_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  16
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  26 use ln::msgs;
  27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  30 use ln::chan_utils;
  31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  35 use util::transaction_utils;
  36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  37 use util::logger::Logger;
  38 use util::errors::APIError;
  39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  40 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
  41
  42 use std;
  43 use std::default::Default;
  44 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  45 use std::ops::Deref;
  46 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  47 use std::sync::Mutex;
  48 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  49 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
  50
  51 #[cfg(test)]
  52 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  53         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  54         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  55         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  56         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  58         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  59         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  60         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  61 }
  62
  63 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  64         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  65         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  66         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  67 }
  68
  69 enum InboundHTLCState {
  70         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  71         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  72         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  73         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  74         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  75         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  76         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  77         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  78         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  79         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  80         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  81         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  82         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  83         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  84         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  85         ///
  86         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  87         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  88         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  89         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  90         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  91         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  92         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  93         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  94         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  95         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  96         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  97         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  98         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  99         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 100         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
 101         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 102         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 103         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 104         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 105         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 106         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 107         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 108         Committed,
 109         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 110         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 111         /// we'll drop it.
 112         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 113         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 114         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 115         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 116         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 117         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 118         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 119         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 120 }
 121
 122 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 123         htlc_id: u64,
 124         amount_msat: u64,
 125         cltv_expiry: u32,
 126         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 127         state: InboundHTLCState,
 128 }
 129
 130 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 131         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 132         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 133         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 134         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 135         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 136         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 137         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 138         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 139         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 140         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 141         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 142         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 143         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 144         Committed,
 145         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 146         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 147         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 148         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 149         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 150         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 151         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 152         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 153         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 154         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 155         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 156         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 157         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 158         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 159         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 160 }
 161
 162 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 163         htlc_id: u64,
 164         amount_msat: u64,
 165         cltv_expiry: u32,
 166         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 167         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 168         source: HTLCSource,
 169 }
 170
 171 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 172 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 173         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 174                 // always outbound
 175                 amount_msat: u64,
 176                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 177                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 178                 source: HTLCSource,
 179                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 180         },
 181         ClaimHTLC {
 182                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 183                 htlc_id: u64,
 184         },
 185         FailHTLC {
 186                 htlc_id: u64,
 187                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 188         },
 189 }
 190
 191 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 192 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 193 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 194 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 195 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 196 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 197 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 198 enum ChannelState {
 199         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 200         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 201         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 202         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 203         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 204         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 205         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 206         FundingCreated = 4,
 207         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 208         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 209         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 210         FundingSent = 8,
 211         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 212         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 213         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 214         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 215         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 216         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 217         ChannelFunded = 64,
 218         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 219         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 220         /// dance.
 221         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 222         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 223         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 224         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 225         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 226         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 227         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 228         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 229         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 230         /// later.
 231         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 232         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 233         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 234         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 235         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 236         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 237         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 238         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 239         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 240         /// us their shutdown.
 241         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 242         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 243         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 244         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 245 }
 246 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 247 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 248
 249 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 250
 251 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 252 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 253 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 254 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 255 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 256 enum UpdateStatus {
 257         /// Status has been gossiped.
 258         Fresh,
 259         /// Status has been changed.
 260         DisabledMarked,
 261         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 262         DisabledStaged,
 263 }
 264
 265 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 266 enum HTLCInitiator {
 267         LocalOffered,
 268         RemoteOffered,
 269 }
 270
 271 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 272 struct HTLCCandidate {
 273         amount_msat: u64,
 274         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 275 }
 276
 277 impl HTLCCandidate {
 278         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 279                 Self {
 280                         amount_msat,
 281                         origin,
 282                 }
 283         }
 284 }
 285
 286 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 287 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 288 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 289 // inbound channel.
 290 //
 291 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 292 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 293 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 294         config: ChannelConfig,
 295
 296         user_id: u64,
 297
 298         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 299         channel_state: u32,
 300         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 301         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 302
 303         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 304
 305         holder_signer: Signer,
 306         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 307         destination_script: Script,
 308
 309         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 310         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 311         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 312
 313         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 314         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 315         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 316         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 317         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 318         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 319
 320         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 321         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 322         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 323         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 324         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 325         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 326         /// send it first.
 327         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 328
 329         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 330         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 331         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 332         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 333         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 334
 335         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 336         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 337         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 338         //
 339         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 340         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 341         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 342         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 343         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 344         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 345         // commitment_signed.
 346         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 347         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 348         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 349         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 350         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 351         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 352         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 353         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 354         update_time_counter: u32,
 355         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 356
 357         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 358         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 359         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 360         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 361         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 362         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 363
 364         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 365
 366         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
 367         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
 368         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 369         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
 370         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 371         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 372         /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
 373         /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
 374         pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
 375         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 376
 377         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 378         #[cfg(test)]
 379         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 380         #[cfg(not(test))]
 381         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 382         #[cfg(test)]
 383         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 384         #[cfg(not(test))]
 385         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 386         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 387         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 388         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 389         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 390         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 391         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 392         #[cfg(test)]
 393         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 394         #[cfg(not(test))]
 395         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 396         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 397         minimum_depth: u32,
 398
 399         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 400
 401         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 402
 403         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 404         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 405
 406         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 407
 408         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 409
 410         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 411
 412         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 413         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 414         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 415         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 416         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 417         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 418         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 419         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 420 }
 421
 422 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 423 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 424         fee: u64,
 425         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 426         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 427         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 428         feerate: u32,
 429 }
 430
 431 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 432 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 433 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 434 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
 435 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 436 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 437 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 438
 439 #[cfg(not(test))]
 440 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 441 #[cfg(test)]
 442 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 443 #[cfg(not(test))]
 444 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 445 #[cfg(test)]
 446 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 447
 448 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 449 /// it's 2^24.
 450 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 451
 452 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 453 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 454 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 455 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 456         Ignore(String),
 457         Close(String),
 458         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 459 }
 460
 461 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 462         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 463                 match self {
 464                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 465                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 466                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 467                 }
 468         }
 469 }
 470
 471 macro_rules! secp_check {
 472         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 473                 match $res {
 474                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 475                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 476                 }
 477         };
 478 }
 479
 480 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 481         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 482         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 483                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 484         }
 485
 486         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 487         /// required by us.
 488         ///
 489         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 490         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 491                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 492                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 493         }
 494
 495         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 496                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 497         }
 498
 499         // Constructors:
 500         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 501         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 502               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 503         {
 504                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 505                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 506                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 507
 508                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 509                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 510                 }
 511                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 512                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 513                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 514                 }
 515                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 516                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 517                 }
 518                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 519                 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 520                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 521                 }
 522
 523                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 524
 525                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 526                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 527
 528                 Ok(Channel {
 529                         user_id,
 530                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 531
 532                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 533                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 534                         secp_ctx,
 535                         channel_value_satoshis,
 536
 537                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 538
 539                         holder_signer,
 540                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 541                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 542
 543                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 544                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 545                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 546
 547                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 548                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 549                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 550                         pending_update_fee: None,
 551                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 552                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 553                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 554                         update_time_counter: 1,
 555
 556                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 557
 558                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 559                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 560                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 561                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 562                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 563
 564                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 565                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 566                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 567                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 568
 569                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 570
 571                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 572                         short_channel_id: None,
 573                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 574                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 575
 576                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 577                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 578                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 579                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 580                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 581                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 582                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 583                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 584                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 585
 586                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 587                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 588                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 589                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 590                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 591                                 funding_outpoint: None
 592                         },
 593                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 594
 595                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 596                         counterparty_node_id,
 597
 598                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 599
 600                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 601
 602                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 603
 604                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 605                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 606                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 607                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 608                 })
 609         }
 610
 611         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 612                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 613         {
 614                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 615                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 616                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 617                 }
 618                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 619                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 620                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 621                 }
 622                 Ok(())
 623         }
 624
 625         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 626         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 627         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 628                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 629           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 630         {
 631                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 632                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 633                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 634                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 635                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 636                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 637                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 638                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 639                 };
 640                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 641
 642                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 643                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 644                 }
 645
 646                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 647                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 648                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 649                 }
 650                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 651                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 652                 }
 653                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 654                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 655                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 656                 }
 657                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 658                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 659                 }
 660                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 661                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 662                 }
 663                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 664                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 665                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 666                 }
 667                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 668
 669                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 670                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 671                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 672                 }
 673                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 674                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 675                 }
 676                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 677                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 678                 }
 679
 680                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 681                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 682                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 683                 }
 684                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 685                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 686                 }
 687                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 688                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 689                 }
 690                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 691                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 692                 }
 693                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 694                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 695                 }
 696                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 697                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 698                 }
 699                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 700                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 701                 }
 702
 703                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 704
 705                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 706                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 707                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 708                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 709                         }
 710                 }
 711                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 712                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 713
 714                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 715
 716                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 717                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 718                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 719                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 720                 }
 721                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 722                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 723                 }
 724                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 725                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 726                 }
 727
 728                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 729                 // for full fee payment
 730                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 731                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 732                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 733                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 734                 }
 735
 736                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 737                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 738                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 739                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 740                 }
 741
 742                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 743                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 744                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 745                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 746                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 747                                                 None
 748                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 749                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
 750                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 751                                         } else {
 752                                                 Some(script.clone())
 753                                         }
 754                                 },
 755                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 756                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 757                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 758                                 }
 759                         }
 760                 } else { None };
 761
 762                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 763                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 764
 765                 let chan = Channel {
 766                         user_id,
 767                         config: local_config,
 768
 769                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 770                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 771                         secp_ctx,
 772
 773                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 774
 775                         holder_signer,
 776                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 777                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 778
 779                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 780                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 781                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 782
 783                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 784                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 785                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 786                         pending_update_fee: None,
 787                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 788                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 789                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 790                         update_time_counter: 1,
 791
 792                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 793
 794                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 795                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 796                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 797                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 798                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 799
 800                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 801                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 802                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 803                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 804
 805                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 806
 807                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 808                         short_channel_id: None,
 809                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 810                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 811
 812                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 813                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 814                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 815                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 816                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 817                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 818                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 819                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 820                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 821                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 822
 823                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 824                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 825                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 826                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 827                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 828                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 829                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 830                                 }),
 831                                 funding_outpoint: None
 832                         },
 833                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 834
 835                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 836                         counterparty_node_id,
 837
 838                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 839
 840                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 841
 842                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 843
 844                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 845                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 846                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 847                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 848                 };
 849
 850                 Ok(chan)
 851         }
 852
 853         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 854         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 855         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 856         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 857         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 858         /// an HTLC to a).
 859         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 860         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 861         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 862         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 863         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 864         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 865         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 866         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 867         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 868         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 869         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 870         #[inline]
 871         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 872                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 873                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 874                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 875
 876                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 877                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 878                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 879                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 880
 881                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 882
 883                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 884                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 885                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 886                                         offered: $offered,
 887                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 888                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 889                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 890                                         transaction_output_index: None
 891                                 }
 892                         }
 893                 }
 894
 895                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 896                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 897                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 898                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 899                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 900                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 901                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 902                                         } else {
 903                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 904                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 905                                         }
 906                                 } else {
 907                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 908                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 909                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 910                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 911                                         } else {
 912                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 913                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 914                                         }
 915                                 }
 916                         }
 917                 }
 918
 919                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 920                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 921                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 922                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 923                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 924                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 925                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 926                         };
 927
 928                         if include {
 929                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 930                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 931                         } else {
 932                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 933                                 match &htlc.state {
 934                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 935                                                 if generated_by_local {
 936                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 937                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 938                                                         }
 939                                                 }
 940                                         },
 941                                         _ => {},
 942                                 }
 943                         }
 944                 }
 945
 946                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 947                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 948                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 949                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 950                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 951                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 952                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 953                         };
 954
 955                         if include {
 956                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 957                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 958                         } else {
 959                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 960                                 match htlc.state {
 961                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 962                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 963                                         },
 964                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 965                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 966                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 967                                                 }
 968                                         },
 969                                         _ => {},
 970                                 }
 971                         }
 972                 }
 973
 974                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 975                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 976                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 977                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 978                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 979                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 980                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 981                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 982
 983                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 984                 {
 985                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 986                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 987                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 988                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 989                         } else {
 990                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 991                         };
 992                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
 993                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
 994                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
 995                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
 996                 }
 997
 998                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 999                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1000                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1001                 } else {
1002                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1003                 };
1004
1005                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1006                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1007
1008                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1009                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1010                 } else {
1011                         value_to_a = 0;
1012                 }
1013
1014                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1015                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1016                 } else {
1017                         value_to_b = 0;
1018                 }
1019
1020                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1021
1022                 let channel_parameters =
1023                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1024                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1025                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1026                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1027                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1028                                                                              keys.clone(),
1029                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1030                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1031                                                                              &channel_parameters
1032                 );
1033                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1034                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1035                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1036                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1037
1038                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1039         }
1040
1041         #[inline]
1042         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1043                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1044                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1045         }
1046
1047         #[inline]
1048         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1049                 let mut ret =
1050                 (4 +                                           // version
1051                  1 +                                           // input count
1052                  36 +                                          // prevout
1053                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1054                  4 +                                           // sequence
1055                  1 +                                           // output count
1056                  4                                             // lock time
1057                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1058                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1059                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1060                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1061                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1062                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1063                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1064                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1065                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1066                 }
1067                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1068                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1069                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1070                 }
1071                 ret
1072         }
1073
1074         #[inline]
1075         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1076                 let txins = {
1077                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1078                         ins.push(TxIn {
1079                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1080                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1081                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1082                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1083                         });
1084                         ins
1085                 };
1086
1087                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1088                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1089                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1090
1091                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1092                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1093                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1094
1095                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1096                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1097                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1098                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1099                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1100                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1101                 }
1102
1103                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1104                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1105                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1106                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1107                         }, ()));
1108                 }
1109
1110                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1111                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1112                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1113                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1114                         }, ()));
1115                 }
1116
1117                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1118
1119                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1120                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1121                         outputs.push(out.0);
1122                 }
1123
1124                 (Transaction {
1125                         version: 2,
1126                         lock_time: 0,
1127                         input: txins,
1128                         output: outputs,
1129                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1130         }
1131
1132         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1133                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1134         }
1135
1136         #[inline]
1137         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1138         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1139         /// our counterparty!)
1140         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1141         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1142         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1143                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1144                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1145                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1146                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1147
1148                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1149         }
1150
1151         #[inline]
1152         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1153         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1154         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1155         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1156                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1157                 //may see payments to it!
1158                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1159                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1160                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1161
1162                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1163         }
1164
1165         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1166         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1167         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1168         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1169                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1170         }
1171
1172         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1173         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1174         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1175         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1176                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1177         }
1178
1179         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1180         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1181         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1182         ///
1183         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1184         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1185         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1186                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1187                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1188                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1189                 // either.
1190                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1191                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1192                 }
1193                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1194
1195                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1196
1197                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1198                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1199                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1200
1201                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1202                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1203                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1204                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1205                                 match htlc.state {
1206                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1207                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1208                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1209                                                 } else {
1210                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1211                                                 }
1212                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1213                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1214                                         },
1215                                         _ => {
1216                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1217                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1218                                         }
1219                                 }
1220                                 pending_idx = idx;
1221                                 break;
1222                         }
1223                 }
1224                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1225                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1226                 }
1227
1228                 // Now update local state:
1229                 //
1230                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1231                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1232                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1233                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1234                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1235                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1236                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1237                         }],
1238                 };
1239
1240                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1241                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1242                                 match pending_update {
1243                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1244                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1245                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1246                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1247                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1248                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1249                                                 }
1250                                         },
1251                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1252                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1253                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1254                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1255                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1256                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1257                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1258                                                 }
1259                                         },
1260                                         _ => {}
1261                                 }
1262                         }
1263                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1264                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1265                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1266                         });
1267                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1268                 }
1269
1270                 {
1271                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1272                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1273                         } else {
1274                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1275                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1276                         }
1277                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1278                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1279                 }
1280
1281                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1282                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1283                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1284                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1285                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1286         }
1287
1288         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1289                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1290                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1291                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1292                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1293                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1294                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1295                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1296                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1297                         },
1298                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1299                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1300                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1301                         },
1302                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1303                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1304                 }
1305         }
1306
1307         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1308         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1309         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1310         ///
1311         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1312         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1313         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1314                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1315                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1316                 }
1317                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1318
1319                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1320                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1321                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1322
1323                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1324                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1325                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1326                                 match htlc.state {
1327                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1328                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1329                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1330                                                 return Ok(None);
1331                                         },
1332                                         _ => {
1333                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1334                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1335                                         }
1336                                 }
1337                                 pending_idx = idx;
1338                         }
1339                 }
1340                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1341                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1342                 }
1343
1344                 // Now update local state:
1345                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1346                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1347                                 match pending_update {
1348                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1349                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1350                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1351                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1352                                                 }
1353                                         },
1354                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1355                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1356                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1357                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1358                                                 }
1359                                         },
1360                                         _ => {}
1361                                 }
1362                         }
1363                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1364                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1365                                 err_packet,
1366                         });
1367                         return Ok(None);
1368                 }
1369
1370                 {
1371                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1372                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1373                 }
1374
1375                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1376                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1377                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1378                         reason: err_packet
1379                 }))
1380         }
1381
1382         // Message handlers:
1383
1384         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1385                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1386                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1387                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1388                 }
1389                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1390                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1391                 }
1392                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1393                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1394                 }
1395                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1396                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1397                 }
1398                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1399                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1400                 }
1401                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1402                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1403                 }
1404                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1405                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1406                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1407                 }
1408                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1409                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1410                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1411                 }
1412                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1413                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1414                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1415                 }
1416                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1417                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1418                 }
1419                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1420                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1421                 }
1422
1423                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1424                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1425                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1426                 }
1427                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1428                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1429                 }
1430                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1431                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1432                 }
1433                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1434                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1435                 }
1436                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1437                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1438                 }
1439                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1440                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1441                 }
1442                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1443                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1444                 }
1445
1446                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1447                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1448                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1449                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1450                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1451                                                 None
1452                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1453                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1454                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1455                                         } else {
1456                                                 Some(script.clone())
1457                                         }
1458                                 },
1459                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1460                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1461                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1462                                 }
1463                         }
1464                 } else { None };
1465
1466                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1467                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1468                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1469                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1470                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1471                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1472
1473                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1474                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1475                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1476                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1477                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1478                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1479                 };
1480
1481                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1482                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1483                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1484                 });
1485
1486                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1487                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1488
1489                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1490
1491                 Ok(())
1492         }
1493
1494         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1495                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1496
1497                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1498                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1499                 {
1500                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1501                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1502                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1503                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1504                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1505                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1506                 }
1507
1508                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1509                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1510
1511                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1512                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1513                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1514
1515                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1516                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1517
1518                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1519                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1520         }
1521
1522         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1523                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1524         }
1525
1526         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1527                 if self.is_outbound() {
1528                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1529                 }
1530                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1531                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1532                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1533                         // channel.
1534                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1535                 }
1536                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1537                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1538                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1539                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1540                 }
1541
1542                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1543                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1544                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1545                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1546                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1547
1548                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1549                         Ok(res) => res,
1550                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1551                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1552                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1553                         },
1554                         Err(e) => {
1555                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1556                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1557                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1558                         }
1559                 };
1560
1561                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1562                         initial_commitment_tx,
1563                         msg.signature,
1564                         Vec::new(),
1565                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1566                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1567                 );
1568
1569                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1570
1571                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1572                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1573                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1574                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1575                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1576                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1577                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1578                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1579                                                           obscure_factor,
1580                                                           holder_commitment_tx);
1581
1582                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1583
1584                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1585                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1586                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1587                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1588
1589                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1590                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1591                         signature
1592                 }, channel_monitor))
1593         }
1594
1595         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1596         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1597         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1598                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1599                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1600                 }
1601                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1602                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1603                 }
1604                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1605                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1606                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1607                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1608                 }
1609
1610                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1611
1612                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1613                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1614                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1615                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1616
1617                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1618
1619                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1620                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1621                 {
1622                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1623                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1624                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1625                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1626                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1627                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1628                         }
1629                 }
1630
1631                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1632                         initial_commitment_tx,
1633                         msg.signature,
1634                         Vec::new(),
1635                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1636                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1637                 );
1638
1639
1640                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1641                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1642                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1643                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1644                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1645                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1646                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1647                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1648                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1649                                                           obscure_factor,
1650                                                           holder_commitment_tx);
1651
1652                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1653
1654                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1655                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1656                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1657                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1658
1659                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1660         }
1661
1662         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1663                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1664                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1665                 }
1666
1667                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1668
1669                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1670                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1671                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1672                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1673                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1674                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1675                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1676                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1677                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1678                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1679                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1680                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1681                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1682                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1683                         }
1684                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1685                         return Ok(());
1686                 } else {
1687                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1688                 }
1689
1690                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1691                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1692                 Ok(())
1693         }
1694
1695         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1696         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1697                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1698                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1699                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1700                 }
1701                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1702         }
1703
1704         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1705         /// holding cell.
1706         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1707                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1708                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1709                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1710                 }
1711
1712                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1713                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1714                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1715                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1716                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1717                         }
1718                 }
1719
1720                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1721         }
1722
1723         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1724         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1725         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1726         /// corner case properly.
1727         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1728                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1729                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1730                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1731         }
1732
1733         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1734         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1735         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1736                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1737                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1738                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1739         }
1740
1741         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1742         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1743         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1744         // are excluded.
1745         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1746                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1747
1748                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1749                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1750
1751                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1752                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1753                 match htlc.origin {
1754                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1755                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1756                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1757                                 }
1758                         },
1759                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1760                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1761                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1762                                 }
1763                         }
1764                 }
1765
1766                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1767                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1768                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1769                                 continue
1770                         }
1771                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1772                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1773                         included_htlcs += 1;
1774                 }
1775
1776                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1777                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1778                                 continue
1779                         }
1780                         match htlc.state {
1781                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1782                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1783                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1784                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1785                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1786                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1787                                 _ => {},
1788                         }
1789                 }
1790
1791                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1792                         match htlc {
1793                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1794                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1795                                                 continue
1796                                         }
1797                                         included_htlcs += 1
1798                                 },
1799                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1800                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1801                         }
1802                 }
1803
1804                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1805                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1806                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1807                 {
1808                         let mut fee = res;
1809                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1810                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1811                         }
1812                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1813                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1814                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1815                                 fee,
1816                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1817                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1818                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1819                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1820                                 },
1821                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1822                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1823                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1824                                 },
1825                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1826                         };
1827                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1828                 }
1829                 res
1830         }
1831
1832         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1833         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1834         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1835         // excluded.
1836         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1837                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1838
1839                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1840                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1841
1842                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1843                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1844                 match htlc.origin {
1845                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1846                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1847                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1848                                 }
1849                         },
1850                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1851                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1852                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1853                                 }
1854                         }
1855                 }
1856
1857                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1858                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1859                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1860                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1861                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1862                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1863                                 continue
1864                         }
1865                         included_htlcs += 1;
1866                 }
1867
1868                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1869                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1870                                 continue
1871                         }
1872                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1873                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1874                         match htlc.state {
1875                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1876                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1877                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1878                                 _ => {},
1879                         }
1880                 }
1881
1882                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1883                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1884                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1885                 {
1886                         let mut fee = res;
1887                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1888                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1889                         }
1890                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1891                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1892                                 fee,
1893                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1894                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1895                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1896                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1897                                 },
1898                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1899                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1900                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1901                                 },
1902                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1903                         };
1904                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1905                 }
1906                 res
1907         }
1908
1909         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1910         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1911                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1912                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1913                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1914                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1915                 }
1916                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1917                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1918                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1919                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1920                 }
1921                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1922                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1923                 }
1924                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1925                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1926                 }
1927                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1928                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1929                 }
1930                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1931                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1932                 }
1933
1934                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1935                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1936                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1937                 }
1938                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1939                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1940                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1941                 }
1942                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1943                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1944                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1945                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1946                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1947                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1948                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1949                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1950                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1951                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1952                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1953                 // transaction).
1954                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1955                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1956                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1957                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1958                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1959                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1960                         }
1961                 }
1962
1963                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1964                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1965                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1966                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1967                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1968                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1969                 }
1970
1971                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1972                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1973                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1974                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1975                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1976                 };
1977                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1978                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1979                 };
1980
1981                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1982                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1983                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1984                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1985                 }
1986
1987                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1988                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
1989                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
1990                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
1991                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
1992                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
1993                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
1994                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
1995                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
1996                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1997                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
1998                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1999                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2000                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2001                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2002                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2003                         }
2004                 } else {
2005                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2006                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2007                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2008                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2009                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2010                         }
2011                 }
2012                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2013                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2014                 }
2015                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2016                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2017                 }
2018
2019                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2020                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2021                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2022                         }
2023                 }
2024
2025                 // Now update local state:
2026                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2027                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2028                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2029                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2030                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2031                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2032                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2033                 });
2034                 Ok(())
2035         }
2036
2037         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2038         #[inline]
2039         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2040                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2041                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2042                                 match check_preimage {
2043                                         None => {},
2044                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2045                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2046                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2047                                                 }
2048                                 };
2049                                 match htlc.state {
2050                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2051                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2052                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2053                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2054                                         },
2055                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2056                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2057                                 }
2058                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2059                         }
2060                 }
2061                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2062         }
2063
2064         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2065                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2066                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2067                 }
2068                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2069                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2070                 }
2071
2072                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2073                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2074         }
2075
2076         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2077                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2078                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2079                 }
2080                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2081                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2082                 }
2083
2084                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2085                 Ok(())
2086         }
2087
2088         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2089                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2090                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2091                 }
2092                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2093                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2094                 }
2095
2096                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2097                 Ok(())
2098         }
2099
2100         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2101         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2102                                 L::Target: Logger
2103         {
2104                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2105                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2106                 }
2107                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2108                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2109                 }
2110                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2111                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2112                 }
2113
2114                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2115
2116                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2117
2118                 let mut update_fee = false;
2119                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2120                         update_fee = true;
2121                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2122                 } else {
2123                         self.feerate_per_kw
2124                 };
2125
2126                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2127                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2128                         let commitment_txid = {
2129                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2130                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2131                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2132
2133                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2134                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2135                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2136                                 }
2137                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2138                         };
2139                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2140                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2141                 };
2142
2143                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2144                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2145                 if update_fee {
2146                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2147                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2148                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2149                         }
2150                 }
2151                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2152                 {
2153                         if self.is_outbound() {
2154                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2155                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2156                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2157                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2158                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2159                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2160                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2161                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2162                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2163                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2164                                                 }
2165                                 }
2166                         }
2167                 }
2168
2169                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2170                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2171                 }
2172
2173                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2174                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2175                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2176                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2177                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2178                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2179                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2180                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2181                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2182                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2183                                 }
2184                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2185                         } else {
2186                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2187                         }
2188                 }
2189
2190                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2191                         commitment_tx,
2192                         msg.signature,
2193                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2194                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2195                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2196                 );
2197
2198                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2199                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2200
2201                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2202                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2203                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2204                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2205                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2206                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2207                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2208                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2209                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2210                                         need_commitment = true;
2211                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2212                                 }
2213                         }
2214                 }
2215
2216                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2217                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2218                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2219                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2220                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2221                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2222                         }]
2223                 };
2224
2225                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2226                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2227                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2228                         } else { None };
2229                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2230                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2231                                 need_commitment = true;
2232                         }
2233                 }
2234                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2235                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2236                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2237                         } else { None } {
2238                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2239                                 need_commitment = true;
2240                         }
2241                 }
2242
2243                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2244                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2245                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2246                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2247
2248                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2249                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2250                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2251                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2252                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2253                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2254                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2255                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2256                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2257                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2258                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2259                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2260                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2261                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2262                         }
2263                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2264                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2265                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2266                 }
2267
2268                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2269                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2270                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2271                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2272                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2273                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2274                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2275                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2276                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2277                         (Some(msg), None)
2278                 } else if !need_commitment {
2279                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2280                 } else { (None, None) };
2281
2282                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2283                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2284                         per_commitment_secret,
2285                         next_per_commitment_point,
2286                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2287         }
2288
2289         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2290         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2291         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2292                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2293                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2294                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2295
2296                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2297                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2298                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2299                         };
2300
2301                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2302                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2303                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2304                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2305                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2306                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2307                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2308                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2309                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2310                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2311                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2312                                 // to rebalance channels.
2313                                 match &htlc_update {
2314                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2315                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2316                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2317                                                         Err(e) => {
2318                                                                 match e {
2319                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2320                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2321                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2322                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2323                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2324                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2325                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2326                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2327                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2328                                                                         },
2329                                                                         _ => {
2330                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2331                                                                         },
2332                                                                 }
2333                                                         }
2334                                                 }
2335                                         },
2336                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2337                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2338                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2339                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2340                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2341                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2342                                                                 }
2343                                                         },
2344                                                         Err(e) => {
2345                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2346                                                                 else {
2347                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2348                                                                 }
2349                                                         }
2350                                                 }
2351                                         },
2352                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2353                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2354                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2355                                                         Err(e) => {
2356                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2357                                                                 else {
2358                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2359                                                                 }
2360                                                         }
2361                                                 }
2362                                         },
2363                                 }
2364                         }
2365                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2366                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2367                         }
2368                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2369                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2370                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2371                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2372                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2373                                 })
2374                         } else {
2375                                 None
2376                         };
2377
2378                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2379                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2380                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2381                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2382                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2383
2384                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2385                                 update_add_htlcs,
2386                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2387                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2388                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2389                                 update_fee,
2390                                 commitment_signed,
2391                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2392                 } else {
2393                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2394                 }
2395         }
2396
2397         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2398         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2399         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2400         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2401         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2402         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2403                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2404                                         L::Target: Logger,
2405         {
2406                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2407                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2408                 }
2409                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2410                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2411                 }
2412                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2413                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2414                 }
2415
2416                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2417                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2418                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2419                         }
2420                 }
2421
2422                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2423                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2424                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2425                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2426                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2427                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2428                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2429                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2430                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2431                 }
2432
2433                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2434                 {
2435                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2436                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2437                 }
2438
2439                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2440                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2441                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2442                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2443                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2444                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2445                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2446                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2447                         }],
2448                 };
2449
2450                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2451                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2452                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2453                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2454                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2455                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2456                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2457                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2458
2459                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2460                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2461                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2462                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2463                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2464                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2465                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2466
2467                 {
2468                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2469                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2470                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2471
2472                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2473                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2474                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2475                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2476                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2477                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2478                                         }
2479                                         false
2480                                 } else { true }
2481                         });
2482                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2483                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2484                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2485                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2486                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2487                                         } else {
2488                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2489                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2490                                         }
2491                                         false
2492                                 } else { true }
2493                         });
2494                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2495                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2496                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2497                                         true
2498                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2499                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2500                                         true
2501                                 } else { false };
2502                                 if swap {
2503                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2504                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2505
2506                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2507                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2508                                                 require_commitment = true;
2509                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2510                                                 match forward_info {
2511                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2512                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2513                                                                 match fail_msg {
2514                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2515                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2516                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2517                                                                         },
2518                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2519                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2520                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2521                                                                         },
2522                                                                 }
2523                                                         },
2524                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2525                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2526                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2527                                                         }
2528                                                 }
2529                                         }
2530                                 }
2531                         }
2532                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2533                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2534                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2535                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2536                                 }
2537                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2538                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2539                                 } else { None } {
2540                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2541                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2542                                         require_commitment = true;
2543                                 }
2544                         }
2545                 }
2546                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2547
2548                 if self.is_outbound() {
2549                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2550                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2551                         }
2552                 } else {
2553                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2554                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2555                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2556                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2557                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2558                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2559                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2560                                         require_commitment = true;
2561                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2562                                 }
2563                         }
2564                 }
2565
2566                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2567                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2568                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2569                         if require_commitment {
2570                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2571                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2572                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2573                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2574                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2575                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2576                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2577                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2578                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2579                         }
2580                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2581                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2582                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2583                 }
2584
2585                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2586                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2587                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2588                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2589                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2590                                 }
2591                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2592                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2593                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2594                                 }
2595
2596                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2597                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2598                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2599                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2600
2601                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2602                         },
2603                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2604                                 if require_commitment {
2605                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2606
2607                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2608                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2609                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2610                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2611
2612                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2613                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2614                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2615                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2616                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2617                                                 update_fee: None,
2618                                                 commitment_signed
2619                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2620                                 } else {
2621                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2622                                 }
2623                         }
2624                 }
2625
2626         }
2627
2628         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2629         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2630         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2631         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2632                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2633                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2634                 }
2635                 if !self.is_usable() {
2636                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2637                 }
2638                 if !self.is_live() {
2639                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2640                 }
2641
2642                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2643                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2644                         return None;
2645                 }
2646
2647                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2648                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2649
2650                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2651                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2652                         feerate_per_kw,
2653                 })
2654         }
2655
2656         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2657                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2658                         Some(update_fee) => {
2659                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2660                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2661                         },
2662                         None => Ok(None)
2663                 }
2664         }
2665
2666         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2667         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2668         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2669         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2670         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2671         /// completed.
2672         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2673                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2674
2675                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2676                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2677                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2678                         return outbound_drops;
2679                 }
2680                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2681                 // will be retransmitted.
2682                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2683
2684                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2685                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2686                         match htlc.state {
2687                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2688                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2689                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2690                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2691                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2692                                         false
2693                                 },
2694                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2695                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2696                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2697                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2698                                         true
2699                                 },
2700                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2701                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2702                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2703                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2704                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2705                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2706                                         true
2707                                 },
2708                         }
2709                 });
2710                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2711
2712                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2713                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2714                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2715                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2716                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2717                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2718                         }
2719                 }
2720
2721                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2722                         match htlc_update {
2723                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2724                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2725                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2726                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2727                                 // logic.
2728                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2729                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2730                                         false
2731                                 },
2732                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2733                         }
2734                 });
2735                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2736                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2737                 outbound_drops
2738         }
2739
2740         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2741         /// updates are partially paused.
2742         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2743         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2744         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2745         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2746         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2747                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2748                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2749                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2750                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2751                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2752                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2753                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2754                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2755         }
2756
2757         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2758         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2759         /// to the remote side.
2760         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2761                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2762                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2763
2764                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2765
2766                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2767                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2768                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2769                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2770                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2771                 // monitor was persisted.
2772                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2773                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2774                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2775                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2776                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2777                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2778                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2779                         })
2780                 } else { None };
2781
2782                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2783                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2784                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2785                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2786
2787                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2788                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2789                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2790                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2791                 }
2792
2793                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2794                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2795                 } else { None };
2796                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2797                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2798                 } else { None };
2799
2800                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2801                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2802                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2803                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2804                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2805                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2806                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2807                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2808                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2809         }
2810
2811         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2812                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2813         {
2814                 if self.is_outbound() {
2815                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2816                 }
2817                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2818                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2819                 }
2820                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2821                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2822                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2823                 Ok(())
2824         }
2825
2826         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2827                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2828                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2829                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2830                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2831                         per_commitment_secret,
2832                         next_per_commitment_point,
2833                 }
2834         }
2835
2836         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2837                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2838                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2839                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2840                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2841
2842                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2843                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2844                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2845                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2846                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2847                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2848                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2849                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2850                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2851                                 });
2852                         }
2853                 }
2854
2855                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2856                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2857                                 match reason {
2858                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2859                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2860                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2861                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2862                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2863                                                 });
2864                                         },
2865                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2866                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2867                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2868                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2869                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2870                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2871                                                 });
2872                                         },
2873                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2874                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2875                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2876                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2877                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2878                                                 });
2879                                         },
2880                                 }
2881                         }
2882                 }
2883
2884                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2885                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2886                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2887                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2888                         update_fee: None,
2889                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2890                 }
2891         }
2892
2893         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2894         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2895         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2896                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2897                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2898                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2899                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2900                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2901                 }
2902
2903                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2904                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2905                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2906                 }
2907
2908                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2909                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2910                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2911                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2912                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2913                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2914                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2915                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2916                                         }
2917                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2918                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2919                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2920                                                 ));
2921                                         }
2922                                 },
2923                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2924                         }
2925                 }
2926
2927                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2928                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2929                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2930
2931                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2932                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2933                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2934                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2935                         })
2936                 } else { None };
2937
2938                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2939                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2940                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2941                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2942                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2943                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2944                                 }
2945                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2946                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2947                         }
2948
2949                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2950                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2951                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2952                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2953                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2954                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2955                 }
2956
2957                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2958                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2959                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2960                         None
2961                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2962                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2963                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2964                                 None
2965                         } else {
2966                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2967                         }
2968                 } else {
2969                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2970                 };
2971
2972                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2973                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2974                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2975                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2976                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2977
2978                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2979                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2980                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2981                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2982                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2983                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2984                         })
2985                 } else { None };
2986
2987                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2988                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2989                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2990                         } else {
2991                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2992                         }
2993
2994                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2995                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2996                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2997                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2998                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2999                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3000                                         }
3001                                 }
3002
3003                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3004                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3005                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3006                                 // now!
3007                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3008                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3009                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3010                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3011                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3012                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3013                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3014                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3015                                         },
3016                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3017                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3018                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3019                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3020                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3021                                         },
3022                                 }
3023                         } else {
3024                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3025                         }
3026                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3027                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3028                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3029                         } else {
3030                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3031                         }
3032
3033                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3034                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3035                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3036                         }
3037
3038                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3039                 } else {
3040                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3041                 }
3042         }
3043
3044         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3045                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3046         {
3047                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3048                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3049                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3050                         return None;
3051                 }
3052
3053                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3054                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3055                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3056                 }
3057                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3058                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3059
3060                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3061                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3062                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3063                         .ok();
3064                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3065                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3066
3067                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3068                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3069                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3070                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3071                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3072                 })
3073         }
3074
3075         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3076                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3077         {
3078                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3079                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3080                 }
3081                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3082                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3083                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3084                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3085                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3086                 }
3087                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3088                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3089                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3090                         }
3091                 }
3092                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3093
3094                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3095                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3096                 }
3097
3098                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3099                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3100                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3101                         }
3102                 } else {
3103                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3104                 }
3105
3106                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3107
3108                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3109                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3110
3111                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3112                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3113                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3114                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3115                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3116                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3117                         match htlc_update {
3118                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3119                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3120                                         false
3121                                 },
3122                                 _ => true
3123                         }
3124                 });
3125                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3126                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3127                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3128
3129                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3130                         None
3131                 } else {
3132                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3133                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3134                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3135                         })
3136                 };
3137
3138                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3139                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3140
3141                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3142         }
3143
3144         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3145                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3146                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3147                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3148
3149                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3150
3151                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3152                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3153                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3154                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3155                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3156                 } else {
3157                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3158                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3159                 }
3160                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3161                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3162
3163                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3164         }
3165
3166         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3167                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3168         {
3169                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3170                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3171                 }
3172                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3173                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3174                 }
3175                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3176                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3177                 }
3178                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3179                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3180                 }
3181
3182                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3183                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3184                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3185                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3186                 }
3187                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3188
3189                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3190                         Ok(_) => {},
3191                         Err(_e) => {
3192                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3193                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3194                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3195                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3196                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3197                         },
3198                 };
3199
3200                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3201                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3202                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3203                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3204                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3205                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3206                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3207                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3208                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3209                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3210                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3211                         }
3212                 }
3213
3214                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3215                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3216                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3217                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3218                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3219                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3220                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3221                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3222                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3223                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3224                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3225                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3226                                         signature: sig,
3227                                 }), None))
3228                         }
3229                 }
3230
3231                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3232                 if self.is_outbound() {
3233                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3234                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3235                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3236                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3237                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3238                                         }
3239                                 }
3240                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3241                         }
3242                 } else {
3243                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3244                 }
3245                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3246                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3247                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3248                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3249                                 }
3250                         }
3251                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3252                 }
3253
3254                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3255                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3256                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3257                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3258                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3259                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3260
3261                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3262                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3263
3264                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3265                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3266                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3267                         signature: sig,
3268                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3269         }
3270
3271         // Public utilities:
3272
3273         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3274                 self.channel_id
3275         }
3276
3277         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3278         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3279         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3280                 self.user_id
3281         }
3282
3283         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3284         /// is_usable() returns true).
3285         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3286         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3287                 self.short_channel_id
3288         }
3289
3290         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3291         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3292         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3293                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3294         }
3295
3296         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3297                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3298         }
3299
3300         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3301                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3302         }
3303
3304         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3305                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3306         }
3307
3308         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3309                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3310         }
3311
3312         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3313         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3314                 self.counterparty_node_id
3315         }
3316
3317         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3318         #[cfg(test)]
3319         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3320                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3321         }
3322
3323         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3324         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3325                 return cmp::min(
3326                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3327                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3328                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3329                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3330
3331                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3332                 );
3333         }
3334
3335         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3336         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3337                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3338         }
3339
3340         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3341                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3342         }
3343
3344         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3345                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3346         }
3347
3348         #[cfg(test)]
3349         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3350                 self.feerate_per_kw
3351         }
3352
3353         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3354                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3355         }
3356
3357         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3358                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3359         }
3360
3361         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3362                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3363         }
3364
3365         #[cfg(test)]
3366         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3367                 &self.holder_signer
3368         }
3369
3370         #[cfg(test)]
3371         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3372                 ChannelValueStat {
3373                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3374                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3375                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3376                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3377                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3378                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3379                                 let mut res = 0;
3380                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3381                                         match h {
3382                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3383                                                         res += amount_msat;
3384                                                 }
3385                                                 _ => {}
3386                                         }
3387                                 }
3388                                 res
3389                         },
3390                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3391                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3392                 }
3393         }
3394
3395         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3396         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3397                 self.update_time_counter
3398         }
3399
3400         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3401                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3402         }
3403
3404         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3405                 self.config.announced_channel
3406         }
3407
3408         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3409                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3410         }
3411
3412         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3413         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3414         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3415                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3416         {
3417                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3418                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3419
3420                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3421                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3422
3423                 if self.is_outbound() {
3424                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3425                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3426                 }
3427
3428                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3429                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3430
3431                 res as u32
3432         }
3433
3434         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3435         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3436                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3437         }
3438
3439         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3440         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3441         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3442                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3443                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3444         }
3445
3446         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3447         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3448         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3449         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3450                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3451         }
3452
3453         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3454         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3455         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3456                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3457         }
3458
3459         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3460         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3461                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3462         }
3463
3464         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3465         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3466         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3467         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3468                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3469                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3470                         true
3471                 } else { false }
3472         }
3473
3474         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3475                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3476         }
3477
3478         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3479                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3480         }
3481
3482         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3483                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3484         }
3485
3486         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3487                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3488         }
3489
3490         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3491                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3492         }
3493
3494         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3495         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3496         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3497         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3498         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3499         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3500         ///
3501         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3502         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3503         /// post-shutdown.
3504         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3505         ///
3506         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3507         /// back.
3508         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3509                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3510                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3511                         match htlc_update {
3512                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3513                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3514                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3515                                                 false
3516                                         } else { true }
3517                                 },
3518                                 _ => true
3519                         }
3520                 });
3521                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3522                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3523                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3524                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3525                         }
3526                 }
3527                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3528                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3529                                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3530                                 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3531                                         let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3532                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3533                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3534                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3535                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3536                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3537                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3538                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3539                                                         // channel and move on.
3540                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3541                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3542                                                 }
3543                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3544                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3545                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3546                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3547                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3548                                                 });
3549                                         } else {
3550                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3551                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3552                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3553                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3554                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3555                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3556                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3557                                                                 }
3558                                                         }
3559                                                 }
3560                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3561                                                 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3562                                                         Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3563                                                         Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3564                                                 }
3565                                         }
3566                                 }
3567                         }
3568                 }
3569                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3570                         self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3571                         self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3572                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3573                                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3574                                         let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3575                                                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3576                                                 true
3577                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3578                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3579                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3580                                                 true
3581                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3582                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3583                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3584                                                 false
3585                                         } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3586                                                 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3587                                         } else {
3588                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3589                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3590                                                 false
3591                                         };
3592                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3593
3594                                         //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3595                                         //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3596                                         //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3597                                         //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3598                                         if need_commitment_update {
3599                                                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3600                                                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3601                                                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3602                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3603                                                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3604                                                         }), timed_out_htlcs));
3605                                                 } else {
3606                                                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3607                                                         return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3608                                                 }
3609                                         }
3610                                 }
3611                         }
3612                 }
3613                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3614         }
3615
3616         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3617         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3618         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3619         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3620                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3621                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3622                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3623                                 return true;
3624                         }
3625                 }
3626                 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3627                 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3628                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3629                 }
3630                 false
3631         }
3632
3633         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3634         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3635
3636         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3637                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3638                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3639                 }
3640                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3641                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3642                 }
3643
3644                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3645                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3646                 }
3647
3648                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3649                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3650
3651                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3652                         chain_hash,
3653                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3654                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3655                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3656                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3657                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3658                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3659                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3660                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3661                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3662                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3663                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3664                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3665                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3666                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3667                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3668                         first_per_commitment_point,
3669                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3670                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3671                 }
3672         }
3673
3674         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3675                 if self.is_outbound() {
3676                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3677                 }
3678                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3679                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3680                 }
3681                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3682                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3683                 }
3684
3685                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3686                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3687
3688                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3689                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3690                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3691                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3692                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3693                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3694                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3695                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3696                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3697                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3698                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3699                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3700                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3701                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3702                         first_per_commitment_point,
3703                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3704                 }
3705         }
3706
3707         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3708         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3709                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3710                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3711                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3712                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3713         }
3714
3715         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3716         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3717         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3718         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3719         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3720         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3721         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3722         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3723                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3724                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3725                 }
3726                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3727                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3728                 }
3729                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3730                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3731                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3732                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3733                 }
3734
3735                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3736                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3737
3738                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3739                         Ok(res) => res,
3740                         Err(e) => {
3741                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3742                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3743                                 return Err(e);
3744                         }
3745                 };
3746
3747                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3748
3749                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3750
3751                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3752                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3753
3754                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3755                         temporary_channel_id,
3756                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3757                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3758                         signature
3759                 })
3760         }
3761
3762         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3763         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3764         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3765         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3766         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3767         /// closing).
3768         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3769         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3770         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3771                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3772                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3773                 }
3774                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3775                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3776                 }
3777                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3778                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3779                 }
3780
3781                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3782
3783                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3784                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3785                         chain_hash,
3786                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3787                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3788                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3789                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3790                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3791                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3792                 };
3793
3794                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3795                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3796
3797                 Ok((msg, sig))
3798         }
3799
3800         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3801         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3802         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3803                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3804                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3805                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3806                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3807                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3808                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3809                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3810                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3811                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3812                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3813                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3814                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3815                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3816                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3817                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3818                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3819                         })
3820                 } else {
3821                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3822                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3823                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3824                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3825                         })
3826                 };
3827                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3828                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3829                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3830                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3831                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3832                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3833                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3834                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3835
3836                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3837                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3838                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3839                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3840                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3841                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3842                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3843                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3844                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3845                         // overflow here.
3846                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3847                         data_loss_protect,
3848                 }
3849         }
3850
3851
3852         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3853
3854         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3855         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3856         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3857         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3858         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3859         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3860         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3861         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3862                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3863                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3864                 }
3865                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3866                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3867                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3868                 }
3869
3870                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3871                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3872                 }
3873
3874                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3875                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3876                 }
3877
3878                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3879                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3880                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3881                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3882                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3883                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3884                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3885                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3886                 }
3887
3888                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3889                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3890                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3891                 }
3892                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3893                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3894                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3895                 }
3896
3897                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3898                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3899                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3900                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3901                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3902                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3903                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3904                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3905                         }
3906                 }
3907
3908                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3909                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3910                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3911                 }
3912
3913                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3914                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3915                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3916                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3917                 } else { 0 };
3918                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3919                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3920                 }
3921
3922                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3923                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3924                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3925                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3926                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3927                 }
3928
3929                 // Now update local state:
3930                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3931                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3932                                 amount_msat,
3933                                 payment_hash,
3934                                 cltv_expiry,
3935                                 source,
3936                                 onion_routing_packet,
3937                         });
3938                         return Ok(None);
3939                 }
3940
3941                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3942                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3943                         amount_msat,
3944                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3945                         cltv_expiry,
3946                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3947                         source,
3948                 });
3949
3950                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3951                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3952                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3953                         amount_msat,
3954                         payment_hash,
3955                         cltv_expiry,
3956                         onion_routing_packet,
3957                 };
3958                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3959
3960                 Ok(Some(res))
3961         }
3962
3963         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3964         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3965         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3966         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3967         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3968                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3969                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3970                 }
3971                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3972                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3973                 }
3974                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3975                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3976                 }
3977                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3978                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3979                 }
3980                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3981                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3982                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3983                                 have_updates = true;
3984                         }
3985                         if have_updates { break; }
3986                 }
3987                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3988                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3989                                 have_updates = true;
3990                         }
3991                         if have_updates { break; }
3992                 }
3993                 if !have_updates {
3994                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3995                 }
3996                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3997         }
3998         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3999         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4000                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4001                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4002                 // is acceptable.
4003                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4004                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4005                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4006                         } else { None };
4007                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4008                                 htlc.state = state;
4009                         }
4010                 }
4011                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4012                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4013                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4014                         } else { None } {
4015                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4016                         }
4017                 }
4018                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4019
4020                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4021                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4022                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4023                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4024                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4025                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4026                         },
4027                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4028                 };
4029
4030                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4031                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4032                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4033                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4034                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4035                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4036                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4037                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4038                         }]
4039                 };
4040                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4041                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4042         }
4043
4044         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4045         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4046         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4047                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4048                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4049                         if self.is_outbound() {
4050                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4051                         }
4052                 }
4053
4054                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4055                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4056                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4057                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4058
4059                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4060                 {
4061                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4062                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4063                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4064                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4065                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4066                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4067                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4068                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4069                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4070                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4071                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4072                                                 }
4073                                 }
4074                         }
4075                 }
4076
4077                 {
4078                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4079                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4080                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4081                         }
4082
4083                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4084                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4085                         signature = res.0;
4086                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4087
4088                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4089                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4090                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4091                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4092                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4093
4094                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4095                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4096                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4097                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4098                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4099                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4100                         }
4101                 }
4102
4103                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4104                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4105                         signature,
4106                         htlc_signatures,
4107                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4108         }
4109
4110         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4111         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4112         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4113         /// more info.
4114         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4115                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4116                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4117                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4118                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4119                         },
4120                         None => Ok(None)
4121                 }
4122         }
4123
4124         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4125         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4126         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4127                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4128                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4129                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4130                         }
4131                 }
4132                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4133                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4134                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4135                         }
4136                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4137                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4138                         }
4139                 }
4140                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4141                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4142                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4143                 }
4144
4145                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4146
4147                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4148                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4149                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4150                 } else {
4151                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4152                 }
4153                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4154
4155                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4156                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4157                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4158                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4159                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4160                         match htlc_update {
4161                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4162                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4163                                         false
4164                                 },
4165                                 _ => true
4166                         }
4167                 });
4168
4169                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4170                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4171                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4172                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4173         }
4174
4175         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4176         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4177         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4178         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4179         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4180         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4181                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4182
4183                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4184                 // return them to fail the payment.
4185                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4186                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4187                         match htlc_update {
4188                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4189                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4190                                 },
4191                                 _ => {}
4192                         }
4193                 }
4194                 let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4195                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4196                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4197                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4198                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4199                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4200                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4201                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4202                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4203                                 Some(funding_txo.clone())
4204                         } else { None }
4205                 } else { None };
4206
4207                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4208                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4209                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4210                 (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4211                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4212                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4213                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4214         }
4215 }
4216
4217 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4218         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4219
4220         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4221         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4222         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4223         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4224         if is_script_too_long {
4225                 return true;
4226         }
4227
4228         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4229                 return false;
4230         }
4231
4232         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4233 }
4234
4235 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4236 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4237
4238 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4239         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4240                 match self {
4241                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4242                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4243                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4244                         },
4245                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4246                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4247                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4248                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4249                         },
4250                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4251                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4252                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4253                         },
4254                 }
4255                 Ok(())
4256         }
4257 }
4258
4259 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4260         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4261                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4262                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4263                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4264                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4265                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4266                 })
4267         }
4268 }
4269
4270 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4271         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4272                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4273                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4274
4275                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4276                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4277
4278                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4279                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4280
4281                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4282                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4283                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4284
4285                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4286
4287                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4288                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4289                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4290                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4291                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4292                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4293
4294                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4295                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4296
4297                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4298                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4299                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4300
4301                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4302                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4303                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4304                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4305                         }
4306                 }
4307                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4308                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4309                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4310                                 continue; // Drop
4311                         }
4312                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4313                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4314                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4315                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4316                         match &htlc.state {
4317                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4318                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4319                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4320                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4321                                 },
4322                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4323                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4324                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4325                                 },
4326                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4327                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4328                                 },
4329                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4330                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4331                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4332                                 },
4333                         }
4334                 }
4335
4336                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4337                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4338                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4339                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4340                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4341                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4342                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4343                         match &htlc.state {
4344                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4345                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4346                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4347                                 },
4348                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4349                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4350                                 },
4351                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4352                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4353                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4354                                 },
4355                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4356                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4357                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4358                                 },
4359                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4360                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4361                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4362                                 },
4363                         }
4364                 }
4365
4366                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4367                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4368                         match update {
4369                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4370                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4371                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4372                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4373                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4374                                         source.write(writer)?;
4375                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4376                                 },
4377                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4378                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4379                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4380                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4381                                 },
4382                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4383                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4384                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4385                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4386                                 }
4387                         }
4388                 }
4389
4390                 match self.resend_order {
4391                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4392                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4393                 }
4394
4395                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4396                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4397                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4398
4399                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4400                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4401                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4402                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4403                 }
4404
4405                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4406                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4407                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4408                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4409                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4410                 }
4411
4412                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4413                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4414
4415                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4416                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4417                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4418                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4419
4420                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4421                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4422                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4423                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4424                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4425                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4426                         },
4427                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4428                 }
4429
4430                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4431                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4432
4433                 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4434                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4435
4436                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4437                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4438                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4439                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4440                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4441                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4442                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4443                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4444
4445                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4446                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4447
4448                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4449                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4450
4451                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4452
4453                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4454                 Ok(())
4455         }
4456 }
4457
4458 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4459 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4460                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4461         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4462                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4463                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4464                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4465                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4466                 }
4467
4468                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4469                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4470
4471                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4472                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4473                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4474
4475                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4476
4477                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4478                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4479                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4480                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4481                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4482                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4483                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4484                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4485                 }
4486                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4487
4488                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4489                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4490
4491                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4492                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4493                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4494
4495                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4496                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4497                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4498                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4499                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4500                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4501                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4502                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4503                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4504                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4505                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4506                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4507                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4508                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4509                                 },
4510                         });
4511                 }
4512
4513                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4514                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4515                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4516                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4517                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4518                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4519                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4520                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4521                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4522                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4523                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4524                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4525                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4526                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4527                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4528                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4529                                 },
4530                         });
4531                 }
4532
4533                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4534                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4535                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4536                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4537                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4538                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4539                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4540                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4541                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4542                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4543                                 },
4544                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4545                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4546                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4547                                 },
4548                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4549                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4550                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4551                                 },
4552                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4553                         });
4554                 }
4555
4556                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4557                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4558                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4559                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4560                 };
4561
4562                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4563                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4564                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4565
4566                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4567                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4568                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4569                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4570                 }
4571
4572                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4573                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4574                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4575                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4576                 }
4577
4578                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4579                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4580
4581                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4582                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4583                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4584                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4585
4586                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4587                         0 => None,
4588                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4589                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4590                 };
4591
4592                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4593                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4594
4595                 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4596                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4597
4598                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4599                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4600                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4602                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4603                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4606
4607                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4608                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609
4610                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4611                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4612
4613                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4614                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4615
4616                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4617                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4618
4619                 Ok(Channel {
4620                         user_id,
4621
4622                         config,
4623                         channel_id,
4624                         channel_state,
4625                         secp_ctx,
4626                         channel_value_satoshis,
4627
4628                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4629
4630                         holder_signer,
4631                         shutdown_pubkey,
4632                         destination_script,
4633
4634                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4635                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4636                         value_to_self_msat,
4637
4638                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4639                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4640                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4641
4642                         resend_order,
4643
4644                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4645                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4646                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4647                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4648                         monitor_pending_failures,
4649
4650                         pending_update_fee,
4651                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4652                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4653                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4654                         update_time_counter,
4655                         feerate_per_kw,
4656
4657                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4658                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4659                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4660                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4661
4662                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4663
4664                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4665                         short_channel_id,
4666                         last_block_connected,
4667                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4668
4669                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4670                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4671                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4672                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4673                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4674                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4675                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4676                         minimum_depth,
4677
4678                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4679                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4680
4681                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4682                         counterparty_node_id,
4683
4684                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4685
4686                         commitment_secrets,
4687
4688                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4689
4690                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4691                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4692                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4693                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4694                 })
4695         }
4696 }
4697
4698 #[cfg(test)]
4699 mod tests {
4700         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4701         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4702         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4703         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4704         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4705         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4706         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4707         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4708         use hex;
4709         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4710         use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4711         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4712         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4713         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4714         use ln::chan_utils;
4715         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4716         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4717         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4718         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4719         use util::config::UserConfig;
4720         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4721         use util::test_utils;
4722         use util::logger::Logger;
4723         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4724         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4725         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4726         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4727         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4728         use std::sync::Arc;
4729
4730         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4731                 fee_est: u32
4732         }
4733         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4734                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4735                         self.fee_est
4736                 }
4737         }
4738
4739         #[test]
4740         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4741                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4742                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4743         }
4744
4745         struct Keys {
4746                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4747         }
4748         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4749                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4750
4751                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4752                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4753                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4754                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4755                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4756                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4757                 }
4758
4759                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4760                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4761                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4762                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4763                 }
4764
4765                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4766                         self.signer.clone()
4767                 }
4768                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4769                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4770         }
4771
4772         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4773                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4774         }
4775
4776         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4777         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4778         #[test]
4779         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4780                 let original_fee = 253;
4781                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4782                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4783                 let seed = [42; 32];
4784                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4785                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4786
4787                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4788                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4789                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4790
4791                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4792                 // same as the old fee.
4793                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4794                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4795                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4796         }
4797
4798         #[test]
4799         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4800                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4801                 // dust limits are used.
4802                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4803                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4804                 let seed = [42; 32];
4805                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4806                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4807
4808                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4809                 // they have different dust limits.
4810
4811                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4812                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4813                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4814                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4815
4816                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4817                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4818                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4819                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4820                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4821                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4822
4823                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4824                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4825                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4826                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4827
4828                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4829                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4830                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4831                         htlc_id: 0,
4832                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4833                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4834                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4835                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4836                 });
4837
4838                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4839                         htlc_id: 1,
4840                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4841                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4842                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4843                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4844                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4845                                 path: Vec::new(),
4846                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4847                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4848                         }
4849                 });
4850
4851                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4852                 // the dust limit check.
4853                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4854                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4855                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4856                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4857
4858                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4859                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4860                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4861                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4862                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4863                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4864                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4865         }
4866
4867         #[test]
4868         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4869                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4870                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4871                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4872                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4873                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4874                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4875                 let seed = [42; 32];
4876                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4877                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4878
4879                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4880                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4881                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4882
4883                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4884                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4885
4886                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4887                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4888                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4889                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4890                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4891                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4892
4893                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4894                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4895                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4896                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4897                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4898
4899                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4900
4901                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4902                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4903                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4904                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4905                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4906
4907                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4908                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4909                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4910                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4911                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4912         }
4913
4914         #[test]
4915         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4916                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4917                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4918                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4919                 let seed = [42; 32];
4920                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4921                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4922
4923                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4924
4925                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4926                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4927                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4928                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4929
4930                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4931                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4932                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4933                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4934
4935                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4936                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4937                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4938
4939                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4940                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4941                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4942                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4943                 }]};
4944                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4945                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4946                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4947
4948                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4949                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4950
4951                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4952                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4953                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4954                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4955                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4956                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4957                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4958                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4959                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4960                         },
4961                         _ => panic!()
4962                 }
4963
4964                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4965                 // is sane.
4966                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4967                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4968                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4969                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4970                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4971                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4972                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4973                         },
4974                         _ => panic!()
4975                 }
4976         }
4977
4978         #[test]
4979         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4980                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4981                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4982                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4983                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4984
4985                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
4986                         &secp_ctx,
4987                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4988                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4989                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4990                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4991                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4992
4993                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4994                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4995                         10_000_000,
4996                         [0; 32]
4997                 );
4998
4999                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5000                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5001                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5002
5003                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5004                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5005                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5006                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5007                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5008
5009                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5010
5011                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5012                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5013                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5014                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5015                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5016                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5017                 };
5018                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5019                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5020                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5021                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5022                         });
5023                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5024                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5025
5026                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5027                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5028
5029                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5030                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5031
5032                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5033                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5034
5035                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5036                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5037                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5038                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5039                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5040                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5041                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5042                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5043
5044                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5045                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5046                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5047                         } ) => { {
5048                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5049                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5050
5051                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5052                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5053                                                 .collect();
5054                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5055                                 };
5056                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5057                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5058                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5059                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5060                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5061                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5062
5063                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5064                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5065                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5066                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5067                                 $({
5068                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5069                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5070                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5071                                 })*
5072                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5073
5074                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5075                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5076                                         counterparty_signature,
5077                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5078                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5079                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5080                                 );
5081                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5082                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5083
5084                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5085                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5086                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5087
5088                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5089                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5090
5091                                 $({
5092                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5093
5094                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5095                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5096                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5097                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5098                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5099
5100                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5101                                         if !htlc.offered {
5102                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5103                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5104                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5105                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5106                                                         }
5107                                                 }
5108
5109                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5110                                         }
5111
5112                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5113                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5114
5115                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5116                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5117                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5118                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5119                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5120                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5121                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5122                                 })*
5123                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5124                         } }
5125                 }
5126
5127                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5128                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5129
5130                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5131                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5132                                                  "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", {});
5133
5134                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5135                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5136                                 htlc_id: 0,
5137                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5138                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5139                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5140                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5141                         };
5142                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5143                         out
5144                 });
5145                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5146                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5147                                 htlc_id: 1,
5148                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5149                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5150                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5151                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5152                         };
5153                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5154                         out
5155                 });
5156                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5157                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5158                                 htlc_id: 2,
5159                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5160                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5161                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5162                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5163                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5164                         };
5165                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5166                         out
5167                 });
5168                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5169                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5170                                 htlc_id: 3,
5171                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5172                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5173                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5174                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5175                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5176                         };
5177                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5178                         out
5179                 });
5180                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5181                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5182                                 htlc_id: 4,
5183                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5184                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5185                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5186                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5187                         };
5188                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5189                         out
5190                 });
5191
5192                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5193                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5194                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5195
5196                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5197                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5198                                  "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", {
5199
5200                                   { 0,
5201                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5202                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5203                                   "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" },
5204
5205                                   { 1,
5206                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5207                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5208                                   "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" },
5209
5210                                   { 2,
5211                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5212                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5213                                   "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" },
5214
5215                                   { 3,
5216                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5217                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5218                                   "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" },
5219
5220                                   { 4,
5221                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5222                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5223                                   "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" }
5224                 } );
5225
5226                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5227                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5228                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5229
5230                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5231                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5232                                  "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", {
5233
5234                                   { 0,
5235                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5236                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5237                                   "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" },
5238
5239                                   { 1,
5240                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5241                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5242                                   "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" },
5243
5244                                   { 2,
5245                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5246                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5247                                   "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" },
5248
5249                                   { 3,
5250                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5251                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5252                                   "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" },
5253
5254                                   { 4,
5255                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5256                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5257                                   "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" }
5258                 } );
5259
5260                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5261                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5262                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5263
5264                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5265                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5266                                  "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", {
5267
5268                                   { 0,
5269                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5270                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5271                                   "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" },
5272
5273                                   { 1,
5274                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5275                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5276                                   "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" },
5277
5278                                   { 2,
5279                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5280                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5281                                   "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" },
5282
5283                                   { 3,
5284                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5285                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5286                                   "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" }
5287                 } );
5288
5289                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5290                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5291                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5292
5293                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5294                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5295                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5296
5297                                   { 0,
5298                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5299                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5300                                   "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" },
5301
5302                                   { 1,
5303                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5304                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5305                                   "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" },
5306
5307                                   { 2,
5308                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5309                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5310                                   "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5311
5312                                   { 3,
5313                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5314                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5315                                   "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" }
5316                 } );
5317
5318                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5319                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5320                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5321
5322                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5323                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5324                                  "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", {
5325
5326                                   { 0,
5327                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5328                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5329                                   "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" },
5330
5331                                   { 1,
5332                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5333                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5334                                   "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" },
5335
5336                                   { 2,
5337                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5338                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5339                                   "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" }
5340                 } );
5341
5342                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5343                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5344                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5345
5346                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5347                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5348                                  "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", {
5349
5350                                   { 0,
5351                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5352                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5353                                   "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" },
5354
5355                                   { 1,
5356                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5357                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5358                                   "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5359
5360                                   { 2,
5361                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5362                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5363                                   "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" }
5364                 } );
5365
5366                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5367                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5368                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5369
5370                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5371                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5372                                  "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", {
5373
5374                                   { 0,
5375                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5376                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5377                                   "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" },
5378
5379                                   { 1,
5380                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5381                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5382                                   "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" }
5383                 } );
5384
5385                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5386                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5387                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5388
5389                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5390                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5391                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5392
5393                                   { 0,
5394                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5395                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5396                                   "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" },
5397
5398                                   { 1,
5399                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5400                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5401                                   "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5402                 } );
5403
5404                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5405                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5406                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5407
5408                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5409                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5410                                  "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", {
5411
5412                                   { 0,
5413                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5414                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5415                                   "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" }
5416                 } );
5417
5418                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5419                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5420                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5421
5422                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5423                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5424                                  "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", {
5425
5426                                   { 0,
5427                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5428                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5429                                   "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" }
5430                 } );
5431
5432                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5433                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5434                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5435
5436                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5437                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5438                                  "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", {});
5439
5440                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5441                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5442                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5443
5444                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5445                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5446                                  "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", {});
5447
5448                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5449                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5450                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5451
5452                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5453                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5454                                  "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", {});
5455
5456                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5457                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5458                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5459
5460                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5461                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5462                                  "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", {});
5463
5464                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5465                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5466                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5467                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5468                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5469                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5470                                 htlc_id: 1,
5471                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5472                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5473                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5474                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5475                         };
5476                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5477                         out
5478                 });
5479                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5480                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5481                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5482                                 htlc_id: 6,
5483                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5484                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5485                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5486                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5487                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5488                         };
5489                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5490                         out
5491                 });
5492                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5493                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5494                                 htlc_id: 5,
5495                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5496                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5497                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5498                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5499                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5500                         };
5501                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5502                         out
5503                 });
5504
5505                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5506                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5507                                  "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", {
5508
5509                                   { 0,
5510                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5511                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5512                                   "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" },
5513                                   { 1,
5514                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5515                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5516                                   "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" },
5517                                   { 2,
5518                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5519                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5520                                   "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" }
5521                 } );
5522         }
5523
5524         #[test]
5525         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5526                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5527
5528                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5529                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5530                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5531                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5532
5533                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5534                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5535                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5536
5537                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5538                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5539
5540                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5541                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5542
5543                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5544                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5545                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5546         }
5547
5548         #[test]
5549         fn test_key_derivation() {
5550                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5551                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5552
5553                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5554                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5555
5556                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5557                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5558
5559                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5560                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5561
5562                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5563                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5564
5565                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5566                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5567
5568                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5569                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5570
5571                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5572                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5573         }
5574 }