1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
598 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
600 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
601 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
605 (0, update, required),
608 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
609 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
610 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
611 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
612 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
616 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
617 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
618 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
620 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
622 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
623 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
624 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
628 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
630 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
631 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
632 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
637 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
638 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
639 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
640 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
641 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
643 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
644 /// in a timely manner.
645 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
648 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
649 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
650 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
652 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
653 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
654 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
655 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
659 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
660 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
661 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
663 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
664 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
665 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
666 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
668 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
672 /// The current channel ID.
673 channel_id: ChannelId,
674 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
675 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
676 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
679 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
680 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
682 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
683 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
684 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
686 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
687 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
688 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
689 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
691 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
692 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
694 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
696 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
697 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
698 destination_script: Script,
700 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
701 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
702 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
704 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
705 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
706 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
707 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
708 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
709 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
711 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
712 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
713 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
714 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
715 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
716 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
718 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
720 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
721 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
722 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
724 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
725 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
726 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
727 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
728 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
729 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
730 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
732 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
734 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
735 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
736 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
737 // HTLCs with similar state.
738 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
739 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
740 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
741 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
742 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
743 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
744 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
745 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
749 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
750 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
751 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
753 update_time_counter: u32,
755 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
756 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
757 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
758 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
759 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
760 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
762 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
763 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
765 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
766 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
767 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
768 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
770 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
771 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
773 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
775 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
777 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
778 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
779 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
780 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
781 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
782 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
783 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
784 channel_creation_height: u32,
786 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
789 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
791 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
794 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
796 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
799 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
801 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
803 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
804 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
807 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
809 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
811 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
812 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
814 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
816 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
817 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
818 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
820 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
822 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
823 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
825 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
826 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
827 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
829 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
831 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
833 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
834 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
835 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
836 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
838 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
839 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
840 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
842 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
843 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
844 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
846 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
847 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
848 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
849 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
850 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
851 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
852 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
853 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
855 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
856 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
857 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
858 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
859 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
861 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
862 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
864 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
865 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
866 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
867 /// unblock the state machine.
869 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
870 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
871 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
873 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
874 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
875 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
877 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
878 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
879 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
880 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
881 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
882 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
883 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
884 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
886 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
887 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
889 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
890 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
891 // the channel's funding UTXO.
893 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
894 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
895 // associated channel mapping.
897 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
898 // to store all of them.
899 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
901 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
902 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
903 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
904 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
905 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
907 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
908 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
910 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
911 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
913 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
914 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
915 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
917 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
918 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
919 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
922 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
923 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
924 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
925 self.update_time_counter
928 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
929 self.latest_monitor_update_id
932 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
933 self.config.announced_channel
936 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
937 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
940 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
941 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
942 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
943 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
946 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
947 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
948 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
951 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
953 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
954 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
955 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
958 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
959 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
960 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
961 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
963 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
964 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
966 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
967 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
969 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
970 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
972 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
975 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
976 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
977 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
978 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
980 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
981 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
982 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
983 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
986 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
987 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
988 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
989 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
990 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
995 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
999 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1001 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1002 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1003 self.temporary_channel_id
1006 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1010 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1011 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1012 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1016 /// Gets the channel's type
1017 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1021 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1023 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1024 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1025 self.short_channel_id
1028 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1029 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1030 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1033 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1034 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1035 self.outbound_scid_alias
1038 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1039 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1040 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1041 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1042 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1043 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1046 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1047 /// get_funding_created.
1048 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1049 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1052 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1053 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1054 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1057 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1058 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1059 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1060 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1064 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1067 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1068 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1071 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1072 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1075 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1076 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1077 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1080 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1081 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1084 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1085 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1086 self.counterparty_node_id
1089 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1090 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1091 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1094 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1095 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1096 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1099 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1100 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1102 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1103 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1104 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1105 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1107 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1112 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1113 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1117 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1118 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1121 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1122 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1123 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1125 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1126 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1131 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1132 self.channel_value_satoshis
1135 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1136 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1139 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1140 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1143 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1144 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1145 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1147 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1148 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1149 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1150 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1151 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1153 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1157 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1158 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1159 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1162 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1163 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1164 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1167 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1168 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1169 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1172 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1173 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1174 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1177 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1178 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1179 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1182 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1183 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1184 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1187 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1188 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1189 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1190 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1191 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1194 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1196 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1197 self.prev_config = None;
1201 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1202 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1206 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1207 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1208 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1209 let did_channel_update =
1210 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1211 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1212 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1213 if did_channel_update {
1214 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1215 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1216 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1217 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1219 self.config.options = *config;
1223 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1224 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1225 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1228 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1229 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1230 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1231 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1232 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1234 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1235 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1236 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1237 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1238 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1239 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1240 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1242 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1243 where L::Target: Logger
1245 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1246 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1247 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1249 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1250 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1251 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1252 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1254 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1255 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1256 if match update_state {
1257 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1258 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1259 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1260 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1261 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1263 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1267 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1268 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1269 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1271 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1273 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1274 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1275 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1277 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1278 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1279 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1280 transaction_output_index: None
1285 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1286 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1287 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1288 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1289 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1292 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1294 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1295 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1296 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1298 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1299 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1302 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1303 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1306 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1308 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1309 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1310 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1312 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1313 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1319 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1320 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1321 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1322 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1323 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1324 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1325 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1329 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1330 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1332 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1334 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1335 if generated_by_local {
1336 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1337 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1346 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1348 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1349 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1350 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1351 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1352 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1353 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1354 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1357 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1358 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1359 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1360 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1364 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1365 preimages.push(preimage);
1369 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1370 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1372 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1374 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1375 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1377 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1378 if !generated_by_local {
1379 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1387 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1388 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1389 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1390 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1391 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1392 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1393 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1394 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1396 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1398 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1399 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1400 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1401 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1403 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1405 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1406 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1407 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1408 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1411 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1412 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1413 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1414 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1416 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1419 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1420 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1421 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1422 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1424 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1427 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1428 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1433 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1434 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1439 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1441 let channel_parameters =
1442 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1443 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1444 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1451 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1454 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1455 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1456 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1457 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1459 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1460 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1461 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1469 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1470 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1476 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1477 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1478 /// our counterparty!)
1479 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1480 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1481 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1482 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1483 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1484 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1485 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1487 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1491 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1492 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1493 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1494 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1495 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1496 //may see payments to it!
1497 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1498 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1499 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1501 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1504 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1505 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1506 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1507 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1508 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1511 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1512 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1515 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1519 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1520 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1521 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1522 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1523 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1524 // which are near the dust limit.
1525 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1526 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1527 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1528 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1529 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1531 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1532 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1534 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1537 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1538 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1539 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1542 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1543 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1545 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1546 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1547 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1548 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1549 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1550 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1551 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1554 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1557 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1558 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1559 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1561 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1562 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1563 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1564 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1565 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1566 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1568 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1569 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1575 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1576 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1578 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1579 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1580 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1581 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1582 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1583 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1584 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1587 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1590 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1591 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1592 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1594 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1595 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1596 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1597 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1598 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1599 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1601 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1602 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1606 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1607 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1608 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1609 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1610 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1611 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1612 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1614 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1615 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1617 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1624 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1625 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1626 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1627 /// corner case properly.
1628 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1629 -> AvailableBalances
1630 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1632 let context = &self;
1633 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1634 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1635 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1637 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1638 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1640 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1642 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1644 if context.is_outbound() {
1645 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1646 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1648 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1649 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1651 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1652 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1653 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1654 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1657 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1658 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1659 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1660 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1662 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1663 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1664 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1665 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1666 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1667 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1668 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1669 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1670 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1671 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1673 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1676 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1677 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1678 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1679 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1680 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1683 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1684 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1686 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1687 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1688 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1690 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1691 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1692 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1693 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1697 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1699 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1700 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1701 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1702 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1703 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1704 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1705 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1707 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1708 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1710 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1711 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1712 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1714 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1715 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1716 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1717 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1718 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1721 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1722 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1723 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1724 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1725 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1726 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1729 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1730 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1731 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1733 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1737 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1738 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1740 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1741 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1745 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1746 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1747 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1748 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1750 outbound_capacity_msat,
1751 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1752 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1756 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1757 let context = &self;
1758 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1761 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1762 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1764 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1765 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1767 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1768 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1770 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1771 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1772 let context = &self;
1773 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1775 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1778 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1779 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1781 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1782 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1784 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1785 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1787 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1788 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1792 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1793 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1799 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1800 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1801 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1804 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1805 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1806 included_htlcs += 1;
1809 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1810 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1814 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1815 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1816 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1817 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1818 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1819 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1824 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1826 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1827 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1832 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1833 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1837 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1838 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1839 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1842 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1843 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1845 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1846 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1847 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1849 total_pending_htlcs,
1850 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1851 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1852 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1854 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1855 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1856 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1858 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1860 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1865 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1866 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1868 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1869 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1871 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1872 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1874 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1875 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1876 let context = &self;
1877 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1879 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1882 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1883 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1885 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1886 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1888 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1889 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1891 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1892 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1896 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1897 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1903 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1904 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1905 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1906 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1907 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1908 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 included_htlcs += 1;
1914 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1915 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1918 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1919 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1921 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1922 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1923 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1928 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1929 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1930 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1933 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1934 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1936 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1937 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1939 total_pending_htlcs,
1940 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1941 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1942 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1944 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1945 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1946 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1948 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1950 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1955 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1956 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1957 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1958 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1964 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1965 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1966 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1967 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1968 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1969 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1970 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1971 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1972 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1973 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1974 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1976 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1977 // return them to fail the payment.
1978 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1979 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1980 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1982 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1983 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1988 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1989 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1990 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1991 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1992 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1993 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1994 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1995 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1996 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1997 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1998 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1999 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2000 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2005 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2006 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2007 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
2011 // Internal utility functions for channels
2013 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2014 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2015 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2017 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2019 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2020 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2021 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2023 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2026 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2028 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2031 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2032 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2033 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2035 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2037 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2038 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2039 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2040 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2041 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2044 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2045 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2046 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2047 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2048 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2049 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2050 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2053 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2054 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2056 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2057 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2060 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2061 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2062 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2063 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2064 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2065 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2068 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2069 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2070 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2071 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2074 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2075 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2077 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2078 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2079 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2083 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2084 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2085 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2087 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2088 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2089 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2090 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2092 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2093 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2094 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2095 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2096 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2097 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2098 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2099 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2100 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2101 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2106 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2107 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2108 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2109 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2110 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2111 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2113 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2115 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2116 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2117 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2118 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2119 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2120 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2121 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2122 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2124 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2125 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2135 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2136 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2137 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2138 // outside of those situations will fail.
2139 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2143 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2148 1 + // script length (0)
2152 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2153 2 + // witness marker and flag
2154 1 + // witness element count
2155 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2156 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2157 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2158 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2159 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2160 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2162 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2163 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2164 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2170 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2171 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2172 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2173 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2175 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2176 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2177 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2179 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2180 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2181 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2182 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2183 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2184 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2187 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2188 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2191 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2192 value_to_holder = 0;
2195 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2196 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2197 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2198 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2200 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2201 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2204 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2205 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2208 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2211 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2212 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2214 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2216 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2217 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2218 where L::Target: Logger {
2219 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2220 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2221 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2222 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2223 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2224 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2225 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2226 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2230 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2231 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2232 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2233 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2235 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2236 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2238 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2240 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2241 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2242 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2244 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2245 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2246 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2247 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2248 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2249 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2250 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2252 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2253 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2254 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2256 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2257 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2259 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2262 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2263 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2267 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2271 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2272 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2273 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2274 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2275 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2276 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2279 // Now update local state:
2281 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2282 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2283 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2284 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2285 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2286 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2287 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2291 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2292 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2293 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2294 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2295 // do not not get into this branch.
2296 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2297 match pending_update {
2298 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2299 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2300 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2301 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2302 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2303 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2304 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2307 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2308 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2309 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2310 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2311 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2312 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2313 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2319 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2320 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2321 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2323 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2324 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2325 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2327 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2328 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2331 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2332 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2334 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2335 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2337 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2338 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2341 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2344 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2345 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2346 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2347 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2352 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2353 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2354 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2355 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2356 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2357 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2358 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2359 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2360 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2361 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2362 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2363 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2364 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2365 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2366 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2368 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2369 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2370 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2371 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2372 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2375 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2376 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2377 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2383 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2384 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2386 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2390 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2391 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2392 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2393 /// before we fail backwards.
2395 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2396 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2397 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2398 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2399 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2400 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2401 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2404 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2405 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2406 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2407 /// before we fail backwards.
2409 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2410 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2411 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2412 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2413 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2414 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2415 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2417 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2419 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2420 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2421 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2423 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2424 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2425 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2427 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2428 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2429 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2431 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2436 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2437 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2443 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2445 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2446 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2447 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2451 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2452 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2453 force_holding_cell = true;
2456 // Now update local state:
2457 if force_holding_cell {
2458 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2459 match pending_update {
2460 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2461 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2462 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2463 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2467 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2468 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2469 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2470 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2476 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2477 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2478 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2484 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2486 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2487 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2490 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2491 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2492 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2497 // Message handlers:
2499 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2500 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2501 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2502 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2503 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2507 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2510 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2511 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2513 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2514 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2515 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2516 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2519 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2521 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2522 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2523 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2524 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2526 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2527 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2529 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2530 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2532 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2533 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2534 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2535 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2536 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2537 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2541 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2542 initial_commitment_tx,
2545 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2546 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2549 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2550 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2553 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2554 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2555 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2556 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2557 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2558 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2559 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2560 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2561 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2562 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2563 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2564 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2566 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2568 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2569 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2570 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2571 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2572 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2573 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2574 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2576 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2577 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2578 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2579 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2581 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2583 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2584 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2588 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2589 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2591 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2592 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2593 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2594 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2596 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2599 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2600 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2604 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2605 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2606 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2607 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2608 // when routing outbound payments.
2609 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2613 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2615 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2616 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2617 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2618 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2619 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2620 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2621 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2622 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2623 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2625 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2626 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2627 let expected_point =
2628 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2629 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2631 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2632 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2633 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2634 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2635 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2636 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2638 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2639 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2640 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2641 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2642 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2644 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2652 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2653 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2655 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2657 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2660 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2661 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2662 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2663 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2664 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2665 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2667 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2668 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2669 if local_sent_shutdown {
2670 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2672 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2673 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2674 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2677 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2680 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2681 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2683 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2686 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2690 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2691 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2692 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2693 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2695 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2696 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2698 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2699 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2700 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2701 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2702 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2703 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2704 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2705 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2706 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2707 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2708 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2710 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2711 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2712 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2713 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2714 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2715 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2719 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2720 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2723 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2724 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2725 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2727 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2728 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2729 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2730 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2731 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2732 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2733 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2737 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2738 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2739 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2740 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2741 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2742 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2743 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2747 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2748 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2749 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2750 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2751 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2755 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2756 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2757 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2758 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2759 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2761 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2765 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2769 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2770 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2771 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2772 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2773 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2774 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2775 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2776 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2777 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2778 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2779 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2780 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2781 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2782 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2783 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2784 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2787 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2788 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2789 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2790 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2794 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2795 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2797 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2801 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2802 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2803 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2807 // Now update local state:
2808 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2809 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2810 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2811 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2812 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2813 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2814 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2819 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2821 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2822 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2823 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2824 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2825 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2826 None => fail_reason.into(),
2827 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2828 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2829 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2832 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2836 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2838 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2839 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2841 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2847 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2850 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2851 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2854 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2858 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2861 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2862 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2865 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2869 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2873 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2874 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2875 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2877 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2881 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2885 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2886 where L::Target: Logger
2888 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2889 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2891 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2894 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2898 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2900 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2902 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2903 let commitment_txid = {
2904 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2905 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2906 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2908 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2909 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2910 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2911 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2912 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2917 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2919 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2920 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2921 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2922 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2925 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2926 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2927 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2931 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2933 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2934 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2935 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2936 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2937 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2938 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2939 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2940 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2941 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2942 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2943 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2949 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2953 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2954 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2955 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2956 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2957 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2958 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2959 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2960 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2961 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2962 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2963 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2964 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2965 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2968 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2969 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2970 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2971 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2972 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2973 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2974 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2976 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2977 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2978 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2979 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2980 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2981 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
2982 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2985 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2986 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2989 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2991 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2992 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2993 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2996 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2999 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3000 commitment_stats.tx,
3002 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3003 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3004 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3007 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3008 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3010 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3011 let mut need_commitment = false;
3012 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3013 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3014 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3015 need_commitment = true;
3019 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3020 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3021 Some(forward_info.clone())
3023 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3024 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3025 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3026 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3027 need_commitment = true;
3030 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3031 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3032 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3033 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3034 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3035 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3036 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3037 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3038 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3039 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3040 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3041 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3042 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3043 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3045 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3047 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3048 need_commitment = true;
3052 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3053 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3054 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3055 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3056 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3057 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3059 nondust_htlc_sources,
3063 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3064 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3065 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3066 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3068 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3069 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3070 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3071 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3072 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3073 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3074 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3075 // includes the right HTLCs.
3076 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3077 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3078 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3079 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3080 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3081 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3083 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3084 &self.context.channel_id);
3085 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3088 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3089 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3090 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3091 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3092 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3093 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3094 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3095 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3096 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3100 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3101 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3102 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3103 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3106 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3107 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3108 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3109 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3110 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3111 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3112 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3114 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3115 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3116 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3117 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3120 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3121 /// for our counterparty.
3122 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3123 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3124 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3125 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3127 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3128 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3129 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3130 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3132 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3133 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3134 updates: Vec::new(),
3137 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3138 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3139 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3140 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3141 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3142 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3143 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3144 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3145 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3146 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3147 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3148 // to rebalance channels.
3149 match &htlc_update {
3150 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3151 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3152 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3154 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3155 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3157 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3160 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3161 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3162 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3163 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3164 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3165 // into the holding cell without ever being
3166 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3167 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3168 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3171 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3177 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3178 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3179 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3180 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3181 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3182 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3183 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3184 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3185 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3186 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3187 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3188 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3191 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3192 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3193 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3194 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3195 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3196 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3197 // for a full revocation before failing.
3198 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3199 update_fail_count += 1;
3202 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3204 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3211 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3212 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3214 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3215 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3220 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3221 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3222 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3223 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3224 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3226 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3227 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3228 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3230 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3231 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3237 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3238 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3239 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3240 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3241 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3242 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3243 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3244 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3245 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3247 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3250 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3253 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3257 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3259 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3260 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3265 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3266 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3267 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3268 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3269 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3270 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3271 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3272 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3276 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3278 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3279 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3282 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3283 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3284 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3285 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3287 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3291 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3292 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3293 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3294 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3295 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3296 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3297 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3298 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3302 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3303 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3304 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3305 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3306 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3307 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3308 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3309 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3310 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3312 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3313 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3316 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3317 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3318 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3319 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3320 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3321 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3322 let mut require_commitment = false;
3323 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3326 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3327 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3328 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3330 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3331 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3332 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3333 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3334 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3335 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3340 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3341 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3342 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3343 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3344 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3346 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3347 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3348 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3353 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3354 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3356 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3360 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3361 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3363 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3364 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3365 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3366 require_commitment = true;
3367 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3368 match forward_info {
3369 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3370 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3371 require_commitment = true;
3373 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3374 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3375 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3377 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3378 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3379 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3383 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3384 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3385 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3386 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3392 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3393 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3394 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3395 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3397 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3398 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3399 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3400 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3401 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3402 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3403 require_commitment = true;
3407 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3409 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3410 match update_state {
3411 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3412 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3413 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3414 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3415 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3417 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3418 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3419 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3420 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3421 require_commitment = true;
3422 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3423 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3428 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3429 let release_state_str =
3430 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3431 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3432 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3433 if !release_monitor {
3434 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3435 update: monitor_update,
3437 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3439 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3444 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3445 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3446 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3447 if require_commitment {
3448 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3449 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3450 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3451 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3452 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3453 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3454 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3455 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3456 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3458 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3459 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3460 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3461 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3462 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3465 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3466 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3467 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3468 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3469 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3470 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3472 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3473 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3475 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3476 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3478 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3479 if require_commitment {
3480 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3482 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3483 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3484 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3485 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3487 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3488 &self.context.channel_id(),
3489 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3492 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3493 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3495 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3496 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3498 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3499 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3505 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3506 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3507 /// commitment update.
3508 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3509 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3510 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3512 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3513 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3516 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3517 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3518 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3519 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3521 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3522 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3523 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3524 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3525 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3526 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3527 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3529 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3530 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3532 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3533 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3535 if !self.context.is_live() {
3536 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3539 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3540 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3541 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3542 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3543 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3544 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3545 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3546 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3547 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3548 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3552 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3553 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3554 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3555 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3556 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3557 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3560 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3561 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3565 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3566 force_holding_cell = true;
3569 if force_holding_cell {
3570 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3574 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3575 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3577 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3578 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3583 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3584 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3586 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3588 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3589 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3590 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3591 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3595 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3596 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3597 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3601 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3602 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3605 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3606 // will be retransmitted.
3607 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3608 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3609 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3611 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3612 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3614 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3615 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3616 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3617 // this HTLC accordingly
3618 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3621 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3622 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3623 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3624 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3627 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3628 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3629 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3630 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3631 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3632 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3637 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3639 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3640 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3641 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3642 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3646 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3647 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3648 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3649 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3650 // the update upon reconnection.
3651 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3655 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3657 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3658 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3661 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3662 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3663 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3664 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3665 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3666 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3667 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3669 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3670 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3671 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3672 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3673 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3674 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3675 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3677 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3678 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3679 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3680 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3681 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3682 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3683 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3686 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3687 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3688 /// to the remote side.
3689 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3690 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3691 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3692 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3695 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3697 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3698 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3700 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3701 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3702 // first received the funding_signed.
3703 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3704 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3705 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3707 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3708 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3709 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3710 funding_broadcastable = None;
3713 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3714 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3715 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3716 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3717 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3718 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3719 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3720 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3721 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3722 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3723 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3724 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3725 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3726 next_per_commitment_point,
3727 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3731 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3733 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3734 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3735 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3736 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3737 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3738 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3740 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3741 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3742 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3743 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3744 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3745 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3749 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3750 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3752 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3753 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3754 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3757 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3758 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3759 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3760 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3761 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3762 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3763 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3764 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3765 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3769 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3770 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3772 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3773 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3775 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3778 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3779 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3781 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3782 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3783 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3784 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3785 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3786 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3787 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3788 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3789 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3790 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3791 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3792 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3793 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3794 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3796 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3798 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3804 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3805 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3806 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3807 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3808 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3809 per_commitment_secret,
3810 next_per_commitment_point,
3812 next_local_nonce: None,
3816 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3817 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3818 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3819 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3820 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3822 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3823 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3824 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3825 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3826 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3827 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3828 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3829 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3830 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3831 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3836 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3837 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3839 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3840 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3841 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3842 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3843 reason: err_packet.clone()
3846 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3847 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3848 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3849 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3850 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3851 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3854 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3855 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3856 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3857 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3858 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3865 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3866 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3867 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3868 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3872 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3873 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3874 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3875 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3876 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3877 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3881 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3882 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3883 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3884 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3885 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3886 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3887 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3892 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3893 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3895 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3896 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3897 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3898 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3899 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3900 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3901 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3902 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3905 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3907 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3908 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3909 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3910 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3911 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3914 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3915 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3919 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3920 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3921 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3922 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3923 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3926 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3927 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3928 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3929 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3930 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3933 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3934 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3935 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3936 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3937 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3938 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3939 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3940 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3944 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3945 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3946 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3947 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3949 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3953 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3954 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3955 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3956 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3958 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3960 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3962 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3963 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3964 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3965 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3966 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3969 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3970 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3971 channel_ready: None,
3972 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3973 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3974 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3978 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3979 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3980 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3981 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3982 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3983 next_per_commitment_point,
3984 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3986 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3987 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3988 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3992 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3993 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3994 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3996 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3997 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3998 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4001 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4007 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4008 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4009 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4010 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4011 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4012 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4013 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4015 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4017 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4018 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4019 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4020 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4021 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4022 next_per_commitment_point,
4023 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4027 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4028 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4029 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4031 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4034 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4035 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4036 raa: required_revoke,
4037 commitment_update: None,
4038 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4040 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4041 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4042 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4044 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4047 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4048 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4049 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4050 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4051 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4052 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4055 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4056 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4057 raa: required_revoke,
4058 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4059 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4063 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4067 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4068 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4069 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4070 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4072 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4074 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4076 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4077 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4078 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4079 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4080 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4081 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4083 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4084 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4085 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4086 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4087 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4089 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4090 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4091 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4092 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4095 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4096 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4097 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4098 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4099 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4100 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4101 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4102 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4103 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4104 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4105 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4106 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4107 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4108 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4109 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4111 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4114 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4115 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4118 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4119 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4120 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4121 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4122 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4123 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4126 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4127 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4128 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4129 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4130 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4131 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4134 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4140 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4141 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4142 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4143 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4145 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4146 return Ok((None, None));
4149 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4150 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4151 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4153 return Ok((None, None));
4156 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4158 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4159 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4160 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4161 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4163 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4164 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4166 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4167 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4169 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4170 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4171 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4172 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4174 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4175 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4176 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4183 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4184 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4186 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4187 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4190 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4191 /// within our expected timeframe.
4193 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4194 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4195 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4198 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4201 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4202 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4206 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4207 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4209 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4212 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4213 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4214 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4215 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4216 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4218 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4219 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4223 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4225 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4226 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4229 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4230 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4231 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4234 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4237 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4238 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4239 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4240 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4242 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4245 assert!(send_shutdown);
4246 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4247 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4248 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4250 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4253 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4258 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4260 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4261 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4263 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4264 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4265 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4266 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4267 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4268 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4271 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4272 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4274 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4275 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4276 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4277 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4281 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4282 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4283 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4284 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4285 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4286 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4288 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4289 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4296 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4297 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4299 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4302 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4303 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4305 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4307 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4308 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4309 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4310 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4311 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4312 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4313 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4314 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4315 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4317 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4318 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4321 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4325 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4326 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4327 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4328 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4330 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4333 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4336 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4339 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4343 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4347 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4348 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4349 return Ok((None, None));
4352 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4353 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4354 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4357 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4359 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4362 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4363 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4364 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4365 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4366 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4370 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4371 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4376 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4377 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4378 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4379 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4380 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4381 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4382 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4386 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4388 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4389 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4390 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4391 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4393 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4396 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4397 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4399 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4400 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4402 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4403 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4404 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4405 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4409 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4410 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4411 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4412 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4414 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4415 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4416 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4424 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4425 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4426 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4428 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4431 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4432 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4435 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4436 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4437 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4438 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4439 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4441 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4443 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4445 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4446 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4449 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4450 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4451 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4452 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4453 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4454 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4455 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4456 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4461 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4462 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4463 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4464 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4466 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4470 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4471 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4472 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4473 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4475 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4481 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4482 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4483 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4484 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4485 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4486 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4487 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4489 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4490 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4493 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4495 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4496 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4502 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4503 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4504 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4505 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4506 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4507 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4508 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4510 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4511 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4518 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4519 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4522 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4523 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4526 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4527 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4531 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4532 &self.context.holder_signer
4536 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4538 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4539 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4540 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4541 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4542 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4543 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4545 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4547 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4555 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4556 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4560 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4561 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4562 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4563 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4566 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4567 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4568 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4569 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4572 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4573 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4574 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4575 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4576 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4577 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4580 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4581 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4582 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4583 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4584 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4585 if !release_monitor {
4586 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4595 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4596 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4599 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4600 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4601 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4603 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4604 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4605 if self.context.channel_state &
4606 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4607 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4608 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4609 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4610 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4613 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4614 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4615 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4616 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4617 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4618 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4620 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4621 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4622 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4624 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4625 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4626 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4627 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4628 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4629 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4635 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4636 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4637 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4640 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4641 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4642 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4645 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4646 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4647 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4650 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4651 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4652 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4653 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4654 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4655 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4660 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4661 self.context.channel_update_status
4664 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4665 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4666 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4669 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4671 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4672 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4673 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4677 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4678 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4679 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4682 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4686 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4687 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4688 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4690 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4691 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4692 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4694 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4695 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4698 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4699 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4700 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4701 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4702 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4703 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4704 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4705 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4706 self.context.channel_state);
4708 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4712 if need_commitment_update {
4713 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4714 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4715 let next_per_commitment_point =
4716 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4717 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4718 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4719 next_per_commitment_point,
4720 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4724 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4730 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4731 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4732 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4733 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4734 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4735 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4736 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4738 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4741 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4742 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4743 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4744 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4745 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4746 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4747 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4748 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4749 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4750 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4751 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4752 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4753 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4754 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4755 // channel and move on.
4756 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4757 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4759 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4760 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4761 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4763 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4764 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4765 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4766 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4767 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4768 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4769 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4770 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4775 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4776 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4777 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4778 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4779 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4782 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4783 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4784 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4785 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4786 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4787 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4790 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4791 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4792 // may have already happened for this block).
4793 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4794 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4795 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4796 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4799 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4800 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4801 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4802 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4810 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4811 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4812 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4813 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4815 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4816 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4819 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4821 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4822 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4823 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4824 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4826 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4829 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4832 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4833 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4834 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4835 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4837 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4840 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4841 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4842 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4844 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4845 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4847 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4848 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4849 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4857 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4859 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4860 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4861 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4863 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4864 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4867 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4868 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4869 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4870 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4871 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4872 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4873 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4874 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4875 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4878 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4879 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4880 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4881 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4883 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4884 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4885 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4887 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4888 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4889 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4890 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4892 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4893 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4894 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4895 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4896 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4897 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4898 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4901 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4902 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4904 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4907 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4908 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4909 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4910 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4911 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4912 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4913 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4914 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4915 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4916 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4917 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4918 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4919 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4920 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4921 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4922 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4923 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4929 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4934 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4935 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4937 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4938 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4939 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4940 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4942 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4945 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4947 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4948 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4949 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4950 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4951 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4952 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4954 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4955 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4958 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4959 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4960 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4961 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4962 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4963 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4965 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4966 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4969 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4970 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4971 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4972 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4973 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4979 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4980 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4981 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4982 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4984 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4987 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4991 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4995 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4996 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5000 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5004 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5005 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5008 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5012 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5014 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5019 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5020 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5021 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5023 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5028 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5030 None => return None,
5033 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5035 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5036 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5038 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5039 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5045 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5047 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5048 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5049 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5050 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5051 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5052 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5053 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5055 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5056 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5057 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5058 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5059 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5060 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5061 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5062 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5063 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5064 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5065 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5066 contents: announcement,
5071 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5075 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5076 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5077 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5078 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5079 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5080 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5081 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5082 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5084 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5086 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5088 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5089 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5091 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5093 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5094 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5097 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5098 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5099 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5100 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5103 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5106 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5107 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5108 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5109 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5110 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5111 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5114 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5116 Err(_) => return None,
5118 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5119 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5124 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5125 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5126 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5127 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5128 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5129 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5130 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5131 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5132 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5133 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5134 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5135 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5136 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5137 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5138 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5139 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5142 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5145 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5146 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5147 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5148 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5149 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5150 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5151 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5152 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5153 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5155 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5156 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5157 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5158 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5159 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5160 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5161 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5162 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5163 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5165 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5166 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5167 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5168 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5169 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5170 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5171 next_funding_txid: None,
5176 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5178 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5179 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5180 /// commitment update.
5182 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5183 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5184 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5185 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5186 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5187 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5188 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5191 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5192 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5193 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5195 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5196 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5201 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5202 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5204 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5206 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5207 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5209 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5210 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5211 /// regenerate them.
5213 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5214 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5216 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5217 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5218 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5219 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5220 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5221 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5222 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5224 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5225 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5227 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5228 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5229 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5232 if amount_msat == 0 {
5233 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5236 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5237 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5238 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5239 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5242 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5243 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5244 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5247 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5248 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5249 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5250 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5251 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5252 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5253 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5254 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5257 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5258 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5259 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5260 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5261 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5262 else { "to peer" });
5264 if need_holding_cell {
5265 force_holding_cell = true;
5268 // Now update local state:
5269 if force_holding_cell {
5270 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5275 onion_routing_packet,
5281 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5282 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5284 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5286 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5291 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5292 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5293 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5297 onion_routing_packet,
5300 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5305 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5306 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5307 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5308 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5310 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5311 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5312 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5314 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5315 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5319 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5320 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5321 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5322 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5323 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5324 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5325 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5328 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5329 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5330 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5331 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5332 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5333 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5336 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5338 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5339 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5340 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5341 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5342 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5344 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5345 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5348 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5349 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5350 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5351 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5352 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5353 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5354 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5355 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5356 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5357 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5358 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5361 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5365 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5366 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5367 where L::Target: Logger
5369 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5370 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5371 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5373 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5375 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5376 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5377 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5378 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5379 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5380 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5381 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5382 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5383 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5384 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5385 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5391 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5394 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5395 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5396 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5397 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5398 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5399 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5401 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5402 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5403 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5405 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5406 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5407 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5410 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5411 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5415 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5416 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5418 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5420 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5421 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5422 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5423 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5425 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5426 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5427 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5428 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5429 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5430 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5434 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5435 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5439 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5440 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5445 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5446 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5448 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5449 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5450 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5451 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5452 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5453 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5454 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5455 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5457 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5458 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5459 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5462 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5463 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5464 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5470 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5471 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5472 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5474 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5475 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5476 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5477 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5483 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5484 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5486 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5487 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5488 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5489 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5490 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5492 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5493 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5494 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5497 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5498 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5499 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5501 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5502 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5505 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5506 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5508 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5509 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5510 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5513 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5514 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5515 let mut chan_closed = false;
5516 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5520 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5522 None if !chan_closed => {
5523 // use override shutdown script if provided
5524 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5525 Some(script) => script,
5527 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5528 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5529 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5530 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5534 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5535 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5537 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5543 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5544 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5545 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5546 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5548 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5550 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5552 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5553 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5554 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5555 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5556 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5557 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5560 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5561 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5563 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5564 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5565 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5568 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5569 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5570 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5571 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5572 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5574 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5575 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5582 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5583 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5585 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5588 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5589 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5590 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5592 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5593 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5597 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5601 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5602 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5603 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5604 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5607 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5608 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5609 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5610 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5611 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5612 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5613 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5614 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5616 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5617 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5618 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5619 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5621 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5622 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5624 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5625 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5627 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5628 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5629 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5631 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5632 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5634 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5635 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5636 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5637 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5638 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5641 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5642 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5644 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5645 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5647 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5649 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5651 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5652 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5653 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5654 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5657 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5658 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5660 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5661 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5662 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5663 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5667 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5668 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5669 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5673 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5674 Ok(script) => script,
5675 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5678 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5681 context: ChannelContext {
5684 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5685 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5686 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5687 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5692 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5694 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5695 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5696 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5697 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5699 channel_value_satoshis,
5701 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5703 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5704 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5707 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5708 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5711 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5712 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5713 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5714 pending_update_fee: None,
5715 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5716 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5717 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5718 update_time_counter: 1,
5720 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5722 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5723 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5724 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5725 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5726 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5727 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5729 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5730 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5731 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5732 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5734 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5735 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5736 closing_fee_limits: None,
5737 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5739 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5740 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5741 short_channel_id: None,
5742 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5744 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5745 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5746 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5747 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5748 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5749 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5750 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5751 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5752 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5753 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5754 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5755 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5757 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5759 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5760 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5761 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5762 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5763 counterparty_parameters: None,
5764 funding_outpoint: None,
5765 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5767 funding_transaction: None,
5769 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5770 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5771 counterparty_node_id,
5773 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5775 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5777 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5778 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5780 announcement_sigs: None,
5782 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5783 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5784 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5785 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5787 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5788 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5790 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5791 outbound_scid_alias,
5793 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5794 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5796 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5797 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5802 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5804 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5808 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5809 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5810 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5811 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5812 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5813 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5814 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5815 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5816 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5821 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5822 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5823 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5824 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5825 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5826 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5827 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5828 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5829 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5830 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5831 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5833 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5834 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5836 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5837 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5838 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5839 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5842 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5843 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5845 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5848 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5849 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5850 return Err((self, e));
5854 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5856 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5858 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5859 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5861 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5862 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5863 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5864 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5865 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5866 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5869 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5871 let channel = Channel {
5872 context: self.context,
5875 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5876 temporary_channel_id,
5877 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5878 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5881 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5883 next_local_nonce: None,
5887 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5888 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5889 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5890 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5891 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5892 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5893 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5894 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5895 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5896 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5899 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5900 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5901 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5902 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5903 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5904 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5910 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5911 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5912 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5913 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5914 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5915 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5917 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5919 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5920 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5921 // We've exhausted our options
5924 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5925 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5928 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5929 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5930 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5931 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5933 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5934 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5935 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5936 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5937 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5938 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5940 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5942 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5943 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5946 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5947 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5948 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5950 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5951 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5954 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5955 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5958 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5959 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5963 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5964 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5965 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5966 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5967 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5968 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5969 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5970 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5971 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5972 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5973 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5974 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5975 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5976 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5977 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5978 first_per_commitment_point,
5979 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5980 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5981 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5982 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5984 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5989 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5990 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5992 // Check sanity of message fields:
5993 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5996 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5999 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6002 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6005 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6008 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6010 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6012 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6013 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6016 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6017 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6020 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6023 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6027 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6028 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6031 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6034 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6037 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6040 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6043 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6046 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6047 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6050 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6051 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6054 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6055 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6057 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6058 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6059 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6061 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6062 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6065 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6066 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6067 &Some(ref script) => {
6068 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6069 if script.len() == 0 {
6072 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6073 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6075 Some(script.clone())
6078 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6085 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6086 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6087 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6088 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6089 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6091 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6092 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6094 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6097 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6098 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6099 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6100 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6101 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6102 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6105 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6106 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6107 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6110 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6111 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6113 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6114 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6120 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6121 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6122 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6123 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6126 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6127 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6128 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6129 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6130 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6131 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6132 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6133 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6134 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6135 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6136 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6139 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6141 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6142 // support this channel type.
6143 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6144 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6148 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6149 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6150 // `static_remote_key`.
6151 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6154 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6155 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6158 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6161 channel_type.clone()
6163 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6164 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6170 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6171 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6172 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6173 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6174 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6175 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6176 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6177 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6178 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6181 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6185 // Check sanity of message fields:
6186 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6189 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6192 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6195 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6196 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6199 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6202 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6205 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6207 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6208 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6211 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6214 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6218 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6219 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6222 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6225 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6228 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6231 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6234 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6237 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6238 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6241 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6243 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6244 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6249 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6250 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6251 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6252 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6255 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6258 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6259 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6260 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6262 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6266 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6267 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6268 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6269 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6270 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6274 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6275 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6276 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6277 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6281 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6282 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6283 &Some(ref script) => {
6284 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6285 if script.len() == 0 {
6288 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6291 Some(script.clone())
6294 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6301 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6302 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6303 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6304 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6308 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6309 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6314 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6315 Ok(script) => script,
6316 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6319 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6320 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6322 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6325 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6329 context: ChannelContext {
6332 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6333 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6335 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6340 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6342 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6343 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6344 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6345 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6348 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6350 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6351 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6354 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6355 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6356 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6358 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6359 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6360 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6361 pending_update_fee: None,
6362 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6363 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6364 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6365 update_time_counter: 1,
6367 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6369 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6370 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6371 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6372 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6373 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6374 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6376 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6377 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6378 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6379 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6381 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6382 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6383 closing_fee_limits: None,
6384 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6386 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6387 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6388 short_channel_id: None,
6389 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6391 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6392 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6393 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6394 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6395 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6396 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6397 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6398 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6399 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6400 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6401 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6402 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6405 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6407 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6408 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6409 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6410 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6411 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6412 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6413 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6415 funding_outpoint: None,
6416 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6418 funding_transaction: None,
6420 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6421 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6422 counterparty_node_id,
6424 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6426 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6428 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6429 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6431 announcement_sigs: None,
6433 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6434 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6435 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6436 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6438 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6439 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6441 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6442 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6444 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6445 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6447 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6448 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6453 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6455 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6461 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6462 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6464 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6465 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6466 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6467 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6469 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6470 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6472 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6473 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6476 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6479 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6480 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6481 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6483 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6484 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6485 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6486 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6488 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6489 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6490 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6491 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6492 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6493 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6494 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6495 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6496 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6497 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6498 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6499 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6500 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6501 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6502 first_per_commitment_point,
6503 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6504 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6505 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6507 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6509 next_local_nonce: None,
6513 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6514 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6516 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6518 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6519 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6522 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6523 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6525 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6526 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6528 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6529 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6530 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6531 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6532 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6533 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6534 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6535 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6536 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6539 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6540 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6542 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6543 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6544 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6545 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6547 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6548 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6549 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6550 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6551 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6553 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6554 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6559 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6560 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6561 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6565 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6566 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6568 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6569 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6570 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6572 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6574 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6575 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6576 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6577 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6580 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6581 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6582 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6583 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6584 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6586 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6588 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6589 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6590 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6593 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6594 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6595 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6599 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6600 initial_commitment_tx,
6603 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6604 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6607 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6608 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6611 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6613 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6614 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6615 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6616 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6617 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6618 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6619 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6620 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6621 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6622 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6623 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6625 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6627 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6628 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6629 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6630 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6631 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6632 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6634 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6635 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6636 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6637 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6639 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6641 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6642 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6643 let mut channel = Channel {
6644 context: self.context,
6646 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6647 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6648 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6650 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6654 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6655 }, channel_monitor))
6659 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6660 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6662 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6668 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6669 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6670 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6671 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6672 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6674 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6675 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6676 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6677 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6683 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6684 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6685 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6686 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6687 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6688 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6693 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6694 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6695 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6696 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6698 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6699 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6700 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6701 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6706 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6707 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6708 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6709 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6710 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6711 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6716 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6717 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6718 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6721 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6723 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6724 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6725 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6726 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6727 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6729 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6730 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6731 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6732 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6734 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6735 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6736 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6738 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6740 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6741 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6742 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6743 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6744 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6745 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6746 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6748 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6749 // deserialized from that format.
6750 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6751 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6752 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6754 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6756 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6757 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6758 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6760 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6761 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6762 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6763 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6766 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6767 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6768 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6771 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6772 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6773 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6774 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6776 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6777 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6779 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6781 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6783 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6785 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6788 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6790 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6795 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6796 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6798 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6799 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6800 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6801 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6802 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6803 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6804 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6806 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6808 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6810 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6813 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6814 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6815 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6818 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6820 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6821 preimages.push(preimage);
6823 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6824 reason.write(writer)?;
6826 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6828 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6829 preimages.push(preimage);
6831 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6832 reason.write(writer)?;
6835 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6836 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6837 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6839 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6840 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6841 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6845 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6846 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6847 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6849 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6850 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6854 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6855 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6856 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6857 source.write(writer)?;
6858 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6860 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6861 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6862 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6864 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6865 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6867 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6869 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6870 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6872 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6874 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6875 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6880 match self.context.resend_order {
6881 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6882 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6885 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6886 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6887 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6889 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6890 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6891 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6892 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6895 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6896 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6897 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6898 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6899 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6902 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6903 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6904 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6905 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6907 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6908 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6909 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6911 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6913 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6914 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6915 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6916 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6918 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6919 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6920 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6921 // consider the stale state on reload.
6924 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6925 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6926 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6928 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6929 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6930 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6932 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6933 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6935 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6936 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6937 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6939 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6940 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6942 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6945 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6946 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6947 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6949 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6952 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6953 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6955 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6956 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6957 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6959 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6961 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6963 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6965 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6966 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6968 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6969 htlc.write(writer)?;
6972 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6973 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6974 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6976 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6977 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6979 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6980 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6981 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6982 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6983 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6984 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6985 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6987 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6988 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6989 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6990 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6991 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6993 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6994 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6996 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6997 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6998 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6999 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7001 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7003 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7004 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7005 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7006 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7007 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7008 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7009 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7011 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7012 (2, chan_type, option),
7013 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7014 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7015 (5, self.context.config, required),
7016 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7017 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7018 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7019 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7020 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7021 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7022 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7023 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7024 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7025 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7026 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7027 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7028 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7029 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7030 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7031 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7032 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7033 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7040 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7041 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7043 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7044 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7046 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7047 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7048 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7050 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7051 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7052 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7053 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7057 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7058 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7061 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7063 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7064 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7069 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7073 let mut keys_data = None;
7075 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7076 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7077 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7078 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7079 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7080 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7081 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7082 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7083 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7084 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7088 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7089 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7090 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7093 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7096 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7099 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7102 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7103 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7104 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7105 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7106 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7107 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7108 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7109 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7110 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7111 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7112 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7113 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7118 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7119 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7120 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7121 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7122 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7123 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7124 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7125 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7126 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7127 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7128 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7129 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7131 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7132 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7135 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7139 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7142 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7144 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7148 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7149 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7150 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7151 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7152 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7153 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7154 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7155 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7156 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7157 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7158 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7160 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7161 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7162 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7164 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7165 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7166 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7168 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7172 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7173 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7174 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7175 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7178 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7182 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7184 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7185 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7188 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7189 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7190 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7191 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7194 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7196 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7199 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7201 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7203 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7204 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7205 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7206 // consider the stale state on reload.
7207 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7210 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7211 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7212 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7214 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7217 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7218 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7219 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7222 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7223 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7224 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7226 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7227 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7229 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7230 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7232 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7233 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7234 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7236 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7238 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7239 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7241 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7242 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7245 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7247 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7248 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7249 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7250 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7252 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7255 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7256 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7258 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7260 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7261 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7263 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7264 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7266 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7269 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7270 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7272 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7273 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7274 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7278 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7279 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7280 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7282 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7288 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7289 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7290 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7291 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7292 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7293 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7294 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7295 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7296 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7297 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7299 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7300 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7301 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7302 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7303 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7304 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7305 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7307 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7308 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7309 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7310 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7312 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7314 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7315 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7317 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7318 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7319 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7320 (2, channel_type, option),
7321 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7322 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7323 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7324 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7325 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7326 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7327 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7328 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7329 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7330 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7331 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7332 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7333 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7334 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7335 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7336 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7337 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7338 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7339 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7340 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7341 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7344 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7345 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7346 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7347 // required channel parameters.
7348 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7349 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7350 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7352 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7354 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7355 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7356 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7357 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7360 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7361 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7362 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7364 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7365 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7367 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7368 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7373 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7374 if iter.next().is_some() {
7375 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7379 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7380 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7381 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7382 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7383 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7386 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7387 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7388 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7390 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7391 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7393 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7394 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7395 // separate u64 values.
7396 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7398 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7400 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7401 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7402 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7403 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7405 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7406 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7408 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7409 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7410 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7411 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7412 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7415 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7416 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7420 context: ChannelContext {
7423 config: config.unwrap(),
7427 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7428 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7429 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7432 temporary_channel_id,
7434 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7436 channel_value_satoshis,
7438 latest_monitor_update_id,
7440 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7441 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7444 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7445 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7448 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7449 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7450 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7451 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7455 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7456 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7457 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7458 monitor_pending_forwards,
7459 monitor_pending_failures,
7460 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7463 holding_cell_update_fee,
7464 next_holder_htlc_id,
7465 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7466 update_time_counter,
7469 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7470 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7471 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7472 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7474 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7475 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7476 closing_fee_limits: None,
7477 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7479 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7480 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7482 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7484 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7485 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7486 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7487 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7488 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7489 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7490 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7491 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7492 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7495 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7497 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7498 funding_transaction,
7500 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7501 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7502 counterparty_node_id,
7504 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7508 channel_update_status,
7509 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7513 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7514 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7515 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7516 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7518 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7519 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7521 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7522 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7523 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7525 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7526 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7528 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7529 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7531 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7534 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7543 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7544 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7545 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7546 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7547 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7549 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7550 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7551 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7552 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7553 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7554 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7555 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7556 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7557 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7558 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7559 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7560 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7561 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7562 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7563 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7564 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7565 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7566 use crate::util::test_utils;
7567 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7568 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7569 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7570 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7571 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7572 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7573 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7574 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7575 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7576 use crate::prelude::*;
7578 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7581 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7582 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7588 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7589 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7590 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7591 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7595 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7596 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7597 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7598 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7599 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7600 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7601 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7602 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7606 signer: InMemorySigner,
7609 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7610 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7613 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7614 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7616 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7617 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7620 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7624 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7626 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7627 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7628 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7629 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7630 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7633 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7635 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7636 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7640 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7641 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7642 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7646 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7647 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7648 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7649 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7651 let seed = [42; 32];
7652 let network = Network::Testnet;
7653 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7654 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7655 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7658 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7659 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7660 let config = UserConfig::default();
7661 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7662 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7663 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7665 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7666 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7670 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7671 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7673 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7674 let original_fee = 253;
7675 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7676 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7677 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7678 let seed = [42; 32];
7679 let network = Network::Testnet;
7680 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7682 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7683 let config = UserConfig::default();
7684 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7686 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7687 // same as the old fee.
7688 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7689 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7690 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7694 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7695 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7696 // dust limits are used.
7697 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7698 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7699 let seed = [42; 32];
7700 let network = Network::Testnet;
7701 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7702 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7703 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7705 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7706 // they have different dust limits.
7708 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7709 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7710 let config = UserConfig::default();
7711 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7713 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7714 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7715 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7716 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7717 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7719 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7720 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7721 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7722 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7723 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7725 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7726 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7727 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7728 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7730 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7731 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7732 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7734 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7735 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7737 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7738 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7739 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7741 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7742 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7743 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7744 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7747 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7749 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7750 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7751 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7752 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7753 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7754 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7755 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7756 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7757 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7759 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7762 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7763 // the dust limit check.
7764 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7765 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7766 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7767 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7769 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7770 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7771 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7772 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7773 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7774 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7775 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7779 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7780 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7781 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7782 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7783 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7784 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7785 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7786 let seed = [42; 32];
7787 let network = Network::Testnet;
7788 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7790 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7791 let config = UserConfig::default();
7792 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7794 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7795 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7797 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7798 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7799 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7800 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7801 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7802 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7804 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7805 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7806 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7807 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7808 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7810 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7812 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7813 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7814 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7815 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7816 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7818 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7819 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7820 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7821 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7822 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7826 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7827 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7828 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7829 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7830 let seed = [42; 32];
7831 let network = Network::Testnet;
7832 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7833 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7834 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7836 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7838 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7839 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7840 let config = UserConfig::default();
7841 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7843 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7844 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7845 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7846 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7848 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7849 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7850 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7852 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7853 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7854 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7855 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7857 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7858 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7859 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7861 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7862 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7864 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7865 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7866 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7867 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7868 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7869 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7870 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7872 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7874 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7875 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7876 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7877 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7878 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7882 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7883 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7884 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7885 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7886 let seed = [42; 32];
7887 let network = Network::Testnet;
7888 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7889 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7890 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7892 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7893 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7894 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7895 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7896 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7897 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7898 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7899 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7901 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7902 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7903 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7904 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7905 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7906 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7908 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7909 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7910 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7911 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7913 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7915 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7916 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7917 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7918 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7919 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7920 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7922 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7923 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7924 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7925 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7927 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7928 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7929 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7930 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7931 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7933 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7934 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7936 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7937 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7938 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7940 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7941 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7942 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7943 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7944 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7946 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7947 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7949 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7950 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7951 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7955 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7957 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7958 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7959 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7961 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7962 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7963 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7964 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7966 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7967 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7968 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7970 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7972 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7973 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7976 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7977 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7978 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7980 let seed = [42; 32];
7981 let network = Network::Testnet;
7982 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7983 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7984 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7987 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7988 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7989 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7991 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7992 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7994 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7995 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7996 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7998 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7999 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8001 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8003 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8004 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8006 // Channel Negotiations failed
8007 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8008 assert!(result.is_err());
8013 fn channel_update() {
8014 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8015 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8016 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8017 let seed = [42; 32];
8018 let network = Network::Testnet;
8019 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8020 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8021 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8023 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8024 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8025 let config = UserConfig::default();
8026 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8028 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8029 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8030 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8031 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8032 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8034 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8035 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8036 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8037 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8038 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8040 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8041 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8042 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8043 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8045 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8046 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8047 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8049 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8050 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8052 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8053 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8054 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8056 short_channel_id: 0,
8059 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8060 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8061 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8063 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8064 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8066 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8068 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8070 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8071 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8072 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8073 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8075 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8076 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8077 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8079 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8083 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8085 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8086 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8087 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8088 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8089 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8090 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8091 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8092 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8093 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8094 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8095 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8096 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8097 use crate::sync::Arc;
8099 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8100 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8101 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8102 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8104 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8106 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8107 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8108 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8109 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8110 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8112 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8113 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8119 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8120 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8121 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8123 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8124 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8125 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8126 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8127 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8128 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8130 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8132 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8133 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8134 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8135 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8136 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8137 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8139 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8140 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8141 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8142 selected_contest_delay: 144
8144 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8145 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8147 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8148 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8150 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8151 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8153 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8154 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8156 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8157 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8158 // build_commitment_transaction.
8159 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8160 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8161 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8162 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8163 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8165 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8166 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8167 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8168 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8172 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8173 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8174 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8175 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8179 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8180 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8181 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8183 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8184 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8186 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8187 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8189 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8191 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8192 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8193 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8194 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8195 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8196 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8197 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8199 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8200 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8201 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8202 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8204 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8205 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8206 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8208 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8210 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8211 commitment_tx.clone(),
8212 counterparty_signature,
8213 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8214 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8215 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8217 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8218 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8220 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8221 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8222 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8224 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8225 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8228 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8229 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8231 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8232 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8233 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8234 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8235 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8236 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8237 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8238 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8240 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8243 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8244 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8245 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8249 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8252 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8253 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8254 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8256 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8257 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8258 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8259 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8260 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8261 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8262 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8263 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8265 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8269 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8270 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8271 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8272 "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", {});
8274 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8275 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8277 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8278 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8279 "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", {});
8281 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8282 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8283 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8284 "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", {});
8286 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8287 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8289 amount_msat: 1000000,
8291 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8292 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8294 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8297 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8298 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8300 amount_msat: 2000000,
8302 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8303 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8305 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8308 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8309 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8311 amount_msat: 2000000,
8313 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8314 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8315 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8316 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8318 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8321 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8322 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8324 amount_msat: 3000000,
8326 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8327 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8328 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8329 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8331 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8334 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8335 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8337 amount_msat: 4000000,
8339 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8340 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8342 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8346 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8347 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8348 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8350 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8351 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8352 "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", {
8355 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8356 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8357 "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" },
8360 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8361 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8362 "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" },
8365 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8366 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8367 "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" },
8370 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8371 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8372 "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" },
8375 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8376 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8377 "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" }
8380 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8381 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8382 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8384 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8385 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8386 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8389 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8390 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8391 "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" },
8394 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8395 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8396 "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" },
8399 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8400 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8401 "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" },
8404 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8405 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8406 "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" },
8409 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8410 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8411 "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" }
8414 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8415 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8416 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8418 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8419 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8420 "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", {
8423 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8424 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8425 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8428 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8429 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8430 "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" },
8433 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8434 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8435 "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" },
8438 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8439 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8440 "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" }
8443 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8444 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8445 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8446 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8448 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8449 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8450 "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", {
8453 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8454 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8455 "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" },
8458 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8459 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8460 "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" },
8463 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8464 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8465 "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" },
8468 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8469 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8470 "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" }
8473 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8474 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8475 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8476 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8478 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8479 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8480 "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", {
8483 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8484 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8485 "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" },
8488 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8489 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8490 "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" },
8493 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8494 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8495 "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" },
8498 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8499 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8500 "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" }
8503 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8507 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8508 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8509 "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", {
8512 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8513 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8514 "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" },
8517 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8518 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8519 "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" },
8522 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8523 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8524 "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" }
8527 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8529 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8531 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8532 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8533 "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", {
8536 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8537 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8538 "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" },
8541 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8542 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8543 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8546 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8547 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8548 "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" }
8551 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8552 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8553 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8555 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8556 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8557 "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", {
8560 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8561 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8562 "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" },
8565 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8566 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8567 "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" }
8570 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8571 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8572 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8573 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8574 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8575 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8577 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8578 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8579 "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", {
8582 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8583 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8584 "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" },
8587 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8588 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8589 "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" }
8592 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8593 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8594 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8595 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8596 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8598 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8599 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8600 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8603 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8604 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8605 "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" },
8608 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8609 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8610 "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" }
8613 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8614 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8615 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8617 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8618 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8619 "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", {
8622 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8623 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8624 "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" }
8627 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8628 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8629 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8630 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8631 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8633 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8634 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8635 "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", {
8638 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8639 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8640 "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" }
8643 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8644 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8645 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8646 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8647 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8649 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8650 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8651 "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", {
8654 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8655 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8656 "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" }
8659 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8660 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8661 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8662 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8664 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8665 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8666 "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", {});
8668 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8669 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8670 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8671 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8672 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8674 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8675 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8676 "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", {});
8678 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8679 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8680 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8681 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8682 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8684 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8685 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8686 "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", {});
8688 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8689 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8690 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8692 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8693 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8694 "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", {});
8696 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8697 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8698 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8699 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8700 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8702 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8703 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8704 "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", {});
8706 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8707 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8708 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8709 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8710 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8712 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8713 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8714 "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", {});
8716 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8717 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8718 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8719 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8720 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8721 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8723 amount_msat: 2000000,
8725 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8726 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8728 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8731 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8732 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8733 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8735 amount_msat: 5000001,
8737 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8738 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8739 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8740 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8742 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8745 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8746 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8748 amount_msat: 5000000,
8750 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8751 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8752 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8753 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8755 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8759 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8760 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8761 "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", {
8764 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8765 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
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8774 "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" }
8777 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8778 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8780 "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", {
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8784 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8785 "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" },
8787 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8788 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8789 "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" },
8791 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8792 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8793 "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" }
8798 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8799 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8801 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8802 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8803 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8804 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8806 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8807 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8808 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8810 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8811 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8813 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8814 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8816 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8817 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8818 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8822 fn test_key_derivation() {
8823 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8824 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8826 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8827 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8829 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8830 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8832 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8833 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8835 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8836 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8838 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8839 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8841 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8842 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8844 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8845 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8849 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8850 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8851 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8852 let seed = [42; 32];
8853 let network = Network::Testnet;
8854 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8855 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8857 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8858 let config = UserConfig::default();
8859 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8860 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8862 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8863 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8865 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8866 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8867 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8868 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8869 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8870 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8871 assert!(res.is_ok());
8875 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8876 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8877 // resulting `channel_type`.
8878 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8879 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8880 let network = Network::Testnet;
8881 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8882 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8884 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8885 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8887 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8888 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8890 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8891 // need to signal it.
8892 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8893 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8894 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8897 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8899 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8900 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8901 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8903 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8904 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8905 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8908 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8909 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8910 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8911 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8912 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8915 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8916 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8920 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8921 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8922 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8923 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8924 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8925 let network = Network::Testnet;
8926 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8927 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8929 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8930 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8932 let config = UserConfig::default();
8934 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8935 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8936 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8937 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8938 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8940 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8941 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8942 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8945 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8946 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8947 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8949 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8950 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8951 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8952 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8953 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8954 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8956 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8960 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8961 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8963 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8964 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8965 let network = Network::Testnet;
8966 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8967 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8969 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8970 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8972 let config = UserConfig::default();
8974 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8975 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8976 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8977 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8978 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8979 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8980 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8981 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8983 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8984 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8985 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8986 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8987 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8988 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8991 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8992 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8994 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8995 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8996 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8997 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8999 assert!(res.is_err());
9001 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9002 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9003 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9005 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9006 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9007 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9010 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
9012 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9013 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9014 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9015 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9018 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9019 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9021 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9022 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9024 assert!(res.is_err());