1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use ln::channelmanager::{CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
67 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
69 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
70 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
71 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
72 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
73 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
74 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
76 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
80 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
81 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
82 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
83 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
86 enum InboundHTLCState {
87 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
88 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
89 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
90 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
91 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
92 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
93 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
94 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
95 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
96 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
97 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
98 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
99 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
100 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
101 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
103 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
104 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
105 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
106 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
107 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
108 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
109 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
110 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
111 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
112 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
113 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
114 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
115 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
116 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
118 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
119 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
120 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
121 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
122 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
123 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
124 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
125 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
127 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
128 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
130 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
131 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
132 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
133 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
134 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
135 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
136 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
137 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
140 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
144 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
145 state: InboundHTLCState,
148 enum OutboundHTLCState {
149 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
150 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
152 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
153 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
154 /// money back (though we won't), and,
155 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
156 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
157 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
158 /// we'll never get out of sync).
159 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
160 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
161 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
163 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
164 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
165 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
166 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
167 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
168 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
169 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
170 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
171 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
172 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
173 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
174 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
176 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
177 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
182 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
183 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
186 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
187 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
189 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
190 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
195 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
198 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
199 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
204 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
208 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
209 state: OutboundHTLCState,
213 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
214 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
215 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
224 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
229 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
233 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
234 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
235 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
236 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
237 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
238 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
239 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
241 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
242 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
243 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
244 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
245 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
246 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
247 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
249 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
250 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
251 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
253 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
254 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
255 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
256 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
257 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
258 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
260 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
261 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
263 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
264 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
265 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
266 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
267 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
268 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
269 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
270 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
271 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
273 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
274 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
276 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
277 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
278 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
280 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
281 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
282 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
283 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
284 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
286 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
287 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
289 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
291 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
292 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
293 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
294 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
295 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
296 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
297 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
298 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
300 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
302 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
304 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
308 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
314 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
317 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
318 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
319 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
320 holding_cell_msat: u64,
321 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
324 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
325 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
326 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
327 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
328 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
329 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
330 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
331 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
332 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
335 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
336 struct HTLCCandidate {
338 origin: HTLCInitiator,
342 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
350 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
352 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
354 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
355 htlc_value_msat: u64,
356 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
361 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
362 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
363 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
364 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
365 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
367 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
368 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
369 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
370 htlc_value_msat: u64,
371 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
372 /// in the holding cell).
373 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
375 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
376 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
380 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
382 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
383 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
384 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
385 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
386 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
387 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
391 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
392 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
393 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
394 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
395 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
396 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
397 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
398 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
399 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
400 pub funding_locked: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
403 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
404 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
405 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
406 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
407 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
408 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
409 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
410 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
411 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
412 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
413 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
414 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
415 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
416 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
417 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
419 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
420 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
421 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
422 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
424 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
425 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
426 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
427 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
429 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
430 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
431 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
432 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
433 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
435 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
436 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
437 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
438 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
440 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
441 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
442 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
445 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
446 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
447 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
448 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
449 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
450 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
451 config: ChannelConfig,
455 channel_id: [u8; 32],
457 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
458 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
460 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
462 holder_signer: Signer,
463 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
464 destination_script: Script,
466 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
467 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
468 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
470 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
471 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
472 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
473 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
474 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
475 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
477 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
478 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
479 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
480 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
481 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
482 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
484 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
486 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
487 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
488 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
489 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
490 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
491 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
493 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
495 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
496 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
497 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
498 // HTLCs with similar state.
499 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
500 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
501 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
502 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
503 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
504 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
505 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
506 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
507 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
510 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
511 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
512 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
514 update_time_counter: u32,
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
518 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
519 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
520 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
521 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
523 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
524 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
526 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
527 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
528 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
529 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
531 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
532 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
534 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
536 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
538 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
539 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
540 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
541 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
542 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
543 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
544 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
545 channel_creation_height: u32,
547 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
550 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
552 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
555 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
557 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
560 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
562 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
564 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
565 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
568 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
570 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
572 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
573 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
575 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
577 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
578 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
579 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
581 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
583 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
584 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
586 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
587 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
588 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
590 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
592 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
594 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
595 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
596 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
597 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
599 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
600 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
601 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
603 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
604 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
605 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
607 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
608 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
609 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
610 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
611 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
612 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
613 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
614 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
616 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
617 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
618 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
619 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
620 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
622 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
623 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
626 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
627 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
628 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
629 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
630 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
631 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
632 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
634 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
635 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
638 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
639 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
641 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
642 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
643 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
647 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
649 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
650 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
651 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
652 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
656 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
658 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
660 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
662 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
664 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
666 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
667 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
668 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
669 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
670 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
671 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
673 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
674 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
676 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
677 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
678 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
679 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
680 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
682 /// See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/905 for more details.
683 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
685 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
686 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
687 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
688 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
692 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
695 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
696 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
698 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
699 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
700 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
701 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
706 macro_rules! secp_check {
707 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
710 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
715 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
716 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
717 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
718 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
721 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
724 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
726 /// This is used both for new channels and to figure out what reserve value we sent to peers
727 /// for channels serialized before we included our selected reserve value in the serialized
729 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
730 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
731 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
734 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
735 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
739 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
740 fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
741 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32
742 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
743 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
744 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
746 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
748 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
749 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
750 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
752 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
753 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
755 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
756 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
757 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
759 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
762 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
763 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
764 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
767 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
769 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
770 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
771 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
772 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
775 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
776 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
778 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
779 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
782 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
783 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
784 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
790 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
792 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
793 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
795 channel_value_satoshis,
797 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
800 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
801 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
803 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
804 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
807 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
808 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
809 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
810 pending_update_fee: None,
811 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
812 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
813 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
814 update_time_counter: 1,
816 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
818 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
819 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
820 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
821 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
822 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
823 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
825 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
826 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
827 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
828 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
830 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
831 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
832 closing_fee_limits: None,
833 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
835 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
836 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
837 short_channel_id: None,
838 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
840 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
841 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
842 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
843 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
844 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis),
845 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
846 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
847 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
848 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
849 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
850 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
852 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
854 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
855 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
856 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
857 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
858 counterparty_parameters: None,
859 funding_outpoint: None,
860 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
862 funding_transaction: None,
864 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
865 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
866 counterparty_node_id,
868 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
870 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
872 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
873 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
875 announcement_sigs: None,
877 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
878 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
879 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
880 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
882 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
884 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
885 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
887 // We currently only actually support one channel type, so don't retry with new types
888 // on error messages. When we support more we'll need fallback support (assuming we
889 // want to support old types).
890 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(),
894 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
895 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
897 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
898 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
899 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
900 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
901 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
902 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
903 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
905 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
906 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
907 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
908 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
909 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
910 fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
911 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
912 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
917 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
918 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
919 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
920 fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
921 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L
922 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
923 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
924 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
927 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
929 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
930 // support this channel type.
931 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
932 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
935 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
940 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
942 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
946 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
947 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
948 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
949 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
950 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
951 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
952 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
953 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
955 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
957 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
961 // Check sanity of message fields:
962 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
965 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
968 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
969 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
972 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
973 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
975 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
976 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
979 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
981 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
982 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
983 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
985 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
986 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
988 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
992 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
993 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
996 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
997 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
999 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1002 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1005 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1008 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1011 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1015 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1017 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1018 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1019 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
1020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1023 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
1024 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
1026 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
1027 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1030 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1031 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1032 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1034 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1038 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1039 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1040 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1041 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1042 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1046 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1047 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1048 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1049 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1053 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1054 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1055 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1056 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1057 if script.len() == 0 {
1060 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1063 Some(script.clone())
1066 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1067 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1073 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1074 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1077 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1078 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1083 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1084 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1086 let chan = Channel {
1088 config: local_config,
1090 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1091 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1094 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1097 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1098 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1100 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1101 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1102 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1104 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1105 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1106 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1107 pending_update_fee: None,
1108 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1109 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1110 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1111 update_time_counter: 1,
1113 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1115 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
1116 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1117 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1118 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1119 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1120 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1122 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1123 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1124 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1125 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1127 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1128 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1129 closing_fee_limits: None,
1130 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1132 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1133 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1134 short_channel_id: None,
1135 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1137 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1138 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1139 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1140 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1141 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1142 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis),
1143 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1144 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1145 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1146 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1147 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1148 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
1150 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1152 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1153 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1154 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
1155 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1156 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1157 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1158 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1160 funding_outpoint: None,
1161 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1163 funding_transaction: None,
1165 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1166 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1167 counterparty_node_id,
1169 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1171 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1173 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1174 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1176 announcement_sigs: None,
1178 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1179 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1180 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1181 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1183 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1185 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1186 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1194 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1195 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1196 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1197 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1198 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1200 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1201 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1202 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1203 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1204 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1205 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1206 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1208 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1209 where L::Target: Logger
1211 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1212 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1213 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1215 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1216 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1217 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1218 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1220 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1221 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1222 if match update_state {
1223 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1224 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1225 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1226 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1227 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1229 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1233 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1234 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1235 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1236 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1238 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1239 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1240 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1242 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1243 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1244 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1245 transaction_output_index: None
1250 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1251 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1252 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1253 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1254 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1255 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1256 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1258 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1259 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1262 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1263 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1264 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1265 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1267 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1268 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1274 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1275 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1276 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1277 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1278 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1279 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1280 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1284 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1285 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1287 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1289 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1290 if generated_by_local {
1291 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1292 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1301 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1302 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1303 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1304 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1305 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1306 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1307 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1311 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1312 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1314 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1316 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1317 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1319 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1320 if !generated_by_local {
1321 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1329 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1330 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1331 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1332 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1333 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1334 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1335 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1336 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1338 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1340 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1341 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1342 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1343 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1345 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1347 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1348 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1349 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1350 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1353 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1354 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1355 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1356 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1358 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1361 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1362 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1363 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1364 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1366 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1369 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1370 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1375 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1376 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1381 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1383 let channel_parameters =
1384 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1385 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1386 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1389 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1394 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1397 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1398 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1399 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1400 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1402 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1403 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1404 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1412 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1413 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1418 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1419 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1420 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1421 // outside of those situations will fail.
1422 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1426 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1431 1 + // script length (0)
1435 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1436 2 + // witness marker and flag
1437 1 + // witness element count
1438 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1439 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1440 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1441 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1442 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1443 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1445 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1446 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1447 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1453 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1454 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1455 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1456 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1458 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1459 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1460 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1462 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1463 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1464 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1465 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1466 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1467 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1470 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1471 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1474 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1475 value_to_holder = 0;
1478 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1479 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1480 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1481 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1483 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1484 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1487 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1488 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1492 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1493 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1494 /// our counterparty!)
1495 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1496 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1497 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1498 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1499 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1500 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1501 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1503 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1507 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1508 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1509 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1510 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1511 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1512 //may see payments to it!
1513 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1514 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1515 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1517 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1520 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1521 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1522 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1523 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1524 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1527 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1528 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1529 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1530 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1532 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1533 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1535 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1537 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1539 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1540 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1541 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1543 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1544 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1545 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1546 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1547 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1549 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1550 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1551 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1553 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1554 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1556 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1559 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1560 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1564 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1568 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1569 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1570 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1571 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1572 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1573 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1576 // Now update local state:
1578 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1579 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1580 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1581 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1582 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1583 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1584 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1588 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1589 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1590 match pending_update {
1591 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1592 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1593 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1594 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1595 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1596 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1597 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1600 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1601 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1602 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1603 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1604 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1605 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1606 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1612 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1613 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1614 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1616 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1617 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1618 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1620 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1621 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1624 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1625 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1627 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1628 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1630 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1631 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1634 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1637 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1638 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1639 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1640 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1645 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1646 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1647 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1648 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1649 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1652 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1653 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1654 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1655 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1656 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1658 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1659 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1660 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1664 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1665 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1666 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1667 /// before we fail backwards.
1668 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1669 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1670 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1671 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1672 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1674 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1676 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1677 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1678 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1680 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1681 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1682 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1684 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1685 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1686 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1688 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1693 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1694 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1700 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1701 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1702 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1703 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1704 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1708 // Now update local state:
1709 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1710 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1711 match pending_update {
1712 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1713 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1714 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1715 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1719 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1720 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1721 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1722 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1728 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1729 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1730 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1736 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1738 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1739 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1742 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1743 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1744 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1749 // Message handlers:
1751 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1752 // Check sanity of message fields:
1753 if !self.is_outbound() {
1754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1756 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1759 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1760 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1762 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1763 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1765 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1766 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1768 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1769 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1772 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1773 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1774 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1776 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1777 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1779 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1783 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1784 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1785 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1787 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1790 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1793 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1794 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1796 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1799 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1800 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1802 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1803 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1805 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1806 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1807 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1809 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1812 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1813 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1814 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1815 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1816 if script.len() == 0 {
1819 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
1822 Some(script.clone())
1825 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1826 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1832 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1833 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1834 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1835 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1836 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1837 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1839 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1840 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1841 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1842 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1843 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1844 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1847 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1848 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1849 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1852 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1853 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1855 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1860 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1861 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1863 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1864 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
1866 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1867 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1868 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1869 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1870 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1871 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1872 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1873 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1874 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1877 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1878 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
1880 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1881 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1882 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1883 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1885 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1886 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1888 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1889 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1892 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1893 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1896 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1897 if self.is_outbound() {
1898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1900 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1901 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1902 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1906 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1907 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1908 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1909 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1912 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1913 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1914 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1915 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1916 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1918 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1920 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1921 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1922 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1925 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1926 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1927 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1931 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1932 initial_commitment_tx,
1935 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1936 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1939 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
1940 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
1942 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1944 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1945 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1946 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1947 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1948 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1949 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1950 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1951 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1952 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1954 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1956 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1958 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1959 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1960 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1961 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1963 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1965 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1966 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1968 }, channel_monitor))
1971 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1972 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1973 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1974 if !self.is_outbound() {
1975 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1977 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1980 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1981 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1982 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1983 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1986 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1988 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1989 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
1990 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1991 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1993 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1994 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1996 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1997 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
1999 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2000 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2001 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2002 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2003 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2008 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2009 initial_commitment_tx,
2012 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2013 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2016 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
2017 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2020 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2021 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2022 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2023 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2024 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2025 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2026 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2027 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2028 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2029 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2031 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
2033 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2035 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2036 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2037 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2038 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2040 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2042 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
2045 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2046 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2047 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2051 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2053 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2054 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
2055 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
2056 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2057 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2058 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
2059 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
2060 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
2061 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
2062 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
2063 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
2064 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
2065 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
2068 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
2074 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2075 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2077 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2082 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2083 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2084 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2085 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2091 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2092 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2093 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2094 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2095 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2096 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2097 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2098 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2099 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2102 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2103 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2104 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2105 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2106 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2107 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2109 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2110 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2116 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2117 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2118 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2119 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2120 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2121 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2122 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2123 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2124 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2127 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2128 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2129 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2130 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2131 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2132 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2134 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2135 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2139 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2140 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2141 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2142 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2143 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2144 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2145 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2147 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2148 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2150 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2157 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
2158 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2159 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2160 /// corner case properly.
2161 /// The channel reserve is subtracted from each balance.
2162 /// See also [`Channel::get_balance_msat`]
2163 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
2164 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2166 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2167 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2168 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2169 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2171 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2172 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2173 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2178 /// Get our total balance in msat.
2179 /// This is the amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
2180 /// See also [`Channel::get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat`]
2181 pub fn get_balance_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2182 self.value_to_self_msat
2183 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat
2186 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2187 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2190 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2191 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2192 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2193 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2194 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2195 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2198 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2199 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2201 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2202 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2205 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2206 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2207 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2209 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2210 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2212 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2213 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2215 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2216 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2218 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2219 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2223 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2224 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2230 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2231 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2232 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2235 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2236 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2237 included_htlcs += 1;
2240 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2241 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2245 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2246 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2247 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2248 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2249 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2250 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2255 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2257 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2258 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2263 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2264 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2268 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2269 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2270 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2273 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2274 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2276 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2277 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2278 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2280 total_pending_htlcs,
2281 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2282 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2283 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2285 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2286 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2287 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2289 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2291 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2296 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2297 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2298 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2300 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2301 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2303 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2304 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2306 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2307 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2310 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2314 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2315 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2321 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2322 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2323 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2324 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2325 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2326 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2329 included_htlcs += 1;
2332 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2333 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2336 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2337 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2339 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2340 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2341 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2346 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2347 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2348 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2351 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2352 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2354 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2355 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2357 total_pending_htlcs,
2358 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2359 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2360 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2362 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2363 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2364 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2366 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2368 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2373 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2374 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2375 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2376 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2377 if local_sent_shutdown {
2378 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2380 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2381 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2382 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2385 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2388 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2391 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2394 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2395 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2398 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2399 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2400 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2403 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2404 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2406 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2407 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2408 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2409 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2410 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2411 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2412 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2413 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2414 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2415 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2416 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2418 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2419 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2420 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2421 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2422 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2423 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2427 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2428 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2429 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2430 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2431 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2432 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2433 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2437 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2438 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2439 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2440 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2441 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2442 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2443 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2447 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2448 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2449 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2450 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2451 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2455 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2456 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2457 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2458 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2459 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2461 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2462 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2465 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2469 if !self.is_outbound() {
2470 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2471 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2472 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2473 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2474 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2475 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2476 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2477 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2478 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2479 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2480 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2481 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2482 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2483 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2484 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2487 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2488 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2489 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2490 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2491 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2494 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2497 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2498 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2501 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2502 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2503 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2507 // Now update local state:
2508 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2509 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2510 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2511 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2512 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2513 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2514 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2519 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2521 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2522 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2523 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2524 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2525 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2526 None => fail_reason.into(),
2527 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2528 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2529 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2530 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2532 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2536 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2537 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2538 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2539 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2541 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2542 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2547 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2550 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2551 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2554 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2558 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2561 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2562 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2565 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2566 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2569 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2573 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2574 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2577 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2581 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2585 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2586 where L::Target: Logger
2588 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2589 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2591 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2592 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2594 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2595 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2598 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2600 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2602 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2603 let commitment_txid = {
2604 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2605 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2606 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2608 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2609 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2610 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2611 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2612 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2613 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2617 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2619 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2620 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2621 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2622 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2625 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2626 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2627 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2628 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2631 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2633 if self.is_outbound() {
2634 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2635 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2636 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2637 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2638 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2639 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2640 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2641 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2642 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2643 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2649 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2650 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
2653 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2654 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2655 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2656 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2657 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2658 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
2659 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2661 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2662 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
2663 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype)[..]);
2664 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2665 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2666 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2667 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2668 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2670 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2672 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2676 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2677 commitment_stats.tx,
2679 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2680 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2681 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2684 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2685 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
2686 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
2687 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2689 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2690 let mut need_commitment = false;
2691 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2692 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2693 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2694 need_commitment = true;
2698 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2699 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2700 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2701 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2702 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2703 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2707 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2708 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2709 Some(forward_info.clone())
2711 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2712 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2713 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2714 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2715 need_commitment = true;
2718 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2719 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2720 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2721 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2722 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2723 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2724 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2725 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2726 need_commitment = true;
2730 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2731 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2732 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2733 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2735 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2736 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2737 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2738 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2739 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2740 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2741 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2742 // includes the right HTLCs.
2743 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2744 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2745 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2746 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2747 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2748 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2750 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2751 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2752 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2755 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2756 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2757 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2758 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2759 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2760 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2761 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2762 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2763 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2767 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2768 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2770 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2771 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2772 per_commitment_secret,
2773 next_per_commitment_point,
2774 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
2777 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2778 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2779 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2780 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2781 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2782 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2783 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2784 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2787 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2788 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2789 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2790 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2791 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2792 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2793 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2795 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2796 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2797 updates: Vec::new(),
2800 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2801 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2802 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2803 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2804 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2805 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2806 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2807 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2808 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2809 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2810 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2811 // to rebalance channels.
2812 match &htlc_update {
2813 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2814 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
2815 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2818 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2819 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2820 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2821 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2822 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2823 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2824 // into the holding cell without ever being
2825 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2826 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2827 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2830 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2836 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2837 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2838 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2839 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2840 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2841 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2842 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2843 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2844 (msg, monitor_update)
2845 } else { unreachable!() };
2846 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2847 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2849 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2850 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2851 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2852 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2853 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2854 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2855 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2856 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2857 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2860 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2862 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2869 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2870 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2872 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2873 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
2878 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2879 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2880 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2881 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2882 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2884 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2885 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2886 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2888 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2890 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2892 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2895 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2897 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2901 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2902 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2903 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2904 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2905 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2906 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
2907 where L::Target: Logger,
2909 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2912 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2915 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2919 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
2921 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2922 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2927 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2928 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2929 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2930 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2931 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2932 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2933 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2934 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2935 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2938 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2940 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2941 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2944 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
2945 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2947 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
2949 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2950 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2951 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2952 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2953 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2954 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2955 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2956 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2960 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2961 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2962 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2963 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2964 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2965 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2966 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2967 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2969 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2970 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2971 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2972 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2973 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2974 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2975 let mut require_commitment = false;
2976 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2979 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2980 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2981 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2983 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2984 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2985 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2986 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2987 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2988 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2993 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2994 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
2995 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2996 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2997 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2999 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3000 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3001 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3006 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3007 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3009 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3013 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3014 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3016 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3017 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3018 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3019 require_commitment = true;
3020 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3021 match forward_info {
3022 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3023 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3024 require_commitment = true;
3026 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3027 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3028 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3030 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3031 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3032 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3036 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3037 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3038 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3039 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3045 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3046 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3047 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3048 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3050 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3051 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3052 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3053 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3054 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3055 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3056 require_commitment = true;
3060 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3062 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3063 match update_state {
3064 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3065 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3066 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3067 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3068 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3070 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3071 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3072 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3073 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3074 require_commitment = true;
3075 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3076 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3081 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
3082 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3083 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3084 if require_commitment {
3085 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3086 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3087 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3088 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3089 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3090 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3091 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3092 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3093 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3095 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3096 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3097 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3098 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3099 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3100 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3101 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3103 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3107 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3108 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3109 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3110 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3111 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3113 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3114 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3115 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3118 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3119 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3120 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3121 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3124 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3125 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3126 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3127 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3129 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3132 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3133 if require_commitment {
3134 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3136 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3137 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3138 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3139 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3141 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3142 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3144 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3145 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3146 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3148 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3152 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3153 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3154 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3157 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3159 commitment_update: None,
3160 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3161 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3162 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3169 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3170 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3171 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3172 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3173 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3174 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3175 if !self.is_outbound() {
3176 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3178 if !self.is_usable() {
3179 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3181 if !self.is_live() {
3182 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3185 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3186 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3187 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3188 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3189 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3190 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3191 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3192 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3193 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3194 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3198 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3199 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3200 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3201 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3202 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3205 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3206 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3210 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3211 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3215 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3216 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3218 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3219 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3224 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3225 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3226 Some(update_fee) => {
3227 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3228 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3234 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3235 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3237 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3239 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3240 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3241 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3242 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3245 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3246 // will be retransmitted.
3247 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3248 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3249 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3251 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3252 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3254 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3255 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3256 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3257 // this HTLC accordingly
3258 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3261 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3262 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3263 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3264 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3267 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3268 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3269 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3270 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3271 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3272 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3277 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3279 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3280 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3281 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3282 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3286 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3287 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3288 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3289 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3290 // the update upon reconnection.
3291 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3295 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3296 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3299 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3300 /// updates are partially paused.
3301 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3302 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3303 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3304 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3305 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3306 mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3307 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3308 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3310 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3311 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3312 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3313 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3314 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3315 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3318 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3319 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3320 /// to the remote side.
3321 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3322 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3323 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3325 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3326 self.funding_transaction.take()
3329 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3330 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3331 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3332 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3333 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3334 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3335 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3336 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3337 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3338 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3339 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3340 next_per_commitment_point,
3344 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3345 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3346 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3347 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3348 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3349 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3351 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3352 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3353 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3354 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3355 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3356 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked
3360 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3361 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3363 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3364 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3367 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3368 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3369 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3370 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3371 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3372 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3373 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3374 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3375 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked
3379 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3380 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3382 if self.is_outbound() {
3383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3385 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3388 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3389 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3391 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3392 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3393 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3394 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3395 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3396 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3397 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3398 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3399 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3400 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3401 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3403 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3405 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3406 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3407 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3413 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3414 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3415 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3416 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3417 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3418 per_commitment_secret,
3419 next_per_commitment_point,
3423 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3424 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3425 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3426 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3427 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3429 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3430 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3431 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3432 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3433 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3434 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3435 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3436 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3437 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3442 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3443 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3445 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3446 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3447 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3448 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3449 reason: err_packet.clone()
3452 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3453 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3454 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3455 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3456 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3457 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3460 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3461 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3462 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3463 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3464 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3471 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3472 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3473 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3474 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3478 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3479 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3480 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3481 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3482 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3483 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3487 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3488 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3489 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3490 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3491 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3492 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3493 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3494 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3497 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3498 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3502 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3503 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3504 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3505 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3506 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3507 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3508 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3509 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3511 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3512 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3513 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3517 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3521 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3522 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3523 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3525 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3526 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3527 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3528 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3529 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3533 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3534 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3535 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3536 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3537 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3538 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3540 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3541 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3544 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3545 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3546 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3547 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3548 next_per_commitment_point,
3549 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3552 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3553 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3554 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3556 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3557 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3558 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3561 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3567 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3568 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3569 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3570 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3571 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3573 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3574 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3575 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3576 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3577 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3578 next_per_commitment_point,
3582 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3583 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3584 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3586 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3589 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3590 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3591 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3592 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3594 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3595 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3596 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) =>
3597 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3598 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3599 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3601 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3602 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3606 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3608 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3609 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3610 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3612 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3615 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3616 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3617 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3620 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3626 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3627 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3628 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3629 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> (u64, u64)
3630 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3632 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3634 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3635 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3636 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3637 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3638 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3639 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3641 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3642 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3643 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3644 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3645 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3647 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3648 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3649 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3650 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3653 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3654 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3655 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3656 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3657 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3658 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3659 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3660 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3661 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3662 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
3663 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3664 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3665 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3666 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3667 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3669 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3672 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3673 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3676 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3677 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3678 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3679 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3680 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3681 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3682 self.channel_state &
3683 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3684 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
3685 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3686 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3689 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3690 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3691 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3692 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3693 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3694 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
3695 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3697 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3703 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
3704 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3705 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3707 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3708 return Ok((None, None));
3711 if !self.is_outbound() {
3712 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
3713 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
3715 return Ok((None, None));
3718 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3720 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3721 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
3722 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
3723 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
3725 let sig = self.holder_signer
3726 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3727 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
3729 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
3730 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3731 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3732 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3734 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3735 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3736 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3741 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
3742 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3743 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3744 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3746 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3749 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3750 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3751 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3752 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3755 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3756 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3760 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3762 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
3763 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3766 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3767 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3768 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3771 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3774 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3775 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3776 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3777 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3779 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3782 assert!(send_shutdown);
3783 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3784 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3785 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3787 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3792 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3794 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3795 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3797 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3798 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3799 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3800 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3801 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3802 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3806 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3807 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3808 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3809 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3813 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3814 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3815 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3816 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3817 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3818 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3820 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3821 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3828 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3829 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3831 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3834 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
3835 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
3837 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3839 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3840 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3841 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3842 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3843 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3845 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3846 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3848 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3849 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3851 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3855 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3856 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3858 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3861 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3864 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3867 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3871 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
3872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
3875 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
3876 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
3877 return Ok((None, None));
3880 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3881 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3882 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
3885 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3887 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3890 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3891 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3892 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3893 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3894 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3898 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
3899 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
3900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
3904 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3905 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3906 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3907 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3908 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3909 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3910 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
3914 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3916 macro_rules! propose_fee {
3917 ($new_fee: expr) => {
3918 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3919 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
3921 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
3924 let sig = self.holder_signer
3925 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3926 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3928 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3929 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3930 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3931 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3935 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
3936 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3937 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3938 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
3940 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3941 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3942 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3948 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
3949 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
3950 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
3952 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3953 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3955 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3956 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3959 if !self.is_outbound() {
3960 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
3961 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
3962 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
3963 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
3965 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
3967 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
3969 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
3970 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3973 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
3974 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
3975 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3976 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
3977 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
3978 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3979 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
3980 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3985 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
3986 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3987 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
3988 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3994 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3995 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3996 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3997 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3999 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4005 // Public utilities:
4007 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4011 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4015 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4016 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4017 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4021 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4022 /// is_usable() returns true).
4023 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4024 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4025 self.short_channel_id
4028 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4029 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4030 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4031 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4034 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4035 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4038 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4039 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4042 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4043 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4044 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4047 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4048 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4051 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4052 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4053 self.counterparty_node_id
4056 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4058 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4059 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4062 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4063 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4065 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4066 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4067 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4068 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4070 self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4074 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4075 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4076 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4079 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4080 self.channel_value_satoshis
4083 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4084 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4087 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4088 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4091 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4092 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4095 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4099 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4100 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4101 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4102 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4103 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4104 // which are near the dust limit.
4105 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4106 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4107 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4108 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4109 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4111 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4112 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4114 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4117 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4118 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4121 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4122 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4125 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4126 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4130 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4135 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4137 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4138 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4139 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4140 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4141 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4142 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4144 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4146 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4154 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4155 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4159 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4160 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4161 self.update_time_counter
4164 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4165 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4168 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4169 self.config.announced_channel
4172 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4173 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4176 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4177 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4178 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4179 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4182 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4183 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4184 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4187 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4188 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4189 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4190 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4191 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
4194 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4195 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4196 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4197 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4198 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4201 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4202 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4203 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4204 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
4207 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4208 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4209 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4212 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4213 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4214 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4217 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4218 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4219 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4222 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4223 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4224 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4225 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4226 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4227 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4232 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4233 self.channel_update_status
4236 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4237 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4238 self.channel_update_status = status;
4241 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
4242 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4246 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4247 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4248 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4251 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4255 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4256 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4257 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
4259 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
4260 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4261 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4263 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
4264 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4266 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4267 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
4269 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4273 if need_commitment_update {
4274 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4275 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4276 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
4277 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4278 next_per_commitment_point,
4281 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
4287 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4288 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4289 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4290 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
4291 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4292 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4293 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4294 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4295 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
4296 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
4297 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4298 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4299 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4300 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4301 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4302 if self.is_outbound() {
4303 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4304 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4305 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4306 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4307 // channel and move on.
4308 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4309 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4311 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4312 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4313 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4315 if self.is_outbound() {
4316 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4317 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4318 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4319 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4320 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4321 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4325 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4326 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4327 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4328 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4329 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4333 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
4334 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4335 // may have already happened for this block).
4336 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4337 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4338 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
4341 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4342 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4343 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4344 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4352 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4353 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4354 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4355 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4357 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4358 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4361 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4363 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
4364 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4365 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4366 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4367 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4369 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4370 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4372 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4373 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4374 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4382 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4384 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4385 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4386 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
4389 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4390 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4391 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
4392 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4393 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4394 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4395 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4396 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
4397 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4400 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
4401 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
4402 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4403 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4404 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
4405 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4406 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4407 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4409 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4410 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4411 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4412 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4413 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
4414 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32, 0);
4415 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4418 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
4421 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4422 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4423 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
4424 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4425 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4426 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4427 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4428 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4429 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4430 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4431 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4432 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4433 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
4434 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
4435 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4436 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4442 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4447 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4448 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4450 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4451 if !self.is_outbound() {
4452 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4454 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4455 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4458 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4459 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4462 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4463 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4467 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4468 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4469 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4470 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4471 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4472 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4473 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4474 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4475 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4476 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4477 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4478 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4479 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4480 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4481 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4482 first_per_commitment_point,
4483 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4484 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4485 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4486 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4488 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
4492 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4493 if self.is_outbound() {
4494 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4496 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4497 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4499 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4500 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4503 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4504 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4506 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4507 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4508 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4509 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4510 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4511 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4512 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4513 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4514 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4515 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4516 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4517 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4518 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4519 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4520 first_per_commitment_point,
4521 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4522 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4523 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4528 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4529 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4530 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4531 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
4532 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4533 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4536 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4537 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4538 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4539 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4540 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4541 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4542 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4543 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4544 if !self.is_outbound() {
4545 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4547 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4548 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4550 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4551 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4552 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4553 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4556 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4557 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4559 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4562 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4563 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4568 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4570 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4572 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4573 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4574 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4576 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4577 temporary_channel_id,
4578 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4579 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4584 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4585 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4586 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4587 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4588 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4590 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4591 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4593 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4594 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4595 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4596 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4598 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4599 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4601 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4602 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4605 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4607 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4608 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4610 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4611 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4612 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4613 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4614 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4615 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4618 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4619 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4624 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4626 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4627 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4628 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4630 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4631 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4632 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4633 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4634 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4635 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4636 contents: announcement,
4639 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4643 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4644 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4645 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4646 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4647 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4649 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4651 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4652 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4653 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4654 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4656 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4657 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4658 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4659 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4662 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4664 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4667 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4668 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4669 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4670 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4672 Err(_) => return None,
4674 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4675 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4676 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4681 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4682 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4683 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4684 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4685 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4686 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4687 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4688 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4689 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4690 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4691 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4692 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4693 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4694 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4695 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4696 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4697 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4698 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4699 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4702 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4703 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4704 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4705 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4708 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4709 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4710 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4711 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4712 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4713 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4714 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4715 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4717 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4718 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4719 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4720 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4721 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4722 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4723 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4724 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4725 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4727 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4733 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4735 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4736 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4738 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4740 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4741 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4743 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4744 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4747 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4749 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4750 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4751 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4752 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4754 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4755 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4756 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4759 if amount_msat == 0 {
4760 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4763 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4764 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4767 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4768 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4769 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4770 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4771 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4772 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4773 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4774 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4777 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4778 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4779 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4780 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4782 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4783 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4784 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4787 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
4788 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4789 if !self.is_outbound() {
4790 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4791 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4792 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4793 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4794 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
4795 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4799 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4800 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4801 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4802 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4803 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4804 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4808 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4809 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4810 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4811 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4812 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4813 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4817 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4818 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
4819 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
4822 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4823 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4824 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4825 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4827 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4828 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4831 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4832 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4833 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4834 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4835 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4838 // Now update local state:
4839 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4840 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4845 onion_routing_packet,
4850 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4851 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4853 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4855 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4859 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4860 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4861 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4865 onion_routing_packet,
4867 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4872 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4873 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4874 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4875 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4876 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4877 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4878 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4880 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4881 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4883 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4884 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4886 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4887 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4889 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4890 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4891 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4892 have_updates = true;
4894 if have_updates { break; }
4896 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4897 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4898 have_updates = true;
4900 if have_updates { break; }
4903 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4905 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4907 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4908 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4909 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
4910 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4911 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4913 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4914 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4915 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4917 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4918 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4922 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4923 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4924 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4925 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4926 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4927 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4928 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4931 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4932 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4933 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4934 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4935 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4936 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4939 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4941 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4942 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4943 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4944 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4945 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4946 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4948 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4951 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4952 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4953 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4954 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4955 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4956 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4957 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4958 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4961 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4962 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4965 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4966 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4967 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4968 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4969 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4970 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
4971 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4973 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4975 if !self.is_outbound() {
4976 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4977 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4978 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4979 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4980 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4981 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4982 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4983 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4984 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
4985 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4992 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
4993 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
4997 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4998 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5000 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5002 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5003 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5004 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5005 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5007 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5008 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5009 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5010 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5011 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5012 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5016 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5017 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5020 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5023 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5024 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5025 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5027 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5028 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5029 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5030 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5031 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5037 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5038 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5039 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5042 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5043 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5044 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5046 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5047 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5048 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5049 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5055 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5056 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5057 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5058 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5059 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5060 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5061 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5062 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5065 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5066 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5067 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5069 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5070 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5073 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5074 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
5075 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5078 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5081 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5082 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5083 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5085 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5090 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5091 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5092 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5093 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5095 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5097 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5099 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5100 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5101 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5102 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5103 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5104 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5108 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5109 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5110 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5113 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5114 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5115 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5116 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5117 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5120 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5127 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5130 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5131 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5132 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5133 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5134 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5135 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
5136 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5137 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5138 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5139 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5140 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5142 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5143 // return them to fail the payment.
5144 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5145 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5147 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5148 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
5153 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5154 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5155 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5156 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5157 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5158 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5159 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5160 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5161 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5162 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5163 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5164 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5165 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5170 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5171 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5172 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5176 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5177 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5179 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5185 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5186 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5187 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5188 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5189 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5191 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5192 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5193 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5194 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5200 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5201 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5202 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5203 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5204 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5205 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5210 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5211 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5212 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5215 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5217 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
5219 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
5220 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
5221 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
5222 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
5223 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
5224 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5226 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5227 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5228 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5230 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
5232 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
5233 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
5234 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
5235 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
5236 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
5237 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5239 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5240 // deserialized from that format.
5241 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5242 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5243 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5245 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5247 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5248 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5249 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5251 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5252 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5253 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5254 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5257 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5258 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5259 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5262 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5263 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5264 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5265 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5267 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5268 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
5270 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5272 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5274 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5276 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5279 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5281 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5286 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
5288 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5289 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5290 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5291 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5292 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5293 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5294 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5296 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5298 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5300 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5303 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5304 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5305 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5308 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
5310 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5311 preimages.push(preimage);
5313 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5314 reason.write(writer)?;
5316 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
5318 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5319 preimages.push(preimage);
5321 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5322 reason.write(writer)?;
5327 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5328 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5330 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
5332 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5333 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5334 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5335 source.write(writer)?;
5336 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
5338 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
5340 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
5341 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5343 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5345 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5346 err_packet.write(writer)?;
5351 match self.resend_order {
5352 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5353 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5356 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
5357 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
5358 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
5360 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5361 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
5362 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
5363 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5366 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5367 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
5368 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
5369 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5370 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5373 if self.is_outbound() {
5374 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
5375 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5376 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
5378 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
5379 // commitment_signed, drop it.
5380 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
5382 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
5384 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5385 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5386 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
5387 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
5389 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5390 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5391 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5392 // consider the stale state on reload.
5395 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
5396 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
5397 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5399 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5400 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5401 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
5403 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5404 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5406 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5407 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5408 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
5410 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5411 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5413 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
5416 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
5417 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
5418 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
5420 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
5423 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
5424 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
5426 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5427 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5428 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
5430 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
5432 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
5434 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
5436 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5437 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5438 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5439 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
5440 htlc.write(writer)?;
5443 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
5444 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
5445 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
5447 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5448 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
5450 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` and
5451 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` values other than the defaults.
5452 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
5453 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
5454 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
5455 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
5456 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
5457 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
5459 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5460 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
5461 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
5462 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
5463 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
5464 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
5465 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
5467 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
5468 (2, chan_type, option),
5469 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5470 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
5471 (5, self.config, required),
5472 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
5473 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5474 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5475 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
5476 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
5477 (15, preimages, vec_type),
5484 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5485 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
5486 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5487 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5488 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
5489 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5491 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5493 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5495 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5496 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5497 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5498 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5499 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5501 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5502 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5505 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5506 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5507 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5509 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5511 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5512 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5513 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5514 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5515 let mut data = [0; 1024];
5516 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5517 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5518 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5520 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5522 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5523 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5524 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5527 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5529 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5530 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5531 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5533 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5534 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5535 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5536 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5537 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5538 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5539 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5540 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5541 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5542 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5543 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5544 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5545 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5546 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5551 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5552 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5553 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5554 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5555 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5556 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5557 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5558 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5559 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5560 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5561 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5562 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5564 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5565 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
5568 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5569 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
5572 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5573 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
5575 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5580 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5581 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5582 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5583 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5584 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5585 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5586 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5587 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5588 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5589 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5591 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5592 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5593 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5595 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5596 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5597 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5599 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5603 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5604 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5605 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5606 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5609 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5610 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5611 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5613 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5614 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5615 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5616 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5619 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5620 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5621 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5622 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5625 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5627 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5629 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5630 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5631 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5632 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5634 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5635 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5636 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5637 // consider the stale state on reload.
5638 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5641 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5642 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5643 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
5645 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5648 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5649 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5650 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5652 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5653 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5654 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5655 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5657 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5658 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5660 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5661 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5663 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5664 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5665 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5667 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5669 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5670 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5672 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5673 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5676 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5678 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5679 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5680 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5681 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5683 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5686 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5687 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5689 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5691 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5692 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5694 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5695 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5697 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5700 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5701 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5703 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5704 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5705 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5709 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5710 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5711 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5713 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5719 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5720 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
5721 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
5722 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
5723 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis));
5724 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
5725 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
5726 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
5727 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
5728 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
5730 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5731 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5732 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5733 (2, channel_type, option),
5734 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5735 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5736 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5737 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
5738 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5739 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5740 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
5741 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
5742 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
5745 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
5746 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
5747 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5749 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
5750 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
5752 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
5753 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
5758 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
5759 if iter.next().is_some() {
5760 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5764 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
5765 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
5766 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
5767 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
5768 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
5771 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
5772 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
5773 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5776 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5777 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5782 config: config.unwrap(),
5786 channel_value_satoshis,
5788 latest_monitor_update_id,
5791 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5794 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5795 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5798 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5799 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5800 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5804 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5805 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5806 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5807 monitor_pending_forwards,
5808 monitor_pending_failures,
5809 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
5812 holding_cell_update_fee,
5813 next_holder_htlc_id,
5814 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5815 update_time_counter,
5818 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5819 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5820 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5821 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5823 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5824 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5825 closing_fee_limits: None,
5826 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
5828 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5829 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5831 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
5833 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5834 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5835 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5836 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
5837 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5838 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
5839 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5840 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5841 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5844 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5846 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5847 funding_transaction,
5849 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5850 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5851 counterparty_node_id,
5853 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5857 channel_update_status,
5858 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5862 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5863 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5864 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5865 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5867 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5869 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5870 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5872 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
5879 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5880 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5881 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5882 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5883 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5884 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5885 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5886 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5888 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5889 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentId};
5890 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5891 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5892 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5893 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5894 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5896 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
5897 use chain::BestBlock;
5898 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5899 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5900 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5901 use util::config::UserConfig;
5902 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5903 use util::errors::APIError;
5904 use util::test_utils;
5905 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5906 use util::logger::Logger;
5907 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5908 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5909 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5910 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5911 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5912 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5913 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5914 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5915 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
5919 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5922 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5923 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5929 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5930 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5931 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5935 signer: InMemorySigner,
5937 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5938 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5940 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5941 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
5942 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5943 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5944 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5945 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5946 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5949 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5950 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5951 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5952 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5955 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5958 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5959 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5960 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5]) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5963 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5964 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5968 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5969 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5970 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5971 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5973 let seed = [42; 32];
5974 let network = Network::Testnet;
5975 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5976 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5977 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5980 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5981 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5982 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5983 let config = UserConfig::default();
5984 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0) {
5985 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5986 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5988 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5989 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5993 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5994 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5996 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5997 let original_fee = 253;
5998 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5999 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6000 let seed = [42; 32];
6001 let network = Network::Testnet;
6002 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6004 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6005 let config = UserConfig::default();
6006 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
6008 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6009 // same as the old fee.
6010 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6011 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6012 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6016 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6017 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6018 // dust limits are used.
6019 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6020 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6021 let seed = [42; 32];
6022 let network = Network::Testnet;
6023 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6024 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6026 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6027 // they have different dust limits.
6029 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6030 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6031 let config = UserConfig::default();
6032 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
6034 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6035 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6036 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6037 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6038 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger).unwrap();
6040 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6041 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
6042 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6043 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6044 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6046 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6047 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6048 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6050 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6051 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6052 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6053 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6056 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6058 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6059 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6060 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6061 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6062 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6064 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6065 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6066 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6067 payment_secret: None,
6068 payment_params: None,
6072 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6073 // the dust limit check.
6074 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6075 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6076 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6077 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6079 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6080 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6081 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6082 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6083 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6084 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6085 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6089 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6090 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6091 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6092 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6093 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6094 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
6095 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6096 let seed = [42; 32];
6097 let network = Network::Testnet;
6098 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6100 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6101 let config = UserConfig::default();
6102 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
6104 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6105 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6107 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6108 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6109 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6110 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6111 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6112 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6114 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6115 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6116 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6117 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6118 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6120 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6122 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6123 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6124 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6125 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6126 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6128 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6129 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6130 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6131 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6132 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6136 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6137 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6138 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6139 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6140 let seed = [42; 32];
6141 let network = Network::Testnet;
6142 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6143 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6144 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6146 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6148 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6149 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6150 let config = UserConfig::default();
6151 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
6153 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6154 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6155 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6156 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger).unwrap();
6158 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6159 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
6160 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6162 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6163 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6164 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6165 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
6167 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
6168 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
6169 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
6171 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
6172 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
6174 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
6175 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
6176 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6177 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6178 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6179 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6180 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6181 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6182 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6187 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
6189 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6190 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6191 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6192 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6193 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6194 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6195 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6202 fn channel_update() {
6203 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6204 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6205 let seed = [42; 32];
6206 let network = Network::Testnet;
6207 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6208 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6210 // Create a channel.
6211 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6212 let config = UserConfig::default();
6213 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap();
6214 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
6215 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
6216 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
6218 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
6219 let update = ChannelUpdate {
6220 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
6222 short_channel_id: 0,
6225 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
6226 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
6227 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
6229 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
6230 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6232 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
6234 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
6236 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
6237 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
6238 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
6239 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
6241 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
6242 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
6243 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
6245 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
6250 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
6251 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
6252 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
6253 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
6254 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6256 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
6258 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6259 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6260 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6261 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6262 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6264 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
6265 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
6270 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
6271 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
6272 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
6274 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6275 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
6276 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
6277 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
6278 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6279 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
6281 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
6283 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6284 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
6285 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6286 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
6287 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
6288 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
6290 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
6291 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6292 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
6293 selected_contest_delay: 144
6295 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
6296 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
6298 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
6299 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
6301 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
6302 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
6304 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
6305 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
6307 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
6308 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
6309 // build_commitment_transaction.
6310 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
6311 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6312 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6313 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
6314 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
6316 macro_rules! test_commitment {
6317 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
6318 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
6319 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
6323 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
6324 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
6325 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
6326 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
6330 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
6331 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
6332 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
6334 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
6335 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
6337 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
6338 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
6340 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
6342 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
6343 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6344 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6345 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6346 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
6347 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
6348 assert!(secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
6350 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
6351 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
6352 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
6353 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
6355 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6356 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
6357 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
6359 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
6361 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6362 commitment_tx.clone(),
6363 counterparty_signature,
6364 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
6365 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6366 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6368 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
6369 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
6371 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6372 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
6373 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
6375 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
6376 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
6379 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
6380 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6382 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
6383 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
6384 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
6385 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
6386 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
6387 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { SigHashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { SigHashType::All };
6388 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype)[..]).unwrap();
6389 assert!(secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
6391 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6394 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
6395 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
6396 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
6400 assert!(preimage.is_some());
6403 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
6404 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
6405 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
6407 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6408 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
6409 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
6410 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
6411 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
6412 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
6413 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
6414 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
6416 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
6420 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
6421 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
6423 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
6424 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
6425 "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", {});
6427 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
6428 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
6429 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
6430 "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", {});
6432 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6433 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6435 amount_msat: 1000000,
6437 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6438 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6440 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
6443 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6444 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6446 amount_msat: 2000000,
6448 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6449 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6451 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6454 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6455 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6457 amount_msat: 2000000,
6459 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6460 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6461 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6463 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
6466 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6467 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6469 amount_msat: 3000000,
6471 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6472 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6473 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6475 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
6478 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6479 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6481 amount_msat: 4000000,
6483 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6484 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6486 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
6490 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6491 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6492 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
6494 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
6495 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
6496 "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", {
6499 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
6500 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
6501 "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" },
6504 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
6505 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
6506 "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" },
6509 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
6510 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
6511 "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" },
6514 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
6515 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
6516 "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" },
6519 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
6520 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
6521 "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" }
6524 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6525 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6526 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
6528 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
6529 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
6530 "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", {
6533 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
6534 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
6535 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
6538 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
6539 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
6540 "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" },
6543 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
6544 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
6545 "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" },
6548 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
6549 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
6550 "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" },
6553 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
6554 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
6555 "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" }
6558 // anchors: commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6559 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6560 chan.feerate_per_kw = 644;
6562 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e0106830467a558c07544a3de7715610c1147062e7d091deeebe8b5c661cda9402202ad049c1a6d04834317a78483f723c205c9f638d17222aafc620800cc1b6ae35",
6563 "3045022100ef82a405364bfc4007e63a7cc82925a513d79065bdbc216d60b6a4223a323f8a02200716730b8561f3c6d362eaf47f202e99fb30d0557b61b92b5f9134f8e2de3681",
6564 "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", {
6567 "304402205912d91c58016f593d9e46fefcdb6f4125055c41a17b03101eaaa034b9028ab60220520d4d239c85c66e4c75c5b413620b62736e227659d7821b308e2b8ced3e728e",
6568 "30440220473166a5adcca68550bab80403f410a726b5bd855030527e3fefa8c1e4b4fd7b02203b1dc91d8d69039473036cb5c34398b99e8eb90ae500c22130a557b62294b188",
6569 "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" },
6572 "3045022100c6b4113678039ee1e43a6cba5e3224ed2355ffc05e365a393afe8843dc9a76860220566d01fd52d65a89ba8595023884f9e8f2e9a310a6b9b85281c0bce06863430c",
6573 "3045022100d0d86307ea55d5daa80f453ad6d64b78fe8a6504aac25407c73e8502c0702c1602206a0809a02aa00c8dc4a53d976bb05d4605d8bb0b7b26b973a5c4e2734d8afbb4",
6574 "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" },
6577 "304402203c3a699fb80a38112aafd73d6e3a9b7d40bc2c3ed8b7fbc182a20f43b215172202204e71821b984d1af52c4b8e2cd4c572578c12a965866130c2345f61e4c2d3fef4",
6578 "304402205bcfa92f83c69289a412b0b6dd4f2a0fe0b0fc2d45bd74706e963257a09ea24902203783e47883e60b86240e877fcbf33d50b1742f65bc93b3162d1be26583b367ee",
6579 "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" },
6582 "304402200f089bcd20f25475216307d32aa5b6c857419624bfba1da07335f51f6ba4645b02206ce0f7153edfba23b0d4b2afc26bb3157d404368cb8ea0ca7cf78590dcdd28cf",
6583 "3045022100e4516da08f72c7a4f7b2f37aa84a0feb54ae2cc5b73f0da378e81ae0ca8119bf02207751b2628d8e2f62b4b9abccda4866246c1bfcc82e3d416ad562fd212102c28f",
6584 "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" },
6587 "3045022100aa72cfaf0965020c73a12c77276c6411ca68c4de36ac1998adf86c917a899a43022060da0a159fecfe0bed37c3962d767f12f90e30fed8a8f34b1301775c21a2bd3a",
6588 "304402203cd12065c2a42963c762e6b1a981e17695616ecb6f9fb33d8b0717cdd7ca0ee4022065500005c491c1dcf2fe9c4024f74b1c90785d572527055a491278f901143904",
6589 "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" }
6592 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6593 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6594 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
6596 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
6597 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
6598 "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", {
6601 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
6602 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
6603 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
6606 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
6607 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
6608 "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" },
6611 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
6612 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
6613 "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" },
6616 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
6617 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
6618 "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" }
6621 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6622 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6623 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
6625 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
6626 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
6627 "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", {
6630 "30440220446f9e5c375db6a61d6eeee8b59219a30a4a37372afc2670a1a2889c78e9b943022061895f6088fb48b490ab2140a4842c277b64bf25ff591625dd0356e0c96ab7a8",
6631 "3045022100c1621ba26a99c263fd885feff5fda5ca2cc73df080b3a49ecf15164ee244d2a5022037f4cc7fd4441af39a83a0e44c3b1db7d64a4c8080e8697f9e952f85421a34d8",
6632 "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" },
6635 "3044022027a3ffcb8a007e3349d75382efbd4b3fb99fcbd479a18555e58697bd1278d5c402205c8303d46211c3ae8975fe84a0df08b4623119fecd03bc93b49d7f7a0c64c710",
6636 "3045022100b697aca55c6fb15e5348bb7387b584815fd15e8dd306afe0c477cb550d0c2d40022050b0f7e370f7604d2fec781fefe86715dbe95dff4dab88d628f509d62f854de1",
6637 "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" },
6640 "30440220013975ae356e6daf22a86a29f21c4f35aca82ed8f731a1103c60c74f5ed1c5aa02200350d4e5455cdbcacb7ccf174db5bed8286019e509a113f6b4c5e606ee12c9d7",
6641 "3045022100e69a29f78779577830e73f327073c93168896f1b89432124b7846f5def9cd9cb02204433db3697e6ed7ac89574ca066a749640e0c9e114ac2e0ee4545741fcf7b7e9",
6642 "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" },
6645 "304402205257017423644c7e831f30bc0c334eecfe66e9a6d2e92d157c5bece576b2be4f022047b21cf8e955e22b7471940563922d1a5852fb95459ca32905c7d46a19141664",
6646 "304402204f5de65a624e3f757adffb678bd887eb4e656538c5ea7044922f6ee3eed8a06202206ff6f7bfe73b565343cae76131ac658f1a9c60d3ca2343358cda60b9e35f94c8",
6647 "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" }
6650 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6651 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6652 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6654 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6655 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6656 "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", {
6659 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6660 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6661 "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" },
6664 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6665 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6666 "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" },
6669 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6670 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6671 "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" },
6674 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6675 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6676 "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" }
6679 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6680 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6681 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2060;
6683 test_commitment_with_anchors!("304402206208aeb34e404bd052ce3f298dfa832891c9d42caec99fe2a0d2832e9690b94302201b034bfcc6fa9faec667a9b7cbfe0b8d85e954aa239b66277887b5088aff08c3",
6684 "304402201ce37a44b95213358c20f44404d6db7a6083bea6f58de6c46547ae41a47c9f8202206db1d45be41373e92f90d346381febbea8c78671b28c153e30ad1db3441a9497",
6685 "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", {
6688 "30440220011f999016570bbab9f3125377d0f35096b4dbe155f97c20f71829ead2817d1602201f23f7e17f6928734601c5d8613431eed5c90aa41c3106e8c1cb02ce32aacb5d",
6689 "3044022017da96dfb0eb4061fa0162dc6fa6b2e07ecc5040ab5e6cb07be59838460b3e58022079371ffc95002cc1dc2891ec38198c9c25aca8164304fe114f1b55e2ffd1ddd5",
6690 "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" },
6693 "304402202d2d9681409b0a0987bd4a268ffeb112df85c4c988ac2a3a2475cb00a61912c302206aa4f4d1388b7d3282bc847871af3cca30766cc8f1064e3a41ec7e82221e10f7",
6694 "304402206426d67911aa6ff9b1cb147b093f3f65a37831a86d7c741d999afc0666e1773d022000bb71821650c70ea58d9bcdd03af736c41a5a8159d436c3ee0408a07394dcce",
6695 "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" },
6698 "3045022100f51cdaa525b7d4304548c642bb7945215eb5ae7d32874517cde67ca23ab0a12202206286d59e4b19926c6ac844be6f3ab8149a1ddb9c70f5026b7e83e40a6c08e6e1",
6699 "304502210091b16b1ac63b867e7a5ca0344f7b2aa1cdd49d4b72eac86a31e7ec6f069e20640220402bfb571ba3a9c49e3b0061c89303453803d0241059d899222aaac4799b5076",
6700 "02000000000101e7f364cf3a554b670767e723ef14b2af7a3eac70bd79dbde9256f384369c062d040000000001000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f51cdaa525b7d4304548c642bb7945215eb5ae7d32874517cde67ca23ab0a12202206286d59e4b19926c6ac844be6f3ab8149a1ddb9c70f5026b7e83e40a6c08e6e18348304502210091b16b1ac63b867e7a5ca0344f7b2aa1cdd49d4b72eac86a31e7ec6f069e20640220402bfb571ba3a9c49e3b0061c89303453803d0241059d899222aaac4799b507601008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
6703 "304402202f058d99cb5a54f90773d43ba4e7a0089efd9f8269ef2da1b85d48a3e230555402205acc4bd6561830867d45cd7b84bba9fa35ad2b345016471c1737142bc99782c4",
6704 "304402202913f9cacea54efd2316cffa91219def9e0e111977216c1e76e9da80befab14f022000a9a69e8f37ebe4a39107ab50fab0dde537334588f8f412bbaca57b179b87a6",
6705 "02000000000101e7f364cf3a554b670767e723ef14b2af7a3eac70bd79dbde9256f384369c062d05000000000100000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202f058d99cb5a54f90773d43ba4e7a0089efd9f8269ef2da1b85d48a3e230555402205acc4bd6561830867d45cd7b84bba9fa35ad2b345016471c1737142bc99782c48347304402202913f9cacea54efd2316cffa91219def9e0e111977216c1e76e9da80befab14f022000a9a69e8f37ebe4a39107ab50fab0dde537334588f8f412bbaca57b179b87a6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
6708 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6709 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6710 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6712 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6713 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6714 "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", {
6717 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6718 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6719 "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" },
6722 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6723 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6724 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
6727 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6728 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6729 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
6732 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6733 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6734 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2061;
6736 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a2faf2ad7e323b2a82e07dc40b6847207ca6ad7b089f2c21dea9a4d37e52d59d02204c9480ce0358eb51d92a4342355a97e272e3cc45f86c612a76a3fe32fc3c4cb4",
6737 "304402204ab07c659412dd2cd6043b1ad811ab215e901b6b5653e08cb3d2fe63d3e3dc57022031c7b3d130f9380ef09581f4f5a15cb6f359a2e0a597146b96c3533a26d6f4cd",
6738 "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", {
6741 "3045022100e10744f572a2cd1d787c969e894b792afaed21217ee0480df0112d2fa3ef96ea02202af4f66eb6beebc36d8e98719ed6b4be1b181659fcb561fc491d8cfebff3aa85",
6742 "3045022100c3dc3ea50a0ca20e350f97b50c52c5514717cfa36cb9600918caac5cb556842b022049af018d676dde0c8e28ecf325f3ff5c1594261c4f7511d501f9d62d0594d2a2",
6743 "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" },
6746 "3045022100e1f51fb72fec604b029b348a3bb6363454e1869f5b1e24fd736f860c8039f8070220030a2c90186437d8c9b47d4897798c024521b1274991c4cdc125970b346094b1",
6747 "3045022100ec7ade6037e531629f24390ca9713782a04d648065d17fbe6b015981cdb296c202202d61049a6ecba2fb5314f3edcda2361cad187a89bea6e5d15185354d80c0c085",
6748 "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" },
6751 "304402203479f81a1d83c516957679dc98bf91d35deada967739a8e3869e3e8db08246130220053c8e154b97e3019048dcec3d51bfaf396f36861fbda6d33f0e2a57155c8b9f",
6752 "3045022100a558eb5caa04e35a4417c1f0123ac12eec5f6badee28f5764dc6b69486e594f802201589b12784e242f205832d2d032149bd4e79433ec304c05394241fc7dcba5a71",
6753 "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" }
6756 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6757 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6758 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6760 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6761 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6762 "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", {
6765 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6766 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6767 "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" },
6770 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6771 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6772 "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" },
6775 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6776 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6777 "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" }
6780 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6781 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6782 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2184;
6784 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022013d326f80ff7607cf366c823fcbbcb7a2b10322484825f151e6c4c756af24b8f02201ba05b9d8beb7cea2947f9f4d9e03f90435e93db2dd48b32eb9ca3f3dd042c79",
6785 "30440220555c05261f72c5b4702d5c83a608630822b473048724b08640d6e75e345094250220448950b74a96a56963928ba5db8b457661a742c855e69d239b3b6ab73de307a3",
6786 "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", {
6789 "304402202e03ba1390998b3487e9a7fefcb66814c09abea0ef1bcc915dbaefbcf310569a02206bd10493a105ac69048e9bcedcb8e3301ef81b55018d911a4afd297297f98d30",
6790 "304402200c3952ca04be0c60dcc0b7873a0829f560607524943554ae4a27d8d967166199022021a68657b88e22f9bf9ac6065be412685aff643d17049f04f2e99e86197dabb1",
6791 "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" },
6794 "304402201f8a6adda2403bc400c919ea69d72d315337291e00d02cde085ea32953dbc50002202d65230da98df7af8ebefd2b60b457d0945232988ee2d7460a94a77d414a9acc",
6795 "3045022100ea69c9273b8914ac62b5b7082d6ac1da2b7b065ebf2ef3cd6403f5305ce3f26802203d98736ea97638895a898dfcc5ee0d0c55eb496b3964df0bb25d223688ea8b87",
6796 "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" },
6799 "3045022100ea6e4c9b8f56dd9cf5799492a201cdd65b8bc9bc089c3cff34107896ae313f90022034760f7760975cc68e8917a7f62894e25583da7be11af557c4fc402661d0cbf8",
6800 "30440220717012f2f7ef6cac590aaf66c2109132c93ffba245959ac62d82e394ba80191302203f00fd9cb37c92c6b0ad4b33e62c3e55b04e5c2cfa0adcca5a9bc49774eeca8a",
6801 "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" }
6804 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6805 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6806 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6808 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6809 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6810 "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", {
6813 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6814 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6815 "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" },
6818 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6819 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6820 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
6823 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6824 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6825 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
6827 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
6828 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
6829 "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", {
6832 "304502210094480e38afb41d10fae299224872f19c53abe23c7033a1c0642c48713e7863a10220726dd9456407682667dc4bd9c66975acb3744961770b5002f7eb9c0df9ef2f3e",
6833 "304402203148dac61513dc0361738cba30cb341a1e580f8acd5ab0149bf65bd670688cf002207e5d9a0fcbbea2c263bc714fa9e9c44d7f582ea447f366119fc614a23de32f1f",
6834 "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" },
6837 "304402200dbde868dbc20c6a2433fe8979ba5e3f966b1c2d1aeb615f1c42e9c938b3495402202eec5f663c8b601c2061c1453d35de22597c137d1907a2feaf714d551035cb6e",
6838 "3045022100b896bded41d7feac7af25c19e35c53037c53b50e73cfd01eb4ba139c7fdf231602203a3be049d3d89396c4dc766d82ce31e237da8bc3a93e2c7d35992d1932d9cfeb",
6839 "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" }
6842 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6843 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6844 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6846 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6847 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6848 "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", {
6851 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6852 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6853 "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" },
6856 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6857 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6858 "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" }
6861 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6862 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6863 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3686;
6865 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220784485cf7a0ad7979daf2c858ffdaf5298d0020cea7aea466843e7948223bd9902206031b81d25e02a178c64e62f843577fdcdfc7a1decbbfb54cd895de692df85ca",
6866 "3045022100c268496aad5c3f97f25cf41c1ba5483a12982de29b222051b6de3daa2229413b02207f3c82d77a2c14f0096ed9bb4c34649483bb20fa71f819f71af44de6593e8bb2",
6867 "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", {
6870 "304402202cfe6618926ca9f1574f8c4659b425e9790b4677ba2248d77901290806130ffe02204ab37bb0287abcdb8b750b018d41a09effe37cb65ff801fa70d3f1a416599841",
6871 "3044022030b318139715e3b34f19be852cc01c1c0e1599e8b926a73df2bfb70dd186ddee022062a2b7398aed9f563b4014da04a1a99debd0ff663ceece68a547df5982dc2d72",
6872 "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" },
6875 "30440220687af8544d335376620a6f4b5412bfd0da48de047c1785674f26e669d4a3ff82022058591c1e3a6c50017427d38a8f756eb685bdab88ec73838eed3530048861f9d5",
6876 "30440220109f1a62b5a13d28d5b7634dd7693b1d5994eb404c4bb4a9a80aa540d3984d170220307251107ff8499a23e99abce7dda4f1c707c98abddb9405a83de0081cde8ace",
6877 "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" }
6880 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6881 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6882 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6884 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6885 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6886 "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", {
6889 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6890 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6891 "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" }
6894 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6895 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6896 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
6898 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
6899 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
6900 "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", {
6903 "3045022100b287bb8e079a62dcb3aaa8b6c67c0f434a87ebf64ab0bcfb2fc14b55576b859f02206d37c2eb5fd04cfc9eb0534c76a28a98da251b84a931377cce307af39dfaed74",
6904 "3045022100a497c64faea286ec4221f48628086dc6403fd7b60a23c4176e8ebbca15ae70dc0220754e20e968e96cf6421fd2a672c8c26d3bc6e19218cfc8fc2aa51fce026c14b1",
6905 "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" }
6908 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6909 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6910 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6912 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6913 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6914 "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", {
6917 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6918 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6919 "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" }
6922 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6923 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6924 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4893;
6926 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a8771147109e4d3f44a5976c3c3de98732bbb77308d21444dbe0d76faf06480e02200b4e916e850c3d1f918de87bbbbb07843ffea1d4658dfe060b6f9ccd96d34be8",
6927 "30440220086288faceab47461eb2d808e9e9b0cb3ffc24a03c2f18db7198247d38f10e58022031d1c2782a58c8c6ce187d0019eb47a83babdf3040e2caff299ab48f7e12b1fa",
6928 "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", {
6931 "30450221008db80f8531104820b3e894492b4463f074f965b542e1b5c153ddfb108a5ea642022030b203d857a2b3581c2087a7bf17c95d04fadc1c6cdae88c620477f2dccb1ee4",
6932 "3045022100e5fbae857c47dbfc050a05924bd449fc9804798bd6442002c578437dc34450810220296589bc387645512345299e307116aaac4ce9fc752abcd1936b802d03526312",
6933 "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" }
6936 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6937 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6938 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6940 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6941 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6942 "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", {});
6944 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6945 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6946 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
6948 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
6949 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
6950 "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", {});
6952 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6953 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6954 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6956 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6957 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6958 "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", {});
6960 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6961 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6962 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6964 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6965 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6966 "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", {});
6968 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6969 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6970 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
6972 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
6973 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
6974 "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", {});
6976 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6977 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6978 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6980 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6981 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6982 "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", {});
6984 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6985 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6986 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6987 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6988 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6989 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6991 amount_msat: 2000000,
6993 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6994 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6996 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6999 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7000 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7001 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7003 amount_msat: 5000000,
7005 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7006 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7007 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7009 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7012 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7013 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7015 amount_msat: 5000000,
7017 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7018 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7019 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7021 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7025 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7026 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7027 "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", {
7030 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7031 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7032 "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" },
7034 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7035 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7036 "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" },
7038 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7039 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7040 "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" }
7043 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7044 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7045 "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", {
7048 "304402202060a5acb12105e92f27d7b86e6caf1e003d9d82068338e5a8a9a0d14cba11260220030ca4dba8fad24a2e395906220c991eccd5369bc4b0f216d217b5f86d1fc61d",
7049 "3044022044f5425fe630fa614f349f55642e4a0b76e2583054b21543821660d9e8f3735702207f70424835b541874ca8bf0443cca4028afa2f6c03a17b0688df85d5c44eeefc",
7050 "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" },
7052 "304402206fde7eb6d7a47fdc63705d3db2169054e229f10342dea66f150b163381f48a0802201be28509c2de9be4b7ab72c569c6fd51c0ce0904fea459142f31d442cd043eb8",
7053 "3045022100ad0236a78dbd029d3a8f583f7f82ee62892273d45303d00ef5a03fecf8903a36022004b2db33f8ff2f4a08ca6127c9cbfd9144c691a2feb9287e36ae6bc7c83c5a5f",
7054 "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" },
7056 "304402205eebc78d8ae6a36c27ef80172359eb757fb18e99fa75b28c37ffe3444b967bc7022060a01c33398d4d8244c42c762fb699e9f61c1f034ff976df2c94350c5a6032a7",
7057 "3045022100ad3fd523594e1b876316401774a30ee6c48bb7fa0efd768bf9a2d022201311ff02207bed627ed8e01041137f03dbaf03c836970be27a4d50f69d90cf1282ff2815e3",
7058 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe2904000000000100000001e0120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205eebc78d8ae6a36c27ef80172359eb757fb18e99fa75b28c37ffe3444b967bc7022060a01c33398d4d8244c42c762fb699e9f61c1f034ff976df2c94350c5a6032a783483045022100ad3fd523594e1b876316401774a30ee6c48bb7fa0efd768bf9a2d022201311ff02207bed627ed8e01041137f03dbaf03c836970be27a4d50f69d90cf1282ff2815e301008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
7063 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7064 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7066 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7067 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7068 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7069 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7071 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7072 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7073 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7075 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7076 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7078 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7079 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7081 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7082 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7083 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7087 fn test_key_derivation() {
7088 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7089 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7091 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7092 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7094 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7095 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7097 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7098 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7100 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7101 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7103 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7104 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7106 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7107 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7109 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7110 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());