1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
70 pub balance_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
72 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
74 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
75 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
78 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
81 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
83 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
85 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
86 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
87 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
88 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
89 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
90 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
92 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
96 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
97 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
98 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
99 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
102 enum InboundHTLCState {
103 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
104 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
105 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
106 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
107 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
108 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
109 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
110 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
111 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
112 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
113 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
114 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
115 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
116 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
117 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
119 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
123 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
124 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
127 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
128 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
129 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
130 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
131 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
132 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
134 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
135 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
136 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
137 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
138 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
139 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
140 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
141 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
143 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
144 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
146 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
147 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
148 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
149 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
150 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
151 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
152 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
153 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
156 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
160 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
161 state: InboundHTLCState,
164 enum OutboundHTLCState {
165 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
166 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
167 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
168 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
169 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
170 /// money back (though we won't), and,
171 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
172 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
173 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
174 /// we'll never get out of sync).
175 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
176 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
177 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
179 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
180 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
181 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
182 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
183 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
184 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
185 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
186 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
187 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
192 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
193 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
197 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
199 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
200 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
203 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
204 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
206 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
207 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
212 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
213 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
221 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
225 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
226 state: OutboundHTLCState,
228 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
231 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
232 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
233 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
237 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
239 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
241 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
244 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
249 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
254 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
255 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
256 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
257 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
258 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
259 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
261 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
262 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
263 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
264 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
265 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
266 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
267 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
269 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
270 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
271 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
273 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
274 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
275 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
276 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
277 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
278 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
280 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
281 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
283 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
284 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
285 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
286 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
287 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
288 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
289 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
290 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
291 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
293 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
294 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
295 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
296 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
297 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
298 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
299 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
300 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
301 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
302 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
303 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
304 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
306 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
307 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
308 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
310 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
311 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
312 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
313 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
314 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
315 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
316 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
317 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
319 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
320 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
322 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
324 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
326 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
328 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
329 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
331 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
335 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
337 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
339 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
341 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
342 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
343 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
344 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
345 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
347 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
348 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
350 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
352 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
353 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
355 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
356 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
357 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
358 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
359 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
360 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
362 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
363 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
365 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
366 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
367 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
368 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
369 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
371 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
372 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
374 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
375 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
377 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
378 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
379 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
380 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
386 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
387 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
389 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
390 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
396 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
397 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
399 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
400 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
406 macro_rules! secp_check {
407 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
410 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
415 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
416 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
417 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
418 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
419 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
420 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
421 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
422 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
424 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
426 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
428 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
432 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
434 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
435 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
436 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
438 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
439 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
441 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
442 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
443 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
444 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
445 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
447 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
448 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
452 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
458 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
461 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
462 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
463 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 holding_cell_msat: u64,
465 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
468 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
469 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
470 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
471 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
472 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
473 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
474 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
475 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
476 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
480 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
481 struct HTLCCandidate {
483 origin: HTLCInitiator,
487 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
495 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
497 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
499 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
500 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
506 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
507 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
508 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
509 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
510 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
512 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
513 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
514 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
515 htlc_value_msat: u64,
517 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
518 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
522 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
523 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
524 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
525 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
526 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
527 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
528 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
529 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
530 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
531 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
532 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
535 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
536 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
537 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
538 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
539 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
540 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
541 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
542 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
545 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
547 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
548 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
549 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
550 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
551 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
552 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
553 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
554 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
558 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
559 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
560 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
561 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
562 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
563 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
564 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
565 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
566 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
567 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
568 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
569 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
570 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
571 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
572 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
574 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
575 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
576 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
577 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
579 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
580 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
581 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
582 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
584 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
585 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
586 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
587 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
588 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
590 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
591 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
592 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
593 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
595 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
596 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
597 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
599 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
600 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
601 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
602 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
603 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
605 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
606 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
609 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
610 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
612 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
613 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
614 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
615 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
617 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
618 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
620 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
621 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
625 (0, update, required),
628 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
629 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
630 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
631 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
632 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
636 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
637 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
638 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
640 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
642 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
643 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
648 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
650 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
651 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
657 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
658 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
659 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
660 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
661 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
663 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
664 /// in a timely manner.
665 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
668 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
669 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
670 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
672 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
673 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
674 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
675 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
679 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
680 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
681 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
683 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
684 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
685 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
686 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
688 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
692 /// The current channel ID.
693 channel_id: ChannelId,
694 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
695 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
696 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
699 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
700 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
702 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
703 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
704 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
706 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
707 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
708 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
709 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
711 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
712 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
714 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
716 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
717 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
718 destination_script: Script,
720 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
721 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
722 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
724 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
725 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
726 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
727 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
728 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
729 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
731 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
732 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
733 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
734 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
735 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
736 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
738 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
740 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
741 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
742 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
744 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
745 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
746 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
747 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
748 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
749 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
750 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
752 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
754 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
755 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
756 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
757 // HTLCs with similar state.
758 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
759 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
760 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
761 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
762 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
763 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
764 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
765 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
766 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
769 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
770 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
771 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
773 update_time_counter: u32,
775 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
776 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
777 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
778 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
779 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
780 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
782 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
783 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
785 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
786 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
787 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
788 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
790 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
791 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
793 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
795 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
797 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
798 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
799 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
800 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
801 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
802 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
803 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
804 channel_creation_height: u32,
806 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
809 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
811 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
814 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
816 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
819 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
821 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
823 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
824 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
827 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
829 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
831 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
832 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
834 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
836 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
837 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
838 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
840 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
842 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
843 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
844 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
846 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
847 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
848 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
850 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
852 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
854 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
855 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
856 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
857 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
859 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
860 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
861 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
863 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
864 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
865 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
867 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
868 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
869 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
870 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
872 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
873 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
874 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
876 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
877 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
878 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
879 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
880 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
882 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
883 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
885 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
886 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
887 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
888 /// unblock the state machine.
890 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
891 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
892 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
894 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
895 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
896 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
899 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
900 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
901 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
902 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
903 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
904 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
905 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
907 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
908 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
910 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
911 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
912 // the channel's funding UTXO.
914 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
915 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
916 // associated channel mapping.
918 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
919 // to store all of them.
920 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
922 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
923 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
924 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
925 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
926 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
928 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
929 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
931 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
932 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
934 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
935 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
936 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
938 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
939 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
940 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
943 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
944 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
945 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
946 self.update_time_counter
949 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
950 self.latest_monitor_update_id
953 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
954 self.config.announced_channel
957 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
958 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
961 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
962 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
963 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
964 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
967 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
968 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
969 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
972 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
973 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
974 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
975 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
976 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
979 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
980 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
981 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
982 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
984 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
985 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
987 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
988 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
990 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
991 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
993 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
996 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
997 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
998 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
999 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1000 self.channel_state &
1001 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1002 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1003 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1004 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1007 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1008 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1009 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1010 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1011 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1014 // Public utilities:
1016 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1020 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1022 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1023 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1024 self.temporary_channel_id
1027 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1031 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1032 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1033 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1037 /// Gets the channel's type
1038 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1042 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1044 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1045 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1046 self.short_channel_id
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1051 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.outbound_scid_alias
1059 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1060 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1061 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1062 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1063 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1064 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1067 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1068 /// get_funding_created.
1069 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1070 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1073 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1074 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1075 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1078 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1079 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1080 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1081 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1085 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1088 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1089 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1092 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1093 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1096 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1097 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1098 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1101 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1102 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1105 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1106 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1107 self.counterparty_node_id
1110 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1111 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1112 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1115 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1116 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1117 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1120 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1121 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1123 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1124 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1125 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1126 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1128 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1132 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1133 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1134 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1137 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1138 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1139 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1142 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1143 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1144 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1146 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1147 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1152 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1153 self.channel_value_satoshis
1156 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1157 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1160 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1161 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1164 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1165 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1166 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1168 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1169 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1170 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1171 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1172 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1174 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1178 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1179 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1180 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1183 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1184 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1185 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1188 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1189 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1193 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1194 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1195 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1198 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1199 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1200 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1203 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1204 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1205 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1208 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1209 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1210 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1211 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1212 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1215 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1217 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1218 self.prev_config = None;
1222 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1223 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1227 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1228 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1229 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1230 let did_channel_update =
1231 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1232 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1233 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1234 if did_channel_update {
1235 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1236 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1237 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1238 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1240 self.config.options = *config;
1244 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1245 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1246 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1247 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1248 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1251 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1252 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1253 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1254 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1255 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1257 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1258 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1259 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1260 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1261 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1262 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1263 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1265 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1266 where L::Target: Logger
1268 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1269 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1270 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1272 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1273 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1274 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1275 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1277 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1278 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1279 if match update_state {
1280 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1281 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1282 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1283 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1284 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1286 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1290 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1291 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1292 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1294 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1296 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1297 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1298 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1300 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1301 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1302 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1303 transaction_output_index: None
1308 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1309 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1310 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1311 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1312 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1315 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1317 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1318 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1319 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1321 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1322 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1325 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1326 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1329 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1331 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1332 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1333 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1335 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1336 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1342 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1343 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1344 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1345 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1347 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1348 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1352 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1353 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1357 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1358 if generated_by_local {
1359 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1360 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1369 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1371 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1372 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1373 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1374 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1376 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1380 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1381 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1387 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1388 preimages.push(preimage);
1392 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1393 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1395 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1397 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1398 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1400 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1401 if !generated_by_local {
1402 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1410 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1411 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1412 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1413 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1414 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1415 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1416 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1417 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1419 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1421 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1422 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1423 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1424 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1426 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1428 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1429 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1430 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1431 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1434 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1435 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1436 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1437 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1439 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1442 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1443 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1444 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1445 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1447 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1450 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1451 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1456 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1462 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1464 let channel_parameters =
1465 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1466 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1467 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1474 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1477 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1478 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1479 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1480 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1482 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1483 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1484 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1492 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1493 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1499 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1500 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1501 /// our counterparty!)
1502 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1503 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1504 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1505 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1506 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1507 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1508 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1510 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1514 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1515 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1516 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1517 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1518 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1519 //may see payments to it!
1520 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1521 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1522 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1524 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1527 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1528 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1529 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1530 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1531 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1534 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1535 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1538 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1542 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1543 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1544 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1545 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1546 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1547 // which are near the dust limit.
1548 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1549 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1550 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1551 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1552 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1554 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1555 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1557 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1560 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1561 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1562 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1565 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1566 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1568 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1569 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1570 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1571 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1572 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1573 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1574 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1577 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1580 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1581 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1582 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1584 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1585 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1587 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1588 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1589 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1591 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1592 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1598 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1599 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1601 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1602 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1603 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1604 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1605 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1606 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1607 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1610 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1613 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1614 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1615 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1617 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1618 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1620 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1621 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1622 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1624 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1625 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1629 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1630 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1631 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1632 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1633 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1634 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1635 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1637 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1638 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1640 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1647 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1648 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1649 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1650 /// corner case properly.
1651 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1652 -> AvailableBalances
1653 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1655 let context = &self;
1656 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1657 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1658 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1660 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1661 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1663 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1666 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1668 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1669 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1671 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1673 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1675 if context.is_outbound() {
1676 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1677 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1679 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1680 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1682 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1683 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1684 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1685 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1688 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1689 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1690 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1691 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1693 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1694 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1695 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1696 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1697 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1698 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1699 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1700 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1701 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1702 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1704 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1707 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1708 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1709 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1710 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1711 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1714 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1715 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1717 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1718 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1719 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1721 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1722 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1723 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1724 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1728 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1730 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1731 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1732 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1733 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1734 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1735 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1736 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1738 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1739 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1741 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1742 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1743 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1745 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1746 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1747 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1748 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1749 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1752 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1753 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1754 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1755 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1756 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1757 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1760 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1761 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1762 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1764 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1768 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1769 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1771 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1772 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1776 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1777 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1778 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1779 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1781 outbound_capacity_msat,
1782 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1783 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1788 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1789 let context = &self;
1790 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1793 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1794 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1796 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1797 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1799 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1800 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1802 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1803 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1804 let context = &self;
1805 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1807 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1810 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1811 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1813 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1814 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1816 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1817 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1820 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1824 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1825 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1831 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1832 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1833 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1836 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1837 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1838 included_htlcs += 1;
1841 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1842 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1846 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1847 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1848 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1850 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1851 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1856 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1858 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1859 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1864 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1865 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1869 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1870 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1874 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1875 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1877 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1878 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1879 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1881 total_pending_htlcs,
1882 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1883 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1884 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1886 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1887 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1888 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1890 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1892 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1897 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1898 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1900 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1901 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1903 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1904 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1906 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1907 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1908 let context = &self;
1909 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1911 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1914 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1915 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1917 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1918 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1920 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1921 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1923 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1924 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1928 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1929 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1935 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1936 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1937 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1938 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1939 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1940 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1943 included_htlcs += 1;
1946 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1947 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1950 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1951 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1953 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1954 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1955 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1960 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1961 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1965 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1966 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1968 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1969 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1971 total_pending_htlcs,
1972 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1973 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1974 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1976 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1977 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1978 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1980 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1982 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1987 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1988 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1989 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
1990 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
1997 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
1999 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2000 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2003 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2005 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2006 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2007 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2011 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2012 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2013 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2016 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2018 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2019 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2022 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2023 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2024 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2025 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2026 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2027 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2028 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2029 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2030 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2031 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2032 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2034 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2035 // return them to fail the payment.
2036 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2037 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2038 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2040 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2041 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2046 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2047 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2048 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2049 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2050 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2051 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2052 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2053 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2054 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2055 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2056 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2057 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2058 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2062 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2064 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2065 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2066 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2070 // Internal utility functions for channels
2072 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2073 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2074 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2076 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2078 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2079 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2080 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2082 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2085 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2087 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2090 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2091 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2092 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2094 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2096 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2097 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2098 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2099 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2100 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2103 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2104 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2105 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2106 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2107 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2108 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2109 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2112 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2113 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2115 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2116 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2119 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2120 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2121 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2122 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2123 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2124 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2127 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2128 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2129 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2130 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2134 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2136 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2137 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2138 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2142 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2143 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2144 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2146 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2147 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2148 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2149 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2151 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2152 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2153 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2154 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2155 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2156 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2157 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2158 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2159 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2160 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2165 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2166 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2167 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2168 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2169 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2170 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2172 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2174 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2175 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2176 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2177 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2178 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2179 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2180 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2181 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2183 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2184 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2194 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2195 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2196 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2197 // outside of those situations will fail.
2198 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2202 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2207 1 + // script length (0)
2211 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2212 2 + // witness marker and flag
2213 1 + // witness element count
2214 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2215 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2216 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2217 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2218 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2219 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2221 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2222 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2223 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2229 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2230 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2231 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2232 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2234 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2235 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2236 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2238 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2239 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2240 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2241 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2242 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2243 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2246 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2247 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2250 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2251 value_to_holder = 0;
2254 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2255 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2256 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2257 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2259 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2260 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2263 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2264 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2267 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2270 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2271 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2273 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2275 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2276 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2277 where L::Target: Logger {
2278 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2279 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2280 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2281 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2282 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2283 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2284 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2285 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2289 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2290 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2291 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2292 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2294 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2295 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2297 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2299 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2300 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2301 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2303 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2304 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2305 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2306 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2307 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2308 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2309 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2311 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2312 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2313 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2315 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2316 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2318 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2321 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2322 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2326 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2330 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2331 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2332 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2333 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2334 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2335 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2338 // Now update local state:
2340 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2341 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2342 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2343 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2344 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2345 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2346 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2350 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2351 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2352 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2353 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2354 // do not not get into this branch.
2355 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2356 match pending_update {
2357 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2358 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2359 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2360 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2361 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2362 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2363 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2366 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2367 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2368 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2369 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2370 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2371 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2372 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2378 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2379 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2380 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2382 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2383 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2384 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2386 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2387 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2390 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2391 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2393 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2394 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2396 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2397 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2400 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2403 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2404 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2405 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2406 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2411 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2412 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2413 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2414 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2415 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2416 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2417 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2418 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2419 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2420 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2421 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2422 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2423 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2424 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2425 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2427 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2428 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2429 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2430 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2431 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2434 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2435 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2436 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2442 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2443 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2445 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2449 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2450 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2451 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2452 /// before we fail backwards.
2454 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2455 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2456 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2457 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2458 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2459 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2460 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2463 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2464 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2465 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2466 /// before we fail backwards.
2468 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2469 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2470 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2471 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2472 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2473 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2474 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2476 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2478 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2479 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2480 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2482 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2483 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2484 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2486 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2487 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2488 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2490 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2495 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2496 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2502 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2503 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2504 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2505 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2506 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2510 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2511 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2512 force_holding_cell = true;
2515 // Now update local state:
2516 if force_holding_cell {
2517 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2518 match pending_update {
2519 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2520 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2521 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2522 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2526 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2527 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2528 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2529 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2535 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2536 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2537 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2543 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2545 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2546 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2549 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2550 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2551 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2556 // Message handlers:
2558 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2559 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2560 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2561 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2562 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2566 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2569 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2572 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2573 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2574 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2575 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2578 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2580 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2581 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2582 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2583 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2585 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2586 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2588 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2589 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2591 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2592 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2593 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2594 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2595 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2600 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2601 initial_commitment_tx,
2604 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2605 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2608 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2609 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2612 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2613 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2614 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2615 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2616 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2617 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2618 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2619 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2620 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2621 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2622 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2623 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2625 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2627 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2628 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2629 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2630 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2631 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2632 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2633 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2635 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2636 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2637 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2639 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2641 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2642 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2644 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2646 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2647 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2651 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2652 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2653 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2654 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2655 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2656 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2657 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2660 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2661 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2663 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2664 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2665 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2666 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2668 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2671 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2672 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2673 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2676 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2677 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2678 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2679 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2680 // when routing outbound payments.
2681 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2685 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2687 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2688 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2690 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2691 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2693 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2694 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2695 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2696 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2697 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2698 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2699 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2700 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2701 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2703 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2704 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2705 let expected_point =
2706 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2707 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2709 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2710 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2711 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2712 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2713 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2714 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2716 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2717 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2718 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2719 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2720 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2722 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2723 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2727 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2730 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2731 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2733 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2735 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2738 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2739 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2740 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2741 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2742 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2743 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2745 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2746 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2747 if local_sent_shutdown {
2748 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2750 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2751 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2752 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2755 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2758 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2761 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2764 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2768 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2769 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2770 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2773 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2776 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2777 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2778 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2779 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2780 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2781 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2782 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2783 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2784 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2785 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2786 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2788 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2789 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2790 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2791 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2792 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2793 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2797 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2798 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2801 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2802 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2803 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2805 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2806 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2807 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2808 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2809 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2810 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2811 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2815 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2816 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2817 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2818 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2819 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2820 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2821 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2825 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2826 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2827 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2828 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2829 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2833 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2834 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2835 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2836 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2837 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2839 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2843 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2847 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2848 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2849 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2850 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2851 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2852 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2853 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2854 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2855 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2856 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2857 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2858 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2859 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2860 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2861 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2862 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2865 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2866 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2867 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2868 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2872 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2875 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2879 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2880 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2881 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2885 // Now update local state:
2886 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2887 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2888 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2889 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2890 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2891 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2892 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2897 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2899 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2900 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2901 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2902 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2903 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2904 None => fail_reason.into(),
2905 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2906 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2907 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2908 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2910 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2914 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2915 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2916 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2917 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2919 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2920 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2925 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2928 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2929 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2932 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2936 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2939 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2940 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2943 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2947 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2951 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2952 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2955 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2956 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2959 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2963 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2964 where L::Target: Logger
2966 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2969 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2972 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2976 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2978 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2980 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2981 let commitment_txid = {
2982 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2983 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2984 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2986 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2987 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2988 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2989 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2990 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2995 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2997 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2998 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2999 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3000 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3003 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3004 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3005 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3009 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3011 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3012 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3013 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3014 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3015 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3016 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3017 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3018 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3019 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3020 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3021 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3027 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3031 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3032 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3033 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3034 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3035 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3036 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3037 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3038 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3039 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3040 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3041 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3042 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3043 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3046 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3047 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3048 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3049 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3050 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3051 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3052 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3054 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3055 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3056 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3057 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3058 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3059 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3060 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3063 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3064 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3067 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3069 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3070 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3071 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3074 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3077 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3078 commitment_stats.tx,
3080 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3081 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3082 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3085 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3086 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3088 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3089 let mut need_commitment = false;
3090 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3091 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3092 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3093 need_commitment = true;
3097 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3098 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3099 Some(forward_info.clone())
3101 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3102 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3103 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3104 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3105 need_commitment = true;
3108 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3109 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3110 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3111 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3112 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3113 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3114 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3115 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3116 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3117 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3118 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3119 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3120 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3121 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3123 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3125 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3126 need_commitment = true;
3130 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3131 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3132 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3133 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3134 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3135 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3137 nondust_htlc_sources,
3141 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3142 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3143 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3144 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3146 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3147 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3148 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3149 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3150 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3151 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3152 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3153 // includes the right HTLCs.
3154 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3155 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3156 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3157 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3158 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3159 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3161 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3162 &self.context.channel_id);
3163 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3166 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3167 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3168 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3169 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3170 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3171 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3172 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3173 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3174 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3178 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3179 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3180 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3181 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3184 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3185 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3186 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3187 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3188 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3189 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3190 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3192 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3193 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3194 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3195 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3198 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3199 /// for our counterparty.
3200 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3201 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3202 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3203 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3205 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3206 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3207 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3208 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3210 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3211 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3212 updates: Vec::new(),
3215 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3216 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3217 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3218 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3219 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3220 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3221 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3222 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3223 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3224 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3225 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3226 // to rebalance channels.
3227 match &htlc_update {
3228 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3229 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3230 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3232 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3233 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3235 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3238 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3239 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3240 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3241 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3242 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3243 // into the holding cell without ever being
3244 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3245 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3246 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3249 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3255 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3256 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3257 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3258 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3259 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3260 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3261 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3262 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3263 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3264 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3265 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3266 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3268 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3269 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3270 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3271 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3272 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3273 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3274 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3275 // for a full revocation before failing.
3276 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3277 update_fail_count += 1;
3280 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3282 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3289 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3290 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3292 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3293 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3298 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3299 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3300 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3301 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3302 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3304 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3305 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3306 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3308 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3309 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3315 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3316 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3317 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3318 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3319 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3320 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3321 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3322 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3323 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3325 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3328 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3331 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3335 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3337 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3338 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3343 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3344 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3345 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3346 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3347 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3348 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3349 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3350 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3354 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3356 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3357 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3360 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3361 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3362 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3363 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3365 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3369 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3370 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3371 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3372 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3373 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3374 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3375 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3376 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3380 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3381 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3382 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3383 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3384 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3385 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3386 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3387 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3388 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3390 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3391 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3394 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3395 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3396 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3397 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3398 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3399 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3400 let mut require_commitment = false;
3401 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3404 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3405 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3406 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3408 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3409 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3410 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3411 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3412 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3413 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3418 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3419 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3420 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3421 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3422 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3424 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3425 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3426 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3431 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3432 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3434 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3438 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3439 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3441 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3442 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3443 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3444 require_commitment = true;
3445 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3446 match forward_info {
3447 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3448 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3449 require_commitment = true;
3451 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3452 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3453 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3455 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3456 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3457 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3461 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3462 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3463 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3464 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3470 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3471 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3472 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3473 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3475 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3476 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3477 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3478 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3479 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3480 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3481 require_commitment = true;
3485 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3487 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3488 match update_state {
3489 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3490 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3491 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3492 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3493 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3495 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3496 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3497 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3498 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3499 require_commitment = true;
3500 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3501 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3506 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3507 let release_state_str =
3508 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3509 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3510 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3511 if !release_monitor {
3512 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3513 update: monitor_update,
3515 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3517 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3522 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3523 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3524 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3525 if require_commitment {
3526 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3527 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3528 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3529 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3530 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3531 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3532 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3533 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3534 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3536 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3537 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3538 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3539 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3540 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3543 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3544 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3545 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3546 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3547 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3548 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3550 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3551 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3553 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3554 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3556 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3557 if require_commitment {
3558 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3560 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3561 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3562 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3563 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3565 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3566 &self.context.channel_id(),
3567 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3570 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3571 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3573 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3574 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3576 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3577 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3583 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3584 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3585 /// commitment update.
3586 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3587 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3588 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3590 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3591 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3594 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3595 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3596 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3597 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3599 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3600 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3601 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3602 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3603 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3604 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3605 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3607 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3608 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3610 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3611 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3613 if !self.context.is_live() {
3614 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3617 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3618 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3619 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3620 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3621 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3622 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3623 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3624 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3625 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3626 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3630 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3631 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3632 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3633 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3634 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3635 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3638 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3639 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3643 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3644 force_holding_cell = true;
3647 if force_holding_cell {
3648 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3652 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3653 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3655 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3656 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3661 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3662 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3664 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3666 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3667 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3668 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3669 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3673 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3674 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3675 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3679 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3680 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3683 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3684 // will be retransmitted.
3685 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3686 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3687 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3689 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3690 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3692 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3693 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3694 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3695 // this HTLC accordingly
3696 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3699 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3700 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3701 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3702 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3705 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3706 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3707 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3708 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3709 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3710 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3715 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3717 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3718 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3719 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3720 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3724 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3725 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3726 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3727 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3728 // the update upon reconnection.
3729 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3733 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3735 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3736 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3740 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3741 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3742 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3743 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3744 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3745 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3746 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3748 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3749 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3750 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3751 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3752 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3753 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3754 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3756 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3757 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3758 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3759 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3760 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3761 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3762 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3765 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3766 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3767 /// to the remote side.
3768 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3769 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3770 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3771 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3774 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3776 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3777 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3779 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3780 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3781 // first received the funding_signed.
3782 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3783 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3784 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3786 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3787 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3788 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3789 funding_broadcastable = None;
3792 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3793 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3794 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3795 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3796 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3797 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3798 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3799 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3800 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3801 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3802 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3803 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3804 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3805 next_per_commitment_point,
3806 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3810 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3812 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3813 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3814 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3815 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3816 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3817 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3819 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3820 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3821 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3822 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3823 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3824 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3828 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3829 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3831 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3832 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3833 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3836 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3837 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3838 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3839 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3840 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3841 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3842 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3843 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3844 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3848 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3849 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3851 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3854 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3857 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3858 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3860 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3861 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3862 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3863 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3864 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3865 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3866 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3867 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3868 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3869 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3870 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3871 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3872 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3873 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3875 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3877 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3883 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3884 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3885 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3886 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3887 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3888 per_commitment_secret,
3889 next_per_commitment_point,
3891 next_local_nonce: None,
3895 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3896 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3897 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3898 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3899 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3901 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3902 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3903 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3904 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3905 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3906 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3907 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3908 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3909 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3910 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3915 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3916 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3918 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3919 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3920 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3921 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3922 reason: err_packet.clone()
3925 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3926 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3927 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3928 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3929 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3930 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3933 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3934 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3935 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3936 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3937 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3944 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3945 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3946 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3947 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3951 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3952 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3953 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3954 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3955 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3956 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3960 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3961 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3962 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3963 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3964 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3965 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3966 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3971 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3972 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3974 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3975 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3976 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3977 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3978 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3979 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3980 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3981 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3984 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3986 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3987 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3988 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3989 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3993 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3994 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3998 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3999 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4000 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4001 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4002 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4005 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4006 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4007 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4008 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4009 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4012 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4013 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4014 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4015 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4016 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4017 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4018 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4019 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4023 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4024 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4025 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4026 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4028 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4032 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4033 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4034 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4035 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4037 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4039 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4041 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4042 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4043 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4044 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4045 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4046 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4048 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4049 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4050 channel_ready: None,
4051 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4052 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4053 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4057 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4058 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4059 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4060 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4061 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4062 next_per_commitment_point,
4063 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4065 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4066 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4067 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4071 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4072 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4073 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4075 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4076 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4077 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4080 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4086 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4087 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4088 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4089 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4090 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4091 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4092 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4094 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4096 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4097 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4098 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4099 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4100 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4101 next_per_commitment_point,
4102 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4106 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4107 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4108 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4110 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4113 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4114 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4115 raa: required_revoke,
4116 commitment_update: None,
4117 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4119 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4120 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4121 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4123 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4126 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4127 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4128 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4129 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4130 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4131 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4134 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4135 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4136 raa: required_revoke,
4137 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4138 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4142 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4146 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4147 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4148 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4149 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4151 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4153 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4155 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4156 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4157 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4158 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4159 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4160 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4162 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4163 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4164 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4165 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4166 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4168 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4169 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4170 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4171 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4174 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4175 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4176 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4177 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4178 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4179 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4180 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4181 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4182 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4183 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4184 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4185 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4186 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4187 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4188 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4190 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4193 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4194 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4197 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4198 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4199 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4200 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4201 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4202 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4205 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4206 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4207 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4208 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4209 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4210 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4213 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4219 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4220 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4221 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4222 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4224 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4225 return Ok((None, None));
4228 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4229 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4230 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4232 return Ok((None, None));
4235 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4237 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4238 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4239 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4240 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4242 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4243 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4245 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4246 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4248 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4249 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4250 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4251 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4253 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4254 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4255 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4262 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4263 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4265 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4266 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4269 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4270 /// within our expected timeframe.
4272 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4273 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4274 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4277 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4280 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4281 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4285 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4286 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4288 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4291 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4292 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4293 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4294 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4297 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4298 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4302 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4304 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4308 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4309 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4310 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4313 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4316 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4317 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4318 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4319 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4321 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4324 assert!(send_shutdown);
4325 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4326 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4327 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4329 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4332 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4337 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4339 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4340 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4342 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4343 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4344 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4345 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4346 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4347 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4350 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4351 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4353 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4354 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4355 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4356 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4360 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4361 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4362 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4363 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4364 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4365 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4367 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4368 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4375 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4376 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4378 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4381 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4382 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4384 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4386 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4387 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4388 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4389 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4390 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4391 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4392 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4393 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4394 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4396 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4397 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4400 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4404 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4405 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4406 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4407 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4409 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4412 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4415 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4418 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4422 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4426 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4427 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4428 return Ok((None, None));
4431 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4432 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4433 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4436 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4438 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4441 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4442 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4443 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4444 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4445 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4449 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4450 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4455 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4456 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4457 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4458 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4459 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4460 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4461 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4465 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4467 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4468 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4469 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4470 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4472 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4475 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4476 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4478 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4479 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4481 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4482 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4483 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4484 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4488 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4489 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4490 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4491 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4493 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4494 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4495 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4503 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4504 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4505 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4507 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4508 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4510 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4511 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4514 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4515 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4516 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4517 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4518 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4520 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4522 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4524 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4525 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4528 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4529 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4530 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4531 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4532 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4533 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4534 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4535 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4537 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4540 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4541 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4542 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4543 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4545 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4549 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4550 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4551 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4552 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4554 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4560 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4561 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4562 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4563 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4564 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4565 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4566 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4568 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4569 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4572 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4574 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4575 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4581 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4582 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4583 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4584 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4585 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4586 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4587 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4589 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4590 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4597 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4598 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4601 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4602 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4605 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4606 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4610 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4611 &self.context.holder_signer
4615 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4617 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4618 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4619 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4620 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4621 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4622 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4624 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4626 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4634 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4635 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4639 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4640 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4641 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4642 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4645 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4646 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4647 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4648 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4651 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4652 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4653 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4654 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4655 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4656 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4659 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4660 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4661 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4662 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4663 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4664 if !release_monitor {
4665 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4674 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4675 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4678 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4679 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4680 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4682 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4683 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4684 if self.context.channel_state &
4685 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4686 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4687 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4688 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4689 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4692 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4693 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4694 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4695 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4696 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4697 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4699 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4700 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4701 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4703 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4704 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4705 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4706 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4707 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4708 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4714 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4715 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4716 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4719 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4720 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4721 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4724 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4725 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4726 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4729 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4730 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4731 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4732 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4733 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4734 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4739 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4740 self.context.channel_update_status
4743 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4744 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4745 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4748 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4750 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4751 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4752 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4756 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4757 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4758 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4761 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4765 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4766 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4767 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4768 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4769 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4771 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4772 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4773 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4775 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4776 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4779 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4780 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4781 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4782 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4783 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4784 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4785 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4786 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4787 self.context.channel_state);
4789 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4793 if need_commitment_update {
4794 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4795 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4796 let next_per_commitment_point =
4797 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4798 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4799 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4800 next_per_commitment_point,
4801 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4805 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4811 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4812 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4813 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4814 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4815 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4816 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4817 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4819 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4822 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4823 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4824 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4825 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4826 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4827 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4828 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4829 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4830 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4831 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4832 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4833 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4834 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4835 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4836 // channel and move on.
4837 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4838 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4840 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4841 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4842 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4844 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4845 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4846 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4847 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4848 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4849 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4850 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4851 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4856 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4857 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4858 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4859 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4860 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4863 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4864 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4865 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4866 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4867 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4868 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4871 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4872 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4873 // may have already happened for this block).
4874 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4875 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4876 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4877 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4880 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4881 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4882 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4883 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4891 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4892 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4893 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4894 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4896 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4897 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4900 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4902 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4903 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4904 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4905 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4907 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4910 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4913 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4914 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4915 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4916 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4918 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4921 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4922 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4923 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4925 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4926 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4928 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4929 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4930 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4938 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4940 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4941 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4942 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4944 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4945 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4948 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4949 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4950 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4951 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4952 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4953 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4954 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4955 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4956 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4959 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4960 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4961 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4962 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4964 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4965 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4966 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4968 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4969 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4970 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4971 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4973 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4974 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4975 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4976 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4977 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4978 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4979 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4982 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4983 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4985 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4988 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4989 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4990 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4991 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4992 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4993 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4994 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4995 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4996 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4997 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4998 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4999 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5000 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5001 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5002 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5003 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5004 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5010 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5015 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5016 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5018 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5019 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5020 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5021 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5023 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5026 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5028 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5029 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5030 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5031 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5032 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5033 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5035 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5036 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5039 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5040 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5041 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5042 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5043 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5044 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5046 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5047 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5050 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5051 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5052 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5053 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5054 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5060 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5061 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5062 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5063 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5065 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5068 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5072 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5076 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5077 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5081 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5085 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5086 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5089 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5093 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5095 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5100 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5101 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5102 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5104 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5109 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5111 None => return None,
5114 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5116 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5117 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5119 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5120 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5126 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5128 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5129 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5130 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5131 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5132 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5133 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5134 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5136 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5137 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5138 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5139 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5140 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5141 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5142 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5143 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5144 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5145 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5146 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5147 contents: announcement,
5152 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5156 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5157 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5158 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5159 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5160 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5161 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5162 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5163 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5165 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5167 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5169 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5170 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5172 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5174 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5175 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5178 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5179 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5180 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5181 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5184 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5187 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5188 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5189 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5190 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5191 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5192 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5195 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5197 Err(_) => return None,
5199 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5200 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5205 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5206 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5207 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5208 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5209 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5210 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5211 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5212 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5213 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5214 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5215 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5216 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5217 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5218 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5219 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5220 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5223 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5226 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5227 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5228 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5229 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5230 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5231 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5232 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5233 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5234 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5236 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5237 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5238 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5239 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5240 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5241 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5242 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5243 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5244 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5246 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5247 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5248 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5249 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5250 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5251 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5252 next_funding_txid: None,
5257 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5259 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5260 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5261 /// commitment update.
5263 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5264 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5265 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5266 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5267 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5268 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5269 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5272 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5273 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5274 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5276 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5277 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5282 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5283 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5285 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5287 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5288 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5290 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5291 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5292 /// regenerate them.
5294 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5295 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5297 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5298 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5299 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5300 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5301 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5302 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5303 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5305 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5306 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5308 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5309 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5310 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5313 if amount_msat == 0 {
5314 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5317 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5318 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5319 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5320 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5323 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5324 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5325 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5328 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5329 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5330 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5331 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5332 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5333 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5334 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5335 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5338 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5339 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5340 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5341 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5342 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5343 else { "to peer" });
5345 if need_holding_cell {
5346 force_holding_cell = true;
5349 // Now update local state:
5350 if force_holding_cell {
5351 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5356 onion_routing_packet,
5362 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5363 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5365 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5367 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5372 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5373 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5374 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5378 onion_routing_packet,
5381 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5386 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5387 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5388 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5389 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5391 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5392 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5393 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5395 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5396 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5400 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5401 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5402 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5403 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5404 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5405 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5406 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5409 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5410 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5411 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5412 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5413 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5414 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5417 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5419 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5420 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5421 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5422 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5423 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5425 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5426 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5429 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5430 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5431 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5432 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5433 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5434 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5435 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5436 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5437 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5438 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5439 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5442 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5446 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5447 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5448 where L::Target: Logger
5450 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5451 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5452 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5456 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5457 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5458 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5459 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5460 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5461 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5462 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5463 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5464 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5465 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5466 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5472 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5475 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5476 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5477 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5478 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5479 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5480 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5482 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5483 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5484 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5486 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5487 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5488 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5491 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5492 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5496 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5497 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5499 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5501 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5502 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5503 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5504 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5506 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5507 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5508 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5509 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5510 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5511 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5515 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5516 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5520 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5521 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5526 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5527 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5529 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5530 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5531 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5532 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5533 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5534 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5535 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5536 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5538 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5539 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5540 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5543 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5544 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5545 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5551 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5553 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5554 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5555 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5556 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5557 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5559 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5561 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5567 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5568 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5570 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5571 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5572 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5573 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5574 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5576 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5577 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5578 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5581 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5582 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5585 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5586 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5589 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5592 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5593 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5594 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5597 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5598 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5599 let mut chan_closed = false;
5600 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5604 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5606 None if !chan_closed => {
5607 // use override shutdown script if provided
5608 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5609 Some(script) => script,
5611 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5612 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5613 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5614 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5618 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5619 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5621 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5627 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5628 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5629 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5630 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5632 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5634 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5636 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5637 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5638 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5639 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5640 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5641 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5644 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5645 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5647 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5648 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5649 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5652 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5653 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5654 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5655 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5656 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5658 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5659 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5666 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5667 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5669 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5672 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5673 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5674 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5676 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5677 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5681 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5685 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5686 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5687 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5688 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5691 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5692 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5693 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5694 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5695 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5696 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5697 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5698 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5700 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5701 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5702 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5703 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5705 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5706 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5708 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5711 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5712 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5713 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5715 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5716 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5718 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5719 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5720 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5721 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5722 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5725 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5726 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5728 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5729 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5731 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5733 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5735 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5736 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5737 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5738 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5741 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5742 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5744 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5745 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5746 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5747 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5751 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5752 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5753 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5757 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5758 Ok(script) => script,
5759 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5762 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5765 context: ChannelContext {
5768 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5769 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5770 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5771 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5776 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5778 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5779 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5780 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5781 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5783 channel_value_satoshis,
5785 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5787 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5788 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5791 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5792 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5795 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5796 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5797 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5798 pending_update_fee: None,
5799 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5800 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5801 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5802 update_time_counter: 1,
5804 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5806 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5807 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5808 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5809 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5810 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5811 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5813 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5814 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5815 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5816 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5818 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5819 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5820 closing_fee_limits: None,
5821 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5823 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5824 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5825 short_channel_id: None,
5826 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5828 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5829 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5830 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5831 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5832 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5833 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5834 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5835 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5836 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5837 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5838 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5839 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5841 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5843 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5844 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5845 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5846 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5847 counterparty_parameters: None,
5848 funding_outpoint: None,
5849 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5851 funding_transaction: None,
5852 is_batch_funding: None,
5854 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5855 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5856 counterparty_node_id,
5858 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5860 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5862 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5863 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5865 announcement_sigs: None,
5867 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5868 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5869 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5870 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5872 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5873 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5875 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5876 outbound_scid_alias,
5878 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5879 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5881 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5882 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5887 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5889 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5893 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5894 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5895 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5896 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5897 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5898 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5899 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5900 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5901 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5906 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5907 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5908 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5909 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5910 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5911 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5912 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5913 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5914 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5915 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5916 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5918 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5919 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5921 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5922 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5923 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5924 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5927 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5928 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5930 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5933 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5934 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5935 return Err((self, e));
5939 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5941 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5943 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5944 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5946 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5947 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5948 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5949 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5950 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5951 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5954 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5955 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5957 let channel = Channel {
5958 context: self.context,
5961 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5962 temporary_channel_id,
5963 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5964 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5967 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5969 next_local_nonce: None,
5973 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5974 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5975 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5976 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5977 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5978 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5979 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5980 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5981 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5982 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5985 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5986 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5987 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5988 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5989 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5990 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5996 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5997 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5998 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5999 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6000 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6001 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6003 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6005 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6006 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6007 // We've exhausted our options
6010 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6011 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6014 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6015 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6016 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6017 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6019 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6020 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6021 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
6022 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6023 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6024 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6026 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6028 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6029 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6032 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6033 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6034 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6036 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6037 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6040 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6041 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6044 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6045 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6049 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6050 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6051 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6052 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6053 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6054 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6055 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6056 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6057 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6058 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6059 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6060 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6061 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6062 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6063 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6064 first_per_commitment_point,
6065 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6066 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6067 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6068 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6070 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6075 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6076 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6078 // Check sanity of message fields:
6079 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6082 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6085 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6088 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6091 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6094 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6096 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6098 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6099 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6102 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6103 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6106 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6107 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6109 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6110 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6113 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6114 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6117 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6120 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6123 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6126 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6129 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6132 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6136 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6137 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6140 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6141 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6143 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6144 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6147 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6148 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6151 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6152 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6153 &Some(ref script) => {
6154 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6155 if script.len() == 0 {
6158 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6161 Some(script.clone())
6164 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6171 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6172 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6173 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6174 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6175 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6177 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6178 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6180 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6183 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6184 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6185 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6186 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6187 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6188 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6191 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6192 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6193 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6196 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6197 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6199 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6200 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6206 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6207 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6208 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6209 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6212 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6213 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6214 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6215 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6216 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6217 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6218 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6219 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6220 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6221 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6222 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6225 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6227 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6228 // support this channel type.
6229 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6230 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6231 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6234 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6235 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6236 // `static_remote_key`.
6237 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6240 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6241 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6244 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6247 channel_type.clone()
6249 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6250 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6256 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6257 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6258 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6259 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6260 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6261 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6262 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6263 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6264 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6267 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6271 // Check sanity of message fields:
6272 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6275 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6278 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6281 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6282 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6285 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6288 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6291 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6293 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6294 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6297 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6300 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6304 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6305 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6308 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6311 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6314 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6317 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6320 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6323 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6327 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6329 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6330 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6335 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6336 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6337 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6338 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6339 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6341 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6342 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6344 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6345 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6346 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6348 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6349 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6352 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6353 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6354 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6355 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6356 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6357 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6360 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6361 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6362 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6363 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6367 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6368 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6369 &Some(ref script) => {
6370 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6371 if script.len() == 0 {
6374 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6375 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6377 Some(script.clone())
6380 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6387 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6388 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6389 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6390 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6394 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6395 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6396 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6400 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6401 Ok(script) => script,
6402 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6405 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6406 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6408 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6411 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6415 context: ChannelContext {
6418 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6419 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6421 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6426 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6428 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6429 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6430 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6431 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6434 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6436 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6437 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6440 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6441 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6442 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6444 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6445 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6446 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6447 pending_update_fee: None,
6448 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6449 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6450 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6451 update_time_counter: 1,
6453 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6455 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6456 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6457 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6458 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6459 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6460 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6462 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6463 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6464 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6465 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6467 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6468 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6469 closing_fee_limits: None,
6470 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6472 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6473 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6474 short_channel_id: None,
6475 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6477 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6478 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6479 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6480 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6481 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6482 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6483 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6484 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6485 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6486 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6487 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6488 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6491 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6493 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6494 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6495 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6496 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6497 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6498 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6499 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6501 funding_outpoint: None,
6502 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6504 funding_transaction: None,
6505 is_batch_funding: None,
6507 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6508 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6509 counterparty_node_id,
6511 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6513 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6515 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6516 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6518 announcement_sigs: None,
6520 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6521 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6522 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6523 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6525 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6526 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6528 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6529 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6531 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6532 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6534 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6535 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6540 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6542 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6548 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6549 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6551 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6552 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6553 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6554 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6556 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6557 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6559 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6560 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6563 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6566 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6567 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6568 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6570 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6571 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6572 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6573 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6575 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6576 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6577 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6578 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6579 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6580 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6581 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6582 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6583 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6584 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6585 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6586 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6587 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6588 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6589 first_per_commitment_point,
6590 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6591 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6592 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6594 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6596 next_local_nonce: None,
6600 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6601 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6603 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6605 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6606 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6609 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6610 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6612 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6613 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6615 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6616 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6617 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6618 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6619 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6620 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6621 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6622 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6623 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6626 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6627 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6629 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6630 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6631 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6632 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6634 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6635 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6636 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6637 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6638 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6640 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6641 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6646 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6647 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6648 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6652 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6653 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6655 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6656 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6657 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6659 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6661 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6662 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6663 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6664 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6667 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6668 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6669 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6670 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6671 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6673 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6675 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6676 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6677 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6680 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6681 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6682 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6686 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6687 initial_commitment_tx,
6690 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6691 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6694 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6695 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6698 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6700 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6701 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6702 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6703 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6704 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6705 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6706 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6707 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6708 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6709 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6710 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6712 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6714 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6715 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6716 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6717 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6718 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6719 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6721 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6722 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6723 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6724 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6726 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6728 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6729 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6730 let mut channel = Channel {
6731 context: self.context,
6733 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6734 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6735 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6737 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6741 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6742 }, channel_monitor))
6746 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6747 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6749 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6755 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6756 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6757 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6758 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6759 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6761 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6762 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6763 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6764 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6770 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6771 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6772 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6773 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6774 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6775 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6780 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6781 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6782 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6783 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6785 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6786 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6787 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6788 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6793 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6794 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6795 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6796 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6797 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6798 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6803 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6804 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6805 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6808 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6810 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6811 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6812 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6813 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6814 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6816 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6817 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6818 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6819 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6821 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6822 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6823 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6825 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6827 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6828 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6829 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6830 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6831 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6832 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6833 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6835 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6836 // deserialized from that format.
6837 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6838 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6839 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6841 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6843 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6844 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6845 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6847 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6848 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6849 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6850 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6853 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6854 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6855 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6858 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6859 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6860 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6861 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6863 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6864 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6866 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6868 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6870 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6872 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6875 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6877 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6882 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6883 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6885 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6886 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6887 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6888 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6889 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6890 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6891 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6893 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6895 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6897 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6900 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6901 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6902 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6905 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6907 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6908 preimages.push(preimage);
6910 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6911 reason.write(writer)?;
6913 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6915 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6916 preimages.push(preimage);
6918 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6919 reason.write(writer)?;
6922 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6923 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6924 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6926 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6927 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6928 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6932 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6933 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6934 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6936 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6937 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6941 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6942 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6943 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6944 source.write(writer)?;
6945 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6947 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6948 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6949 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6951 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6952 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6954 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6956 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6957 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6959 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6961 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6962 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6967 match self.context.resend_order {
6968 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6969 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6972 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6973 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6974 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6976 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6977 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6978 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6979 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6982 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6983 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6984 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6985 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6986 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6989 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6990 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6991 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6992 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6994 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6995 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6996 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6998 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7000 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7001 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7002 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7003 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7005 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7006 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7007 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7008 // consider the stale state on reload.
7011 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7012 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7013 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7015 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7016 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7017 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7019 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7020 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7022 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7023 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7024 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7026 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7027 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7029 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7032 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7033 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7034 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7036 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7039 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7040 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7042 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7043 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7044 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7046 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7048 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7050 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7052 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7053 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7054 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7055 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7056 htlc.write(writer)?;
7059 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7060 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7061 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7063 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7064 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7066 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7067 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7068 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7069 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7070 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7071 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7072 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7074 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7075 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7076 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7077 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7078 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7080 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7081 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7083 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7084 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7085 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7086 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7088 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7090 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7091 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7092 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7093 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7094 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7095 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7096 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7098 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7099 (2, chan_type, option),
7100 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7101 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7102 (5, self.context.config, required),
7103 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7104 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7105 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7106 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7107 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7108 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7109 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7110 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7111 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7112 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7113 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7114 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7115 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7116 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7117 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7118 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7119 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7120 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7121 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7128 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7129 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7131 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7132 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7134 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7135 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7136 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7138 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7139 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7140 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7141 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7143 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7145 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7146 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7147 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7148 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7149 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7152 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7156 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7157 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7161 let mut keys_data = None;
7163 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7164 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7165 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7166 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7167 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7168 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7169 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7170 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7171 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7172 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7176 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7177 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7178 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7181 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7184 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7187 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7189 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7190 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7191 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7192 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7193 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7194 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7195 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7196 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7197 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7198 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7199 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7200 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7201 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7206 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7207 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7208 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7209 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7210 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7211 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7212 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7213 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7214 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7215 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7216 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7217 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7219 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7220 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7223 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7224 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7227 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7228 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7230 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7232 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7236 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7237 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7238 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7239 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7240 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7241 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7242 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7243 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7244 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7245 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7246 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7248 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7249 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7250 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7252 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7253 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7254 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7256 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7260 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7261 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7262 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7263 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7266 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7267 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7270 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7271 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7272 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7273 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7276 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7277 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7278 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7279 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7282 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7284 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7287 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7288 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7289 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7292 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7293 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7294 // consider the stale state on reload.
7295 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7298 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7299 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7300 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7305 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7312 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7314 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7315 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7317 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7318 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7324 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7326 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7327 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7329 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7330 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7333 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7335 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7336 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7337 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7338 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7340 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7343 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7346 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7351 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7354 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7356 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7357 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7358 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7360 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7361 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7362 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7366 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7367 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7368 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7370 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7376 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7377 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7378 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7379 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7380 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7381 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7382 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7383 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7384 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7385 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7387 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7388 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7389 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7390 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7391 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7392 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7393 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7395 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7396 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7397 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7398 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7400 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7402 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7403 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7405 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7407 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7408 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7409 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7410 (2, channel_type, option),
7411 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7412 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7413 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7414 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7415 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7416 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7417 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7418 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7419 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7420 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7421 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7422 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7423 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7424 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7425 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7426 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7427 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7428 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7429 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7430 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7431 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7432 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7435 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7436 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7437 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7438 // required channel parameters.
7439 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7440 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7441 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7443 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7445 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7446 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7447 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7448 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7451 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7452 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7453 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7455 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7456 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7458 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7459 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7464 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7465 if iter.next().is_some() {
7466 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7470 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7471 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7472 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7473 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7474 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7477 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7478 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7479 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7481 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7482 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7484 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7485 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7486 // separate u64 values.
7487 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7489 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7491 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7492 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7493 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7494 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7496 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7497 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7499 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7500 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7501 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7502 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7503 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7506 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7507 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7511 context: ChannelContext {
7514 config: config.unwrap(),
7518 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7519 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7520 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7523 temporary_channel_id,
7525 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7527 channel_value_satoshis,
7529 latest_monitor_update_id,
7531 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7532 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7535 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7536 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7539 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7540 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7541 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7542 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7546 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7547 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7548 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7549 monitor_pending_forwards,
7550 monitor_pending_failures,
7551 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7554 holding_cell_update_fee,
7555 next_holder_htlc_id,
7556 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7557 update_time_counter,
7560 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7561 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7562 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7563 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7565 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7566 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7567 closing_fee_limits: None,
7568 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7570 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7571 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7573 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7575 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7576 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7577 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7578 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7579 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7580 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7581 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7582 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7583 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7586 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7588 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7589 funding_transaction,
7592 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7593 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7594 counterparty_node_id,
7596 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7600 channel_update_status,
7601 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7605 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7606 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7607 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7608 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7610 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7611 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7613 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7614 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7615 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7617 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7618 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7620 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7621 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7623 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7626 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7635 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7636 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7637 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7638 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7639 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7641 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7642 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7643 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7644 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7645 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7646 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7647 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7648 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7649 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7650 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7651 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7652 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7653 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7654 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7655 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7656 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7657 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7658 use crate::util::test_utils;
7659 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7660 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7661 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7662 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7663 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7664 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7665 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7666 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7667 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7668 use crate::prelude::*;
7670 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7673 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7674 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7680 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7681 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7682 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7683 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7687 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7688 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7689 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7690 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7691 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7692 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7693 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7694 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7698 signer: InMemorySigner,
7701 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7702 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7705 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7706 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7708 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7709 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7712 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7716 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7718 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7719 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7720 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7721 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7722 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7725 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7726 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7727 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7728 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7732 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7733 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7734 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7738 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7739 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7740 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7741 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7743 let seed = [42; 32];
7744 let network = Network::Testnet;
7745 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7746 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7747 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7750 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7751 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7752 let config = UserConfig::default();
7753 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7754 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7755 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7757 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7758 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7762 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7763 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7765 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7766 let original_fee = 253;
7767 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7768 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7769 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7770 let seed = [42; 32];
7771 let network = Network::Testnet;
7772 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7774 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7775 let config = UserConfig::default();
7776 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7778 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7779 // same as the old fee.
7780 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7781 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7782 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7786 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7787 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7788 // dust limits are used.
7789 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7790 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7791 let seed = [42; 32];
7792 let network = Network::Testnet;
7793 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7794 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7795 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7797 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7798 // they have different dust limits.
7800 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7801 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7802 let config = UserConfig::default();
7803 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7805 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7806 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7807 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7808 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7809 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7811 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7812 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7813 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7814 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7815 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7817 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7818 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7819 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7820 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7822 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7823 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7824 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7826 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7827 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7829 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7830 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7831 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7833 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7834 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7835 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7836 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7839 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7841 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7842 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7843 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7844 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7845 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7846 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7847 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7848 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7849 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7851 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7854 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7855 // the dust limit check.
7856 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7857 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7858 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7859 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7861 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7862 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7863 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7864 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7865 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7866 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7867 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7871 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7872 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7873 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7874 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7875 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7876 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7877 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7878 let seed = [42; 32];
7879 let network = Network::Testnet;
7880 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7882 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7883 let config = UserConfig::default();
7884 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7886 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7887 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7889 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7890 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7891 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7892 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7893 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7894 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7896 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7897 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7898 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7899 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7900 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7902 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7904 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7905 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7906 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7907 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7908 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7910 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7911 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7912 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7913 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7914 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7918 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7919 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7920 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7921 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7922 let seed = [42; 32];
7923 let network = Network::Testnet;
7924 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7925 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7926 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7928 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7930 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7931 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7932 let config = UserConfig::default();
7933 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7935 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7936 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7937 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7938 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7940 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7941 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7942 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7944 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7945 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7946 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7947 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7949 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7950 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7951 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7953 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7954 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7956 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7957 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7958 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7959 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7960 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7961 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7962 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7964 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7966 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7967 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7968 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7969 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7970 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7974 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7975 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7976 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7977 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7978 let seed = [42; 32];
7979 let network = Network::Testnet;
7980 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7981 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7982 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7984 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7985 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7986 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7987 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7988 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7989 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7990 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7991 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7993 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7994 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7995 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7996 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7997 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7998 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8000 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8001 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8002 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8003 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8005 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8007 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8008 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8009 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8010 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8011 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8012 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8014 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8015 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8016 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8017 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8019 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8020 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8021 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8022 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8023 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8025 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8026 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8028 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8029 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8030 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8032 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8033 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8034 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8035 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8036 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8038 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8039 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8041 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8042 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8043 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8047 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8049 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8050 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8051 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8053 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8054 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8055 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8056 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8058 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8059 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8060 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8062 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8064 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8065 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8068 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8069 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8070 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8071 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8072 let seed = [42; 32];
8073 let network = Network::Testnet;
8074 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8075 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8076 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8079 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8080 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8081 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8083 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8084 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8086 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8087 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8088 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8090 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8091 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8093 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8095 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8096 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8098 // Channel Negotiations failed
8099 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8100 assert!(result.is_err());
8105 fn channel_update() {
8106 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8107 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8108 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8109 let seed = [42; 32];
8110 let network = Network::Testnet;
8111 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8112 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8113 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8115 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8116 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8117 let config = UserConfig::default();
8118 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8120 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8121 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8122 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8123 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8124 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8126 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8127 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8128 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8129 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8130 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8132 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8133 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8134 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8135 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8137 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8138 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8139 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8141 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8142 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8144 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8145 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8146 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8148 short_channel_id: 0,
8151 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8152 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8153 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8155 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8156 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8158 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8160 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8162 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8163 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8164 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8165 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8167 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8168 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8169 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8171 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8174 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8177 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8179 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8180 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8181 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8182 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8183 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8184 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8185 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8186 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8187 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8188 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8189 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8190 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8191 use crate::sync::Arc;
8193 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8194 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8195 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8196 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8198 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8200 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8201 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8202 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8203 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8204 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8206 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8207 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8213 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8214 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8215 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8217 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8218 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8219 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8220 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8221 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8222 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8224 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8226 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8227 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8228 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8229 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8230 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8231 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8233 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8234 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8235 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8236 selected_contest_delay: 144
8238 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8239 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8241 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8242 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8244 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8245 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8247 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8248 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8250 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8251 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8252 // build_commitment_transaction.
8253 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8254 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8255 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8256 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8257 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8259 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8260 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8261 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8262 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8266 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8267 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8268 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8269 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8273 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8274 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8275 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8277 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8278 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8280 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8281 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8283 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8285 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8286 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8287 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8288 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8289 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8290 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8291 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8293 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8294 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8295 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8296 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8298 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8299 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8300 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8302 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8304 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8305 commitment_tx.clone(),
8306 counterparty_signature,
8307 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8308 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8309 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8311 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8312 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8314 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8315 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8316 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8318 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8319 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8322 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8323 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8325 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8326 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8327 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8328 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8329 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8330 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8331 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8332 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8334 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8337 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8338 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8339 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8343 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8346 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8347 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8348 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8350 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8351 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8352 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8353 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8354 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8355 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8356 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8357 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8359 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8363 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8364 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8365 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8366 "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", {});
8368 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8369 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8371 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8372 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8373 "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", {});
8375 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8376 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8377 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8378 "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", {});
8380 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8381 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8383 amount_msat: 1000000,
8385 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8386 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8388 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8391 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8392 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8394 amount_msat: 2000000,
8396 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8397 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8399 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8402 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8403 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8405 amount_msat: 2000000,
8407 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8408 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8409 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8410 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8412 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8415 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8416 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8418 amount_msat: 3000000,
8420 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8421 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8422 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8423 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8425 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8428 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8429 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8431 amount_msat: 4000000,
8433 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8434 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8436 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8440 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8441 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8442 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8444 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8445 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8446 "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", {
8449 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8450 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8451 "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" },
8454 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8455 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8456 "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" },
8459 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8460 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8461 "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" },
8464 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8465 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8466 "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" },
8469 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8470 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8471 "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" }
8474 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8478 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8479 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8480 "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", {
8483 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8484 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8485 "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" },
8488 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8489 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8490 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8493 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8494 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8495 "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" },
8498 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8499 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8500 "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" },
8503 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8504 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8505 "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" }
8508 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8509 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8510 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8512 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8513 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8514 "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", {
8517 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8518 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8519 "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" },
8522 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8523 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8524 "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" },
8527 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8528 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8529 "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" },
8532 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8533 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8534 "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" }
8537 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8538 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8539 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8540 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8542 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8543 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8544 "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", {
8547 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8548 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8549 "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" },
8552 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8553 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8554 "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" },
8557 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8558 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8559 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8562 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8563 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8564 "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" }
8567 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8568 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8569 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8570 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8572 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8573 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8574 "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", {
8577 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8578 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8579 "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" },
8582 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8583 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8584 "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" },
8587 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8588 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8589 "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" },
8592 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8593 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8594 "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" }
8597 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8598 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8599 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8601 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8602 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8603 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8606 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8607 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8608 "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" },
8611 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8612 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8613 "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" },
8616 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8617 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8618 "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" }
8621 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8622 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8623 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8625 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8626 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8627 "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", {
8630 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8631 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8632 "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" },
8635 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8636 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8637 "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" },
8640 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8641 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8642 "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" }
8645 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8646 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8647 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8649 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8650 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8651 "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", {
8654 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8655 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8656 "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" },
8659 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8660 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8661 "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" }
8664 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8665 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8666 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8667 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8668 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8669 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8671 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8672 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8673 "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", {
8676 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8677 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8678 "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" },
8681 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8682 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8683 "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" }
8686 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8687 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8688 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8689 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8690 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8692 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8693 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8694 "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", {
8697 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8698 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8699 "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" },
8702 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8703 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8704 "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" }
8707 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8708 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8709 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8711 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8712 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8713 "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", {
8716 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8717 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8718 "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" }
8721 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8722 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8723 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8724 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8725 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8727 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8728 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8729 "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", {
8732 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8733 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8734 "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" }
8737 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8738 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8739 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8740 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8741 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8743 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8744 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8745 "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", {
8748 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8749 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8750 "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" }
8753 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8754 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8755 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8756 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8758 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8759 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8760 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8762 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8763 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8764 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8765 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8766 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8768 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8769 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8770 "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", {});
8772 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8773 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8774 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8775 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8776 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8778 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8779 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8780 "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", {});
8782 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8783 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8784 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8786 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8787 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8788 "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", {});
8790 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8791 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8792 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8793 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8794 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8796 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8797 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8798 "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", {});
8800 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8801 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8802 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8803 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8804 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8806 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8807 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8808 "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", {});
8810 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8811 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8812 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8813 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8814 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8815 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8817 amount_msat: 2000000,
8819 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8820 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8822 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8825 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8826 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8827 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8829 amount_msat: 5000001,
8831 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8832 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8833 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8834 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8836 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8839 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8840 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8842 amount_msat: 5000000,
8844 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8845 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8846 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8847 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8849 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8853 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8854 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8855 "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", {
8858 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8859 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8860 "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" },
8862 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8863 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8864 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8866 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8867 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8868 "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" }
8871 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8872 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8873 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8874 "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", {
8877 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8878 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8879 "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" },
8881 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8882 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8883 "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" },
8885 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8886 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8887 "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" }
8892 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8893 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8895 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8896 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8897 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8898 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8900 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8901 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8902 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8904 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8905 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8907 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8908 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8910 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8911 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8912 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8916 fn test_key_derivation() {
8917 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8918 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8920 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8921 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8923 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8924 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8926 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8927 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8929 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8930 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8932 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8933 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8935 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8936 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8938 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8939 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8943 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8944 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8945 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8946 let seed = [42; 32];
8947 let network = Network::Testnet;
8948 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8949 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8951 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8952 let config = UserConfig::default();
8953 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8954 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8956 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8957 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8959 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8960 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8961 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8962 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8963 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8964 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8965 assert!(res.is_ok());
8969 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8970 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8971 // resulting `channel_type`.
8972 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8973 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8974 let network = Network::Testnet;
8975 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8976 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8978 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8979 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8981 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8982 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8984 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8985 // need to signal it.
8986 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8987 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8988 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8991 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8993 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8994 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8995 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8997 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8998 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8999 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9002 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9003 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9004 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9005 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9006 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9009 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9010 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9014 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9015 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9016 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9017 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9018 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9019 let network = Network::Testnet;
9020 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9021 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9023 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9024 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9026 let config = UserConfig::default();
9028 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9029 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9030 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9031 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9032 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9034 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9035 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9036 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9039 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9040 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9041 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9043 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9044 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9045 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9046 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9047 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9048 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9050 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9054 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9055 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9057 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9058 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9059 let network = Network::Testnet;
9060 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9061 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9063 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9064 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9066 let config = UserConfig::default();
9068 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9069 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9070 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9071 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9072 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9073 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9074 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9075 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9077 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9078 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9079 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9080 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9081 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9082 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9085 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9086 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9088 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9089 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9090 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9091 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9093 assert!(res.is_err());
9095 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9096 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9097 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9099 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9100 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9101 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9104 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9106 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9107 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9108 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9109 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9112 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9113 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9115 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9116 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9118 assert!(res.is_err());
9122 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9123 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9124 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9125 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9126 let seed = [42; 32];
9127 let network = Network::Testnet;
9128 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9129 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
9130 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9132 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9133 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9134 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9135 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9137 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9138 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9139 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9144 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9153 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9154 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9155 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9160 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9161 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9167 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9170 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9171 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9172 &accept_channel_msg,
9173 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9174 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9177 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9178 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9179 let tx = Transaction {
9181 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9185 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9188 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9191 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9192 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9197 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9198 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9199 &funding_created_msg,
9203 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9204 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9212 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9213 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9214 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9215 &funding_signed_msg,
9220 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9227 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9228 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9229 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9230 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9232 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9233 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9234 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9237 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9238 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9239 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9247 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9248 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9249 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9250 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9253 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9254 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9256 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9257 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9258 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9260 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());