1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
24 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
28 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
35 use util::transaction_utils;
36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
37 use util::logger::Logger;
38 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
40 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
42 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
44 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
47 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
50 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
51 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
52 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
53 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
54 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
55 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
56 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
57 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
58 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
61 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
62 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
63 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
64 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
67 enum InboundHTLCState {
68 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
69 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
70 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
71 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
72 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
73 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
74 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
75 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
76 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
77 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
78 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
79 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
80 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
81 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
82 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
84 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
85 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
86 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
87 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
88 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
89 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
90 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
91 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
92 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
93 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
94 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
95 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
96 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
97 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
99 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
100 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
102 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
103 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
104 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
105 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
106 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
108 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
109 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
111 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
112 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
113 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
114 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
115 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
116 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
117 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
118 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
121 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126 state: InboundHTLCState,
129 enum OutboundHTLCState {
130 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
131 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
132 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
133 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
134 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
135 /// money back (though we won't), and,
136 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
137 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
138 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
139 /// we'll never get out of sync).
140 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
141 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
142 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
144 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
145 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
146 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
147 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
148 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
149 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
150 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
151 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
152 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
153 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
154 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
155 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
156 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
157 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
158 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
161 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: OutboundHTLCState,
170 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
171 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
172 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
176 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
178 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
181 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
186 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
190 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
191 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
192 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
193 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
194 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
195 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
196 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
198 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
199 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
200 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
201 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
202 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
203 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
204 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
206 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
207 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
208 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
210 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
211 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
212 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
213 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
214 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
215 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
217 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
218 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
220 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
221 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
222 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
223 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
224 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
225 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
226 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
227 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
228 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
230 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
231 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
232 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
233 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
234 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
235 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
236 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
237 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
238 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
239 /// us their shutdown.
240 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
241 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
242 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
243 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
245 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
246 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
248 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
250 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
251 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
252 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
253 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
254 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
255 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
256 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
257 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
259 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
261 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
263 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
267 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
273 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
274 struct HTLCCandidate {
276 origin: HTLCInitiator,
280 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
288 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
290 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
291 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
292 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
293 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
294 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
295 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
296 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
297 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
298 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
301 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
302 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
303 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
306 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
307 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
308 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
309 config: ChannelConfig,
313 channel_id: [u8; 32],
315 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
318 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
320 holder_signer: Signer,
321 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
322 destination_script: Script,
324 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
325 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
326 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
328 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
329 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
330 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
331 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
332 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
333 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
335 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
336 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
337 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
338 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
339 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
340 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
342 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
344 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
345 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
346 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
347 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
348 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
350 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
351 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
352 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
354 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
355 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
356 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
357 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
358 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
359 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
360 // commitment_signed.
361 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
362 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
363 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
364 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
365 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
366 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
367 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
368 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
369 update_time_counter: u32,
372 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
373 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
374 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
375 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
376 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
377 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
379 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
381 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
382 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
383 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
384 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
386 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
388 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
390 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
392 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
394 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
395 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
396 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
397 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
398 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
399 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
400 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
402 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
404 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
405 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
408 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
410 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
411 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
413 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
414 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
415 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
417 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
419 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
421 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
423 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
424 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
425 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
426 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
427 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
428 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
429 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
430 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
434 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
436 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
437 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
438 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
442 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
443 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
446 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
448 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
450 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
452 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
454 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
456 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
458 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
459 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
460 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
461 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
462 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
463 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
464 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
465 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
466 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
468 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
469 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
470 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
471 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
472 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
474 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
475 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
476 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
477 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
480 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
483 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
484 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
486 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
487 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
488 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
493 macro_rules! secp_check {
494 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
497 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
502 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
503 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
504 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
505 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
508 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
511 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
512 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
513 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
514 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
518 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
519 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
520 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
522 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
523 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
524 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
526 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
527 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
529 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
530 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
531 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
533 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
534 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
536 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
537 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
538 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
541 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
543 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
544 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
548 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
550 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
551 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
553 channel_value_satoshis,
555 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
558 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
559 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
561 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
562 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
563 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
565 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
566 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
567 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
568 pending_update_fee: None,
569 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
570 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
571 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
572 update_time_counter: 1,
574 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
576 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
577 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
578 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
579 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
580 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
582 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
583 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
584 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
585 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
587 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
589 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
590 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
591 short_channel_id: None,
593 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
594 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
595 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
596 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
597 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
598 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
599 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
600 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
601 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
603 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
605 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
606 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
607 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
608 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
609 counterparty_parameters: None,
610 funding_outpoint: None
612 funding_transaction: None,
614 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
615 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
616 counterparty_node_id,
618 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
620 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
622 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
624 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
625 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
626 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
627 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
631 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
632 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
634 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
635 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
636 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
638 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
639 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
645 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
646 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
647 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
648 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
649 F::Target: FeeEstimator
651 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
652 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
653 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
654 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
655 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
656 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
657 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
658 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
660 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
662 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
666 // Check sanity of message fields:
667 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
670 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
673 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
674 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
677 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
680 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
683 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
684 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
685 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
687 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
689 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
690 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
693 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
696 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
700 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
701 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
702 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
704 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
705 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
707 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
710 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
711 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
713 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
714 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
716 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
717 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
719 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
720 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
723 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
725 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
726 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
727 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
731 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
732 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
734 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
736 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
737 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
738 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
740 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
741 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
743 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
744 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
747 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
748 // for full fee payment
749 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
750 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
751 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
752 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
755 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
756 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
757 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
761 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
762 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
763 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
764 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
765 if script.len() == 0 {
767 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
768 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
769 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
774 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
775 &OptionalField::Absent => {
776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
781 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
782 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
786 config: local_config,
788 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
789 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
792 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
795 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
796 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
798 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
799 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
800 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
802 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
803 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
804 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
805 pending_update_fee: None,
806 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
807 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
808 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
809 update_time_counter: 1,
811 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
813 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
814 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
815 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
816 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
817 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
819 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
820 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
821 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
822 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
824 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
826 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
827 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
828 short_channel_id: None,
830 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
831 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
832 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
833 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
834 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
835 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
836 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
837 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
838 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
839 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
841 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
843 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
844 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
845 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
846 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
847 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
848 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
849 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
851 funding_outpoint: None
853 funding_transaction: None,
855 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
856 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
857 counterparty_node_id,
859 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
861 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
863 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
865 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
866 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
867 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
868 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
874 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
875 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
876 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
877 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
878 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
880 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
881 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
882 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
883 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
884 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
885 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
886 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
887 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
888 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
889 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
890 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
892 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
893 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
894 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
895 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
897 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
898 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
899 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
900 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
902 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
904 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
905 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
906 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
908 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
909 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
910 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
911 transaction_output_index: None
916 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
917 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
918 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
919 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
920 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
921 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
922 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
924 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
925 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
928 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
929 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
930 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
931 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
933 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
934 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
940 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
941 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
942 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
943 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
944 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
945 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
946 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
950 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
951 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
953 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
955 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
956 if generated_by_local {
957 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
958 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
967 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
968 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
969 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
970 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
971 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
972 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
973 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
977 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
978 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
980 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
982 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
983 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
985 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
986 if !generated_by_local {
987 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
995 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
996 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
997 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
998 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
999 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1000 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1001 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1002 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1006 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1007 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1008 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1009 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1011 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1013 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1014 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1015 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1016 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1019 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1020 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1021 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1023 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1026 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1027 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1029 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1030 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1035 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1036 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1041 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1043 let channel_parameters =
1044 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1045 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1046 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1051 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1054 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1055 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1056 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1057 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1059 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1063 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1064 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1065 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1069 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1074 1 + // script length (0)
1078 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1079 2 + // witness marker and flag
1080 1 + // witness element count
1081 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1082 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1083 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1084 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1085 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1086 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1088 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1089 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1090 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1096 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1098 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1100 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1101 script_sig: Script::new(),
1102 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1103 witness: Vec::new(),
1108 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1109 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1110 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1112 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1113 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1114 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1116 if value_to_self < 0 {
1117 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1118 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1119 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1120 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1121 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1124 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1125 txouts.push((TxOut {
1126 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1127 value: value_to_remote as u64
1131 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1132 txouts.push((TxOut {
1133 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1134 value: value_to_self as u64
1138 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1140 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1141 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1142 outputs.push(out.0);
1150 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1153 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1154 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1158 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1159 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1160 /// our counterparty!)
1161 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1162 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1163 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1164 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1165 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1166 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1167 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1169 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1173 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1174 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1175 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1176 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1177 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1178 //may see payments to it!
1179 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1180 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1181 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1183 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1186 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1187 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1188 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1189 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1190 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1193 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1194 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1195 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1196 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1197 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1200 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1201 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1202 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1204 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1205 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1206 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1207 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1208 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1209 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1211 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1212 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1214 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1216 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1218 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1219 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1220 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1222 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1223 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1224 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1225 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1227 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1228 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1229 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1231 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1233 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1234 return Ok((None, None));
1237 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1238 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1245 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1249 // Now update local state:
1251 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1252 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1253 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1254 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1255 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1256 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1257 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1261 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1262 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1263 match pending_update {
1264 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1265 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1266 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1267 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1268 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1269 return Ok((None, None));
1272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1273 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1274 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1275 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1276 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1277 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1278 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1284 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1285 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1286 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1288 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1292 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1293 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1295 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1296 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1298 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1299 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1302 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1303 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1304 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1305 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1306 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1309 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1310 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1311 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1312 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1313 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1314 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1315 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1316 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1317 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1319 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1320 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1321 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1323 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1324 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1328 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1329 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1330 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1332 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1333 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1334 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1335 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1336 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1338 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1340 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1341 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1342 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1344 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1345 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1346 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1348 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1349 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1350 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1354 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1355 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1361 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1362 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1365 // Now update local state:
1366 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1367 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1368 match pending_update {
1369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1370 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1371 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1372 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1375 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1376 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1377 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1378 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1384 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1385 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1392 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1393 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1396 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1397 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1398 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1403 // Message handlers:
1405 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1406 // Check sanity of message fields:
1407 if !self.is_outbound() {
1408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1410 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1413 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1414 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1416 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1419 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1420 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1422 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1423 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1425 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1426 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1427 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1429 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1430 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1433 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1434 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1435 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1437 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1440 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1441 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1444 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1445 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1446 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1448 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1449 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1451 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1452 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1454 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1455 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1457 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1460 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1461 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1463 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1467 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1468 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1469 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1470 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1471 if script.len() == 0 {
1473 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1474 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1477 Some(script.clone())
1480 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1481 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1487 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1488 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1489 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1490 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1491 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1492 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1494 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1495 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1496 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1497 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1498 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1499 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1502 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1503 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1504 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1507 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1508 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1510 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1515 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1516 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1518 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1519 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1521 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1522 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1523 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1524 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1525 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1526 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1529 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1530 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1532 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1533 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1534 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1536 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1537 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1539 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1540 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1543 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1544 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1547 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1548 if self.is_outbound() {
1549 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1551 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1552 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1553 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1557 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1558 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1559 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1560 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1563 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1564 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1565 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1566 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1567 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1569 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1571 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1572 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1573 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1576 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1577 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1578 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1582 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1583 initial_commitment_tx,
1586 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1587 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1590 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1592 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1593 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1594 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1595 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1596 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1597 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1598 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1599 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1601 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1603 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1605 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1606 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1607 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1608 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1610 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1611 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1613 }, channel_monitor))
1616 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1617 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1618 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1619 if !self.is_outbound() {
1620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1622 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1623 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1625 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1626 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1627 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1628 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1631 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1633 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1634 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1635 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1636 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1638 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1640 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1641 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1643 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1644 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1645 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1646 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1647 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1652 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1653 initial_commitment_tx,
1656 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1657 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1661 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1662 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1663 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1664 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1665 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1666 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1667 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1668 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1669 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1671 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1673 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1675 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1676 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1677 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1678 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1680 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1683 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1684 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1688 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1690 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1691 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1692 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1693 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1694 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1695 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1696 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1697 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1698 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1699 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1700 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1701 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1702 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1703 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1705 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1711 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1712 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1716 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1717 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1718 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1719 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1720 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1722 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1725 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1727 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1728 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1729 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1730 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1733 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1734 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1735 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1736 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1737 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1741 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1744 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1745 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1746 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1747 /// corner case properly.
1748 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1749 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1750 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1751 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1754 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1755 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1756 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1757 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1758 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1759 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1762 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1763 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1764 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1766 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1767 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1769 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1770 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1772 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1773 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1775 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1776 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1780 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1781 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1787 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1788 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1789 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1792 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1793 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1794 included_htlcs += 1;
1797 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1798 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1802 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1803 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1804 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1805 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1806 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1807 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1812 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1814 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1815 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1820 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1821 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1825 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1826 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1827 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1830 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1831 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1833 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1834 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1835 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1837 total_pending_htlcs,
1838 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1839 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1840 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1842 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1843 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1844 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1846 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1848 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1853 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1854 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1855 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1857 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1858 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1860 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1861 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1863 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1864 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1866 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1867 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1871 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1872 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1878 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1879 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1880 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1881 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1882 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1883 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1886 included_htlcs += 1;
1889 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1890 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1893 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1894 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1896 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1897 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1898 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1903 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1904 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1905 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1908 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1909 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1911 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1912 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1914 total_pending_htlcs,
1915 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1916 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1917 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1919 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1920 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1921 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1923 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1925 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1930 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1931 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1932 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1933 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1934 if local_sent_shutdown {
1935 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1937 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1938 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1939 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1942 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1945 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1948 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1951 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1952 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1955 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1956 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1957 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1959 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1960 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1963 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1964 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1965 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1966 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1967 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1968 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1969 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1970 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1971 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1972 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1973 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1975 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1976 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1977 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1978 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1979 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1980 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1984 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1985 self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1986 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1987 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1988 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1989 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1992 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1993 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1994 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1995 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1996 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1998 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2002 let chan_reserve_msat =
2003 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2004 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2005 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2008 if !self.is_outbound() {
2009 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2010 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2011 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2012 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2013 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2014 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2015 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2016 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2017 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2018 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2019 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2020 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2021 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2022 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2023 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2026 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2027 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2028 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2029 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2033 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2036 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2040 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2041 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2042 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2046 // Now update local state:
2047 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2048 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2049 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2050 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2051 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2052 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2053 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2058 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2060 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2061 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2062 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2063 match check_preimage {
2065 Some(payment_hash) =>
2066 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2071 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2073 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2074 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2076 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2079 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2082 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2085 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2086 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2089 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2093 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2094 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2097 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2098 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2101 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2105 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2109 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2110 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2113 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2117 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2121 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2122 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2125 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2126 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2128 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2129 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2131 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2132 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2135 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2137 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2139 let mut update_fee = false;
2140 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2142 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2147 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2148 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2149 let commitment_txid = {
2150 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2151 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2152 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2154 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2155 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2156 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2160 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2161 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2164 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2165 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2167 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2168 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2169 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2172 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2174 if self.is_outbound() {
2175 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2176 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2177 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2178 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2179 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2180 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2181 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2182 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2183 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2184 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2190 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2191 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2194 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2195 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2196 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2197 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2198 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2199 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2200 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2201 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2202 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2203 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2205 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2207 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2211 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2214 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2215 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2216 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2219 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2220 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2222 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2223 let mut need_commitment = false;
2224 if !self.is_outbound() {
2225 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2226 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2227 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2228 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2229 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2230 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2231 need_commitment = true;
2232 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2237 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2238 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2239 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2240 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2241 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2242 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2246 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2247 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2248 Some(forward_info.clone())
2250 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2251 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2252 need_commitment = true;
2255 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2256 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2257 Some(fail_reason.take())
2259 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2260 need_commitment = true;
2264 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2265 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2266 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2267 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2269 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2270 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2271 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2272 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2273 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2274 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2275 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2276 // includes the right HTLCs.
2277 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2278 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2279 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2280 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2281 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2282 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2284 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2285 // re-send the message on restoration)
2286 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2289 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2290 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2291 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2292 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2293 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2294 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2295 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2296 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2297 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2299 } else if !need_commitment {
2300 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2301 } else { (None, None) };
2303 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2304 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2305 per_commitment_secret,
2306 next_per_commitment_point,
2307 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2310 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2311 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2312 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2313 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2314 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2315 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2317 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2318 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2319 updates: Vec::new(),
2322 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2323 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2324 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2325 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2326 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2327 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2328 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2329 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2330 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2331 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2332 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2333 // to rebalance channels.
2334 match &htlc_update {
2335 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2336 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2337 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2340 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2341 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2342 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2343 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2344 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2345 // into the holding cell without ever being
2346 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2347 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2348 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2351 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2357 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2358 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2359 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2360 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2361 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2362 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2366 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2368 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2373 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2374 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2375 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2377 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2379 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2386 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2387 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2389 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2390 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2391 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2392 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2393 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2399 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2400 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2401 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2402 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2403 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2405 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2407 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2409 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2412 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2414 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2418 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2419 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2420 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2421 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2422 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2423 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2424 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2427 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2428 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2430 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2431 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2433 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2437 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2438 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2443 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2444 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2445 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2446 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2447 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2448 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2449 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2450 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2454 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2456 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2457 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2460 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2461 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2462 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2463 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2464 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2465 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2466 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2467 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2471 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2472 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2473 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2474 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2475 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2476 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2477 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2478 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2480 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2481 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2482 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2483 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2484 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2485 let mut require_commitment = false;
2486 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2489 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2490 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2491 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2493 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2494 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2495 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2496 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2497 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2498 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2503 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2504 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2505 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2506 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2507 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2509 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2510 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2515 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2516 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2517 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2519 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2520 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2524 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2525 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2527 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2528 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2529 require_commitment = true;
2530 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2531 match forward_info {
2532 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2533 require_commitment = true;
2535 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2536 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2537 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2539 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2540 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2541 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2545 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2546 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2547 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2553 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2554 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2555 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2556 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2558 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2559 Some(fail_reason.take())
2561 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2562 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2563 require_commitment = true;
2567 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2569 if self.is_outbound() {
2570 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2571 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2574 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2575 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2576 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2577 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2578 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2579 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2580 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2581 require_commitment = true;
2582 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2587 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2588 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2589 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2590 if require_commitment {
2591 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2592 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2593 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2594 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2595 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2596 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2597 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2598 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2599 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2601 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2602 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2603 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2606 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2607 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2608 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2609 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2610 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2612 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2613 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2614 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2617 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2618 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2619 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2620 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2622 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2624 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2625 if require_commitment {
2626 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2628 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2629 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2630 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2631 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2633 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2634 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2635 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2637 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2640 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2642 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2649 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2650 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2651 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2652 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2653 if !self.is_outbound() {
2654 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2656 if !self.is_usable() {
2657 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2659 if !self.is_live() {
2660 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2663 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2664 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2668 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2669 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2671 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2672 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2677 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2678 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2679 Some(update_fee) => {
2680 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2681 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2687 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2688 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2689 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2690 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2691 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2693 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2694 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2696 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2697 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2698 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2699 return outbound_drops;
2701 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2702 // will be retransmitted.
2703 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2705 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2706 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2708 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2709 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2710 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2711 // this HTLC accordingly
2712 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2715 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2716 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2717 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2718 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2721 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2722 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2723 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2724 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2725 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2726 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2731 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2733 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2734 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2735 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2736 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2737 // the update upon reconnection.
2738 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2742 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2744 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2745 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2746 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2747 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2749 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2750 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2753 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2756 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2757 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2761 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2762 /// updates are partially paused.
2763 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2764 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2765 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2766 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2767 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2768 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2769 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2770 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2771 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2772 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2773 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2774 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2775 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2778 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2779 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2780 /// to the remote side.
2781 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2782 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2783 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2785 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2786 self.funding_transaction.take()
2789 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2790 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2791 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2792 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2793 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2794 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2795 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2796 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2797 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2798 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2799 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2800 next_per_commitment_point,
2804 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2805 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2806 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2807 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2809 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2810 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2811 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2812 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2815 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2816 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2818 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2819 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2822 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2823 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2824 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2825 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2826 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2827 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2828 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2829 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2830 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2833 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2834 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2836 if self.is_outbound() {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2839 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2842 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2843 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2844 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2848 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2849 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2850 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2851 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2852 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2853 per_commitment_secret,
2854 next_per_commitment_point,
2858 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2859 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2860 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2861 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2862 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2864 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2865 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2866 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2867 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2868 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2869 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2870 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2871 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2872 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2877 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2878 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2880 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2881 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2882 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2883 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2884 reason: err_packet.clone()
2887 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2888 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2889 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2890 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2891 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2892 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2895 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2896 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2897 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2898 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2899 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2906 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2907 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2908 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2909 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2911 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2915 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2916 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2917 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2918 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2919 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2920 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2921 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2925 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2926 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2930 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2931 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2932 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2933 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2934 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2935 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2936 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2939 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2940 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2941 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2945 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2949 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2950 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2951 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2953 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2954 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2955 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2956 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2960 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2961 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2962 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2963 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2964 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2967 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2968 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2971 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2972 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2973 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2974 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2975 next_per_commitment_point,
2976 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2979 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2980 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2981 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2983 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2984 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2985 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2988 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2994 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2995 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2996 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2997 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2998 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3000 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3001 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3002 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3003 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3004 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3005 next_per_commitment_point,
3009 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3010 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3011 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3013 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3016 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3017 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3018 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
3019 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3020 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
3021 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3025 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3026 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3027 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3029 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3030 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3031 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3032 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3033 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3034 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3035 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3036 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3038 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3039 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3040 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3041 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3042 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3046 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3048 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3049 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3050 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3052 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3055 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3056 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3057 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3060 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3066 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3067 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3069 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3070 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3071 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3075 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3076 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3077 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3079 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3080 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3082 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3083 let sig = self.holder_signer
3084 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3086 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3087 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3089 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3090 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3091 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3092 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3093 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3097 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3098 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3100 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3103 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3104 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3105 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3106 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3107 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3109 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3110 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3114 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3116 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3120 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3121 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3125 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3128 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3130 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3131 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3133 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3134 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3135 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3136 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3137 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3138 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3140 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3141 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3147 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3148 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3149 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3151 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3154 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3155 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3156 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3160 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3161 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3163 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3166 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3167 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3168 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3169 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3171 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3173 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3174 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3175 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3176 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3177 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3179 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3180 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3182 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3183 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3185 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3188 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3189 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3191 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3194 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3197 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3200 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3204 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3205 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3206 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3209 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3211 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3214 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3215 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3216 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3217 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3218 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3222 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3223 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3224 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3225 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3226 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3227 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3228 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3229 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3230 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3231 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3232 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3236 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3237 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3238 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3239 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3240 let sig = self.holder_signer
3241 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3242 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3243 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3244 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3245 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3246 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3247 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3253 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3254 if self.is_outbound() {
3255 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3256 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3257 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3258 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3262 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3265 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3267 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3268 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3269 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3273 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3276 let sig = self.holder_signer
3277 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3278 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3279 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3280 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3281 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3283 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3284 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3286 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3287 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3288 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3290 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3293 // Public utilities:
3295 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3299 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3300 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3301 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3305 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3306 /// is_usable() returns true).
3307 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3308 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3309 self.short_channel_id
3312 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3313 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3314 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3315 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3318 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3319 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3322 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3323 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3326 fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3327 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3330 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3331 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3334 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3335 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3336 self.counterparty_node_id
3339 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3341 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3342 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3345 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3346 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3348 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3349 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3350 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3351 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3353 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3357 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3358 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3359 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3362 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3363 self.channel_value_satoshis
3366 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3367 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3370 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3371 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3375 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3379 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3380 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3383 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3384 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3387 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3388 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3392 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3397 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3399 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3400 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3401 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3402 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3403 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3404 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3406 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3408 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3416 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3417 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3421 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3422 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3423 self.update_time_counter
3426 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3427 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3430 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3431 self.config.announced_channel
3434 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3435 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3438 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3439 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3440 pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3441 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3443 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3444 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3446 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3447 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3449 if self.is_outbound() {
3450 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3451 res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3454 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3455 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3460 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3461 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3462 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3465 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3466 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3467 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3468 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3469 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3472 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3473 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3474 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3475 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3476 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3479 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3480 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3481 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3482 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3485 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3486 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3487 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3490 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3491 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3492 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3493 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3494 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3495 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3500 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3501 self.channel_update_status
3504 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3505 self.channel_update_status = status;
3508 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3509 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3513 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3514 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3515 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3518 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
3522 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3523 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3524 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3526 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3527 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3528 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3530 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3531 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3533 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3534 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3536 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3540 if need_commitment_update {
3541 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3542 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3543 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3544 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3545 next_per_commitment_point,
3548 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3554 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3555 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3556 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3557 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3558 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3559 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3560 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3561 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3562 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3563 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3564 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3565 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3566 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3567 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3568 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3569 if self.is_outbound() {
3570 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3571 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3572 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3573 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3574 // channel and move on.
3575 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3576 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3578 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3579 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3580 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3581 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3584 if self.is_outbound() {
3585 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3586 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3587 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3588 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3589 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3590 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3594 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3595 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3596 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3597 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3598 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3602 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3603 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3604 // may have already happened for this block).
3605 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3606 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3609 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3610 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3611 log_trace!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3612 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3613 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3614 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3623 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3624 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3625 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3626 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3628 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3629 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3632 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3634 pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3635 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3636 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3637 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3639 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3640 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3641 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3649 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3651 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3652 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3655 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3656 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3657 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3658 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3659 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3660 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3661 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3662 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3663 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3666 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3667 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3668 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3669 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3670 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
3671 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3672 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3673 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
3678 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3681 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3682 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3683 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3684 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3685 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3686 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3687 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3688 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3689 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3690 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3691 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3692 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3693 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time) {
3694 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3695 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3696 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3702 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3707 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3708 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3710 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3711 if !self.is_outbound() {
3712 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3714 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3715 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3718 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3719 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3722 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3723 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3727 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3728 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3729 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3730 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3731 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3732 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3733 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3734 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3735 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3736 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3737 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3738 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3739 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3740 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3741 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3742 first_per_commitment_point,
3743 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3744 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3748 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3749 if self.is_outbound() {
3750 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3752 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3753 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3755 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3756 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3759 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3760 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3762 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3763 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3764 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3765 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3766 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3767 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3768 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3769 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3770 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3771 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3772 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3773 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3774 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3775 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3776 first_per_commitment_point,
3777 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3781 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3782 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3783 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3784 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3785 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3786 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3789 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3790 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3791 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3792 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3793 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3794 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3795 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3796 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3797 if !self.is_outbound() {
3798 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3800 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3801 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3803 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3804 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3805 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3806 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3809 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3810 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3812 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3815 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3816 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3821 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3823 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3825 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3826 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3827 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
3829 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3830 temporary_channel_id,
3831 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3832 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3837 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3838 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3839 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3840 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3841 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3843 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3844 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3845 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3846 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3847 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3849 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3850 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3852 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3853 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3856 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3858 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3859 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3861 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3862 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3863 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3864 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3865 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3866 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3869 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3870 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3875 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3876 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3877 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3878 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3879 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3880 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3881 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3882 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3883 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3884 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3885 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3886 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3887 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3888 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3889 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3890 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3891 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3892 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3893 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3896 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3897 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3898 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3899 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3902 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3903 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3904 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3905 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3906 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3907 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3908 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3909 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3911 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3912 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3913 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3914 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3915 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3916 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3917 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3918 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3919 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3921 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3927 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3929 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3930 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3931 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3932 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3933 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3934 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3935 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3936 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3937 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3938 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3940 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3941 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3942 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3945 if amount_msat == 0 {
3946 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3949 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3950 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3953 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3954 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3955 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3956 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3957 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3958 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3959 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3960 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3963 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3964 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3965 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3967 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3968 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3969 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3972 if !self.is_outbound() {
3973 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3974 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3975 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3976 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3977 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3978 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3979 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3983 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3984 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3985 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3988 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3989 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3990 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3991 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3993 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3994 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3997 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3998 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3999 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4000 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4001 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4004 // Now update local state:
4005 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4006 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4011 onion_routing_packet,
4016 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4017 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4019 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4021 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4025 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4026 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4027 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4031 onion_routing_packet,
4033 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4038 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4039 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4040 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4041 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4042 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4043 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4044 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4046 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4047 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4049 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4050 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4052 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4053 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4055 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4056 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4057 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4058 have_updates = true;
4060 if have_updates { break; }
4062 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4063 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4064 have_updates = true;
4066 if have_updates { break; }
4069 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4071 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4073 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4074 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4075 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4076 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4078 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4079 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4080 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4082 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4086 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4087 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4088 Some(fail_reason.take())
4090 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4093 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4095 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4096 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4097 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4098 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4099 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4100 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4102 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4105 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4106 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4107 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4108 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4109 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4110 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4111 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4112 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4115 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4116 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4119 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4120 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4121 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4122 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4123 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4124 if self.is_outbound() {
4125 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4129 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4130 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4131 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4132 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4134 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4136 if !self.is_outbound() {
4137 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4138 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4139 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4140 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4141 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4142 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4143 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4144 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4145 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4146 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4153 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4154 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4158 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4159 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4161 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4163 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4164 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4165 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4166 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4167 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4169 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4170 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4171 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4172 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4173 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4174 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4178 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4179 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4182 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4185 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4186 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4187 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4189 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4190 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4191 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4192 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4193 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4199 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4200 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4201 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4204 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4205 let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
4206 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
4207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4209 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4210 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4211 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4212 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4218 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4219 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4220 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4221 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4222 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4223 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4226 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4227 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4228 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4230 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4231 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4234 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4235 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4236 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4239 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4241 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4242 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4243 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4245 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4247 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4249 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4250 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4251 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4252 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4253 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4255 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4256 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4263 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4264 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4265 scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4266 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4269 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4270 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4271 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4272 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4273 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4274 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4275 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4276 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4277 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4278 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4279 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4281 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4282 // return them to fail the payment.
4283 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4284 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4286 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4287 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4292 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4293 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4294 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4295 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4296 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4297 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4298 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4299 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4300 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4301 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4302 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4303 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4304 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4309 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4310 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4311 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4315 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4316 // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4318 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4319 // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4320 // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4321 let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4322 if is_script_too_long {
4326 if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4330 return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4333 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4334 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4336 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4337 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4339 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4341 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4343 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4345 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4346 err_code.write(writer)?;
4348 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4350 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4357 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4358 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4359 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4360 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4361 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4362 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4363 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4368 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4369 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4370 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4371 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4372 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4374 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4375 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4376 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4377 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4383 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4384 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4385 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4386 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4387 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4388 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4393 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4394 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4395 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4396 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4398 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4400 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4401 self.config.write(writer)?;
4403 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4404 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4405 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4407 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4409 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4410 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4411 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4412 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4413 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4414 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4416 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4417 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4419 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4420 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4421 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4423 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4424 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4425 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4426 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4429 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4430 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4431 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4434 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4435 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4436 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4437 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4439 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4440 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4442 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4444 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4446 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4448 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4451 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4453 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4458 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4459 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4460 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4461 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4462 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4463 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4464 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4466 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4468 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4470 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4473 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4475 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4477 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4479 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4481 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4483 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4488 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4489 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4491 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4493 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4494 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4495 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4496 source.write(writer)?;
4497 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4499 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4501 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4502 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4504 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4506 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4507 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4512 match self.resend_order {
4513 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4514 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4517 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4518 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4519 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4521 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4522 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4523 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4524 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4527 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4528 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4529 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4530 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4531 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4534 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4535 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4537 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4538 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4539 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4540 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4542 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4543 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4545 feerate.write(writer)?;
4549 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4552 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4553 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4554 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4556 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4557 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4558 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4559 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4560 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4561 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4562 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4563 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4565 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4568 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4569 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4570 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4572 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4575 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4576 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4578 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4579 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4580 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4582 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4584 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4586 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4588 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4594 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4595 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4596 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4597 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4598 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4600 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4603 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4611 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4612 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4613 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4614 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4615 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4616 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4618 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4620 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4621 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4623 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4624 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4625 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4627 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4628 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4629 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4630 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4631 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4632 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4633 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4634 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4635 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4636 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4637 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4638 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4639 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4640 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4645 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4646 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4647 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4648 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4649 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4650 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4651 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4652 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4653 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4654 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4655 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4656 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4657 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4658 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4659 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4660 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4665 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4666 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4667 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4668 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4669 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4670 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4671 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4672 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4673 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4674 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4676 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4677 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4678 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4680 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4681 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4682 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4684 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4688 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4689 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4690 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4691 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4694 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4695 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4696 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4698 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4699 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4700 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4701 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4704 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4705 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4706 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4707 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4710 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4711 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4713 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4714 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4715 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4716 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4718 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4720 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4721 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4724 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4725 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4726 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4728 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4729 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4730 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4731 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4732 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4733 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4734 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4735 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4737 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4739 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4740 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4741 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4742 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4744 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4747 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4748 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
4750 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4752 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4753 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4755 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4756 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4758 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
4760 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
4762 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4763 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4772 channel_value_satoshis,
4774 latest_monitor_update_id,
4780 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4781 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4784 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4785 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4786 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4790 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4791 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4792 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4793 monitor_pending_forwards,
4794 monitor_pending_failures,
4797 holding_cell_update_fee,
4798 next_holder_htlc_id,
4799 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4800 update_time_counter,
4803 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4804 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4805 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4806 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4808 last_sent_closing_fee,
4810 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4811 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
4814 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4815 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4816 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4817 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4818 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4819 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4820 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4823 counterparty_forwarding_info,
4825 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4826 funding_transaction,
4828 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4829 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4830 counterparty_node_id,
4832 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4836 channel_update_status,
4838 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4839 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4840 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4841 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4848 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4849 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4850 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4851 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4852 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4853 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4854 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4855 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4857 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4858 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
4859 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4860 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4861 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4862 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
4864 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4865 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4866 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
4867 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4868 use util::config::UserConfig;
4869 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4870 use util::test_utils;
4871 use util::logger::Logger;
4872 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4873 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
4874 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4875 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
4876 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4877 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4878 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4881 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4884 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4885 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4891 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4892 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4893 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4897 signer: InMemorySigner,
4899 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4900 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4902 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4903 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4904 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4905 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4906 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4907 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4910 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4911 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4912 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4913 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4916 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4919 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4920 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4921 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
4924 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4925 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4928 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4929 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4931 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4932 let original_fee = 253;
4933 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4934 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4935 let seed = [42; 32];
4936 let network = Network::Testnet;
4937 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4939 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4940 let config = UserConfig::default();
4941 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4943 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4944 // same as the old fee.
4945 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4946 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4947 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4951 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4952 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4953 // dust limits are used.
4954 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4955 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4956 let seed = [42; 32];
4957 let network = Network::Testnet;
4958 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4960 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4961 // they have different dust limits.
4963 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4964 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4965 let config = UserConfig::default();
4966 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4968 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4969 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4970 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4971 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4972 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4974 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4975 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4976 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4977 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4978 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
4980 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4981 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4982 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4984 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4985 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4986 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4987 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4990 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4992 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4993 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4994 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4995 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4996 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4998 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4999 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5003 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5004 // the dust limit check.
5005 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5006 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5007 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5008 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5010 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5011 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5012 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5013 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5014 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5015 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5016 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5020 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5021 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5022 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5023 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5024 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5025 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5026 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5027 let seed = [42; 32];
5028 let network = Network::Testnet;
5029 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5031 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5032 let config = UserConfig::default();
5033 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5035 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5036 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5038 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5039 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5040 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5041 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5042 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5043 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5045 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5046 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5047 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5048 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5049 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5051 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5053 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5054 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5055 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5056 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5057 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5059 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5060 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5061 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5062 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5063 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5067 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5068 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5069 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5070 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5071 let seed = [42; 32];
5072 let network = Network::Testnet;
5073 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5074 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5075 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5077 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5079 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5080 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5081 let config = UserConfig::default();
5082 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5084 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5085 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5086 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5087 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5089 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5090 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5091 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5093 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5094 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5095 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5096 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5098 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5099 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5100 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5102 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5103 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5105 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5106 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5107 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5108 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5109 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5110 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5111 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5112 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5113 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5118 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5120 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5121 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5122 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5123 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5124 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5125 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5126 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5133 fn channel_update() {
5134 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5135 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5136 let seed = [42; 32];
5137 let network = Network::Testnet;
5138 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5139 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5141 // Create a channel.
5142 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5143 let config = UserConfig::default();
5144 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5145 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5146 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5147 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5149 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5150 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5151 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5153 short_channel_id: 0,
5156 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5157 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5158 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5160 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5161 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5163 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5165 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5167 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5168 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5169 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5170 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5172 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5173 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5174 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5176 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5181 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5182 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5183 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5184 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5185 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5187 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5189 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5190 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5191 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5192 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5193 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5195 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5196 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5201 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5202 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5203 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5205 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5206 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5207 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5208 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5209 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5211 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5213 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5214 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5215 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5216 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5217 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5218 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5220 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5221 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5222 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5223 selected_contest_delay: 144
5225 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5226 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5228 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5229 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5231 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5232 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5234 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5235 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5237 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5238 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5239 // build_commitment_transaction.
5240 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5241 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5242 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5243 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5244 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5246 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5247 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5248 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5250 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5251 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5253 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5254 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5258 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5259 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5260 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5261 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5262 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5263 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5265 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5266 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5267 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5268 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5270 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5271 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5272 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5274 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5276 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5277 commitment_tx.clone(),
5278 counterparty_signature,
5279 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5280 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5281 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5283 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5284 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5286 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5287 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5288 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5290 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5291 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5294 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5296 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5297 let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5298 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5299 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5300 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5302 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5305 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5306 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5307 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5311 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5314 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5315 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5317 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5318 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5319 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5320 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5321 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5322 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5323 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5325 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5329 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5330 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5332 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5333 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5334 "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", {});
5336 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5337 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5339 amount_msat: 1000000,
5341 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5342 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5344 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5347 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5348 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5350 amount_msat: 2000000,
5352 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5353 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5355 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5358 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5359 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5361 amount_msat: 2000000,
5363 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5364 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5365 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5367 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5370 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5371 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5373 amount_msat: 3000000,
5375 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5376 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5377 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5379 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5382 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5383 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5385 amount_msat: 4000000,
5387 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5388 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5390 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5394 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5395 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5396 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5398 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5399 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5400 "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", {
5403 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5404 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5405 "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" },
5408 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5409 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5410 "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" },
5413 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5414 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5415 "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" },
5418 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5419 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5420 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5423 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5424 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5425 "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" }
5428 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5429 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5430 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5432 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5433 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5434 "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", {
5437 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5438 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5439 "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" },
5442 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5443 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5444 "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" },
5447 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5448 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5449 "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" },
5452 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5453 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5454 "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" },
5457 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5458 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5459 "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" }
5462 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5463 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5464 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5466 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5467 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5468 "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", {
5471 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5472 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5473 "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" },
5476 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5477 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5478 "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" },
5481 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5482 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5483 "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" },
5486 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5487 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5488 "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" }
5491 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5492 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5493 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5495 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5496 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5497 "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", {
5500 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5501 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5502 "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" },
5505 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5506 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5507 "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" },
5510 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5511 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5512 "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" },
5515 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5516 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5517 "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" }
5520 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5521 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5522 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5524 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5525 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5526 "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", {
5529 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5530 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5531 "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" },
5534 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5535 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5536 "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" },
5539 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5540 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5541 "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" }
5544 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5545 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5546 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5548 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5549 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5550 "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", {
5553 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5554 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5555 "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" },
5558 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5559 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5560 "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" },
5563 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5564 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5565 "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" }
5568 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5569 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5570 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5572 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5573 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5574 "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", {
5577 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5578 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5579 "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" },
5582 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5583 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5584 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5587 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5588 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5589 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5591 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5592 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5593 "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", {
5596 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5597 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5598 "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" },
5601 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5602 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5603 "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" }
5606 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5607 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5608 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5610 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5611 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5612 "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", {
5615 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5616 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5617 "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" }
5620 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5621 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5622 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5624 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5625 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5626 "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", {
5629 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5630 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5631 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5634 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5635 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5636 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5638 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5639 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5640 "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", {});
5642 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5643 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5644 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5646 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5647 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5648 "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", {});
5650 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5651 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5652 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5654 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5655 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5656 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5658 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5659 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5660 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5662 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5663 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5664 "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", {});
5666 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5667 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5668 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5669 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5670 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5671 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5673 amount_msat: 2000000,
5675 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5676 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5678 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5681 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5682 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5683 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5685 amount_msat: 5000000,
5687 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5688 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5689 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5691 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5694 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5695 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5697 amount_msat: 5000000,
5699 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5700 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5701 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5703 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5707 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5708 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5709 "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", {
5712 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5713 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5714 "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" },
5716 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5717 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5718 "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" },
5720 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5721 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5722 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3402000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f014730440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e51101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
5727 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5728 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5730 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5731 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5732 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5733 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5735 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5736 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5737 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5739 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5740 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5742 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5743 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5745 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5746 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5747 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5751 fn test_key_derivation() {
5752 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5753 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5755 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5756 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5758 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5759 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5761 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5762 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5764 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5765 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5767 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5768 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5770 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5771 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5773 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5774 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());