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4292 return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4294 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4295 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4298 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4300 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4301 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4302 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4305 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4308 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4309 commitment_stats.tx,
4311 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4312 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4313 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4316 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4317 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4319 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4320 let mut need_commitment = false;
4321 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4322 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4323 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4324 need_commitment = true;
4328 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4329 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4330 Some(resolution.clone())
4332 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4333 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4334 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4335 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4336 need_commitment = true;
4339 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4340 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4341 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4342 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4343 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4344 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4345 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4346 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4347 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4348 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4349 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4350 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4351 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4352 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4354 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4356 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4357 need_commitment = true;
4361 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4362 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4363 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4364 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4365 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4366 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4367 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4369 nondust_htlc_sources,
4371 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4374 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4375 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4376 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4377 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4378 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4380 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4381 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4382 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4383 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4384 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4385 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4386 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4387 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4388 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4389 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4390 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4391 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4392 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4393 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4395 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4396 &self.context.channel_id);
4397 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4400 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4401 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4402 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4403 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4404 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4405 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4406 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4407 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4408 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4412 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4413 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4414 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4415 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4418 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4419 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4420 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4421 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4422 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4423 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4424 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4426 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4427 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4428 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4431 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4432 /// for our counterparty.
4433 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4434 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4435 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4436 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4438 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4439 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4440 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4441 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4443 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4444 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4445 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4446 updates: Vec::new(),
4447 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4450 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4451 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4452 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4453 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4454 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4455 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4456 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4457 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4458 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4459 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4460 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4461 // to rebalance channels.
4462 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4463 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4464 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4465 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4467 match self.send_htlc(
4468 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4469 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4471 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4474 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4475 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4476 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4477 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4478 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4479 // into the holding cell without ever being
4480 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4481 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4482 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4485 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4492 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4493 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4494 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4495 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4496 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4497 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4498 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4499 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4500 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4501 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4502 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4503 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4506 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4507 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4508 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4510 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4511 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4512 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4515 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4517 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4518 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4519 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4520 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4521 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4522 // for a full revocation before failing.
4523 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4524 update_fail_count += 1;
4526 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4528 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4533 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4534 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4536 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4537 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4542 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4543 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4544 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4545 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4546 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4548 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4549 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4550 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4552 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4553 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4559 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4560 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4561 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4562 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4563 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4564 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4565 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4566 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4567 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4569 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4570 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4572 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4573 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4575 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4576 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4579 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4581 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4582 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4583 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4587 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4588 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4589 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4590 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4591 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4592 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4593 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4594 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4595 return Err(ChannelError::close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4598 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4600 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4601 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4604 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4605 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4606 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4607 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4609 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4611 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4616 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4617 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4618 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4619 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4620 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4621 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4622 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4623 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4624 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4626 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4629 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4630 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4631 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4632 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4633 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4634 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4635 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4636 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4637 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4639 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4640 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4643 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4644 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4645 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4646 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4647 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4648 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4649 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4650 let mut require_commitment = false;
4651 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4654 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4655 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4656 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4657 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4659 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4660 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4661 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4662 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4663 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4664 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4666 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4670 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4671 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4672 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4673 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4674 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4676 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4677 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4678 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4683 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4684 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4686 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4690 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4691 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4693 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4694 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4695 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4696 require_commitment = true;
4697 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4699 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4700 match pending_htlc_status {
4701 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4702 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4703 require_commitment = true;
4705 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4706 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4707 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4709 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4710 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4711 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4715 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4716 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4717 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4718 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4721 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4722 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4723 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4724 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4730 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4731 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4732 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4733 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4734 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4736 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4737 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4738 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4739 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4740 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4741 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4742 require_commitment = true;
4746 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4748 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4749 match update_state {
4750 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4751 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4752 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4753 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4754 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4755 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4757 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4758 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4759 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4760 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4761 require_commitment = true;
4762 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4763 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4768 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4769 let release_state_str =
4770 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4771 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4772 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4773 if !release_monitor {
4774 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4775 update: monitor_update,
4777 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4779 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4784 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4786 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4787 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4788 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4789 if require_commitment {
4790 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4791 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4792 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4793 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4795 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4796 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4797 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4798 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4799 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4801 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4802 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4803 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4804 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4805 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4808 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4809 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4810 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4811 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4812 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4813 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4815 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4816 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4818 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4819 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4821 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4822 if require_commitment {
4823 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4825 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4826 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4827 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4828 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4830 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4831 &self.context.channel_id(),
4832 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4835 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4836 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4838 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4839 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4841 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4842 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4848 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4849 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4850 /// commitment update.
4851 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4852 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4853 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4855 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4856 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4859 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4860 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4861 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4862 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4864 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4865 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4866 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4867 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4868 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4869 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4870 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4872 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4873 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4875 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4876 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4878 if !self.context.is_live() {
4879 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4882 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4883 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4884 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4885 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4886 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4887 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4888 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
4889 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4890 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4891 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4895 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4896 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4897 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4898 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4901 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4902 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4906 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4907 force_holding_cell = true;
4910 if force_holding_cell {
4911 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4915 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4916 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4918 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4919 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4924 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4925 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4927 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4929 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4930 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4931 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4932 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4936 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4937 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4938 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4942 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4943 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4946 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4947 // will be retransmitted.
4948 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4949 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4950 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4952 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4953 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4955 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4956 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4957 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4958 // this HTLC accordingly
4959 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4962 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4963 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4964 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4965 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4968 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4969 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4970 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4971 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4972 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4973 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4978 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4980 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4981 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4982 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4983 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4987 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4988 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4989 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4990 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4991 // the update upon reconnection.
4992 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4996 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4998 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4999 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5003 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5004 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5005 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5006 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5007 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5008 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5009 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5011 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5012 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5013 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5014 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5015 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5016 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5017 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5019 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5020 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5021 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5022 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5023 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5024 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5025 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5028 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5029 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5030 /// to the remote side.
5031 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5032 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5033 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5034 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5037 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5039 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5040 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5042 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5043 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5044 // first received the funding_signed.
5045 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5046 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5047 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5048 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5050 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5052 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5053 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5054 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5055 funding_broadcastable = None;
5058 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5059 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5060 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5061 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5062 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5063 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5064 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5065 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5066 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5067 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5068 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5069 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5070 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5071 next_per_commitment_point,
5072 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5076 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5078 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5079 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5080 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5081 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5082 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5083 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5084 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5085 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5087 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5088 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5089 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5090 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5091 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5092 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5093 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5097 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5098 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5100 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5101 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5103 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5104 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5107 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5108 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5109 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5110 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5111 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5112 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5113 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5114 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5115 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5116 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5120 pub fn check_for_stale_feerate<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, min_feerate: u32) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> {
5121 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5122 // While its possible our fee is too low for an outbound channel because we've been
5123 // unable to increase the fee, we don't try to force-close directly here.
5126 if self.context.feerate_per_kw < min_feerate {
5128 "Closing channel as feerate of {} is below required {} (the minimum required rate over the past day)",
5129 self.context.feerate_per_kw, min_feerate
5131 Err(ClosureReason::PeerFeerateTooLow {
5132 peer_feerate_sat_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
5133 required_feerate_sat_per_kw: min_feerate,
5140 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5141 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5143 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5144 return Err(ChannelError::close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5146 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5147 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5149 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5151 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5152 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5153 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5154 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5155 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5156 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5157 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5158 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5159 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5161 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5162 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5163 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5168 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5170 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5171 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5172 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5173 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5175 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5176 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5178 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5179 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5182 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5183 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5184 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5185 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5187 SignerResumeUpdates {
5194 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5195 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5196 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5197 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5198 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5199 per_commitment_secret,
5200 next_per_commitment_point,
5202 next_local_nonce: None,
5206 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5207 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5208 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5209 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5210 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5211 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5213 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5214 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5215 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5216 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5217 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5218 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5219 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5220 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5221 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5222 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5223 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5228 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5229 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5231 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5232 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5233 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5234 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5235 reason: err_packet.clone()
5238 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5239 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5240 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5241 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5242 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5243 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5246 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5247 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5248 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5249 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5250 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5257 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5258 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5259 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5260 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5264 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5265 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5266 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5267 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5268 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5269 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5270 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5274 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5275 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5277 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5278 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5279 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5280 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5285 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5286 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5291 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5292 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5293 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5294 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5295 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5296 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5297 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5302 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5303 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5305 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5306 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5307 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5308 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5309 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5310 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5311 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5312 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5315 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5317 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5318 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5319 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5320 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5321 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5324 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5325 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5326 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5329 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5330 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5331 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5332 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5333 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5334 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5335 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5337 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5338 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5339 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5340 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5341 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5344 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5345 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5346 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5347 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5348 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5349 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5350 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5351 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5355 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5356 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5357 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5358 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5359 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5360 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5361 our_commitment_transaction
5365 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5366 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5367 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5368 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5370 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5372 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5374 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5375 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5376 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5377 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5378 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5379 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5381 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5382 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5383 channel_ready: None,
5384 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5385 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5386 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5390 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5391 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5392 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5393 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5394 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5395 next_per_commitment_point,
5396 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5398 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5399 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5400 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5404 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5405 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5406 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5408 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5409 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5410 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5413 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5416 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5417 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5418 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5419 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5420 our_commitment_transaction
5424 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5425 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5426 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5427 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5428 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5429 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5430 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5432 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5434 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5435 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5436 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5437 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5438 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5439 next_per_commitment_point,
5440 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5444 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5445 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5446 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5448 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5451 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5452 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5453 raa: required_revoke,
5454 commitment_update: None,
5455 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5457 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5458 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5459 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5461 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5464 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5465 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5466 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5467 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5468 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5469 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5472 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5473 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5474 raa: required_revoke,
5475 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5476 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5479 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5480 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5481 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5482 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5483 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5486 Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
5487 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5488 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5489 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5494 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5495 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5496 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5497 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5499 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5501 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5503 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5504 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5505 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5506 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5507 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5508 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5509 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5510 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5512 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5513 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5514 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5515 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5516 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5518 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5519 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5520 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5521 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5524 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5525 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5526 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5527 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5528 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5529 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5530 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5531 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5532 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5533 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5534 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5535 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5536 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5537 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5538 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5540 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5543 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5544 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5547 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5548 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5549 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5550 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5551 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5552 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5555 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5556 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5557 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5558 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5559 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5560 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5561 return Err(ChannelError::close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5563 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5569 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5570 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5571 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5572 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5574 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5575 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5576 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5577 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5578 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5579 return Ok((None, None, None));
5582 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5583 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5584 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5586 return Ok((None, None, None));
5589 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5590 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5591 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5592 return Ok((None, None, None));
5595 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5597 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5598 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5599 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5600 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5602 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5603 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5605 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5606 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5608 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5609 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5610 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5611 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5613 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5614 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5615 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5619 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5625 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5626 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5628 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5629 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5632 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5633 /// within our expected timeframe.
5635 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5636 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5637 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5640 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5643 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5644 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5648 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5649 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5651 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5652 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5654 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5655 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5656 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5657 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5658 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5660 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5661 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5662 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5665 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5667 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5668 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5671 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5672 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5673 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5676 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5679 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5680 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5681 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5682 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5684 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5687 assert!(send_shutdown);
5688 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5689 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5690 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5692 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5693 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5695 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5700 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5702 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5703 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5705 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5706 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5707 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5708 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5709 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5710 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5711 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5713 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5715 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5716 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5718 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5719 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5720 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5721 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5725 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5726 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5727 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5728 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5729 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5730 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5732 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5733 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5740 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5741 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5743 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5746 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5747 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5749 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5751 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5752 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5753 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5754 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5755 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5756 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5757 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5758 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5759 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5761 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5762 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5765 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5769 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5770 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5771 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5772 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5774 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5775 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5777 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5778 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5780 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5781 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5783 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5784 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5787 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5788 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5791 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5792 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5793 return Ok((None, None, None));
5796 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5797 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5798 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5799 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5801 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5803 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5806 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5807 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5808 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5809 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5810 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5814 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5815 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < Amount::from_sat(MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) {
5816 return Err(ChannelError::close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5820 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5821 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5823 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5826 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5827 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5828 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5829 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5831 monitor_update: None,
5832 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5833 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5834 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5835 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5836 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5837 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5838 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5839 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5841 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5842 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5843 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5844 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5848 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5850 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5851 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5852 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5853 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5855 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5858 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5859 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5861 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5862 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5863 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5864 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5866 monitor_update: None,
5867 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5868 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5869 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5870 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5871 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5872 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5873 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5874 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5876 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5877 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5878 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5879 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5884 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5885 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5886 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5887 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5889 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5890 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5891 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5893 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5895 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5902 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5903 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5904 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5906 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5907 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5909 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5910 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5913 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5914 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5915 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5916 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5917 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5919 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5920 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5921 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5923 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5924 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5927 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5928 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5929 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5930 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5931 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5932 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5933 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5934 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5936 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5939 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5940 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5941 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5942 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5944 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5948 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5949 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5950 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5951 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5953 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5959 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5960 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5961 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5962 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5963 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5964 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5965 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5967 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5968 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5971 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5973 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5974 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5980 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5981 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5982 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5983 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5984 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5985 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5986 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5988 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5989 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5996 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5997 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
5998 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6000 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6003 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6004 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6007 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6008 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6009 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6010 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6013 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6014 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6015 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6017 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6018 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6019 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6020 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6021 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6022 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6023 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6026 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6027 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6028 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6029 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6030 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6031 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6032 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6033 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6037 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6038 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6039 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6040 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6041 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6042 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6043 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6047 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6048 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6053 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6054 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6055 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6056 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6057 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6058 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6062 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6063 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6064 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6065 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6067 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6068 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6069 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6070 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6071 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6072 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6073 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6074 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6075 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6077 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6078 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6079 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6086 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6087 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6090 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6091 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6094 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6095 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6099 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6100 &self.context.holder_signer
6104 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6106 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6107 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6108 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6109 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6110 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6111 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6113 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6115 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6123 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6124 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6128 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6129 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6130 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6131 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6134 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6135 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6136 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6137 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6140 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6141 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6142 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6143 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6144 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6145 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6148 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6149 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6150 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6151 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6152 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6153 if !release_monitor {
6154 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6163 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6164 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6165 /// here after logging them.
6166 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6167 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6168 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6169 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6172 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6173 update.update.update_id,
6183 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6184 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6187 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6188 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6189 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6191 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6192 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6194 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6195 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6197 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6198 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6199 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6202 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6203 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6204 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6205 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6206 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6207 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6209 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6210 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6211 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6213 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6214 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6215 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6216 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6217 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6218 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6224 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6225 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6226 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6227 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6230 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6231 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6232 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6235 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6236 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6237 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6240 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6241 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6242 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6245 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6246 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6247 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6248 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6249 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6252 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6253 self.context.channel_update_status
6256 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6257 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6258 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6261 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6263 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6264 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6265 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6269 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6270 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6271 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6274 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6278 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6279 // channel_ready yet.
6280 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6284 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6285 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6286 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6287 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6289 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6290 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6291 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6293 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6294 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6297 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6298 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6300 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6301 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6302 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6303 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6304 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6305 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6306 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6307 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6309 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6313 if need_commitment_update {
6314 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6315 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6316 let next_per_commitment_point =
6317 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6318 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6319 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6320 next_per_commitment_point,
6321 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6325 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6331 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6332 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6333 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6334 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6335 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6336 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6337 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6339 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6342 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6343 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6344 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6345 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6346 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6347 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6348 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6349 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6350 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh() ||
6351 tx.output[txo_idx].value.to_sat() != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6352 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6353 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6354 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6355 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6356 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6357 // channel and move on.
6358 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6359 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6361 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6362 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6363 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6365 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6366 if !tx.is_coinbase() {
6367 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6368 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6369 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6370 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6371 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6372 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6377 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6378 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6379 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6380 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6381 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6384 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6385 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6386 if tx.is_coinbase() &&
6387 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6388 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6389 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6392 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6393 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6394 // may have already happened for this block).
6395 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6396 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6397 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6398 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6401 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6402 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6403 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6404 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6412 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6413 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6414 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6415 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6417 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6418 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6421 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6423 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6424 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6425 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6426 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6428 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6431 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6434 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6435 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6436 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6437 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6439 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6442 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6443 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6444 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6446 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6447 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6449 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6450 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6451 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6459 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6461 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6462 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6463 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6465 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6466 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6469 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6470 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6471 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6472 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6473 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6474 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6475 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6476 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6479 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6480 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6481 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6482 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6484 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6485 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6486 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6488 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6489 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6490 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6491 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6493 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6494 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6495 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6496 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6497 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6498 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6499 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6502 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6503 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6505 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6508 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6509 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6510 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6511 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6512 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6513 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6514 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6515 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6516 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6517 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6518 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6519 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6520 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6521 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6522 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6523 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6524 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6530 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6535 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6536 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6538 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6539 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6540 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6541 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6543 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6546 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6548 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6549 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6550 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6551 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6552 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6553 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6555 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6556 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6559 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6560 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6561 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6562 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6563 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6564 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6566 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6567 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6570 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6571 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6572 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6573 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6574 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6580 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6581 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6582 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6583 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6585 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6588 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6592 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6596 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6597 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6601 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6605 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6606 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6609 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6613 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6615 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6620 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6621 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6622 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6624 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6629 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6631 None => return None,
6634 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6636 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6637 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6639 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6640 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6643 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6649 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6651 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6652 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6653 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6654 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6655 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6656 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6657 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6659 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6660 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6661 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6662 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6663 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6664 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6665 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6666 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6667 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6668 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6669 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6670 contents: announcement,
6673 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6678 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6682 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6683 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6684 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6685 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6686 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6687 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6688 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6689 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6691 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6693 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6694 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6695 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6696 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6698 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6699 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!(
6700 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6701 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6704 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6705 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6706 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6707 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6710 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6713 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6714 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6715 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6716 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6717 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6718 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6721 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6723 Err(_) => return None,
6725 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6726 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6731 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6732 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6733 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6734 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6735 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6736 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6737 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6738 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6739 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6740 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6741 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6742 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6743 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6744 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6745 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6746 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6749 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6752 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6753 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6754 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6755 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6756 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6757 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6758 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6759 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6760 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6762 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6763 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6764 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6765 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6766 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6767 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6768 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6769 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6770 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6772 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6773 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6774 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6775 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6776 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6777 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6778 next_funding_txid: None,
6783 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6785 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6786 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6787 /// commitment update.
6789 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6790 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6791 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6792 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6793 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6794 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6795 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6798 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6799 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6800 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6802 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6803 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6808 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6809 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6811 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6813 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6814 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6816 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6817 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6818 /// regenerate them.
6820 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6821 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6823 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6824 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6825 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6826 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6827 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6828 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6829 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6830 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6832 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6833 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6834 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6836 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6838 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6839 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6840 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6843 if amount_msat == 0 {
6844 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6847 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6848 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6849 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6850 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6853 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6854 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6855 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6858 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6859 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6860 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6861 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6862 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6863 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6864 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6865 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6868 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6869 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6870 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6871 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6872 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6873 else { "to peer" });
6875 if need_holding_cell {
6876 force_holding_cell = true;
6879 // Now update local state:
6880 if force_holding_cell {
6881 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6886 onion_routing_packet,
6893 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6894 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6896 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6898 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6904 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6905 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6906 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6910 onion_routing_packet,
6914 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6919 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6920 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6921 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6922 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6924 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6925 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6926 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6928 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6929 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6933 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6934 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6935 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6936 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6937 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6938 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6939 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6942 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6943 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6944 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6945 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6946 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6947 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6950 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6952 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6953 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6954 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6955 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6956 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6958 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6959 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6962 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6963 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6964 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6965 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6966 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6967 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6968 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6969 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6970 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6971 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6972 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6973 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6975 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6977 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6981 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6982 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6983 where L::Target: Logger
6985 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6986 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6987 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6991 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6992 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6993 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6994 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6995 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6996 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6997 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6998 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6999 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7000 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7001 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7007 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7010 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7011 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7012 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7013 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7014 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7015 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7017 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7018 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7019 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7021 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7022 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7023 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7026 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7027 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7031 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7032 &commitment_stats.tx,
7033 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7034 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7035 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7036 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7038 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7040 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7041 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7042 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7043 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7045 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7046 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7047 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7048 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7049 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7050 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7054 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7055 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7059 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7060 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7062 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7068 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7069 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7071 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7072 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7073 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7074 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7075 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7076 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7077 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7078 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7080 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7081 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7082 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7085 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7086 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7087 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7093 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7095 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7096 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7097 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7098 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7099 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7101 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7103 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7109 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7110 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7111 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7112 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7113 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7115 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7116 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7117 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7120 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7121 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7123 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7124 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7126 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7127 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7129 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7130 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7131 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7134 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7137 // use override shutdown script if provided
7138 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7139 Some(script) => script,
7141 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7142 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7143 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7144 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7148 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7149 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7151 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7156 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7157 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7158 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7159 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7160 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7162 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7163 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7164 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7165 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7166 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7167 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7168 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7170 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7172 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7173 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7175 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7176 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7177 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7180 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7181 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7182 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7183 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7184 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7186 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7187 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7194 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7195 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7197 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7200 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7201 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7202 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7204 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7205 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7209 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7213 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7214 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7215 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7216 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7219 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7220 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7221 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7222 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7223 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7224 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7225 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7226 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7228 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7229 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7230 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7231 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7232 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7233 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7236 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7237 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7238 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7241 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7245 counterparty_node_id,
7247 channel_value_satoshis,
7251 current_chain_height,
7252 outbound_scid_alias,
7253 temporary_channel_id,
7254 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7259 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7264 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7265 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7266 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7267 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7268 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7269 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7270 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7271 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7272 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7274 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7279 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7280 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7281 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7284 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7285 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7286 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7287 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7290 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7292 next_local_nonce: None,
7296 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7297 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7298 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7299 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7300 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7301 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7302 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7303 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7304 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7305 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7306 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7309 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7310 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7312 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7314 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7315 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7316 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7317 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7320 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7321 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7323 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7325 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7326 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7328 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7329 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7330 if funding_transaction.is_coinbase() &&
7331 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7332 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7333 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7336 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7337 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7339 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7340 if funding_created.is_none() {
7341 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7342 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7344 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7345 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7346 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7347 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7355 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7356 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7357 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7358 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7359 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7360 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7362 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7364 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7365 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7368 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7369 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7370 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7371 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7374 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7375 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7376 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7378 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7379 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7382 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7383 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7386 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7387 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7390 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7392 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7393 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7394 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7395 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7396 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7397 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7398 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7399 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7400 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7401 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7402 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7403 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7404 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7405 first_per_commitment_point,
7406 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7407 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7408 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7409 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7411 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7413 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7414 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7419 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7420 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7422 // Check sanity of message fields:
7423 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7424 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7426 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7427 return Err(ChannelError::close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7429 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7430 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7432 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7433 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7435 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7436 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7438 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7439 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7440 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7442 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7443 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7444 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7446 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7447 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7448 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7450 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7451 return Err(ChannelError::close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7453 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7454 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7457 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7458 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7459 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7461 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7462 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7464 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7465 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7467 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7468 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7470 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7471 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7473 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7474 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7476 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7477 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7480 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7481 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7482 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7484 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7485 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7487 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7488 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7489 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7491 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7492 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7495 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7496 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7497 &Some(ref script) => {
7498 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7499 if script.len() == 0 {
7502 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7503 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7505 Some(script.clone())
7508 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7510 return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7515 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7516 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7517 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7518 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7519 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7521 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7522 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7524 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7527 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7528 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7529 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7530 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7531 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7532 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7535 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7536 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7537 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7540 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7541 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7543 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7544 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7546 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7551 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7552 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7553 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7554 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7555 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7559 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7560 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7562 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7563 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7565 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7566 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7567 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7568 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7571 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7573 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7574 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7575 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7576 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7578 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7579 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7581 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7582 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7584 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7585 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7586 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7587 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7588 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7589 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7593 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7594 initial_commitment_tx,
7597 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7598 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7602 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7603 if validated.is_err() {
7604 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7607 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7608 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7609 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7610 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7611 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7612 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7613 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7614 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7615 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7616 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7617 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7618 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7620 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7621 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7622 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7623 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7624 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7625 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7626 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7627 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7629 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7630 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7631 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7633 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7635 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7636 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7638 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7640 let mut channel = Channel {
7641 context: self.context,
7642 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7643 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7646 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7647 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7648 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7651 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7653 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7654 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7655 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7656 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7657 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7662 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7663 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7664 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7665 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7668 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7669 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7670 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7671 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7672 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7673 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7674 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7675 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7676 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7679 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7680 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7681 // `static_remote_key`.
7682 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7683 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7685 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7686 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7687 return Err(ChannelError::close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7689 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7690 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7691 return Err(ChannelError::close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7693 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7695 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7696 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7697 return Err(ChannelError::close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7703 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7704 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7705 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7706 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7707 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7708 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7709 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7710 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7711 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7712 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7713 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7716 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7718 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7719 // support this channel type.
7720 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7722 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7723 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7724 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7725 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7726 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7727 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7728 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7732 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7736 counterparty_node_id,
7740 current_chain_height,
7745 counterparty_pubkeys,
7747 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7748 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7750 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7752 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7757 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7758 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7760 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7761 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7762 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7763 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7766 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7767 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7769 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7771 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7772 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7775 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7778 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7779 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7780 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7782 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7783 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7784 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7785 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7787 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7788 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7789 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7790 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7791 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7792 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7793 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7794 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7795 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7796 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7797 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7798 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7799 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7800 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7801 first_per_commitment_point,
7802 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7803 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7804 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7806 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7808 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7810 next_local_nonce: None,
7814 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7815 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7817 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7819 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7820 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7823 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7824 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7826 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7827 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7828 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7829 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7830 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7831 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7832 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7833 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7834 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7835 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7836 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7838 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7841 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7842 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7843 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7847 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7848 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7851 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7852 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7854 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7855 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7857 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7859 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7860 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7861 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7862 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7865 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7866 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7867 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7868 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7869 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7871 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7873 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7874 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7875 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7878 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7879 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7880 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7884 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7885 initial_commitment_tx,
7888 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7889 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7892 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7893 return Err((self, ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7896 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7898 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7899 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7900 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7901 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7903 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7905 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7906 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7907 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7908 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7909 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7910 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7911 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7912 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7913 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7914 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7915 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7917 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7918 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7919 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7920 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7921 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7922 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7923 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7925 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7926 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7928 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7929 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7930 let mut channel = Channel {
7931 context: self.context,
7932 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7933 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7935 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7936 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7938 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7942 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
7943 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7944 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7945 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7946 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7947 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7948 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
7951 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7952 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7953 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7954 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7955 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
7956 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
7957 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
7958 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
7959 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7960 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7962 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
7963 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7964 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7966 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
7968 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
7969 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7971 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
7972 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
7975 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7979 counterparty_node_id,
7985 current_chain_height,
7986 outbound_scid_alias,
7987 temporary_channel_id,
7988 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7993 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
7994 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
7995 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
7996 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
7997 funding_tx_locktime,
7998 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8004 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8005 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8006 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8007 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8008 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8009 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8011 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8013 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8014 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8017 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8018 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8019 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8022 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8023 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8026 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8027 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8028 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8029 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8030 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8031 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8032 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8034 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8035 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8037 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8038 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8039 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8040 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8041 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8042 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8043 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8044 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8045 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8046 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8047 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8048 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8049 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8050 first_per_commitment_point,
8051 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8052 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8053 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8054 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8056 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8058 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8059 second_per_commitment_point,
8060 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8061 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8066 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8067 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8068 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8069 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8070 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8071 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8074 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8075 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8076 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8077 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8078 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8079 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8080 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8081 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8082 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8083 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8084 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8085 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8088 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8089 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8090 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8091 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8092 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8094 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8095 // support this channel type.
8096 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8097 return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8098 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8100 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8102 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8103 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8104 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8105 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8106 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8107 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8110 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8114 counterparty_node_id,
8118 current_chain_height,
8124 counterparty_pubkeys,
8126 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8127 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8128 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8129 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8131 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8132 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8133 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8134 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8138 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8139 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8140 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8141 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8142 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8143 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8150 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8151 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8153 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8154 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8155 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8156 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8159 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8160 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8162 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8164 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8165 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8168 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8171 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8172 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8173 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8175 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8176 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8177 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8178 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8179 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8180 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8181 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8183 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8184 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8185 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8186 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8187 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8188 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8189 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8190 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8191 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8192 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8193 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8194 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8195 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8196 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8197 first_per_commitment_point,
8198 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8199 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8200 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8202 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8204 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8205 second_per_commitment_point,
8206 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8210 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8211 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8213 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8215 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8216 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8220 // Unfunded channel utilities
8222 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8223 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8224 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8225 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8226 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8227 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8228 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8229 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8230 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8231 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8234 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8235 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8236 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8237 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8238 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8239 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8245 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8246 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8248 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8254 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8255 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8256 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8257 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8258 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8260 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8261 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8262 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8263 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8269 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8270 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8271 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8272 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8273 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8274 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8279 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8280 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8281 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8282 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8284 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8285 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8286 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8287 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8292 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8293 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8294 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8295 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8296 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8297 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8302 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8303 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8304 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8307 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8308 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8309 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8310 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8314 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8316 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8318 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8320 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8321 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8322 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8323 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8324 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8326 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8327 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8328 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8329 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8331 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8333 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8334 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8335 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8337 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8339 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8341 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8343 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8345 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8346 // deserialized from that format.
8347 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8348 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8349 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8351 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8353 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8354 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8355 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8357 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8358 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8359 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8360 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8363 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8364 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8365 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8368 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8369 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8370 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8371 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8373 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8374 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8376 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8377 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8378 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8383 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8386 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8388 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8389 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8390 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8395 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8398 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8401 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8403 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8408 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8409 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8410 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8412 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8413 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8414 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8415 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8416 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8417 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8418 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8420 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8422 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8424 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8427 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8428 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8429 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8432 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8434 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8435 preimages.push(preimage);
8437 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8438 reason.write(writer)?;
8440 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8442 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8443 preimages.push(preimage);
8445 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8446 reason.write(writer)?;
8449 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8450 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8453 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8454 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8455 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8456 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8457 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8458 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8460 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8461 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8462 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8465 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8466 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8467 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8468 source.write(writer)?;
8469 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8471 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8472 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8474 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8476 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8477 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8479 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8481 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8482 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8484 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8485 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8487 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8488 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8489 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8491 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8493 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8494 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8499 match self.context.resend_order {
8500 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8501 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8504 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8505 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8506 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8508 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8509 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8510 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8511 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8514 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8515 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8516 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8517 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8518 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8521 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8522 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8523 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8524 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8526 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8527 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8528 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8530 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8532 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8533 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8534 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8535 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8537 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8538 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8539 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8540 // consider the stale state on reload.
8543 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8544 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8545 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8547 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8548 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8549 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8551 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8552 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8554 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8555 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8556 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8558 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8559 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8561 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8564 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8565 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8566 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8568 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8571 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8572 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8574 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8575 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8576 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8578 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8580 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8582 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8584 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8585 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8586 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8587 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8588 htlc.write(writer)?;
8591 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8592 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8593 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8595 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8596 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8598 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8599 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8600 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8601 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8602 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8603 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8604 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8606 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8607 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8608 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8609 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8610 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8612 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8613 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8615 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8616 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8617 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8618 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8620 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8622 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8623 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8624 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8627 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8628 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8629 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8630 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8631 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8632 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8633 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8635 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8636 (2, chan_type, option),
8637 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8638 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8639 (5, self.context.config, required),
8640 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8641 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8642 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8643 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8644 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8645 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8646 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8647 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8648 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8649 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8650 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8651 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8652 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8653 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8654 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8655 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8656 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8657 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8658 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8659 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8660 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8661 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8662 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8663 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8664 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8671 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8672 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8674 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8675 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8677 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8678 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8679 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8681 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8682 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8683 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8684 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8686 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8688 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8689 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8690 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8691 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8692 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8694 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8695 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8698 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8699 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8700 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8702 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8704 let mut keys_data = None;
8706 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8707 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8708 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8709 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8710 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8711 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8712 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8713 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8714 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8715 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8719 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8720 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8721 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8724 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8726 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8727 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8728 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8730 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8732 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8733 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8734 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8735 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8736 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8737 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8738 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8739 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8741 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8742 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8744 Readable::read(reader)?
8746 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8749 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8750 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8752 Readable::read(reader)?
8754 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8756 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8757 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8758 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8763 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8764 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8765 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8766 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8767 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8768 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8769 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8770 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8771 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8772 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8773 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8774 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8776 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8777 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8780 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8781 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8784 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8785 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8787 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8789 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8790 blinding_point: None,
8794 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8795 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8796 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8797 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8798 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8799 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8800 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8801 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8802 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8803 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8804 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8805 blinding_point: None,
8807 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8808 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8809 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8811 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8812 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8813 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8815 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8819 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8820 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8821 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8822 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8825 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8826 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8827 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8829 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8830 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8831 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8832 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8835 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8836 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8837 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8838 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8841 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8843 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8845 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8846 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8847 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8848 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8850 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8851 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8852 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8853 // consider the stale state on reload.
8854 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8857 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8858 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8859 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8861 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8864 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8865 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8866 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8868 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8869 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8870 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8871 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8873 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8874 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8876 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8877 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8879 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8880 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8881 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8883 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8885 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8886 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8888 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8889 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8892 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8894 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8895 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8896 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8897 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8899 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8902 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8903 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8905 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8907 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8908 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8910 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8911 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8913 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8916 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8917 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8919 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8920 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8921 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8925 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8926 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8927 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8929 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8935 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8936 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8937 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8938 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8939 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8940 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8941 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8942 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8943 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8944 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8946 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8947 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8948 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8949 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8950 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8951 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8952 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8954 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8955 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8956 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8957 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8959 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8961 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8962 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8964 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8966 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8968 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8969 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8971 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8972 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
8974 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8975 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8976 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8977 (2, channel_type, option),
8978 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8979 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8980 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8981 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8982 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8983 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8984 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8985 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8986 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8987 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8988 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8989 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8990 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8991 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8992 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8993 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8994 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8995 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8996 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8997 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8998 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8999 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9000 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9001 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9002 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9003 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9004 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
9005 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9008 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9009 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9010 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9011 // required channel parameters.
9012 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9013 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9015 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9017 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9018 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9019 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9020 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9023 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9024 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9025 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9027 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9028 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9030 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9031 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9036 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9037 if iter.next().is_some() {
9038 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9042 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9043 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9044 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9045 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9046 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9049 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9050 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9051 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9053 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9054 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9056 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9057 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9058 // separate u64 values.
9059 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9061 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9063 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9064 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9065 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9066 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9068 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9069 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9071 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9072 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9073 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9074 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9075 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9078 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9079 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9081 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9082 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9083 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9084 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9086 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9087 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9089 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9090 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9091 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9092 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9093 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9096 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9097 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9100 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9101 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9102 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9103 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9104 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9105 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9108 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9109 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9110 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9112 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9117 context: ChannelContext {
9120 config: config.unwrap(),
9124 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9125 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9126 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9129 temporary_channel_id,
9131 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9133 channel_value_satoshis,
9135 latest_monitor_update_id,
9137 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9138 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9141 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9142 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9145 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9146 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9147 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9148 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9152 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9153 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9154 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9155 monitor_pending_forwards,
9156 monitor_pending_failures,
9157 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9158 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9160 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9161 signer_pending_funding: false,
9164 holding_cell_update_fee,
9165 next_holder_htlc_id,
9166 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9167 update_time_counter,
9170 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9171 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9172 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9173 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9175 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9176 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9177 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9178 closing_fee_limits: None,
9179 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9181 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9182 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9184 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9186 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9187 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9188 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9189 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9190 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9191 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9192 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9193 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9194 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9197 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9199 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9200 funding_transaction,
9203 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9204 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9205 counterparty_node_id,
9207 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9211 channel_update_status,
9212 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9217 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9218 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9219 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9221 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9222 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9224 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9225 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9226 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9228 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9229 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9231 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9232 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9234 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9237 local_initiated_shutdown,
9239 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9241 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9242 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9250 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
9251 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9252 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9253 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, Version};
9254 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9255 use bitcoin::network::Network;
9256 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9257 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9258 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9259 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9260 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9261 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9262 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9263 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9264 use crate::ln::msgs;
9265 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9266 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9267 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9268 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9269 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9270 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9271 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9272 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9273 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9274 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9275 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9276 use crate::util::test_utils;
9277 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9278 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9279 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9280 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9281 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9282 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9283 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9284 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9285 use bitcoin::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion, WPubkeyHash};
9286 use crate::prelude::*;
9289 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9290 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9291 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9292 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9294 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9295 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9296 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9297 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9300 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9303 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9304 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9310 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9311 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9312 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9313 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9317 signer: InMemorySigner,
9320 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9321 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9324 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9325 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9327 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9329 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9330 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9333 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9337 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9339 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9340 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9341 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9342 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9343 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9346 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9347 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9348 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9349 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9353 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9354 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9355 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9359 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9360 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9361 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9362 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9365 let seed = [42; 32];
9366 let network = Network::Testnet;
9367 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9368 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9369 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9372 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9373 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9374 let config = UserConfig::default();
9375 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9376 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9377 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9379 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9380 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9384 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9385 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9387 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9388 let original_fee = 253;
9389 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9390 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9391 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9392 let seed = [42; 32];
9393 let network = Network::Testnet;
9394 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9396 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9397 let config = UserConfig::default();
9398 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9400 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9401 // same as the old fee.
9402 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9403 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9404 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9408 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9409 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9410 // dust limits are used.
9411 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9412 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9413 let seed = [42; 32];
9414 let network = Network::Testnet;
9415 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9416 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9417 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9419 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9420 // they have different dust limits.
9422 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9423 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9424 let config = UserConfig::default();
9425 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9427 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9428 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9429 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9430 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9431 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9433 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9434 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9435 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9436 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9437 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9439 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9440 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9441 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9442 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9444 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9445 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9446 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9448 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9449 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9450 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9452 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9453 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9454 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9456 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9457 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9458 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9459 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9462 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9464 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9465 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9466 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9467 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9468 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9469 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9470 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9471 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9472 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9474 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9475 blinding_point: None,
9478 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9479 // the dust limit check.
9480 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9481 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9482 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9483 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9485 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9486 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9487 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9488 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9489 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9490 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9491 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9495 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9496 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9497 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9498 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9499 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9500 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9501 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9502 let seed = [42; 32];
9503 let network = Network::Testnet;
9504 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9506 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9507 let config = UserConfig::default();
9508 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9510 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9511 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9513 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9514 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9515 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9516 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9517 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9518 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9520 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9521 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9522 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9523 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9524 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9526 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9528 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9529 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9530 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9531 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9532 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9534 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9535 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9536 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9537 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9538 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9542 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9543 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9544 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9545 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9546 let seed = [42; 32];
9547 let network = Network::Testnet;
9548 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9549 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9550 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9552 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9554 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9555 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9556 let config = UserConfig::default();
9557 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9559 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9560 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9561 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9562 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9564 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9565 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9566 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9568 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9569 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9570 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9571 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9573 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9574 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9575 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9577 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9578 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9579 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9581 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9582 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9583 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9584 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9585 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9586 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9587 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9589 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9591 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9592 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9593 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9594 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9595 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9599 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9600 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9601 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9602 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9603 let seed = [42; 32];
9604 let network = Network::Testnet;
9605 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9606 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9607 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9609 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9610 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9611 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9612 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9613 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9614 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9615 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9616 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9618 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9619 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9620 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9621 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9622 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9623 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9625 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9626 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9627 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9628 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9630 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9632 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9633 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9634 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9635 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9636 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9637 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9639 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9640 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9641 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9642 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9644 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9645 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9646 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9647 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9648 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9650 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9651 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9653 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9654 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9655 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9657 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9658 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9659 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9660 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9661 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9663 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9664 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9666 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9667 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9668 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9672 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9674 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9675 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9676 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9678 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9679 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9680 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9681 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9683 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9684 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9685 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9687 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9689 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9690 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9693 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9694 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9695 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9696 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9697 let seed = [42; 32];
9698 let network = Network::Testnet;
9699 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9700 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9701 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9704 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9705 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9706 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9708 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9709 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9711 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9712 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9713 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9715 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9716 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9718 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9720 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9721 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9723 // Channel Negotiations failed
9724 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9725 assert!(result.is_err());
9730 fn channel_update() {
9731 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9732 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9733 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9734 let seed = [42; 32];
9735 let network = Network::Testnet;
9736 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9737 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9738 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9740 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9741 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9742 let config = UserConfig::default();
9743 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9745 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9746 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9747 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9748 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9749 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9751 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9752 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9753 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9754 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9755 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9757 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9758 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9759 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9760 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9762 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9763 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9764 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9766 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9767 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9768 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9770 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9771 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9772 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9774 short_channel_id: 0,
9777 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9778 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9779 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9781 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9782 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9784 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9786 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9788 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9789 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9790 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9791 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9793 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9794 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9795 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9797 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9800 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9804 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9805 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9807 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9808 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9810 let seed = [42; 32];
9811 let network = Network::Testnet;
9812 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9813 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9815 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9816 let config = UserConfig::default();
9817 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9818 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9819 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9821 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9822 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9823 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9825 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9826 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9827 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9829 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9830 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9831 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9832 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9833 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9836 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9838 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9839 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9840 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9841 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9845 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9846 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9847 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9849 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9852 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9854 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9855 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9856 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9857 blinding_point: None,
9859 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9860 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9862 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9865 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9868 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9870 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9873 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9874 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9875 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9877 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9878 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9881 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9882 blinding_point: None,
9884 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9885 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9888 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9889 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9891 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9892 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9894 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9897 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9898 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9899 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9900 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9901 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9902 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9903 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9904 } = &mut dummy_add {
9905 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9906 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9908 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9909 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9910 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9912 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9915 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9917 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9918 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9919 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9920 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9921 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9922 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9923 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9924 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9927 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9929 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9930 use bitcoin::sighash;
9931 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9932 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9933 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9934 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9935 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9936 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9937 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9938 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9939 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9940 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9941 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9942 use crate::sync::Arc;
9943 use core::str::FromStr;
9944 use hex::DisplayHex;
9946 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9947 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9948 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9949 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9951 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9953 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9954 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9955 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9956 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9957 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9959 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9960 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9966 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9967 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9968 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9970 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9971 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9972 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9973 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9974 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9975 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9977 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9979 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9980 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9981 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9982 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9983 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9984 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9986 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9987 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9988 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9989 selected_contest_delay: 144
9991 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9992 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9994 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9995 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9997 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9998 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10000 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10001 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10003 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10004 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10005 // build_commitment_transaction.
10006 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10007 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10008 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10009 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10010 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10012 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10013 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10014 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10015 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10019 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10020 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10021 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10022 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10026 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10027 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10028 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10030 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10031 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10033 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10034 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10036 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10038 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10039 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10040 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10041 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10042 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10043 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10044 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10046 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10047 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10048 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10049 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10051 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10052 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10053 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10055 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10057 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10058 commitment_tx.clone(),
10059 counterparty_signature,
10060 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10061 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10062 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10064 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10065 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10067 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10068 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10069 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10071 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10072 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10075 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10076 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10078 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10079 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10080 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10081 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10082 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10083 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10084 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_digest(sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap().as_raw_hash().to_byte_array());
10085 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10087 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10090 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10091 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10092 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10096 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10099 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10100 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10101 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10102 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10103 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10104 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10106 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10107 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10108 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10109 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10110 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10111 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10112 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10113 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10114 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10115 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10117 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10118 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10119 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10120 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10121 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10122 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10124 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10128 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10129 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10130 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10131 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10133 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10134 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10136 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10137 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10138 "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", {});
10140 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10141 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10142 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10143 "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", {});
10145 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10146 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10148 amount_msat: 1000000,
10150 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10151 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10153 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10156 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10157 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10159 amount_msat: 2000000,
10161 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10162 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10164 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10167 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10168 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10170 amount_msat: 2000000,
10172 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10173 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10174 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10175 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10176 blinding_point: None,
10178 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10181 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10182 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10184 amount_msat: 3000000,
10186 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10187 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10188 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10189 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10190 blinding_point: None,
10192 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10195 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10196 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10198 amount_msat: 4000000,
10200 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10201 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10203 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10207 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10208 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10209 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10211 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10212 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10213 "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", {
10216 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10217 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10218 "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" },
10221 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10222 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10223 "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" },
10226 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10227 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10228 "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" },
10231 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10232 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10233 "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" },
10236 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10237 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10238 "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" }
10241 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10242 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10243 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10245 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10246 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10247 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10250 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10251 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10252 "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" },
10255 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10256 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10257 "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" },
10260 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10261 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10262 "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" },
10265 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10266 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10267 "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" },
10270 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10271 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10272 "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" }
10275 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10276 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10277 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10279 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10280 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10281 "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", {
10284 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10285 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10286 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10289 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10290 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10291 "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" },
10294 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10295 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10296 "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" },
10299 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10300 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10301 "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" }
10304 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10305 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10306 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10307 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10309 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10310 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10311 "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", {
10314 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10315 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10316 "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" },
10319 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10320 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10321 "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" },
10324 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10325 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10326 "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" },
10329 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10330 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10331 "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" }
10334 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10335 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10336 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10337 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10339 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10340 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10341 "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", {
10344 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10345 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10346 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10349 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10350 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10351 "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" },
10354 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10355 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10356 "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" },
10359 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10360 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10361 "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" }
10364 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10365 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10366 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10368 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10369 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10370 "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", {
10373 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10374 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10375 "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" },
10378 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10379 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10380 "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" },
10383 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10384 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10385 "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" }
10388 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10389 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10390 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10392 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10393 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10394 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10397 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10398 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10399 "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" },
10402 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10403 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10404 "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" },
10407 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10408 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10409 "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" }
10412 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10413 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10414 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10416 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10417 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10418 "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", {
10421 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10422 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10423 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10426 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10427 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10428 "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" }
10431 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10432 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10433 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10434 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10435 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10436 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10438 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10439 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10440 "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", {
10443 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10444 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10445 "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" },
10448 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10449 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10450 "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" }
10453 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10454 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10455 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10456 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10457 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10459 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10460 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10461 "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", {
10464 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10465 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10466 "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" },
10469 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10470 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10471 "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" }
10474 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10478 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10479 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10480 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10483 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10484 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10485 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10488 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10489 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10490 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10491 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10492 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10494 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10495 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10496 "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", {
10499 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10500 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10501 "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" }
10504 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10505 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10506 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10507 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10508 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10510 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10511 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10512 "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", {
10515 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10516 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10517 "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" }
10520 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10521 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10522 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10523 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10525 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10526 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10527 "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", {});
10529 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10530 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10531 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10532 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10533 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10535 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10536 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10537 "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", {});
10539 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10540 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10541 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10542 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10543 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10545 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10546 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10547 "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", {});
10549 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10550 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10551 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10553 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10554 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10555 "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", {});
10557 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10558 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10559 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10560 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10561 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10563 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10564 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10565 "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", {});
10567 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10568 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10569 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10570 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10571 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10573 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10574 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10575 "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", {});
10577 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10578 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10579 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10580 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10581 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10582 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10584 amount_msat: 2000000,
10586 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10587 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10589 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10592 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10593 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10594 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10596 amount_msat: 5000001,
10598 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10599 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10600 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10601 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10602 blinding_point: None,
10604 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10607 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10608 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10610 amount_msat: 5000000,
10612 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10613 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10614 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10615 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10616 blinding_point: None,
10618 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10622 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10623 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10624 "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", {
10627 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10628 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10629 "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" },
10631 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10632 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10633 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
10635 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10636 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10637 "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" }
10640 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10641 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10642 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10643 "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", {
10646 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10647 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10648 "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" },
10650 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10651 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10652 "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" },
10654 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10655 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10656 "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" }
10661 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10662 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10664 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10665 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10666 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10667 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10669 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10670 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10671 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10673 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10674 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10676 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10677 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10679 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10680 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10681 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10685 fn test_key_derivation() {
10686 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10687 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10689 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10690 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10692 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10693 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10695 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10696 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10698 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10699 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10701 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10702 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10704 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10705 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10709 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10710 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10712 let seed = [42; 32];
10713 let network = Network::Testnet;
10714 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10715 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10717 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10718 let config = UserConfig::default();
10719 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10720 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10722 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10723 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10725 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10726 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10727 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10728 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10729 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10730 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10731 assert!(res.is_ok());
10735 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10736 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10737 // resulting `channel_type`.
10738 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10739 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10740 let network = Network::Testnet;
10741 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10742 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10744 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10745 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10747 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10748 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10750 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10751 // need to signal it.
10752 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10753 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10754 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10755 &config, 0, 42, None
10757 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10759 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10760 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10761 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10763 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10764 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10765 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10769 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10770 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10771 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10772 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10773 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10776 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10777 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10781 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10782 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10783 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10785 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10786 let network = Network::Testnet;
10787 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10788 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10790 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10791 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10793 let config = UserConfig::default();
10795 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10796 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10797 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10798 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10799 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10801 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10802 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10803 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10807 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10808 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10809 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10811 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10812 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10813 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10814 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10815 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10816 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10818 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10822 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10823 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10825 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10826 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10827 let network = Network::Testnet;
10828 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10829 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10831 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10832 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10834 let config = UserConfig::default();
10836 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10837 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10838 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10839 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10840 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10841 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10842 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10843 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10845 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10846 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10847 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10848 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10849 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10850 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10854 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10855 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10857 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10858 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10859 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10860 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10862 assert!(res.is_err());
10864 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10865 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10866 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10868 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10869 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10870 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10873 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10875 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10876 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10877 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10878 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10881 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10882 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10884 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10885 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10887 assert!(res.is_err());
10891 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10892 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10893 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10894 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10895 let seed = [42; 32];
10896 let network = Network::Testnet;
10897 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10898 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10899 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10901 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10902 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10903 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10904 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10906 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10907 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10908 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10913 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10923 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10924 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10925 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10930 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10931 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10937 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10940 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10941 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10942 &accept_channel_msg,
10943 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10944 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10947 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10948 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10949 let tx = Transaction {
10950 version: Version::ONE,
10951 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10955 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10958 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10961 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10962 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10963 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10964 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10965 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10966 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10970 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10971 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10979 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10980 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10981 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10982 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10984 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10985 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10992 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10993 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10994 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10995 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10996 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10998 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10999 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11000 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11008 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11009 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11012 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11013 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11014 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11015 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());