1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
742 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
744 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
745 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
750 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
752 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
753 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
755 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
761 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
763 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
765 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
766 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
767 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
768 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
769 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
771 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
772 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
774 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
776 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
777 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
779 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
780 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
781 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
782 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
783 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
784 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
786 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
787 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
789 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
790 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
791 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
792 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
793 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
795 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
796 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
798 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
799 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
801 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
802 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
803 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
804 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
810 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
811 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
813 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
814 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
815 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
820 macro_rules! secp_check {
821 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
824 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
829 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
830 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
831 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
832 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
834 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
836 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
837 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
838 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
840 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
843 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
845 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
848 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
849 /// required by us according to the configured or default
850 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
852 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
854 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
855 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
856 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
857 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
858 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
861 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
862 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
863 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
864 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
865 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
866 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
867 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
870 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
871 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
874 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
875 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
876 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
877 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
878 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
879 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
880 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
881 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
886 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
887 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
888 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
889 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
890 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
891 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
892 // We've exhausted our options
895 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
896 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
900 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
901 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
902 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
903 outbound_scid_alias: u64
904 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
905 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
906 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
908 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
910 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
911 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
912 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
914 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
917 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
920 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
921 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
924 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
927 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
928 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
929 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
930 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
934 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
936 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
937 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
938 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
939 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
942 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
943 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
945 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
946 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
949 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
950 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
951 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
958 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
959 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
960 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
961 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
966 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
968 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
969 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
970 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
972 channel_value_satoshis,
974 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
977 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
978 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
980 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
981 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
984 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
985 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
986 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
987 pending_update_fee: None,
988 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
989 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
990 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
991 update_time_counter: 1,
993 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
995 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
996 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
997 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
998 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
999 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1000 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1002 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1003 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1005 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1007 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1008 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1009 closing_fee_limits: None,
1010 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1012 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1014 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1015 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1016 short_channel_id: None,
1017 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1019 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1020 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1021 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1022 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1023 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1024 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1025 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1026 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1027 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1028 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1029 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1031 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1033 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1034 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1035 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1036 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1037 counterparty_parameters: None,
1038 funding_outpoint: None,
1039 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1041 funding_transaction: None,
1043 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1044 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1045 counterparty_node_id,
1047 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1049 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1051 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1052 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1054 announcement_sigs: None,
1056 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1057 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1058 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1059 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1061 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1063 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1064 outbound_scid_alias,
1066 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1067 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1069 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1073 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1074 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1076 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1077 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1078 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1079 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1080 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1081 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1082 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1085 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1086 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1087 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1088 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1089 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1090 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1096 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1097 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1098 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1099 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1100 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1101 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1102 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1103 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1104 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1107 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1108 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1110 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1111 // support this channel type.
1112 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1113 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1117 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1121 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1122 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1123 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1124 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1125 // publicly announced.
1126 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1127 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1131 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1135 channel_type.clone()
1137 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1139 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1143 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1144 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1145 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1146 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1147 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1148 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1149 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1150 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1153 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1157 // Check sanity of message fields:
1158 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1161 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1164 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1167 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1168 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1171 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1174 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1177 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
1179 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1180 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1183 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1186 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1190 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1191 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1194 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1197 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1200 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1206 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1209 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1213 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1215 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1216 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1221 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1222 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1223 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1224 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1227 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1230 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1231 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1232 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1234 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1238 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1239 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1240 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1241 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1242 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1246 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1247 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1248 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1249 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1253 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1254 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1255 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1256 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1257 if script.len() == 0 {
1260 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1263 Some(script.clone())
1266 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1267 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1273 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1274 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1277 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1278 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1283 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1284 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1286 let chan = Channel {
1289 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1290 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1292 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1297 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1299 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1300 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1301 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1304 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1307 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1308 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1310 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1311 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1312 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1314 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1315 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1316 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1317 pending_update_fee: None,
1318 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1319 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1320 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1321 update_time_counter: 1,
1323 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1325 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1326 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1327 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1328 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1329 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1330 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1332 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1333 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1334 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1335 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1337 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1338 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1339 closing_fee_limits: None,
1340 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1342 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1344 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1345 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1346 short_channel_id: None,
1347 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1349 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1350 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1351 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1352 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1353 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1354 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1355 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1356 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1357 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1358 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1359 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1360 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1362 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1364 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1365 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1366 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1367 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1368 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1369 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1370 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1372 funding_outpoint: None,
1373 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1375 funding_transaction: None,
1377 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1378 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1379 counterparty_node_id,
1381 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1383 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1385 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1386 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1388 announcement_sigs: None,
1390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1391 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1392 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1393 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1395 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1397 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1398 outbound_scid_alias,
1400 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1401 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1409 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1410 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1411 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1412 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1413 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1415 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1416 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1417 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1418 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1419 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1420 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1421 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1423 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1424 where L::Target: Logger
1426 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1427 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1428 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1430 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1431 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1432 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1433 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1435 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1436 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1437 if match update_state {
1438 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1439 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1440 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1441 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1442 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1444 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1448 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1449 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1450 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1451 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1453 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1454 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1455 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1457 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1458 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1459 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1460 transaction_output_index: None
1465 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1466 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1467 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1468 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1469 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1472 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1474 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1475 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1476 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1478 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1479 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1482 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1483 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1486 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1488 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1489 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1490 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1492 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1493 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1499 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1500 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1501 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1502 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1503 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1504 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1505 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1509 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1510 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1512 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1514 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1515 if generated_by_local {
1516 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1517 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1526 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1528 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1529 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1530 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1531 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1532 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1533 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1534 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1537 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1538 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1539 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1540 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1544 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1545 preimages.push(preimage);
1549 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1550 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1552 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1554 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1555 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1557 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1558 if !generated_by_local {
1559 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1567 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1568 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1569 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1570 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1571 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1572 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1573 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1574 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1576 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1578 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1579 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1580 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1581 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1583 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1585 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1586 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1587 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1588 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1591 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1592 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1593 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1594 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1596 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1599 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1600 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1601 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1602 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1604 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1607 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1608 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1613 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1614 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1619 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1621 let channel_parameters =
1622 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1623 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1624 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1627 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1632 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1635 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1636 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1637 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1638 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1640 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1641 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1642 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1650 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1651 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1657 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1658 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1659 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1660 // outside of those situations will fail.
1661 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1665 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1670 1 + // script length (0)
1674 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1675 2 + // witness marker and flag
1676 1 + // witness element count
1677 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1678 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1679 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1680 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1681 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1682 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1684 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1685 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1686 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1692 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1693 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1694 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1695 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1697 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1698 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1699 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1701 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1702 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1703 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1704 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1705 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1706 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1709 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1710 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1713 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1714 value_to_holder = 0;
1717 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1718 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1719 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1720 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1722 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1723 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1726 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1727 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1731 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1732 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1733 /// our counterparty!)
1734 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1735 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1736 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1737 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1738 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1739 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1740 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1742 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1746 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1747 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1748 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1749 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1750 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1751 //may see payments to it!
1752 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1753 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1754 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1756 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1759 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1760 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1761 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1762 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1763 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1766 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1769 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1770 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1772 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1774 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1775 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1776 where L::Target: Logger {
1777 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1778 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1779 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1780 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1781 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1782 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1783 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1784 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1788 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1789 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1790 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1791 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1793 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1794 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1796 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1798 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1800 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1801 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1802 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1804 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1805 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1806 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1807 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1808 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1810 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1811 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1812 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1814 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1815 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1817 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1820 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1821 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1825 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1829 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1830 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1831 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1832 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1833 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1834 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1837 // Now update local state:
1839 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1840 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1841 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1842 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1843 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1844 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1845 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1849 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1850 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1851 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1852 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1853 // do not not get into this branch.
1854 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1855 match pending_update {
1856 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1857 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1858 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1859 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1860 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1861 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1862 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1865 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1866 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1867 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1868 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1869 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1870 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1871 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1877 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1878 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1879 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1881 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1882 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1883 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1885 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1886 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1889 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1890 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1892 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1893 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1895 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1896 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1899 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1902 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1903 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1904 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1905 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1910 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1911 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1912 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1913 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1914 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1917 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1918 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1919 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1920 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1921 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1923 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1924 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1925 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1929 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1930 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1931 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1932 /// before we fail backwards.
1933 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1934 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1935 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1936 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1937 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1939 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1941 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1942 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1943 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1945 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1946 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1947 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1949 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1950 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1951 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1953 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1958 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1959 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1965 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1966 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1967 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1968 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1969 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1973 // Now update local state:
1974 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1975 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1976 match pending_update {
1977 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1978 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1979 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1980 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1984 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1985 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1986 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1987 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1993 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1994 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1995 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2001 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2003 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2004 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2007 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2008 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2009 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2014 // Message handlers:
2016 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2017 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2019 // Check sanity of message fields:
2020 if !self.is_outbound() {
2021 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2023 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2024 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2026 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2029 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2032 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2035 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2037 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2039 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2040 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2043 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2044 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2047 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2050 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2054 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2055 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2058 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2061 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2064 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2067 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2068 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2070 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2073 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2077 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2078 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2081 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2082 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2084 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2087 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2088 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2089 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2090 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2091 if script.len() == 0 {
2094 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2097 Some(script.clone())
2100 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2101 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2107 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2108 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2109 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2110 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2111 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2113 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2114 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2116 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2119 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2120 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2121 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2122 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2123 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2124 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2127 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2128 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2129 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2132 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2133 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2135 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2136 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2141 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2142 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2144 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2145 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2147 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2148 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2149 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2150 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2151 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2152 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2153 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2154 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2155 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2158 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2159 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2161 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2162 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2163 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2164 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2166 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2167 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2169 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2170 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2173 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2174 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2177 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2178 if self.is_outbound() {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2181 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2182 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2183 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2187 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2190 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2191 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2192 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2193 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2196 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2197 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2198 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2199 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2200 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2202 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2204 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2205 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2209 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2210 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2211 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2215 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2216 initial_commitment_tx,
2219 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2220 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2223 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2224 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2226 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2228 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2229 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2230 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2231 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2232 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2233 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2234 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2235 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2236 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2238 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2240 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2242 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2243 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2244 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2245 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2247 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2249 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2250 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2252 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2255 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2256 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2257 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2258 if !self.is_outbound() {
2259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2261 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2264 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2265 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2266 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2267 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2270 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2272 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2273 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2274 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2275 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2277 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2278 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2280 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2281 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2283 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2284 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2285 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2286 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2287 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2292 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2293 initial_commitment_tx,
2296 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2297 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2300 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2301 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2304 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2305 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2306 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2307 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2308 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2309 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2310 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2311 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2312 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2313 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2315 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2317 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2319 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2320 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2321 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2322 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2324 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2326 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2329 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2330 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2332 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2333 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2334 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2335 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2338 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2339 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2340 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2341 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2342 // when routing outbound payments.
2343 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2347 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2349 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2350 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2351 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2352 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2353 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2354 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 ||
2355 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2356 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2357 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2359 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2360 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2361 let expected_point =
2362 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2363 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2365 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2367 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2368 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2369 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2370 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2371 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2373 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2381 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2382 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2384 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2386 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2389 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2390 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2391 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2392 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2398 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2399 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2400 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2401 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2402 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2403 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2404 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2405 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2406 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2409 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2412 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2413 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2414 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2416 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2417 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2418 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2419 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2420 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2421 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2423 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2424 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2430 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2431 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2432 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2433 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2434 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2435 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2436 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2437 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2438 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2441 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2444 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2445 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2446 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2448 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2449 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2450 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2451 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2452 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2453 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2455 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2456 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2460 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2461 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2462 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2463 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2464 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2465 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2466 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2468 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2469 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2471 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2478 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2479 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2480 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2481 /// corner case properly.
2482 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2483 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2484 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2486 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2487 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2488 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2489 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2492 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2494 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2495 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2496 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2499 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2500 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2501 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2502 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2504 outbound_capacity_msat,
2505 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2506 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2507 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2513 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2514 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2517 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2518 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2519 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2520 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2521 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2522 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2525 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2526 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2528 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2529 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2532 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2533 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2534 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2536 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2537 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2539 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2542 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2543 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2545 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2546 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2548 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2549 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2551 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2552 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2556 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2557 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2563 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2564 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2565 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2568 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2569 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2570 included_htlcs += 1;
2573 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2574 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2578 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2579 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2580 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2581 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2582 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2583 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2588 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2590 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2591 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2596 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2597 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2601 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2602 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2603 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2606 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2607 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2609 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2610 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2611 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2613 total_pending_htlcs,
2614 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2615 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2616 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2618 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2619 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2620 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2622 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2624 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2629 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2630 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2631 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2633 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2634 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2636 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2639 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2640 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2642 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2643 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2645 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2646 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2648 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2649 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2653 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2654 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2660 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2661 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2662 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2663 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2664 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2665 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2668 included_htlcs += 1;
2671 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2675 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2676 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2678 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2679 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2680 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2685 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2686 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2690 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2691 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2693 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2694 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2696 total_pending_htlcs,
2697 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2698 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2699 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2701 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2702 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2703 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2705 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2707 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2712 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2713 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2714 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2715 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2716 if local_sent_shutdown {
2717 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2719 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2720 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2721 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2724 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2727 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2730 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2733 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2734 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2737 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2738 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2739 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2742 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2743 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2745 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2746 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2747 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2748 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2749 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2750 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2751 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2752 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2753 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2754 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2755 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2757 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2758 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2759 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2760 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2761 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2762 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2766 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2769 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2770 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2771 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2773 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2774 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2775 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2776 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2777 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2778 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2779 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2783 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2784 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2785 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2786 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2787 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2788 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2789 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2793 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2794 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2795 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2796 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2797 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2801 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2802 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2803 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2804 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2805 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2807 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2811 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2815 if !self.is_outbound() {
2816 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2817 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2818 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2819 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2820 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2821 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2822 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2823 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2824 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2825 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2826 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2827 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2828 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2829 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2830 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2833 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2834 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2835 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2836 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2840 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2843 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2847 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2848 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2849 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2853 // Now update local state:
2854 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2855 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2856 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2857 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2858 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2859 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2860 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2865 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2867 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2868 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2869 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2870 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2871 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2872 None => fail_reason.into(),
2873 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2874 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2875 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2878 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2882 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2884 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2885 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2887 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2893 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2896 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2897 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2900 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2904 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2907 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2908 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2911 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2915 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2919 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2920 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2927 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2931 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2932 where L::Target: Logger
2934 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2935 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2937 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2938 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2940 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2941 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2944 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2946 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2948 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2949 let commitment_txid = {
2950 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2951 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2952 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2954 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2955 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2956 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2957 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2958 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2959 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2963 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2965 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2966 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2967 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2968 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2971 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2972 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2973 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2974 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2977 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2979 if self.is_outbound() {
2980 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2981 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2982 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2983 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2984 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2985 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2986 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2987 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2988 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2989 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2995 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2996 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
2999 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3000 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3001 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3002 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3003 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3004 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3005 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3007 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3008 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3009 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3010 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3011 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3012 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3013 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3014 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3016 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3018 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3022 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3023 commitment_stats.tx,
3025 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3026 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3027 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3030 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3031 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3032 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3033 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3035 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3036 let mut need_commitment = false;
3037 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3038 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3039 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3040 need_commitment = true;
3044 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3045 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3046 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3047 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3048 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3049 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3053 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3054 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3055 Some(forward_info.clone())
3057 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3058 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3059 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3060 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3061 need_commitment = true;
3064 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3065 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3066 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3067 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3068 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3069 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3070 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3071 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3072 need_commitment = true;
3076 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3077 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3078 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3079 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3081 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3082 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3083 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3084 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3085 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3086 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3087 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3088 // includes the right HTLCs.
3089 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3090 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3091 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3092 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3093 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3094 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3096 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3097 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3098 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3101 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3102 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3103 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3104 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3105 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3106 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3107 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3108 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3109 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3113 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3114 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3116 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3117 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3118 per_commitment_secret,
3119 next_per_commitment_point,
3120 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3123 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3124 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3125 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3126 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3127 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
3128 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3129 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3130 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3133 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3134 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3135 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3136 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3137 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3138 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3139 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3141 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3142 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3143 updates: Vec::new(),
3146 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3147 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3148 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3149 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3150 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3151 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3152 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3153 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3154 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3155 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3156 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3157 // to rebalance channels.
3158 match &htlc_update {
3159 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3160 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3161 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3164 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3165 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3166 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3167 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3168 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3169 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3170 // into the holding cell without ever being
3171 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3172 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3173 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3176 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3182 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3183 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3184 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3185 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3186 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3187 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3188 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3189 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3190 (msg, monitor_update)
3191 } else { unreachable!() };
3192 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3193 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3195 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3196 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3197 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3198 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3199 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3200 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3201 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3202 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3203 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3206 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3208 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3215 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3216 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3218 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3219 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3224 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3225 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3226 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3227 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3228 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3230 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3231 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3232 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3234 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3236 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3238 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3241 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3243 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3247 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3248 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3249 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3250 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3251 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3252 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3253 where L::Target: Logger,
3255 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3258 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3261 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3265 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3267 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3268 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3273 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3274 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3275 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3276 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3277 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3278 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3279 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3280 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3284 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3286 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3287 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3290 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3291 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3293 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3295 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3296 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3297 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3298 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3299 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3300 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3301 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3302 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3306 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3307 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3308 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3309 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3310 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3311 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3312 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3313 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3315 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3316 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3319 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3320 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3321 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3322 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3323 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3324 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3325 let mut require_commitment = false;
3326 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3329 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3330 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3331 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3333 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3334 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3335 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3336 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3337 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3338 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3343 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3344 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3345 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3346 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3347 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3349 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3350 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3351 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3356 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3357 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3359 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3363 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3364 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3366 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3367 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3368 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3369 require_commitment = true;
3370 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3371 match forward_info {
3372 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3373 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3374 require_commitment = true;
3376 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3377 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3378 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3380 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3381 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3382 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3386 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3387 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3388 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3389 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3395 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3396 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3397 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3398 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3400 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3401 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3402 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3403 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3404 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3405 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3406 require_commitment = true;
3410 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3412 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3413 match update_state {
3414 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3415 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3416 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3417 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3418 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3420 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3421 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3422 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3423 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3424 require_commitment = true;
3425 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3426 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3431 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3432 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3433 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3434 if require_commitment {
3435 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3436 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3437 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3438 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3439 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3440 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3441 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3442 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3443 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3445 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3446 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3447 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3448 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3449 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3450 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3451 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3453 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3457 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3458 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3459 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3460 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3461 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3463 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3464 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3465 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3468 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3469 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3470 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3471 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3474 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3475 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3476 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3477 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3479 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3482 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3483 if require_commitment {
3484 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3486 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3487 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3488 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3489 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3491 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3492 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3494 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3495 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3496 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3498 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3502 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3503 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3504 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3507 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3509 commitment_update: None,
3510 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3511 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3512 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3519 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3520 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3521 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3522 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3523 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3524 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3525 if !self.is_outbound() {
3526 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3528 if !self.is_usable() {
3529 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3531 if !self.is_live() {
3532 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3535 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3536 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3537 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3538 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3539 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3540 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3541 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3542 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3543 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3544 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3548 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3549 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3550 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3551 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3552 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3555 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3556 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3560 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3561 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3565 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3566 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3568 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3569 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3574 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3575 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3576 Some(update_fee) => {
3577 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3578 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3584 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3585 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3587 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3589 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3590 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3591 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3592 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3596 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3597 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3598 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3602 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3603 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3606 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3607 // will be retransmitted.
3608 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3609 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3610 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3612 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3613 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3615 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3616 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3617 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3618 // this HTLC accordingly
3619 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3622 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3623 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3624 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3625 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3628 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3629 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3630 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3631 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3632 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3633 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3638 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3640 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3641 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3642 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3643 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3647 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3648 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3649 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3650 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3651 // the update upon reconnection.
3652 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3656 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3657 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3660 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3661 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3662 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3663 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3664 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3665 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3667 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3668 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3669 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3670 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3671 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3672 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3674 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3675 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3676 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3677 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3678 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3679 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3680 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3683 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3684 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3685 /// to the remote side.
3686 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3687 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3688 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3690 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3691 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3692 // first received the funding_signed.
3693 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3694 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3695 self.funding_transaction.take()
3697 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3698 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3699 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3700 funding_broadcastable = None;
3703 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3704 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3705 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3706 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3707 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3708 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3709 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3710 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3711 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3712 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3713 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3714 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3715 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3716 next_per_commitment_point,
3717 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3721 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3723 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3724 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3725 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3726 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3727 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3728 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3730 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3731 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3732 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3733 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3734 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3735 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3739 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3740 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3742 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3743 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3746 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3747 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3748 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3749 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3750 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3751 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3752 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3753 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3754 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3758 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3759 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3761 if self.is_outbound() {
3762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3764 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3767 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3768 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3770 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3771 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3772 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3773 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3774 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3775 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3776 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3777 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3778 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3779 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3780 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3781 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3782 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3784 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3785 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3786 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3792 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3793 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3794 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3795 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3796 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3797 per_commitment_secret,
3798 next_per_commitment_point,
3802 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3803 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3804 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3805 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3806 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3808 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3809 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3810 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3811 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3812 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3813 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3814 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3815 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3816 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3821 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3822 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3824 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3825 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3826 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3827 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3828 reason: err_packet.clone()
3831 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3832 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3833 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3834 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3835 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3836 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3839 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3840 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3841 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3842 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3843 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3850 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3851 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3852 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3853 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3857 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3858 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3859 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3860 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3861 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3862 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3866 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3867 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3869 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3870 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3871 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3872 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3873 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3874 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3875 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3876 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3877 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3878 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3879 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3883 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3884 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3888 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3889 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3890 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3891 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3892 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3893 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3894 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3897 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3898 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3899 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3900 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3901 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3904 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3905 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3906 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3907 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3908 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3909 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3910 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3911 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3914 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3918 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3919 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3920 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3921 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3923 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3927 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3928 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3929 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3931 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3932 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3933 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3934 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3935 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3939 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3941 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3942 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3943 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3944 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3945 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3948 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3949 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3950 channel_ready: None,
3951 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3952 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3953 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3954 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3958 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3959 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3960 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3961 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3962 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3963 next_per_commitment_point,
3964 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3966 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3967 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3968 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3969 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3973 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3974 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3975 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3977 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3978 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3979 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3982 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3988 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3989 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3990 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3991 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3992 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3994 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3995 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3996 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3997 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3998 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3999 next_per_commitment_point,
4000 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4004 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4005 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4006 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4008 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4011 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
4012 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
4013 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
4014 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
4016 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
4017 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
4018 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
4019 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
4020 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4021 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4022 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4023 raa: required_revoke,
4024 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
4025 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4026 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
4027 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4030 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4031 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4032 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4033 raa: required_revoke,
4034 commitment_update: None,
4035 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4037 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4042 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4043 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4044 raa: required_revoke,
4045 commitment_update: None,
4046 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4048 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4051 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4052 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4053 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4055 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4058 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4059 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4060 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4061 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4062 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
4063 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4064 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4067 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4068 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4069 raa: required_revoke,
4070 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4071 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4073 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4077 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4081 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4082 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4083 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4084 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4086 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4088 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4090 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4091 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4092 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4093 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4094 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4095 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4097 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4098 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4099 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4100 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4101 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4103 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4104 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4105 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4106 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4109 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4110 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4111 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4112 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4113 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4114 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4115 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4116 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4117 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4118 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4119 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4120 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4121 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4122 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4123 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4125 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4128 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4129 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4132 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4133 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4134 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4135 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4136 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4137 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4138 self.channel_state &
4139 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4140 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4141 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4142 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4145 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4146 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4147 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4148 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4149 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4150 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4153 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4159 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4160 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4161 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4162 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4164 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4165 return Ok((None, None));
4168 if !self.is_outbound() {
4169 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4170 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4172 return Ok((None, None));
4175 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4177 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4178 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4179 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4180 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4182 let sig = self.holder_signer
4183 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4184 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4186 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4187 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4188 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4189 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4191 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4192 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4193 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4198 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4199 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4200 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4201 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
4203 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4206 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4207 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4208 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4209 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4212 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4213 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4217 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4219 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4220 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4223 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4224 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4225 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4228 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4231 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4232 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4233 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4234 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4236 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4239 assert!(send_shutdown);
4240 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4241 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4244 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4249 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4251 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4252 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4254 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4255 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4256 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4257 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4258 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4259 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4263 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4264 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4265 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4266 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4270 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4271 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4272 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4273 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4274 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4275 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4277 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4278 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4285 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4286 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4288 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4291 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4292 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4294 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4296 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4297 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4298 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4299 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4300 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4301 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4302 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4303 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4304 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4306 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4307 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4310 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4314 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4315 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4316 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4317 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4319 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4322 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4325 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4328 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4332 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4336 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4337 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4338 return Ok((None, None));
4341 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4342 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4343 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4346 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4348 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4351 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4352 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4353 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4354 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4355 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4359 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4360 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4365 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4366 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4367 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4368 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4369 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4370 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4371 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4375 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4377 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4378 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4379 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4380 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4382 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4385 let sig = self.holder_signer
4386 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4387 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4389 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4390 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4391 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4392 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4396 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4397 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4398 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4399 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4401 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4402 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4403 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4409 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4410 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4413 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4416 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4420 if !self.is_outbound() {
4421 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4422 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4423 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4424 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4426 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4428 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4430 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4431 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4434 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4435 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4436 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4437 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4438 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4439 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4440 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4441 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4446 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4447 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4448 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4449 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4455 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4456 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4457 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4458 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4460 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4466 // Public utilities:
4468 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4472 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4476 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4477 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4478 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4482 /// Gets the channel's type
4483 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4487 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4488 /// is_usable() returns true).
4489 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4490 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4491 self.short_channel_id
4494 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4495 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4496 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4499 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4500 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4501 self.outbound_scid_alias
4503 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4504 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4505 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4506 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4507 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4510 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4511 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4512 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4513 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4516 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4517 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4520 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4521 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4524 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4525 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4526 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4529 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4530 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4533 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4534 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4535 self.counterparty_node_id
4538 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4539 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4540 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4543 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4544 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4545 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4548 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4549 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4551 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4552 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4553 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4554 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4556 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4560 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4561 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4562 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4565 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4566 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4567 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4570 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4571 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4572 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4574 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4575 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4580 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4581 self.channel_value_satoshis
4584 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4585 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4588 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4589 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4592 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4593 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4596 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4597 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4598 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4601 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4602 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4603 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4604 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4605 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4608 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4610 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4611 self.prev_config = None;
4615 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4616 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4620 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4621 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4622 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4623 let did_channel_update =
4624 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4625 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4626 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4627 if did_channel_update {
4628 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4629 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4630 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4631 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4633 self.config.options = *config;
4637 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4638 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4639 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4640 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4641 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4642 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4643 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4645 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4646 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4649 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4651 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4652 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4658 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4659 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4660 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4661 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4662 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4663 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4664 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4666 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4667 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4674 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4678 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4679 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4680 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4681 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4682 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4683 // which are near the dust limit.
4684 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4685 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4686 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4687 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4688 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4690 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4691 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4693 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4696 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4697 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4700 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4701 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4704 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4705 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4709 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4714 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4716 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4717 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4718 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4719 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4720 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4721 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4723 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4725 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4733 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4734 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4738 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4739 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4740 self.update_time_counter
4743 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4744 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4747 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4748 self.config.announced_channel
4751 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4752 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4755 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4756 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4757 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4758 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4761 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4762 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4763 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4766 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4767 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4768 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4769 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4770 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4773 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4774 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4775 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4776 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4777 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4780 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4781 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4782 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4783 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4786 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4787 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4788 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4791 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4792 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4793 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4795 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4796 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4797 if self.channel_state &
4798 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4799 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4800 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4801 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4802 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4805 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4806 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4807 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4808 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4809 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4810 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4812 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4813 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4814 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4816 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4817 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4818 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4819 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4820 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4821 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4827 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4828 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4829 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
4832 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4833 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4834 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4837 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4838 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4839 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4842 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4843 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4844 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4845 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4846 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4847 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4852 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4853 self.channel_update_status
4856 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4857 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4858 self.channel_update_status = status;
4861 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4863 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4864 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4865 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4869 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4870 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4871 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4874 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4878 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4879 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4880 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4882 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4883 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4884 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4886 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4887 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4890 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4891 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4892 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4893 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4894 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4895 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4896 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4897 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4898 self.channel_state);
4900 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4904 if need_commitment_update {
4905 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4906 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4907 let next_per_commitment_point =
4908 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4909 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4910 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4911 next_per_commitment_point,
4912 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4916 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4922 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4923 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4924 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4925 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4926 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4927 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4928 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4929 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4930 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4931 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4932 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4933 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4934 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4935 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4936 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4937 if self.is_outbound() {
4938 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4939 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4940 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4941 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4942 // channel and move on.
4943 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4944 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4946 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4947 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4948 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4950 if self.is_outbound() {
4951 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4952 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4953 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4954 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4955 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4956 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4960 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4961 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4962 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4963 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4964 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4968 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4969 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4970 // may have already happened for this block).
4971 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4972 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4973 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4974 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4977 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4978 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4979 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4980 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4988 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4989 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4990 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4991 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4993 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4994 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4997 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4999 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5000 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5001 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5004 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5005 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5006 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5007 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5008 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5010 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5011 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5013 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5014 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5015 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5023 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5025 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5026 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5027 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5029 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5030 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5033 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5034 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
5035 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5036 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5037 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5038 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5039 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5040 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5041 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5044 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5045 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5046 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5047 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5049 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5050 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5051 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5053 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5054 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5055 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5056 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5058 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5059 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5060 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5061 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5062 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
5063 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5064 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5067 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5068 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5070 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5073 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5074 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5075 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5076 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5077 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5078 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5079 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5080 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5081 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5082 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5083 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5084 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5085 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5086 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5087 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5088 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5089 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5095 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5100 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5101 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5103 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5104 if !self.is_outbound() {
5105 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5107 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5108 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5111 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5112 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5115 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5116 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5120 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5121 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5122 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5123 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5124 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5125 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5126 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5127 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5128 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5129 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5130 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5131 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5132 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5133 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5134 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5135 first_per_commitment_point,
5136 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5137 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5138 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5139 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5141 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5145 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5146 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5149 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5150 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5151 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5152 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5155 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5156 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5158 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5159 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5160 if self.is_outbound() {
5161 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5163 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5164 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5166 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5167 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5169 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5170 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5173 self.user_id = user_id;
5174 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5176 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5179 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5180 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5181 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5183 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5184 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5185 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5186 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5188 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5189 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5190 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5191 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5192 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5193 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5194 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5195 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5196 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5197 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5198 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5199 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5200 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5201 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5202 first_per_commitment_point,
5203 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5204 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5205 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5207 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5211 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5212 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5214 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5216 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5217 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5220 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5221 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5222 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5223 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5224 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5225 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5228 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5229 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5230 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5231 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5232 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5233 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5234 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5235 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5236 if !self.is_outbound() {
5237 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5239 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5240 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5242 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5243 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5244 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5245 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5248 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5249 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5251 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5254 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5255 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5260 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5262 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5264 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5265 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5266 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5268 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5269 temporary_channel_id,
5270 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5271 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5276 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5277 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5278 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5279 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5281 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5284 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5285 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5286 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5287 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5289 if !self.is_usable() {
5290 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5293 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5295 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5296 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5298 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5299 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5300 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5301 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5302 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5303 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5309 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5310 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5311 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5315 if !self.is_usable() {
5319 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5320 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5324 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5328 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5329 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5332 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5336 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5338 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5343 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5345 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5346 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5347 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5348 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5349 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5353 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5355 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5356 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5357 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5359 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5360 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5361 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5362 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5363 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5364 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5365 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5366 contents: announcement,
5369 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5373 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5374 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5375 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5376 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5377 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5379 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5381 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5382 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5383 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5384 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5386 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5387 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5388 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5389 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5392 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5393 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5394 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5395 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5398 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5401 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5402 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5403 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5404 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5407 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5409 Err(_) => return None,
5411 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5412 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5417 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5418 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5419 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5420 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5421 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5422 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5423 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5424 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5425 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5426 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5427 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5428 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5429 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5430 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5431 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5432 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5433 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5434 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5435 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5438 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5439 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5440 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5441 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5444 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5445 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5446 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5447 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5448 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5449 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5450 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5451 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5453 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5454 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5455 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5456 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5457 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5458 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5459 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5460 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5461 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5463 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5469 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5471 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5472 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5474 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5476 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5477 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5479 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5480 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5481 /// regenerate them.
5483 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5485 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5486 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5487 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5488 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5490 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5491 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5492 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5495 if amount_msat == 0 {
5496 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5499 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5500 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5503 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5504 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5505 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5506 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5507 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5508 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5509 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5510 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5513 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5514 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5515 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5516 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5518 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5519 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5520 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5523 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5524 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5525 if !self.is_outbound() {
5526 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5527 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5528 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5529 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5530 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5531 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5535 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5538 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5539 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5540 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5542 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5543 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5544 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5545 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5546 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5547 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5551 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5552 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5553 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5554 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5555 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5556 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5560 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5561 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5562 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5565 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5566 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5567 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5568 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5570 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5571 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5574 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5575 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5576 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5577 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5578 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5581 // Now update local state:
5582 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5583 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5588 onion_routing_packet,
5593 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5594 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5596 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5598 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5602 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5603 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5604 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5608 onion_routing_packet,
5610 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5615 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5616 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5617 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5618 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5619 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5620 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5621 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5623 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5624 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5626 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5627 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5629 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5630 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5632 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5633 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5634 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5635 have_updates = true;
5637 if have_updates { break; }
5639 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5640 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5641 have_updates = true;
5643 if have_updates { break; }
5646 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5648 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5650 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5651 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5652 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5653 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5654 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5656 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5657 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5658 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5660 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5661 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5665 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5666 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5667 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5668 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5669 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5670 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5671 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5674 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5675 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5676 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5677 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5678 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5679 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5682 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5684 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5685 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5686 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5687 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5688 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5689 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5691 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5694 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5695 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5698 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5699 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5700 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5701 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5702 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5703 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5704 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5705 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5708 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5709 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5712 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5713 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5714 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5715 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5716 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5717 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5718 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5722 if !self.is_outbound() {
5723 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5724 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5725 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5726 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5727 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5728 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5729 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5730 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5731 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5732 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5739 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5740 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5744 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5745 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5747 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5749 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5750 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5751 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5752 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5754 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5755 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5756 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5757 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5758 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5759 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5763 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5764 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5767 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5770 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5771 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5772 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5774 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5775 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5776 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5777 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5778 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5784 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5785 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5786 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5789 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5790 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5793 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5794 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5795 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5796 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5802 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5803 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5804 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5805 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5806 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5807 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5808 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5809 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5812 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5813 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5814 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5816 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5817 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5820 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5821 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5822 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5825 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5828 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5829 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5830 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5832 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5837 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5838 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5839 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5840 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5842 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5844 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5846 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5847 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5848 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5849 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5850 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5851 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5855 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5856 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5857 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5860 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5861 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5862 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5863 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5864 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5866 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5867 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5874 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5877 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5878 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5879 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5880 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5881 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5882 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5883 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5884 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5885 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5886 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5887 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5889 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5890 // return them to fail the payment.
5891 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5892 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5893 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5895 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5896 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5901 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5902 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5903 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5904 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5905 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5906 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5907 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5908 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5909 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5910 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5911 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5912 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5913 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5918 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5919 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5920 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5924 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5925 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5927 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5933 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5934 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5935 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5936 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5937 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5939 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5940 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5941 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5942 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5948 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5949 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5950 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5951 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5952 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5953 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5958 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5959 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5960 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5961 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5963 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5964 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5965 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5966 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5971 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5972 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5973 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5974 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5975 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5976 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5981 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5982 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5983 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5986 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5988 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
5990 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
5991 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
5992 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
5993 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
5995 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5996 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5997 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5999 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6001 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6002 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6003 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6004 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6005 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6006 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6008 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6009 // deserialized from that format.
6010 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6011 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6012 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6014 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6016 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6017 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6018 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6020 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6021 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6022 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6023 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6026 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6027 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6028 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6031 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6032 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6033 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6034 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6036 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6037 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6039 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6041 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6043 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6045 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6048 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6050 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6055 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6057 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6058 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6059 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6060 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6061 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6062 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6063 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6065 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6067 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6069 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6072 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6073 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6074 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6077 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6079 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6080 preimages.push(preimage);
6082 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6083 reason.write(writer)?;
6085 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6087 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6088 preimages.push(preimage);
6090 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6091 reason.write(writer)?;
6096 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6097 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6099 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6101 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6102 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6103 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6104 source.write(writer)?;
6105 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6107 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6109 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6110 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6112 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6114 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6115 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6120 match self.resend_order {
6121 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6122 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6125 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6126 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6127 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6129 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6130 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6131 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6132 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6135 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6136 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6137 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6138 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6139 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6142 if self.is_outbound() {
6143 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6144 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6145 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6147 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6148 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6149 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6151 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6153 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6154 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6155 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6156 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6158 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6159 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6160 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6161 // consider the stale state on reload.
6164 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6165 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6166 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6168 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6169 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6170 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6172 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6173 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6175 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6176 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6177 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6179 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6180 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6182 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6185 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6186 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6187 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6189 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6192 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6193 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6195 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6196 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6197 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6199 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6201 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6203 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6205 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6206 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6207 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6208 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6209 htlc.write(writer)?;
6212 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6213 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6214 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6216 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6217 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6219 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6220 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6221 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6222 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6223 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6224 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6225 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6227 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6228 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6229 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6230 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6231 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6233 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6234 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6235 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6236 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6237 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6238 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6239 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6241 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6242 (2, chan_type, option),
6243 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6244 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6245 (5, self.config, required),
6246 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6247 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6248 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6249 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6250 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6251 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6252 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6253 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6254 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6261 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6262 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
6263 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
6264 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6265 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6266 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6268 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6270 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6272 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6273 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6274 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6275 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6276 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6278 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6279 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6282 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6283 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6284 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6286 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6288 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6289 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6290 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6291 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6292 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6293 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6294 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6295 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6297 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6299 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6300 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6301 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6304 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6306 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6307 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6310 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6311 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6312 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6313 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6314 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6315 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6316 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6317 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6318 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6319 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6320 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6321 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6322 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6323 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6328 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6329 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6330 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6331 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6332 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6333 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6334 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6335 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6336 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6337 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6338 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6339 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6341 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6342 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6345 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6346 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6349 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6350 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6352 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6357 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6358 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6359 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6360 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6361 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6362 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6363 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6364 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6365 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6366 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6368 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6369 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6370 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6372 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6373 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6374 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6376 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6380 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6381 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6382 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6383 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6386 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6387 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6390 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6391 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6392 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6393 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6396 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6397 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6398 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6399 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6402 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6404 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6406 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6407 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6408 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6409 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6411 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6412 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6413 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6414 // consider the stale state on reload.
6415 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6418 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6419 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6420 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6422 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6425 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6426 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6427 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6430 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6431 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6432 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6434 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6435 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6437 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6438 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6441 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6442 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6444 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6446 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6447 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6449 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6450 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6455 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6456 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6457 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6458 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6460 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6463 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6466 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6474 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6476 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6477 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6478 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6480 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6481 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6482 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6486 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6487 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6488 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6490 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6496 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6497 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6498 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6499 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6500 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6501 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6502 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6503 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6504 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6505 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6507 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6508 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6509 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6510 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6511 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6513 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6514 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6515 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6516 (2, channel_type, option),
6517 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6518 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6519 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6520 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6521 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6522 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6523 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6524 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6525 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6526 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6527 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6528 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6531 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6532 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6533 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6535 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6536 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6538 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6539 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6544 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6545 if iter.next().is_some() {
6546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6550 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6551 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6552 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6553 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6554 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6557 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6558 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6559 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6562 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6563 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6568 config: config.unwrap(),
6572 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6573 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6574 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6578 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6580 channel_value_satoshis,
6582 latest_monitor_update_id,
6585 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6588 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6589 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6592 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6593 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6594 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6598 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6599 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6600 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6601 monitor_pending_forwards,
6602 monitor_pending_failures,
6603 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6606 holding_cell_update_fee,
6607 next_holder_htlc_id,
6608 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6609 update_time_counter,
6612 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6613 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6614 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6615 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6617 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6618 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6619 closing_fee_limits: None,
6620 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6622 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6624 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6625 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6627 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6629 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6630 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6631 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6632 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6633 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6634 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6635 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6636 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6637 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6640 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6642 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6643 funding_transaction,
6645 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6646 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6647 counterparty_node_id,
6649 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6653 channel_update_status,
6654 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6658 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6659 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6660 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6661 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6663 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6665 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6666 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6667 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6669 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6670 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6672 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6680 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6681 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6682 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6683 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6684 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6686 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6687 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6688 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6689 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6690 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6691 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6692 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6693 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6694 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6695 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6696 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6697 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6698 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6699 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6700 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6701 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6702 use crate::util::test_utils;
6703 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6704 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6705 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6706 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6707 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6708 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6709 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6710 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6711 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6712 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6713 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6714 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6715 use crate::prelude::*;
6717 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6720 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6721 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6727 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6728 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6729 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6730 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6734 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6735 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6736 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6737 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6738 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6739 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator, u32::max_value()).is_err());
6743 signer: InMemorySigner,
6745 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6746 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6748 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6749 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6750 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6751 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6752 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6753 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6754 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6755 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6758 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6759 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6760 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6761 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6764 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6767 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6768 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6769 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6772 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6773 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6774 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6778 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6779 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6780 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6781 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6783 let seed = [42; 32];
6784 let network = Network::Testnet;
6785 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6786 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6787 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6790 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6791 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6792 let config = UserConfig::default();
6793 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6794 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6795 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6797 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6798 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6802 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6803 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6805 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6806 let original_fee = 253;
6807 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6808 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6810 let seed = [42; 32];
6811 let network = Network::Testnet;
6812 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6814 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6815 let config = UserConfig::default();
6816 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6818 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6819 // same as the old fee.
6820 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6821 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6822 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6826 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6827 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6828 // dust limits are used.
6829 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6830 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6831 let seed = [42; 32];
6832 let network = Network::Testnet;
6833 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6834 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6836 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6837 // they have different dust limits.
6839 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6840 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6841 let config = UserConfig::default();
6842 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6844 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6845 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6846 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6847 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6848 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6850 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6851 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6852 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6853 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6854 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6856 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6857 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6858 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6860 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6861 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6862 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6863 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6866 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6868 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6869 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6870 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6871 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6872 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6874 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6875 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6876 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6877 payment_secret: None,
6878 payment_params: None,
6882 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6883 // the dust limit check.
6884 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6885 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6886 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6887 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6889 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6890 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6891 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6892 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6893 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6894 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6895 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6899 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6900 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6901 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6902 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6903 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6904 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6905 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6906 let seed = [42; 32];
6907 let network = Network::Testnet;
6908 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6910 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6911 let config = UserConfig::default();
6912 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6914 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6915 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6917 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6918 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6919 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6920 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6921 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6922 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6924 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6925 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6926 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6927 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6928 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6930 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6932 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6933 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6934 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6935 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6936 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6938 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6939 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6940 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6941 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6942 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6946 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6947 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6948 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6949 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6950 let seed = [42; 32];
6951 let network = Network::Testnet;
6952 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6953 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6954 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6956 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6958 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6959 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6960 let config = UserConfig::default();
6961 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6963 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6964 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6965 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6966 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6968 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6969 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6970 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6972 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6973 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6974 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6975 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
6977 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
6978 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
6979 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
6981 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
6982 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
6984 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
6985 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
6986 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6987 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6988 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6989 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6990 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6991 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6992 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6997 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
6999 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7000 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7001 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7002 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7003 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7004 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7005 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7012 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7013 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7014 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7015 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7016 let seed = [42; 32];
7017 let network = Network::Testnet;
7018 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7019 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7020 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7022 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7023 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7024 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7025 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7026 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7027 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7028 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7029 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7031 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7032 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7033 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7034 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7035 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7036 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7038 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7039 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7040 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7041 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7043 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7045 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7046 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7047 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7048 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7049 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7050 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7052 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7053 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7054 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7055 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7057 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7058 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7059 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7060 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7061 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7063 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7064 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7066 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7067 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7068 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7070 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7071 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7072 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7073 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7074 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7076 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7077 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7079 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7080 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7081 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7085 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7087 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7088 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7089 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7091 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7092 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7093 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7094 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7096 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7097 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7098 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7100 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7102 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7103 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7106 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7107 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7108 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7109 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7110 let seed = [42; 32];
7111 let network = Network::Testnet;
7112 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7113 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7114 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7117 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7118 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7119 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7121 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7122 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7124 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7125 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7126 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7128 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7129 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7131 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7133 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7134 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7136 // Channel Negotiations failed
7137 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7138 assert!(result.is_err());
7143 fn channel_update() {
7144 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7145 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7146 let seed = [42; 32];
7147 let network = Network::Testnet;
7148 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7149 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7151 // Create a channel.
7152 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7153 let config = UserConfig::default();
7154 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7155 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7156 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7157 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7159 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7160 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7161 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7163 short_channel_id: 0,
7166 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7167 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7168 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7170 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7171 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7173 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7175 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7177 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7178 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7179 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7180 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7182 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7183 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7184 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7186 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7190 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7192 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7193 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7194 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7195 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7196 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7197 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7198 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7199 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7200 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7201 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7202 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7203 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7204 use crate::sync::Arc;
7206 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7207 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7208 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7209 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7211 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7213 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7214 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7215 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7216 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7217 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7218 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7220 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7221 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7226 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7227 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7228 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7230 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7231 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7232 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7233 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7234 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7235 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7237 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7239 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7240 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7241 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7242 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7243 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7244 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7246 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7247 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7248 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7249 selected_contest_delay: 144
7251 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7252 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7254 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7255 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7257 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7258 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7260 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7261 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7263 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7264 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7265 // build_commitment_transaction.
7266 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7267 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7268 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7269 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7270 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7272 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7273 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7274 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7275 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7279 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7280 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7281 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7282 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7286 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7287 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7288 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7290 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7291 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7293 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7294 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7296 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7298 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7299 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7300 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7301 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7302 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7303 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7304 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7306 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7307 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7308 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7309 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7311 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7312 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7313 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7315 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7317 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7318 commitment_tx.clone(),
7319 counterparty_signature,
7320 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7321 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7322 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7324 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7325 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7327 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7328 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7329 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7331 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7332 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7335 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7336 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7338 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7339 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7340 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7341 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7342 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7343 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7344 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7345 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7347 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7350 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7351 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7352 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7356 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7359 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7360 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7361 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7363 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7364 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7365 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7366 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7367 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7368 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7369 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7370 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7372 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7376 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7377 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7379 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7380 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7381 "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", {});
7383 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7384 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7385 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7386 "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", {});
7388 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7389 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7391 amount_msat: 1000000,
7393 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7394 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7396 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7399 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7400 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7402 amount_msat: 2000000,
7404 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7405 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7407 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7410 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7411 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7413 amount_msat: 2000000,
7415 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7416 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7417 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7419 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7422 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7423 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7425 amount_msat: 3000000,
7427 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7428 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7429 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7431 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7434 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7435 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7437 amount_msat: 4000000,
7439 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7440 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7442 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7446 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7447 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7448 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7450 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7451 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7452 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7455 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7456 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7457 "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" },
7460 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7461 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7462 "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" },
7465 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7466 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7467 "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" },
7470 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7471 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7472 "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" },
7475 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7476 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7477 "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" }
7480 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7481 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7482 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7484 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7485 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7486 "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", {
7489 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7490 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7491 "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" },
7494 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7495 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7496 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7499 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7500 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7501 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7504 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7505 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7506 "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" },
7509 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7510 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7511 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7514 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7515 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7516 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7518 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7519 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7520 "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", {
7523 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7524 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7525 "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" },
7528 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7529 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7530 "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" },
7533 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7534 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7535 "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" },
7538 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7539 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7540 "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" }
7543 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7544 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7545 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7546 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7548 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7549 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7550 "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", {
7553 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7554 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7555 "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" },
7558 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7559 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7560 "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" },
7563 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7564 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7565 "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" },
7568 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7569 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7570 "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" }
7573 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7574 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7575 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7576 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7578 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7579 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7580 "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", {
7583 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7584 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7585 "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" },
7588 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7589 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7590 "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" },
7593 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7594 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7595 "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" },
7598 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7599 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7600 "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" }
7603 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7604 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7605 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7607 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7608 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7609 "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", {
7612 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7613 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7614 "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" },
7617 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7618 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7619 "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" },
7622 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7623 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7624 "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" }
7627 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7628 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7629 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7631 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7632 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7633 "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", {
7636 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7637 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7638 "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" },
7641 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7642 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7643 "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" },
7646 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7647 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7648 "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" }
7651 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7652 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7653 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7655 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7656 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7657 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7660 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7661 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7662 "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" },
7665 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7666 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7667 "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" }
7670 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7671 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7672 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7673 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7675 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7676 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7677 "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", {
7680 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7681 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7682 "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" },
7685 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7686 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7687 "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" }
7690 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7691 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7692 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7693 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7695 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7696 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7697 "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", {
7700 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7701 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7702 "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" },
7705 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7706 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7707 "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" }
7710 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7711 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7712 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7714 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7715 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7716 "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", {
7719 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7720 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7721 "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" }
7724 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7725 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7726 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7727 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7729 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7730 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7731 "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", {
7734 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7735 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7736 "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" }
7739 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7740 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7741 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7742 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7744 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7745 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7746 "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", {
7749 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7750 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7751 "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" }
7754 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7755 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7756 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7757 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7759 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7760 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7761 "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", {});
7763 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7764 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7765 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7766 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7768 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7769 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7770 "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", {});
7772 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7773 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7774 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7775 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7777 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7778 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7779 "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", {});
7781 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7782 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7783 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7785 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7786 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7787 "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", {});
7789 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7790 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7791 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7792 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7794 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7795 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7796 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7798 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7799 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7800 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7801 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7803 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7804 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7805 "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", {});
7807 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7808 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7809 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7810 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7811 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7812 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7814 amount_msat: 2000000,
7816 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7817 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7819 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7822 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7823 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7824 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7826 amount_msat: 5000000,
7828 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7829 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7830 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7832 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7835 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7836 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7838 amount_msat: 5000000,
7840 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7841 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7842 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7844 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7848 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7849 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7850 "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", {
7853 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7854 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7855 "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" },
7857 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7858 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7859 "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" },
7861 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7862 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7863 "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" }
7866 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7867 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7868 "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", {
7871 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7872 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7873 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe2902000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec8347304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7875 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7876 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7877 "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" },
7879 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7880 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7881 "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" }
7886 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7887 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7889 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7890 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7891 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7892 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7894 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7895 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7896 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7898 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7899 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7901 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7902 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7904 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7905 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7906 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7910 fn test_key_derivation() {
7911 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7912 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7914 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7915 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7917 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7918 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7920 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7921 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7923 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7924 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7926 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7927 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7929 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7930 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7932 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7933 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7937 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7938 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7939 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7940 let seed = [42; 32];
7941 let network = Network::Testnet;
7942 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7943 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7945 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7946 let config = UserConfig::default();
7947 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7948 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7950 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7951 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7953 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7954 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7955 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7956 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7957 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7958 assert!(res.is_ok());